容易受到政治干扰的生意。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的资本密集型业务
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.
我们的BNSF铁路公司和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”），即我们持股90%的公用事业公司，具有与Berkshire其他业务显著不同的重要特征。因此，我们在这封信中特别设立了一个章节讨论它们，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表和利润表中分别列示这两家公司合并的财务数据。这两家重要子公司在去年占据了Berkshire税后经营利润的33%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在使用寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入巨资，并通过大量长期债务进行部分融资，这些债务并不由Berkshire担保。事实上，这些公司的信用状况无需依赖我们，因为即便在极其糟糕的经济环境下，它们的盈利能力也远超其利息支出。例如，在铁路行业表现不佳的去年，BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过6倍。（我们对利息保障倍数的定义是“息税前利润除以利息费用”，而不是市面常用的“EBITDA除以利息”，我们认为后者是一个存在严重缺陷的指标。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
而对于BHE来说，有两个因素确保其在任何情况下都具备偿债能力。第一点是所有公用事业公司所共有的：抗衰退的盈利能力，因为这些公司提供的是需求极为稳定的基本服务。第二点则是其他公用事业公司少有的：收益来源日益多元化，使得BHE不会因某一个监管机构的政策而遭受重大损害。这些多元的利润来源，再加上BHE拥有一个实力雄厚的母公司这一固有优势，使得BHE及其旗下的公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实不仅对我们有利，也惠及我们的客户。
29. Not surprised “if we find good uses” for Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s capital
如果我们找到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的资本的良好用途，我并不感到惊讶。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？
GREGG WARREN: Warren, Berkshire Energy has benefited greatly from operating under the Berkshire umbrella. By not having to pay out 60 to 70 percent of earnings annually as a dividend, the company was able to amass 9 billion in capital the past five years, and closer to 12 billion in the past ten, money that can be allocated to acquisitions and capital spending, especially on renewables.
格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，伯克希尔能源在伯克希尔的庇护下受益匪浅。由于不必每年支付 60%到 70%的收益作为股息，公司在过去五年中积累了 90 亿美元的资本，在过去十年中接近 120 亿美元，这些资金可以用于收购和资本支出，特别是在可再生能源方面。
While tax credits for solar energy don’t run out until next year, we’ve already seen a dramatic reduction in Berkshire Energy’s capital commitment to solar projects. And even though spending on wind generation capacity is projected to be elevated this year and next, it does wind down in 2020 as the wind production tax credits are phased out.
虽然太阳能的税收抵免要到明年才会到期，但我们已经看到伯克希尔能源对太阳能项目的资本承诺大幅减少。尽管预计今年和明年风能发电能力的支出将保持在高位，但随着风能生产税收抵免的逐步取消，这一支出将在 2020 年减少。
Absent a major commitment to additional capital projects, it looks like Berkshire Energy’s expenditures in 2021 will be its lowest since 2012, leaving the firm with more cash on hand than it has had in some time.
在没有重大资本项目的承诺下，伯克希尔能源在 2021 年的支出看起来将是自 2012 年以来的最低水平，这使得该公司手头的现金比一段时间以来都要多。
Do you think it is likely at that point that Berkshire Energy starts funneling some of that cash up to the parent company? Or will it be earmarked for debt reduction, or just be left on the balance sheet as dry powder for acquisitions?
你认为在那时伯克希尔能源会开始将一些现金转移到母公司吗？还是会用于减少债务，或者仅仅留在资产负债表上作为收购的备用资金？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — you’re right about when tax credits phase out and all of that. Although, as you know, they’ve extended that legislation in the past. Who knows exactly what the government’s position will be on incentivizing various forms of alternative energy?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你说得对，关于税收抵免何时逐步取消等等。尽管你知道，他们过去曾延长过那项立法。谁知道政府在激励各种形式的替代能源方面的立场究竟会是什么呢？
But my guess is — I mean, if you take the logical expenditures that may be required in all aspects of the public — like regeneration and the utility business generally — I think there’ll be a lot of money spent.
但我猜——我的意思是，如果你考虑到公共领域可能需要的合理支出——比如再生和公用事业业务一般——我认为会花费很多钱。
And the question is whether we can spend it and get a reasonable return on it. There again, we’ll do what’s logical.
问题是我们是否可以花费它并获得合理的回报。在这里，我们将做出合乎逻辑的决定。
There are three shareholders, basically, of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Berkshire Hathaway itself owns 90 percent of it. And Greg Abel and his family, perhaps, and Walter Scott and, again, family members — own the other 10 percent. And we all have an interest in employing as much capital as we can at good rates.
伯克希尔能源的三个主要股东基本上是：伯克希尔本身拥有90%的股份。格雷格·阿贝尔及其家族，可能还有沃尔特·斯科特及其家族，拥有另外10%的股份。我们都希望尽可能地以良好的回报使用资本。
And we’ll know when it can be done and when it can’t be done. And we’ll do — there’s no tax consequences to Berkshire at all. So — but the three partners will figure out which makes the most sense.
我们会知道什么时候可以做到，什么时候做不到。我们会做出最合适的选择。对伯克希尔没有税收后果。因此——但三个合伙人将决定哪种方式最有意义。
But when you think of what might be done to improve the grid in the U.S. and the fact that we do have the capital, I wouldn’t be surprised if we find good uses for capital in Berkshire Hathaway Energy for a long time in the future.
但是当你考虑到可以采取什么措施来改善美国的电网，以及我们确实拥有资本这一事实时，我不会感到惊讶，如果我们在未来很长一段时间内在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源找到资本的良好用途。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I think there’ll be huge opportunities in Berkshire Energy as far ahead as you can see to deploy capital very intelligently. So I think the chances of a big dividend is approximately zero.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为，在伯克希尔能源方面，将会有巨大的机会来非常聪明地部署资本。 所以我认为大幅分红的可能性接近于零。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve not only got the money to an extent that virtually no utility company does — we’ve also got the talent, too. I mean, we’ve got a very, very talented organization there.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不仅拥有几乎没有公用事业公司能比拟的资金，我们还有人才。我是说，我们那里有一个非常非常有才华的团队。
So it’s a big field and we’ve got shareholders that are capitalists. And we’ve got managers that are terrific. And you would think we’d find something intelligent to do over time in the field.
所以这是一个大领域，我们有资本家的股东。我们有出色的管理者。你会认为我们会随着时间的推移在这个领域找到一些聪明的事情去做。
So far, we have. I mean, we’ve owned it now for close to 20 years. And we’ve deployed a lot of capital and so far, so good. I mean, it’s —
到目前为止，我们已经拥有它将近 20 年了。我们投入了大量资金，到目前为止，一切都很好。我的意思是——
If you look at the improvements that can be made in our utility system in the United States, you’re talking hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions. So — you know, where else but Berkshire would you look for that kind of money? (Laughs)
如果你看看我们在美国的公用事业系统可以做出的改进，你在谈论数百亿，甚至数万亿的美元。因此——你知道，还能去哪里寻找那样的资金呢？（笑声）
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
与BNSF不同，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）对普通股不支付任何股息，这在电力公用事业领域极为罕见。这一近乎苦行僧式的政策，贯穿了我们拥有该公司21年来的始终。与铁路不同，美国的电力行业需要进行大规模的现代化改造，最终所需成本将极为巨大。这项任务将在未来数十年内消耗BHE的全部利润。我们欢迎这一挑战，并相信额外的投资终将获得合理的回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its \$18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
让我向你们介绍一下BHE正在开展的一个项目——该公司计划投入180亿美元，对美国西部地区现有电力传输网络的大部分老旧线路进行升级改造和扩展。BHE于2006年启动该项目，预计将在2030年完成——是的，你没看错，就是2030年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.
可再生能源的兴起，让我们的项目成为社会必需品。从历史上看，长期占主导地位的煤电厂通常靠近人口密集的大城市。但在新能源时代，风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点却往往位于偏远地区。2006年，当BHE对形势进行评估时，很明显，美国西部地区输电线路需要大规模投资改造。然而，当各方算清楚项目成本后，很少有公司或政府机构能有底气站出来承担这个任务。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.
值得一提的是，BHE决定推进该项目，基于其对美国政治、经济和司法体系的充分信任。数十亿美元的资金投入后，才能看到实质的收入回报。这些输电线路需要跨越多个州和不同司法辖区，而每个辖区都有自己的规则和利益群体。此外，BHE还需与数百名土地所有者沟通协调，并与可再生能源发电供应商以及远距离输送电力的公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。利益冲突方、旧秩序的捍卫者，以及渴望一夜之间改变世界的空想家，都必须逐步赢得认同。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.
在这一过程中，遭遇各种意外和拖延几乎是必然的。但同样确定的是，BHE拥有实现承诺所需的管理人才、机构承诺以及财务能力。尽管我们的西部输电项目距离最终竣工尚需多年，但如今我们已经开始寻找其他规模相似的项目以继续推进。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
无论前方还有多少障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领先者。
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
去年，我们遭遇的第二个、且更为严重的盈利失望发生在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）。其大部分电力公用事业以及庞大的天然气管网的表现大体符合预期，但少数州的监管环境却带来了零盈利甚至破产的阴影（加州最大的公用事业公司已出现此状况，夏威夷目前亦面临该威胁）。在这些司法管辖区里，预测利润和资产价值都十分困难，而电力公用事业曾被视为全美最稳定的行业之一。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（有时因卓越表现可获小幅奖励）筹集巨额资金，以支撑其扩张。凭借这种模式，企业得以提前进行大规模投资，以满足数年后可能出现的需求。这种前瞻性监管体现了公用事业建设发电与输电资产通常需要多年才能完工的现实。BHE 在美国西部跨多州的输电巨型工程始于 2006 年，目前距完工尚需数年；最终，该线路将服务于占美国本土面积 30%、横跨 10 个州的广大地区。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory- return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
在私营和公营电力系统均采取这一模式的情况下，即便人口增长或工业需求超出预期，电网依旧稳定运行。这种“安全边际”方法在监管者、投资者和公众看来皆属理性。然而，如今少数州已打破这一“固定且合理回报”的契约，投资者担心此局面会蔓延。气候变化令忧虑加剧——地下输电或成必需，但在几十年前，谁愿意承担其惊人的建设成本？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已对已发生损失作出最佳估算。这些损失源于森林火灾；若对流风暴愈发频繁，其发生频率与强度均将继续上升。
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
要想了解 BHE 因森林火灾造成的最终损失，并据此理性决定未来是否在西部易受灾州继续投资，还需要很多年时间。目前尚不清楚其他地区的监管环境是否会发生变化。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司或将遭遇与太平洋煤电公司及夏威夷电力公司类似的生存困境。如果现有问题以“没收式”结局收场，对 BHE 显然不利，但 BHE 与伯克希尔本身的架构都足以承受突发冲击。我们的保险业务经常面对此类意外——其核心产品本就是承担风险——其他领域亦难免发生。伯克希尔能承受财务冲击，却不会明知无望仍继续砸钱。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔如何，电力行业的最终局面或许令人担忧：部分公用事业公司可能再无法吸引美国民众的储蓄，被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 20 世纪 30 年代便已作此选择，全国也有众多公共电力机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们偏好的模式。
在 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条时期，内布拉斯加州决定 全面放弃以股东盈利为目的的私营电力公司（private-power systems），转而由公共机构或非营利合作社来拥有和运营电力系统，即采纳 public-power model。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当尘埃落定时，美国对电力的需求及其引发的资本支出将达到惊人规模。我当初既未预见、更未考虑监管回报的不利变化，与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两位合作伙伴一样，这一忽视让我付出了昂贵的代价。