I.H.45.Warren Buffett.Tech Field

科技行业的变化起伏是机会也是风险，但总体上是风险，很大程度上缺少长期确定性的基础。

1、《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

17. We don’t know how to value Intel and Microsoft

我们不知道如何评估英特尔和微软

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第十一区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, I would like to thank you again for issuing the Class B shares.

观众：是的，巴菲特先生，我再次感谢您发行了B类股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, I’m glad we did, and I hope you own them.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）我很高兴我们这么做了，我希望您拥有这些股票。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a Class B shareholder.

观众：我是一名B类股股东。

I need your comment on some analysis that we did. If someone uses your investment philosophy of building a highly concentrated portfolio of six to eight stocks, and adopts your buy-and-holding principle so that the max of compounding and no tax works for you, but however, with one major modification: invest in high-octane companies like Intel and Microsoft that are growing at 30 percent, instead of typical 15 percent growth company in your portfolio.

我们进行了一些分析。如果有人采用您的投资哲学，建立一个高度集中的投资组合，包含6到8只股票，并采用您的长期持有原则，这样可以最大化复利效应且免于缴税，但有一个主要修改：投资于像英特尔和微软这样的高增长公司，它们的增长率是30%，而不是您投资组合中典型的15%的增长公司。

My question is, will this investment philosophy translate into twice the shareholder return as you have historically provided to your shareholders?

我的问题是，这种投资哲学是否会转化为您历史上为股东提供回报的两倍？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it will certainly work out to twice the return if Intel and Microsoft do twice as well as Coke and Gillette. I mean, it’s a question of being able to identify businesses that you understand and feel very certain about.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果英特尔和微软的表现是可口可乐和吉列的两倍，那么回报肯定也会是两倍。这主要取决于是否能够识别出您理解并非常确信的业务。

And if you understand those businesses, and many people do, but Charlie and I don’t, you have the opportunity to evaluate them. And if you decide they’re fairly priced and they have marvelous prospects, you’re going to do very well.

如果您理解这些业务，很多人确实理解，但查理和我不理解，那么您就有机会去评估它们。如果您认为它们的价格合理且前景光明，那么您会表现得非常出色。

But there’s a whole group of companies, a very large group of companies, that Charlie and I just don’t know how to value. And that doesn’t bother us. I mean, you know, we don’t know what — we don’t know how to figure out what cocoa beans are going to do, or the Russian ruble, or I mean, there’s all kinds of financial instruments that we just don’t feel we have the knowledge to evaluate.

但是，有一大类公司，确实是很大的一类公司，查理和我不知道该如何评估。而这并不会困扰我们。我的意思是，比如我们不知道可可豆的价格走势，也不知道俄罗斯卢布会如何表现，还有各种各样的金融工具，我们觉得自己没有足够的知识去评估它们。

And really, you know, it might be a little too much to expect that somebody would understand every business in the world.

确实，期望有人能够理解全世界的每一个行业可能有点过分。

And we find some that are much harder for us to understand. And when I say understand, my idea of understanding a business is that you’ve got a pretty good idea where it’s going to be in ten years. And I just can’t get that conviction with a lot of businesses, whereas I can get it with relatively few. But I only need a few. As you’ve pointed out, you only need a few, six or eight or something like that.

我们发现有些行业对我们来说非常难以理解。而我所说的“理解”是指你对一个企业十年后的状况有一个相当清晰的预判。而对于很多企业，我无法得到这种信心，而对于少数企业，我可以。但我只需要少数几个企业。正如你提到的，你只需要少数几个，比如六到八个这样的企业。

It would be better for you — it certainly would have been better for you — if we had the insights about what we regard as the somewhat more complicated businesses you describe, because there was and may still be a chance to make a whole lot more money if those growth rates that you describe are maintained.

如果我们对你所描述的那些稍微复杂一些的企业有更多的洞察力，这对你来说会更好——肯定会更好。因为如果这些增长率能够保持，那么确实有机会赚到更多的钱，现在可能仍然有这样的机会。

But I don’t think they’re — I don’t think you’ll find better managers than Andy Grove at Intel and Bill Gates at Microsoft. And they certainly seem to have fantastic positions in the businesses they’re in.

但我不认为——我不认为你能找到比英特尔的安迪·格罗夫（Andy Grove）和微软的比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）更优秀的管理者。而且他们似乎确实在各自的领域中占据了极好的位置。

But I don’t know enough about those businesses to be as sure that those positions are fantastic as I am about being sure that Gillette and Coca-Cola’s businesses are fantastic.

但对于这些企业，我并没有足够的了解，无法像确信吉列和可口可乐的业务一样，确信它们的地位是如此的出色。

You may understand those businesses better than you understand Coke and Gillette because of your background or just the way your mind is wired. But I don’t, and therefore I have to stick with what I really think I can understand. And if there’s more money to be made elsewhere, I think the people that make it are entitled to it.

由于你的背景或思维方式，你可能比了解可口可乐和吉列更了解那些企业。但我不是，因此我必须坚持投资我真正认为可以理解的业务。如果其他地方可以赚更多的钱，我认为那些赚到钱的人是应得的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you take a business like Intel, there are limitations under the laws of physics which eventually stop your putting more transistors on a single chip. And the 30 percent per annum, or something like that, you — I don’t think — those limitations are still a good distance away, but they’re not any infinite distance away.

查理·芒格：以英特尔这样的公司为例，物理定律设定了一些限制，这些限制最终会阻止你在单个芯片上放置更多的晶体管。至于30%的年增长率之类的情况，我认为——这些限制还比较遥远，但并不是无限遥远的。

That means that Intel has to leverage its current leadership into new activities, just as IBM leveraged the Hollerith machine into the computer. Predicting whether somebody’s going to be able to do that in advance is just — it’s too tough for us.

这意味着英特尔必须将其当前的领先地位扩展到新的活动中，就像IBM将霍勒瑞斯打孔机（Hollerith machine）扩展到计算机领域一样。提前预测某人是否能够做到这一点——对我们来说，这太难了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce —

沃伦·巴菲特：鲍勃·诺伊斯——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We could (inaudible) to you.

查理·芒格：我们可以（听不清）。

WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce, one of the two founders of — two primary founders — of Intel, grew up in Grinnell, Iowa. I think he’s the son of a minister in Grinnell, and went through Grinnell College and was chairman of the board of trustees of Grinnell when I went on the board of Grinnell back in the late ’60s.

沃伦·巴菲特：鲍勃·诺伊斯是英特尔的两位主要创始人之一，他在艾奥瓦州的格林内尔长大。我记得他是格林内尔一位牧师的儿子，就读于格林内尔学院，并在我于60年代末加入格林内尔董事会时，担任学院董事会主席。

And when he left Fairchild to form Intel with Gordon Moore, Grinnell bought 10 percent of the private placement that funded — was the initial funding for Intel.

当他离开仙童公司（Fairchild）与戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）共同创立英特尔时，格林内尔购买了英特尔初始私募资金的10%。

And Bob was a terrific guy. He was very easy to talk to, just as Bill Gates is. I mean, these fellows explained the businesses to me, and they’re great teachers but I’m a lousy student. And they — I mean, they really do. They’re very good at explaining their businesses.

鲍勃是一个了不起的人。他非常平易近人，就像比尔·盖茨一样。我是说，这些人向我解释他们的业务，他们是很棒的老师，但我是个糟糕的学生。他们确实是非常擅长解释他们的业务。

Bob was a very down to earth Iowa boy who could tell you the risks and tell you the upside, and enormously likeable, a hundred percent honest, every way.

鲍勃是一个非常脚踏实地的艾奥瓦州男孩，他会告诉你风险和潜力。他非常讨人喜欢，完全诚实，方方面面都是如此。

So we did buy 10 percent of the original issue. The genius that ran the investment committee and managed to sell those a few years later, I won’t give you his name. (Laughter)

因此，我们确实购买了最初发行的10%。至于那个领导投资委员会并在几年后卖掉这些股份的天才，我就不说他的名字了。（笑声）

And there’s no prize for anybody that calculates the value of those shares now.

顺便说一下，现在谁要是计算这些股份的价值，是没有奖品的。

Incidentally, one of the things Bob was very keen on originally, in fact he was probably the keenest on it, was he had some watch that Intel was making. And it was a fabulous watch, according to Bob.

顺便说一下，鲍勃最初非常热衷的一件事，实际上他可能最为热衷的，是英特尔当时制作的一款手表。据鲍勃说，这是一款了不起的手表。

It just had one problem. We sent a guy out from Grinnell who was going out to the West Coast to where Intel was. And Bob gave him one of these watches. And when he got back to Grinnell he wrote up a report about this little investment we had, and he said, “These watches are marvelous.” He said, “Without touching anything, they managed to adapt to the time zones as they change as we went along.” In other words, they were running very fast, as it turned out. (Laughter)

不过它有一个问题。我们从格林内尔派了一个人到西海岸英特尔的所在地。鲍勃给了他一块这样的手表。当他回到格林内尔时，他写了一份关于我们这笔小投资的报告。他说：“这些手表太棒了。”他说：“不用动任何东西，它们就能自动适应我们经过的时区变化。”换句话说，事实证明，它们走得非常快。（笑声）

And they worked with that watch for about five or six years, and they fell on their face.

他们花了五到六年时间研究那款手表，结果以失败告终。

And as you know, you know, they had a total transformation in the mid-’80s when the product on which they relied also ran out of gas. So, it’s not —

大家知道，在80年代中期，他们依赖的产品也失去了动力，于是他们进行了彻底的转型。所以，这并不是——

And Andy Grove has written a terrific book, incidentally, Only the Paranoid Survive, which describes strategic inflection points. I recommend that every one of you read that book, because it is a terrific book.

顺便说一下，安迪·格罗夫写了一本非常棒的书——《只有偏执狂才能生存》，书中描述了战略拐点。我建议你们每个人都去读这本书，因为它确实很好。

But they had an Andy Grove there who made that transformation, along with some other people. But that doesn’t happen every time. Companies get left behind.

但他们有安迪·格罗夫和其他一些人一起完成了转型。不过，这种事情并不是每次都会发生。公司会被落下。

恰恰说明这是一项非常艰难的生意，微软有同样的经历。

We don’t want to be in businesses where companies — where we feel companies can be left behind. And that means that, you know — and Intel could have, and almost did, go off the tracks. IBM owned a big piece of Intel, as you know, and they sold it in the mid-’80s.

我们不希望进入那些我们认为可能会被落后的行业。这意味着，英特尔曾经——几乎确实——脱轨了。你们知道，IBM曾经拥有英特尔的大量股份，但他们在80年代中期卖掉了。

So, you know, here are a bunch of people that should know a lot about that business but they couldn’t see the future either.

所以，你看，这些人应该对那个行业非常了解，但他们也看不到未来。

I think it’s very tough to make money that way, but I think some people can make a lot of money understanding those kinds of businesses. I mean, there are people with the insights.

我认为靠那种方式赚钱非常困难，但我也认为有些人可以通过理解那类业务赚很多钱。我的意思是，有些人确实有这种洞察力。

Walter Scott, one of our directors, has done terrifically with a business that started, you know, just a gleam in the eye maybe ten or 12 years ago here in Omaha, and it turned into a huge business.

我们的董事之一沃尔特·斯科特，在一家业务上取得了巨大的成功。这家业务大约在十到十二年前从奥马哈萌芽，后来发展成了一个巨大的企业。

And you know, Walter explained that to me on the way down to football games, but bad student again, so — (Laughs)

沃尔特曾在我们去看橄榄球比赛的路上向我解释过这个业务，但我还是一个差学生，所以——（笑声）

Walter — if Walter could have connected, and you know, I’d cheer from the stands. But that doesn’t bother me at all. I mean, what would bother me is if I think I understand a business and I don’t. That would bother me.

如果沃尔特能理解，我会在看台上为他欢呼。但这对我来说根本没有困扰。真正会困扰我的是，如果我认为我理解一个业务，但实际上并没有，那才会困扰我。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, having flunked when we were young and strong at understanding some complex businesses, we’re not looking to master what we earlier failed at — (laughs) — in our latter years. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们年轻力壮的时候，就已经在理解一些复杂业务上失败了，现在年纪大了，我们可不打算重新掌握那些我们之前没搞懂的东西。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12? This may turn out like a revival meeting where we all confess our sins and come forward (inaudible). (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第十二区？这可能会像一个忏悔大会，大家都来承认自己的过错并站出来（听不清）。（笑声）

2、《1999-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

47. Technological change is bad for investments

技术变革对投资不利

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Greg Kaza (PH) from Oakland County, Michigan. I’d like to thank both of you gentleman for your hospitality this weekend.

观众：下午好。我叫格雷格·卡扎（音），来自密歇根州的奥克兰县。感谢两位先生在这个周末的热情款待。

My question deals with price deflation. Could you please explain how technological advances and productivity increases are affecting our non-fixed income holdings, especially insurance?

我的问题与价格通缩有关。您能否解释一下技术进步和生产力提高对我们的非固定收益持仓，特别是保险业务的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well I think that, to the extent your question implies — the question, how has technology affected the inflation rate, the advances in technology? I’ve heard Alan Greenspan make a lot of interesting comments on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，从您的问题的含义来看，是在问技术进步对通货膨胀率的影响。我听艾伦·格林斯潘对此发表过许多有趣的评论。

I think it baffles him to some extent, but he also recognizes that there’s some important, very hard-to-measure factor that has caused inflation not to behave in the way that most people expected, with this drop of employment, general prosperity, et cetera.

我认为这在某种程度上让他感到困惑，但他也意识到，有一些重要且难以量化的因素导致通胀没有像大多数人预期的那样表现，比如就业下降、普遍繁荣等情况。

And I think he attributes it, in some part — but again, immeasurable — to what has been happening in the information technology world.

我认为他将其部分归因于信息技术领域的变化，但同样无法精确量化。

Obviously, low inflation is good for fixed-income investments, but that’s been reflected to a significant degree in a long-term rate that’s at about 5 1/2 percent now.

显然，低通胀对固定收益投资有利，但这已经显著反映在当前约 5.5% 的长期利率中。

You know, it is — it does look, at the moment, like an almost perfect world, in terms of the macroeconomic factors. And that probably is a reason why people are enthused about stocks.

从宏观经济因素来看，目前似乎是一个近乎完美的世界。这可能也是人们对股票充满热情的原因之一。

And it’s a reason — and it’s a good reason, in terms of price inflation — it’s a good reason why bonds have behaved well over the last, really, since 1982.

从价格通胀的角度来看，这是一个很好的理由，也解释了为什么自 1982 年以来，债券市场表现良好。

I don’t know the answers to what it means for the future. I have to believe that it’s very good for this country to have the lead in information technology that it does on the rest of the world. I mean, we —

我不知道这对未来意味着什么。但我相信，美国在信息技术方面领先于世界其他国家对本国是非常有利的。我的意思是，我们——

It seems to me, as a non-expert, that we are so far ahead of the rest of the world, in terms of the leading — having the leading companies and the money flowing into it, the brainpower flowing into it, that it’s hard to think of it — who’s in second place.

在我这个非专家看来，无论是领先的公司，还是流入其中的资金与人才，我们都遥遥领先于世界其他国家。甚至很难想到谁是第二名。

And I think that’s helped this country in some very significant way. But I don’t know how to measure it.

我认为，这在某些非常重要的方面帮助了美国。但我不知道该如何量化这一点。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I would say that Berkshire’s businesses, on average, are less likely to be obsoleted by new technology than businesses generally. New steel-toed work shoes? I do not anticipate a significant change in the technology. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我想说，伯克希尔的业务总体上比一般的企业更不容易被新技术淘汰。比如新的钢头工作鞋？我不认为这项技术会有显著变化。（笑声）

And I think we have more of the stuff that’s sort of basic and hard to obsolete than many other corporations do.

而且我认为，我们拥有的业务更多是基础性且不容易被淘汰的，比许多其他公司都更具优势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. As we mentioned in the report, we think all of that activity is very beneficial from a societal standpoint. Our own emphasis is on trying to find businesses that are predictable in a general way, as to where they’ll be in 10 or 15 or 20 years.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。正如我们在报告中提到的，我们认为所有这些活动从社会的角度来看是非常有益的。而我们自己的重点是寻找那些从整体上看未来 10 年、15 年或 20 年可以预测的业务。

And that means we’re looking for businesses that, in general, are not going to be susceptible to very much change.

这意味着我们在寻找那些总体上不会受到太多变化影响的业务。

We view change as more of a threat into the investment process than an opportunity. That’s quite contrary to the way most people are looking at equities now.

我们认为变化对投资过程来说更多是一种威胁，而不是机会。这与现在大多数人看待股票的方式恰恰相反。

But we do not get enthused about — with a few exceptions — we do not get enthused about change as a way to make a lot of money.

但我们不会因为变化而感到兴奋——有少数例外——我们不会因为变化而视之为赚大钱的方式。

We try to look at — we’re looking for the absence of change to protect ways that are already making a lot of money and allow them to make even more in the future.

我们关注的是缺乏变化的领域，以保护那些已经赚钱的业务，并让它们在未来赚得更多。

So we look at change as a threat. And whenever we look at a business and we see lots of change coming, 9 times out of 10, we’re going to pass on that.

因此，我们将变化视为一种威胁。每当我们看到一个业务将发生许多变化时，十次有九次我们会放弃。

And when we see something we think is very likely to look the same 10 years from now, or 20 years from now, as it does now, we feel much more confident about predicting it.

而当我们看到某个业务在未来 10 年或 20 年后可能与现在看起来非常相似时，我们对其预测会更有信心。

I mean, Coca-Cola is still selling a product that is very, very similar to one that was sold 110-plus years ago. And the fundamentals of distribution and talking to the consumer, and all of that sort of thing, really haven’t changed at all.

我的意思是，可口可乐仍然在销售一种与 110 多年前非常相似的产品。其分销的基本原理、与消费者的沟通等方面几乎没有任何变化。

Your analysis of Coca-Cola 50 years ago can pretty well serve as an analysis now. We’re more comfortable in those kind of businesses.

你对可口可乐 50 年前的分析，现在基本上仍然适用。我们对这种类型的业务更有信心。

It means we miss some — a lot — of very big winners, but we would not have picked those out anyway.

这意味着我们错过了一些——甚至很多——非常成功的大赢家，但我们无论如何都不会选中它们。

It does mean also that we have very few big losers and that’s quite helpful over time.

但这也意味着我们很少有大亏损者，从长远来看，这非常有帮助。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the peanut brittle has very little technological change, too. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，花生脆糖的技术变化也很少。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: They better not change it. (Laughs) We like it just the way it is.

沃伦·巴菲特：最好不要改变它。（笑）我们就喜欢它现在的样子。

3、《2011-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

9. Picking tech stocks is difficult but could be profitable

挑选科技股很困难，但可能会有利可图。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第二个区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Caroline Tile (PH), Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：卡罗琳·泰尔（PH），马萨诸塞州波士顿。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, if you were going to live another 50 years, and we sincerely hope you do, and could add one additional sector or asset class to your circle of competence, which sector would it be and why?

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，如果你们打算再活 50 年，我们真心希望你们能这样做，并且可以在你们的能力范围内增加一个额外的行业或资产类别，你们会选择哪个行业，为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question, and I particularly like the preamble. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个非常好的问题，我特别喜欢这个开场白。（笑声）

Well, you would — you would certainly pick a sector that’s large, because it isn’t going to make any difference to Berkshire if we get to be experts on some tiny little industry or business.

好吧，你肯定会选择一个规模较大的行业，因为如果我们成为某个小行业或小企业的专家，对伯克希尔来说并没有什么区别。

I would say that — that, you know, it would have to be something in the — this isn’t going to happen — but if I could really become expert — and I mean really expert, knowing more than most — almost anybody else about the subject — in the tech field, you know, I think that that would be terrific.

我会说，如果我能真正成为专家——我指的是非常专业，了解这个领域的知识比大多数人都要多——在技术领域，我认为那将是非常棒的。

It isn’t going to happen, but it’s going to be a huge field.

这不会发生，但这将是一个巨大的领域。

There are likely to be, you know, a few enormous winners, a lot of disappointments. So that the ability to pick the winners, you know, is far disproportionate to the ability to pick the winners, we’ll say, among integrated major oil companies where they’re all equated in price.

可能会有一些巨大的赢家，也会有很多失望。因此，挑选赢家的能力，您知道的，远远不成比例于在综合大型石油公司中挑选赢家的能力，因为它们的价格是相等的。

You’re not going to have a big edge in trying to pick Chevron against Exxon against Continental and Occidental, and you name it.

你在选择雪佛龙、埃克森美孚、康菲和西方石油等公司时不会有太大的优势。

But the degree of disparity in results among larger tech companies in the future is likely to be very, very dramatic. And if I had the skills where I could pick the winners there I would do a lot better than if I had the skills to pick the winners in the major integrated oil field.

但未来大型科技公司之间的结果差异程度可能会非常非常显著。如果我有能力选择赢家，我的表现会比在主要综合油田中选择赢家时要好得多。

You probably will have better luck with Charlie on this one because he knows a lot more about a lot of industries than I do. Charlie, what’s your answer?

你在这件事上可能会更幸运，因为查理对很多行业的了解比我多得多。查理，你的答案是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it would either be tech or energy. And I think that we’re the wrong people to develop the expertise. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那么，要么是科技，要么是能源。我认为我们不是发展这种专长的合适人选。(笑声)

I think if we were going to do it, it would have already happened.

我认为如果我们要做的话，早就应该发生了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do think we might identify someone else who has abilities that we lack. That’s been very hard for us but — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我确实认为我们可能会找到其他具备我们所缺乏能力的人。这对我们来说非常困难，但——(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not going to tell you. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会告诉你。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But we’ve done a little better lately.

查理·芒格：但我们最近做得稍微好了一些。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good question.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题。

I.H.45.Warren Buffett.Tech Field

I.H.45.Warren Buffett.Tech Field

1、《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

2、《1999-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

3、《2011-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

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