Unconventional Commitments
非常规投入
When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality. Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price. Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments, we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.
当我们找不到最心仪的配置对象——一家经营良好、定价合理且具备优异经济属性的企业——我们通常会把新增资金放在最高质量的超短期工具上。不过有时，我们也会尝试其他方向。显然，我们相信这些“替代性投入”更有可能盈利而非亏损。但我们同样明白，它们无法像以吸引人价格买到的优秀企业那样，提供几乎确定的收益。遇到那类机会，我们知道一定会赚钱——只是时间问题。做替代性投资时，我们“认为”会赚钱，但也清楚有时会遭受亏损，且偶尔幅度还不小。
We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95. Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no opinion as to its attractiveness.
年末我们持有三项非传统头寸。第一项是 14.0 million barrels 的原油衍生品合约，这是我们在 1994–95 年建立的 45.7 million barrels 头寸的剩余部分。1995–97 年间我们结清了 31.7 million barrels 的合约，获得了约 $61.9 million 的税前收益。剩余合约将于 1998 与 1999 年到期。到年末，这部分未实现收益为 $11.6 million。会计准则要求大宗商品头寸按市价计量，因此我们的年度与季度报表都会反映这些合约的未实现盈亏。我们建立头寸时，远期交割的原油看起来略有低估。至于今天是否具有吸引力，我们并无观点。
Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.
第二项非常规投入是白银。去年我们买入了 111.2 million ounces。按市价计量，该头寸在 1997 年为我们带来 $97.4 million 的税前收益。某种意义上，这对我来说是回到过去：三十年前，我因为预期 U.S. Government 将使白银去货币化而买入过白银。此后我一直关注这种金属的基本面，但并未持有。在近几年，金银库存明显下降，去年夏天我与 Charlie 判断，供需达到均衡需要更高的价格。需要说明的是，通胀预期并未纳入我们对白银价值的计算。
Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6 billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros. Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in yearend book value.
最后一项、也是年末规模最大的非传统头寸，是按摊余成本计 $4.6 billion 的 U.S. Treasury 长期零息债券。这类证券不支付利息，而是通过买入折价为持有人带来回报；这一特性也使其在利率变动时价格波动极快。利率上行，持有零息债会遭受重挫；利率下行，则可能获得超额收益。由于 1997 年利率下行，我们所持零息债录得 $598.8 million 的未实现税前收益。由于这些证券按市价列账，该收益已反映在年末的账面价值中。
In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful. However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.
选择买入零息债而非停留在类现金资产上，我们冒着“看起来很愚蠢”的风险：这种基于宏观判断的投入，成功概率绝不可能接近 100%。不过，你们付钱给我和 Charlie，是让我们尽最大判断之责——而不是为了避免难堪——因此当我们认为胜率在我们这边时，偶尔会做出非常规之举。若我们失手了，请尽量宽容一些。我们会与你们一道“感同身受”，就像 President Clinton 所说那样：Munger 家族超过 90% 的净资产在 Berkshire，而 Buffett 家族超过 99% 在 Berkshire。
48. Why Buffett bought silver
巴菲特为何购买白银
WARREN BUFFETT: We’d better go to zone 4, I think. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们还是到第4区吧。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, or afternoon, actually. My name’s Matt Schwab. I’m from New York. Pound Ridge, New York.
观众提问者： 早上好，或者说下午好。我叫马特·施瓦布，来自纽约庞德里奇。
I actually had a question about the silver purchase last year. When you announced it, you said that you believed that supply and demand fundamentals would only be established at a higher price — re-established at a higher price.
我想问一下去年购买白银的事情。当时您宣布这一消息时说，您认为供需基本面只能在更高的价格上重新建立平衡。
I was just wondering if you could go into more detail about what some of those fundamentals are. I mean, we’ve read a lot about, like, battery technology and some other things.
我想知道，您能否详细说明这些基本面是什么？我们看到过一些关于电池技术等方面的报道。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have no inside information about great new uses for silver or anything of the sort. But the situation — and you can get these figures and they’re not precise, but I think they’re in general — they’re generally accurate.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们并没有关于白银的新用途或类似信息的内幕消息。但情况是这样的——你可以查到这些数字，尽管它们并不精确，但总体来说应该是大致准确的。
You can see from looking at the numbers that aggregate demand, primarily from photography, from industrial uses, and from ornamental jewelry-type uses, is close. Call it 800 million-plus ounces a year.
从数据中可以看出，总需求主要来自摄影、工业用途以及装饰性珠宝用途，总量接近每年超过8亿盎司。
And there are 500 million or so ounces being produced of silver, annually, although there will be more coming on in the next couple of years. There’s more coming on right now.
每年大约有5亿盎司的白银被开采出来，尽管在接下来的几年里产量会有所增加。目前的确有更多白银产出。
However, most of that silver is produced as a byproduct in the mining of gold or copper and lead zinc, so that since it’s a byproduct, it’s not responsive to — not very responsive to price changes, because obviously, if you’ve got a copper mine and you get a little silver out of it, you’re much more interested in the price of copper than silver.
然而，大部分白银是金矿、铜矿或铅锌矿开采中的副产品，因此作为副产品，它对价格变化的反应并不大。显然，如果你经营一个铜矿，并从中获得少量白银，你更关心的是铜价而不是银价。
So you have 500 million ounces or so of mine production, and you have 150 million ounces or so of reclaimed silver, a large part of which relates to the uses in photography.
因此，你有约5亿盎司的矿产白银，还有约1.5亿盎司的回收白银，其中很大一部分来自摄影用途。
So there’s been a gap in recent years of perhaps 150 million ounces — but none of these figures are precise — which has been filled by an inventory of bullion above ground, which may have been a billion-two, or more, ounces a few years back, but which has been depleted.
最近几年，存在约1.5亿盎司的缺口——虽然这些数字并不精确——这个缺口是通过消耗地面上的白银库存来填补的。几年前库存可能有12亿盎司或更多，但现在已经被大量消耗。
And no one knows the exact figures on this, but there’s no question that the bullion inventory has been depleted significantly.
虽然没有人确切知道这些数字，但毫无疑问白银库存已经显著减少。
Which means that the present price for silver does not produce an equilibrium between supply, as measured by newly-mined silver plus reclaimed silver, and usage.
这意味着，当前的白银价格不足以使新开采和回收的白银与需求之间达到平衡。
And that — eventually something will happen to change that picture. Now, it could be reduced usage, it could be increased supply, or it could be a change in price.
最终，会有一些事情发生以改变这种局面。这可能是需求减少、供应增加，或者价格变化。
And that imbalance is sufficiently large, even though there is some new production coming on, and there’s the threat of digital imaging that will reduce silver usage, perhaps, in the future in photography.
这种不平衡已经足够大，尽管有一些新的产量正在增加，同时数字成像技术可能会在未来减少摄影领域对白银的需求。
But we think that that gap is wide enough so that it will continue to deplete inventories — bullion inventories — to the point where a new price is needed to establish equilibrium.
但我们认为，这种缺口足够大，以至于库存——特别是白银库存——会继续减少，直至需要一个新价格来建立供需平衡。
And because of the byproduct nature, which makes the supply inelastic, and because of the nature of demand, which is relatively inelastic, that — we don’t think that that price change would necessarily be minor.
由于白银作为副产品的特性导致供应缺乏弹性，加上需求的相对刚性，我们认为价格的变化可能不会是微小的。
It’s interesting, because silver has been artificially influenced for a long time. You saw that movie about — you know, it was William Jennings Bryan, who was editor of The Omaha World-Herald and a congressman from Nebraska — and his brother was governor of Nebraska — who was the big silver man.
这很有趣，因为白银长期以来受到人为干预。你可能听说过那部电影——威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩，他曾是《奥马哈世界先驱报》的编辑，也是一位来自内布拉斯加州的国会议员——他的兄弟是内布拉斯加州的州长——他是白银的重要支持者。
And they used to talk 16-to-1. The 16-to-1 ratio, I think, goes back to Isaac Newton, when he was master of the mint. Charlie will know all about that, because he’s our Newtonian expert here. But that ratio had kind of a mystical significance for a while. Didn’t really mean anything.
他们过去常谈到16比1的比例。这个16比1的比例，我认为可以追溯到艾萨克·牛顿担任铸币局局长时。查理对此一定很熟悉，因为他是我们这里的牛顿专家。但这一比例在一段时间内具有某种神秘意义，实际上并没有实际意义。
And in 1934, the government passed an act called The Silver Purchase Act of, surprisingly, 1934, which set an artificially high price for silver at that time, when production and usage was much less.
1934年，美国政府通过了一项名为《1934年白银购买法案》的法律，在那时设定了一个人为的高银价，而当时的白银产量和使用量都少得多。
And the government, U.S. government, ended up accumulating two billion ounces of silver. Now, this was at a time when demand was a couple hundred million ounces a year, so you’re talking ten years’ supply.
美国政府最终积累了20亿盎司的白银。当时的年需求量仅为几亿盎司，所以这相当于10年的供应量。
So there was an artificially high price for a while. By the early 1960s, that became an artificially low price of $1.29, and at that time I could see the inventories of the U.S. government being depleted, somewhat akin to what inventories are being depleted now.
因此，白银价格曾一度被人为地抬高。到了20世纪60年代初，这变成了每盎司1.29美元的人为低价，那时我可以看到美国政府的白银库存正在减少，有点类似于现在库存减少的情景。
And despite the fact that Lyndon Johnson and the administration said they would not demonetize silver, they did demonetize it, and silver went up substantially. That was the last purpose we had of silver, but I’ve kept track of the figures ever since.
尽管林登·约翰逊政府声称不会废除银本位，但他们确实这样做了，白银价格大幅上涨。这是我们对白银最后的关注目的，但自那时起我一直在关注这些数据。
The Hunt brothers caused a great amount of silver to be converted into bullion form, including a lot of silver coins. So they, again, increased the supply in a very big way by their action in pushing the price way up to the point where people started melting it down.
亨特兄弟的行为导致大量白银被转化为银条形式，包括许多银币。他们通过将价格推高到让人们开始熔化银币的程度，再次大幅增加了白银的供应量。
So you had this — dislocations in silver over a 60-plus year period, which has caused the price to be affected by these huge inventory accumulations and reductions.
因此，在过去的60多年里，白银市场经历了这种错位，价格受到库存大量积累和减少的影响。
And we think right now that — or we thought last summer when we started buying it — that the price we bought it, that that was not an equilibrium price, and that sooner or later — and we didn’t think it was imminent, because we don’t wait till things are imminent.
我们认为，现在或者去年夏天当我们开始购买时，我们买入的价格不是一个均衡价格。迟早——我们并不认为会很快发生，因为我们不会等到事情迫在眉睫才行动。
You know, we were going to buy a lot of silver. We didn’t want to buy so much as to really disrupt the market, however. We had no intention of replaying any Hunt scenario. So we wanted to be sure we didn’t buy that much silver. But we liked it.
我们确实计划购买大量白银。然而，我们不想买到破坏市场的程度。我们没有意图重演亨特兄弟的剧本。所以我们确保不会买那么多白银。但我们喜欢它。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think this whole episode will have about as much impact on Berkshire Hathaway’s future as Warren’s bridge playing. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为这整个事件对白银市场的影响，就像沃伦打桥牌对于伯克希尔哈撒韦未来的影响一样。（笑声）
You’ve got a line of activity where once every 30 or 40 years you can do something employing 2 percent of assets. This is not a big deal for —
你有一项活动，可能每30或40年才能利用2%的资产做一次。这对伯克希尔来说并不是什么大事——
WARREN BUFFETT: No.
沃伦·巴菲特： 确实不是什么大事。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — Berkshire. The fact that it keeps Warren amused and — (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 伯克希尔的确如此。不过，这让沃伦感到有趣——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I do like —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我确实喜欢——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — and not doing counterproductive things — (Laughter)
查理·芒格： ——并且避免做出适得其反的事情——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It makes me feel good about — it makes me feel better about all those pictures that people take over the weekend. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这让我觉得——让我对人们周末拍的所有照片感觉更好。（笑声）
They all use a little bit of silver. (Laughter)
这些照片都用了一点点银。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: At least it shows something that teaches an interesting lesson. Think of the discipline it takes to think about something for three or four decades, waiting for a chance to employ — (laughter) — 2 percent of your assets.
查理·芒格： 至少这说明了一件有趣的事情。想想需要怎样的自律，才能思考一个问题三四十年，等待一个机会来动用——（笑声）——2%的资产。
I’m afraid that’s the way we are. (Laughter)
恐怕这就是我们的风格。（笑声）
It means there’ll be some dull stretches.
这意味着会有一些枯燥的时光。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right. Yeah, it’s less than a billion dollars in silver. It’s $15 billion in Coke. You know, it’s a —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，白银的投资不到10亿美元，可口可乐是150亿美元。你知道，这——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a non-event.
查理·芒格： 这不算一件大事。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s 5 billion in American Express. I mean it is close to a non-event, but if you see it there — you know?
沃伦·巴菲特： 在美国运通的投资是50亿美元。我是说，这几乎算不上什么大事，但如果你看到机会在那里——你懂的？
CHARLIE MUNGER: At least it shows the human personality at work. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 至少这体现了人性的作用。（笑声）
Very peculiar personality, I might add. (Laughter)
顺便说一句，是非常特殊的人性。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Reinforced by a partner.
沃伦·巴菲特： 并且有一个搭档加强了这种特点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的。（笑声）