41. Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming
派拉蒙全球在流媒体领域面临激烈竞争
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?
沃伦·巴菲特:好的,贝基?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Barry Laffer in New York City. "Berkshire owns about 94 million shares of Paramount Global as of the last published data. This asset-rich company has disappointed on recent quarterly earnings reports, and just this week slashed its dividend by 80%.
贝基·奎克:这个问题来自纽约市的巴里·拉弗。“根据最新发布的数据,伯克希尔拥有大约 9400 万股派拉蒙全球的股份。这个资产丰富的公司在最近的季度财报中令人失望,并且就在本周将其股息削减了 80%。”
"How do you see the streaming wars evolving? And do you still have conviction in your investment thesis? Is your investment thesis based on the company being an acquisition target, or based on its fundamentals?"
你如何看待流媒体战争的发展?你对你的投资论点仍然有信心吗?你的投资论点是基于公司成为收购目标,还是基于其基本面?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And how would you like to manage my money for nothing? (LAUGH) They, you know, we are not in the business of giving stock advice to people. And people who don't know anything about stocks can make a lot of money doing that, and we don't think it's something we should give away.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。你想怎么免费管理我的钱?(笑)你知道,我们并不是给人们提供股票建议的行业。那些对股票一无所知的人也能通过这样做赚很多钱,我们认为这不是我们应该免费提供的东西。
But I will say this, it's not good news when any company passes its dividend or cuts its dividend dramatically.
但我会说,当任何公司暂停分红或大幅削减分红时,这不是好消息。
And the streaming business is extremely interesting to watch, because there's, people love to use their iPhones, watching, being entertained on a screen in front of them, or a phone, or whatever it may be.
流媒体业务非常有趣,因为人们喜欢使用他们的 iPhone,在他们面前的屏幕上或手机上观看和娱乐,无论是什么设备。
But there's a lot of companies doing it. And you need fewer companies, or you need higher prices. And, well, you need higher prices, or it doesn't work. And you don't lock in people when you get them to join up for the streaming period when your serial runs.
但有很多公司在做这个。你需要更少的公司,或者需要更高的价格。嗯,你需要更高的价格,否则它就行不通。而且,当你的节目播出时,你不能让人们在流媒体期间固定下来。
I mean, you know, you keep them on for a while, but you get them for, like, a month. And we'll see what happens. I mean, I had a gasoline station when I was 21 or 22, and it's about three or four, four or five miles from here. And we had one competitor.
我意思是,你知道,你保持它们一段时间,但你得到它们大约一个月。我们看看会发生什么。我是说,我在 21 或 22 岁时有一个加油站,离这里大约三到四、四到五英里。我们只有一个竞争对手。
And he determined our profit, because we looked at his price every day. And if we cut the price he'd match it, and we couldn't raise the price. And he did twice the gallonage, so he won. And there's just basic business problems that you see with certain industries that you don't see with the other.
他决定了我们的利润,因为我们每天都查看他的价格。如果我们降价,他就会跟着降,而我们无法提高价格。他的销量是我们的两倍,所以他赢了。在某些行业中,你会看到一些基本的商业问题,而在其他行业中则看不到。
Disney was unique in its animated — what it offered, you know — in the '30s and '40s. And they wrote the stuff off at the first showing, and then they rejuvenated Snow White and all these other people every seven years, and that was fine.
迪士尼在其动画方面是独一无二的——你知道的——在 30 年代和 40 年代。他们在第一次放映时就将这些作品注销,然后每七年就重新制作《白雪公主》和其他这些角色,这样做很好。
现在罗永浩、董宇辉、小杨哥能不能做到用1年停2年?2年以后再接着用,如果能做到就能够实现平台利益的最大化。
But this is a different world. And the eyeballs aren't going to increase dramatically in the time they can spend is not going to increase dramatically. And you've got a bunch of companies that don't want to quit. And who knows what pricing does under that. But anybody who tells you that they know what pricing will do in the future is kidding themselves.
但这是一个不同的世界。用户的注意力不会大幅增加,他们能花费的时间也不会大幅增加。而且你有一堆不想退出的公司。谁知道在这种情况下定价会怎样。但任何告诉你他们知道未来定价会怎样的人都是在自欺欺人。
Charlie? Charlie's had a lot of experience, incidentally, with Hollywood. I mean, he used to, before I even met him —
查理?顺便说一下,查理在好莱坞有很多经验。我的意思是,在我甚至见到他之前——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the movie business is one tough business.
查理·芒格:我认为电影行业是一个艰难的行业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特:是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That's my view.
查理·芒格:这是我的看法。
WARREN BUFFETT: The talent will make the money; the agents will make the money. And if you've got a theater, you know, the theaters are now doing 70% of the business that they did before the pandemic. And big hits, you know, have enormous grosses. But you can't reduce the supply.
沃伦·巴菲特:人才会赚钱;经纪人会赚钱。如果你有一个剧院,你知道,剧院现在的营业额是疫情前的 70%。而大热剧目,知道的,票房收入巨大。但你无法减少供应。
People have only got so many hours in the day. They've only got two eyeballs. And they've got more choice than ever before, and they've got stuff that's cheaper that offers them the same experience. And some of them like the experience, you know, particularly with the big hits of going.
人们一天只有那么多小时。他们只有两个眼球。而且他们的选择比以往任何时候都多,还有一些更便宜的东西能提供相同的体验。有些人喜欢这种体验,尤其是那些热门的东西。
But it isn't like you can double the number of people or double the eyeballs or anything like that. And you've got a lot of people. The talent will always get paid. And when you essentially are packaging that talent one way or another, and you need to get higher prices, and you've got a lot of strong companies who don't want to quit, that's an interesting equation.
但并不是说你可以将人数翻倍或增加关注度之类的。你有很多人。人才总是会得到报酬。当你以某种方式打包这些人才,并且需要提高价格时,而你又有很多不想退出的强大公司,这就是一个有趣的方程式。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And if you think the movies are tough, try to invest in a New York show on a conventional stage. There they think it's a breach of faith in that business to let the person who put up the money to ever get any money back. (LAUGHTER)
查理·芒格:如果你觉得电影行业很艰难,那就试试在纽约的传统舞台上投资一场演出。在那里,他们认为让出资人拿回任何钱都是对这个行业的背叛。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, well, Charlie saw a lot of that actually when —
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。是的,查理实际上看到过很多这一点,当——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don't like those businesses.
查理·芒格:是的。我不喜欢那些生意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what happened on "Cleopatra, Charlie." (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特:告诉他们“ Cleopatra,查理”发生了什么。(笑声)
It, no, it's a business that everybody's tempted. They love the idea of going in it, you know, and they get a certain amount of psychic income. But —
这,没错,这是一项让每个人都心动的生意。他们喜欢参与其中的想法,你知道,他们会获得一定的心理收益。但是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I never owned any racehorses, either.
查理·芒格:我从来没有拥有过任何赛马。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my father-in-law and I used to talk about claiming a horse at AK-SAR-BEN, but we never quite got around to it. And we had a lot of fun going to the track together. (LAUGH)
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我岳父和我曾经讨论过在AK-SAR-BEN(阿克萨本)赛马场认领一匹马,但我们从未真正实现过。我们一起去赛马场玩得很开心。(笑)
So we are experimenting, and we’ll continue to experiment, on something like small commercial, workers’ comp, whatever it may be. We’ll try and figure out ways to take cost out of the system, offer the customer an equivalent product or better at lesser price, and we’ll find out what can be done and what can’t be done.
所以我们正在试验,我们将继续试验,比如小型商业、工人赔偿,无论它可能是什么。我们将尝试找出如何从系统中削减成本,以较低的价格向客户提供同等或更好的产品,我们将找出能做什么和不能做什么。
And we’re not the only ones doing it, as you know. But we are not going — we’ve got some managers that are going to be quite, I’m sure, enterprising on that. And we back them. And we expect some to fail and some — and if a few succeed — we’ll have some very good businesses. And the world is going in that direction. So — you could expect us to try and go with it.
Charlie?
而且我们不是唯一这样做的人,正如你所知。但我们不会——我们有一些管理者将会非常,我肯定,有进取心。我们支持他们。我们预计一些会失败,一些——如果一些成功——我们将拥有一些非常好的业务。如果世界正朝着那个方向发展,所以——你可以期待我们尝试跟随它。
查理?
平常心能避免噪音的干扰,最终保证了自我更新的能力,what can be done and what can’t be done.(能做什么和不能做什么)。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if it were easy, I think it would’ve happened more fast —
查理·芒格:如果容易的话,我想事情会发展得更快。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah — 是的
CHARLIE MUNGER: — than it has.
查理·芒格:--比它有。
WARREN BUFFETT: It will happen as we go along. I mean, it wasn’t easy in auto, I mean, when you think about it.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们会继续前进的。我是说,汽车行业并不容易,我是说,你想想看。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it wasn’t.
查理·芒格:不,没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. I mean, it was a system with all kinds of extra costs that go back to the turn of the 19th century into the 20th. I mean, it was built on fire insurance and strong general agencies. And that slopped over into auto when the auto came along in 1903 from Ford or whenever. And — so it grew within a system that really wasn’t very efficient compared to what was available.
沃伦·巴菲特:不,我的意思是,这是一个充满了各种额外成本的系统,这些成本可以追溯到19世纪末到20世纪初。我的意思是,它是建立在火灾保险和强大的总代理之上的。当1903年福特汽车出现或无论何时汽车出现时,它就渗透到了汽车领域。因此,它在一个与原有系统相比并不高效的系统中发展。
But it took State Farm initially to go to a direct, or a captive agency system. And then it took USAA, and then later, GEICO, and then later, Progressive, to go to direct systems that are even more efficient and consumer-friendly.
但最初是State Farm采取了直接的,或者说是专属代理系统的模式,然后是美国军队互助协会(USAA),再后来是GEICO,再后来是Progressive,它们都转向了更高效、更友好的直接系统。
And the same thing is going to happen, to some degree, in all kinds of industries, and certainly small commercial — somebody will —
同样的事情在各种行业中都会在某种程度上发生,当然在小型商业领域——有人会——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It could happen, but it will be slow.
查理·芒格:有可能,但进展缓慢。
WARREN BUFFETT: It takes an amazingly long time. I mean, it — but you know, the battle doesn’t always go to the strong and the race to the swift. But that’s the way to bet, you know, as they say. So — (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特:这需要很长的时间。我的意思是,但你知道,战斗并不总是属于强者,赛跑并不总是属于速度快的。但这就是赌注,你知道的,就像他们说的那样。所以
起源于火灾的互助基金(人类集体抵抗资产风险的模式),“extra costs”可能是指形形式式的人,每个人的风险不一样,把这些人集合起来充满有种变数,变数即成本。
30. No single formula for regulatory impact on businesses
对企业监管影响没有单一公式
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11?
沃伦·巴菲特:第 11 号?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. It’s James Tarkenton of Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员:下午好。我是来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆的詹姆斯·塔肯顿。
Current examples, including discussion of media ownership rules, FCC regulation of the telecom industry, and proposed oversight changes for mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are all examples of the legislative, regulatory, and lobbying process as an influence in shaping and reshaping economic moats.
目前的例子,包括对媒体所有权规则的讨论、FCC对电信行业的监管,以及对抵押贷款巨头房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)拟议的监管变更,都是立法、监管和游说过程影响经济护城河形成与重塑的例子。
We would be interested in your comments on these and other examples of how competitive advantages are shaped by government.
我们想听听您对此以及其他如何通过政府影响竞争优势的看法。
In general, how do you incorporate the impact of regulation on the size and ferocity of economic moats for various businesses?
一般来说,您如何将法规对各种企业经济护城河的规模和强度的影响纳入考虑?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that varies enormously by the business. I mean, there’re some businesses that we think that it’s not a very big factor, and there’s other businesses we’re in — the energy business, the insurance business — where regulatory change could have a huge impact.
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这在很大程度上取决于业务类型。我的意思是,有些业务我们认为这不是一个很大的因素,而我们所处的其他业务——能源业务、保险业务——监管变化可能会产生巨大影响。
You know, we don’t have any one-size-fits-all type arrangement. We just try to think intelligently about any business we’re in. And if it’s — when we bought GEICO in 1995, or bought that last half of it or whichever year it was, the question, you know, whether the regulatory climate would change in some major way, you nationalize auto-insurance — well, all of those things go through our mind and we evaluate them.
你知道,我们没有任何一刀切的安排。我们只是试图对我们所从事的任何业务进行明智的思考。而且,如果是——当我们在 1995 年购买 GEICO,或者购买了最后一半,不管是哪一年,问题是,监管环境是否会以某种重大方式改变,你将汽车保险国有化——所有这些事情都会在我们脑海中闪过,我们会对它们进行评估。
But there is no — there’s no formula. You know, if we’re — if we’re in furniture retailing, you know, that is not something we’re going to worry about. We’re going to worry about plenty of things, in terms of competition, but there are different variables that apply with different intensity to each business we’re in. And it’s up to Charlie and me to try and think about any of the variables that might hit those businesses, and to weigh them appropriately, and to crank that into our evaluation.
但是没有——没有公式。你知道,如果我们在家具零售业,你知道,那不是我们要担心的事情。我们会担心很多事情,关于竞争方面,但不同的变量以不同的强度适用于我们所从事的每个业务。查理和我需要努力思考可能影响这些业务的任何变量,并适当地权衡它们,并将其纳入我们的评估中。
Charlie? 查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it would be fair to say that in our early days, we tended to overestimate the difficulties from regulation. We refrained from buying television station stocks for a long, long time because it seemed like such a peculiar asset when anybody could just ask to have your license jerked away from you each year and they could ask a government agency to do it. And — but it turned out, the way the system evolved, that almost never happened.
查理·芒格:我认为可以公平地说,在我们早期的时候,我们往往高估了监管带来的困难。我们很长一段时间都没有购买电视台的股票,因为这似乎是一种非常特殊的资产,任何人都可以每年要求吊销你的执照,他们可以要求政府机构这样做。但是,事实证明,随着系统的发展,这种情况几乎从未发生过。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Tom Murphy figured that one out before we did. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,汤姆·墨菲比我们更早发现了这一点。(笑)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we had it — we were slow on the learning curve. Murphy was way better at it than we were.
查理·芒格:是的,我们在学习曲线上进展缓慢。墨菲在这方面比我们好得多。