I.H.54.Warren Buffett.Stock options
1、《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
34. Abuse of stock options as executive compensation
滥用股票期权作为高管薪酬
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll talk about comp then, a little.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，那我们就来谈谈薪酬问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, comp, yeah.
查理·芒格：是的，薪酬，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: The — comps — there are three or four aspects to that.
沃伦·巴菲特：这个——薪酬——有三四个方面。
On the subject of options, I would say that most options are constructed poorly, from the standpoint of the owner, but they’re constructed very well from the standpoint of the person who receives them, which is not entirely unexplainable because the — it’s a very strange form of negotiation when the beneficiary is the one that also really does all the design and hires the experts to come in and tell him what is good for the company when the expert knows that the guy who signs the check would be quite interested also in hearing what’s good for him.
关于期权的问题，我想说的是，从所有者的角度来看，大多数期权的构建都很糟糕，但从获得期权的人的角度来看，它们的构建非常好，这并非完全无法解释，因为——当受益人也是真正做所有设计并聘请专家进来告诉他什么对公司有利的人时，这是一种非常奇怪的谈判形式，而专家知道签支票的人也会非常有兴趣听听什么对他有利。
There’s nothing wrong with options per se, at all. Frankly, in terms of Berkshire, it would have been perfectly appropriate if a properly designed option had been given to me or to Charlie.
期权本身没有任何问题。坦率地说，就伯克希尔而言，如果给予我和查理一个设计合理的期权，那将是完全合适的。
I mean, we have responsibility for the whole enterprise, and we believe that any kind of incentive for performance should be related to the area in which you have responsibility.
我的意思是，我们对整个企业负责，我们认为任何形式的绩效激励都应该与你负责的领域相关。
We feel that if you want a typist to type 100 words a minute, that you ought to pay for typing 100 words a minute, not what the earnings per share were last year.
我们认为，如果你想让打字员每分钟打 100 个字，那么你应该按每分钟打 100 个字付费，而不是按去年的每股收益付费。
这种区分在软件企业已经模糊了，基层的工程师可能做出整体性的贡献。
We feel if a salesman gets paid for how many of the product is sold, he should get paid for that and not for some production quotas met.
我们认为，如果销售人员的报酬取决于产品的销售数量，那么他应该为此获得报酬，而不是为了达到某些生产配额。
So we believe in tying incentive comp to performance for which you have responsibility. And there are certain areas of a business that don’t lend themselves to that staff performance and so on.
因此，我们认为应该将激励性薪酬与你负责的绩效挂钩。而且企业的某些领域不适合这种员工绩效等等。
But that would lead to the corollary, that the people that are responsible for the entire results of the business, it’s perfectly appropriate to compensate them by options that in some way reflect the performance of that entire business.
但这会引出一个推论，即对企业的整体业绩负责的人，通过某种方式反映整个企业业绩的期权来补偿他们是完全合适的。
The trouble is that stock prices reflect other things than the performance of the business.
问题是，股票价格反映的不仅仅是企业的业绩。
For one thing, over a period of time, they reflect simply the reinvestment of earnings. You know, I have pointed out in the past that if you gave me an option on your savings account — to manage your savings account — and you reinvested all the interest, I would take away a significant payment at the end of ten years simply because you left the interest in.
首先，在一段时间内，它们仅仅反映了收益的再投资。你知道，我过去曾指出，如果你给我一个期权来管理你的储蓄账户——管理你的储蓄账户——然后你将所有利息再投资，我将在十年后拿走一大笔钱，仅仅因为你把利息留在了里面。
With a company that pays no dividend like Berkshire, if you’re going to leave all your capital in every year, for me to get a fixed-price option for ten years would mean that I was getting a royalty on money that you left with me. And I made the choice to have you leave it with me. So that does not strike me as equitable.
对于像伯克希尔这样不支付股息的公司，如果你每年都将所有资本留在公司，而我获得了一个为期十年的固定价格期权，这意味着我从你留给我的钱中获得了特许权使用费。而我选择了让你把钱留给我。所以这在我看来并不公平。
So I think any option should have a step-up in price that reflects the fact that money is reinvested by the shareholders annually. That if somebody wants to pay out a hundred percent of the earnings every year, then I’d say that you can have a fixed-price option. If you give me the money every year, and you do more with the money that’s left with you than the original sum, that’s fine.
所以我认为任何期权都应该有一个价格上涨，以反映股东每年将资金再投资的事实。如果有人想每年支付 100% 的收益，那么我会说你可以拥有一个固定价格的期权。如果你每年都把钱给我，而且你用留给你的钱比原来的钱做得更多，那就没问题了。
But if money is left with someone for ten years, there’s going to be some increase in value even if they spend every day golfing. And to give a piece of that away simply over — to have a royalty on the passage of time for them is a mistake.
但是，如果把钱留给某人十年，即使他们每天都打高尔夫球，也会有一些价值增长。仅仅因为时间的流逝而把其中的一部分赠予他们——让他们拥有时间流逝的特许权使用费，这是一个错误。
I think options ought to be granted, basically, at the fair value of the business at the time they’re granted. Sometimes that’s the market price, sometimes it isn’t the market price, but —
我认为期权基本上应该在授予期权时以企业的公允价值授予。有时那是市场价格，有时不是市场价格，但是——
Certainly the management of a company would not give an option on their business to some third party at a market price they felt was way too low, so I find it a little disingenuous when managements say that they’re — when they get a takeover bid, they say that the company’s really worth twice that much, but they’re perfectly willing to issue options to themselves at this price which they say is totally inadequate, when the owners get the option elsewhere.
当然，公司的管理层不会以他们认为过低的市场价格将其业务的期权授予第三方，所以我发现当管理层说他们——当他们收到收购要约时，他们说公司的实际价值是这个价格的两倍，但当所有者在其他地方获得期权时，他们完全愿意以他们认为完全不够的价格向自己发行期权，这有点不诚实。
But options, properly structured, for people with responsibility for the business, I think, makes — can make sense. And I think that if something happened to me and to Charlie, in terms of the manager of the business subsequently, if it was structured properly, I would not see anything wrong with an option arrangement.
但是，对于对企业负有责任的人来说，结构合理的期权，我认为，是——可以是有意义的。而且我认为，如果我和查理发生了什么事，就随后的企业经理而言，如果结构合理，我不会认为期权安排有任何问题。
We carry this philosophy down to our subsidiaries where they generally get incentive arrangements that relate to the operation of their business. But they don’t have incentive arrangements that relate to Berkshire overall, because if Chuck Huggins does a wonderful job at See’s Candy, as he has done, and I fall on my face, in terms of allocating capital, Berkshire stock will go no place despite what Chuck does.
我们将这一理念贯彻到我们的子公司，在那里他们通常会获得与他们业务运营相关的激励安排。但他们没有与伯克希尔整体相关的激励安排，因为如果查克·哈金斯像他所做的那样在 See's Candy 做得很好，而我在资本配置方面一败涂地，那么无论查克做什么，伯克希尔的股票都将无处可去。
And to penalize him, or to tie his rewards to something over which he has no control, I think, is kind of silly. So we tie it instead to the operations of the candy business.
我认为，惩罚他，或者将他的奖励与他无法控制的事情挂钩，是有点愚蠢的。因此，我们将它与糖果业务的运营联系起来。
In terms of overall level of compensation, the real sin is having a mediocre manager. I mean, that is what costs owners very significant amounts of money over time.
就整体薪酬水平而言，真正的罪恶是拥有一个平庸的经理。我的意思是，随着时间的推移，这会让所有者付出非常高昂的代价。
And if a mediocre manager is paid a relatively small sum, it’s still a great mistake. And if they’re paid huge sums, it’s a travesty. And that happens sometimes.
如果一个平庸的经理的薪酬相对较低，那仍然是一个很大的错误。如果他们得到巨额报酬，那就是一种讽刺。这种情况有时会发生。
It’s almost impossible to pay the outstanding manager a sum that’s disproportion to the value of that outstanding manager, when you get a large enterprise.
当你的企业规模很大时，你几乎不可能付给杰出经理一笔与其价值不成比例的薪酬。
Coca-Cola had a market value of $4 billion when Roberto Goizueta took over. It had stagnated during the previous decade under an earlier management, despite having the same product and those great Mean Joe Greene commercials you saw, that was — Mean Joe Greene was in the ’70s. The “Teach the World to Sing” commercial was in the ’70s. All these great commercials. But the company didn’t do much.
当罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔接手时，可口可乐的市值为 40 亿美元。尽管拥有相同的产品和你看到的那些伟大的 Mean Joe Greene 广告，但在之前的十年里，它在前任管理层的领导下停滞不前，那是——Mean Joe Greene 是在 70 年代。“教世界唱歌”广告是在 70 年代。所有这些伟大的广告。但公司并没有做太多。
Roberto — if we’d bought the entire Coca-Cola Company — I wish we had — in 1981 or ’2, whenever he came in, for 4 billion and we now had a business worth 150 billion, Roberto would have earned more money with us than he’s earned under the present arrangement.
罗伯托——如果我们当时以 40 亿美元收购了整个可口可乐公司——我希望我们当时收购了——在 1981 年或 1982 年，无论他是什么时候进来的，而我们现在拥有一家价值 1500 亿美元的企业，罗伯托在我们这里赚的钱会比他在目前的安排下赚的钱更多。
I mean, having the right person in place is just enormously important.
我的意思是，拥有合适的人选非常重要。
How much they should take is another question. That’s more a philosophical question.
他们应该拿多少是另一个问题。这更像是一个哲学问题。
Tom Murphy, best manager, you know, in the world, he just didn’t feel like taking a lot of money out of it, you know. And you know, I tip my hat to him, but I don’t think that necessarily makes it wrong for somebody else to take more money for doing the job. But I think it ought to be related to doing the job.
汤姆·墨菲，你知道的，世界上最好的经理，他只是不想从中拿走很多钱，你知道的。你知道，我向他致敬，但我认为这并不一定意味着其他人为了做这项工作而拿更多的钱是错误的。但我认为这应该与完成工作有关。
When I ran a partnership in the 1960s, I took a quarter of the profit over 6 percent a year. And I didn’t get paid any salary, but I could make a lot of money doing that. And that thought occurred to me as I ran the place from day to day, and I think it probably helped a little. (Laughter)
当我在 1960 年代经营一家合伙企业时，我拿走了每年超过 6% 利润的四分之一。而且我没有拿到任何薪水，但我可以通过这样做赚很多钱。当我日复一日地经营这个地方时，我想到了这一点，我认为这可能有一点帮助。（笑声）
So I don’t think it’s a terrible thing to have somebody get paid for making money for the shareholders.
所以我认为让某人因为为股东赚钱而获得报酬并不是一件可怕的事情。
But they ought to get paid for really making it, not simply because the shareholders reinvest money with them. They ought to make it based on the fair value of what they had when they took over, and they ought to make it really for just excellent performance.
但他们应该因为真正赚到钱而获得报酬，而不仅仅是因为股东将钱再投资给他们。他们应该根据他们接手时的公允价值来赚钱，而且他们应该真正地为出色的表现而赚钱。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we have remarked in previous Berkshire Hathaway meetings that we regard present mandated corporate accounting, with respect to stock options as weak, corrupt, and contemptible. And it is.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们在之前的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司会议上说过，我们认为目前强制性的公司会计处理股票期权的方式是软弱的、腐败的和可鄙的。的确如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: Otherwise, we’re undecided. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：除此之外，我们还没有决定。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If something is so wonderful as a standard technique of compensation, why does it have to be masked under weak, corrupt, and contemptible accounting? I think it is no credit to our civilization that we’ve drifted into this particular modality.
查理·芒格：如果某件事作为一种标准的薪酬技术如此美妙，为什么它必须被掩盖在软弱、腐败和可鄙的会计处理之下？我认为我们陷入这种特殊的模式对我们的文明来说不是一件光彩的事情。
And you can get, if you overuse stock options, where the whole thing is sort of a chain letter. I mean, in Silicon Valley there’s one company that practically paid everybody in options, and as long as the chain letter galloped, it worked as far as the income account because nothing went through expense.
如果你过度使用股票期权，你会发现整个事情有点像连锁信。我的意思是，在硅谷有一家公司实际上是用期权支付给所有人的，只要连锁信迅速发展，就收入账户而言它是有效的，因为没有任何费用产生。
And then once everybody is issuing stock options, everybody else feels that he has to do it. And the practice spreads.
然后，一旦每个人都在发行股票期权，其他每个人都觉得他必须这样做。这种做法就会蔓延开来。
So I am not totally wild about the extreme prevalence of the stock option modality in American corporate life. Personally, I would vastly prefer different modalities, which would probably involve stock instead of stock options.
因此，我对美国企业生活中股票期权模式的极端普遍性并不完全狂热。就个人而言，我更喜欢不同的模式，这些模式可能会涉及股票而不是股票期权。
I’m all for sharing with the kind of people who are doing the important work pretty well down in the organization in a place like Costco or Coca-Cola or any other such company. But I don’t much like the present scheme that civilization has drifted into.
我完全赞成与在好市多、可口可乐或任何其他此类公司中做重要工作的那种人在组织中相当好地分享。但我不太喜欢文明已经陷入的当前方案。
With respect to the subject of do we have some wretched excesses in American corporate compensation, my answer would be yes. I don’t think the excess is necessarily the guy who got the most money. In many cases I agree with Warren, that the money has been deserved.
关于我们美国企业薪酬是否存在一些可恶的过度行为这一主题，我的回答是肯定的。我不认为过度行为一定是拿钱最多的人。在许多情况下，我同意沃伦的观点，即这笔钱是应得的。
But such is the envy effect that the practice spreads to everybody else. And then the taxi driver and everybody starts thinking the system is irrational, unfair, crazy.
但这就是嫉妒效应，这种做法会蔓延到其他所有人。然后出租车司机和其他每个人都开始认为这个系统是不合理的、不公平的、疯狂的。
And I think that’s what causes some people, as they rise in American corporations, to, at a certain point of power gaining and wealth gaining, they start exercising extreme restraint as a sort of moral duty. And that’s what Warren was saying about Tom Murphy.
我认为这就是导致一些人在美国企业中崛起时，在获得权力和财富的某个时刻，他们开始作为一种道德义务进行极度克制的原因。这就是沃伦所说的汤姆·墨菲。
And I would argue that the Tom Murphy attitude is the right attitude. And it goes way, way back in the history of civilization. The word “liturgy” comes from a Greek word which is just the same. I mean, if you were an important citizen of Athens, it was a lot like being an important person in Jewish culture.
我认为汤姆·墨菲的态度是正确的态度。它可以追溯到文明的历史。 “liturgy”一词来自一个希腊词，意思是一样的。我的意思是，如果你是雅典的重要公民，那就很像犹太文化中的重要人物。
I mean, you had duties to give back and to act as a certain example. And the civilization had social pressures that enforced those duties. And I would argue that the Berkshire Hathaway compensation system, considering what the people at the top already have, it would be better if we saw a little more of it.
我的意思是，你有责任回馈社会并树立榜样。文明有社会压力来执行这些职责。我认为，考虑到高层人士已经拥有的东西，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的薪酬体系，如果我们能看到更多这样的情况会更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: A few —
沃伦·巴菲特：一些——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think Warren and I do all right. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：我认为沃伦和我做得很好。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: A few years — I think an added problem is the sort of, in terms of the accounting, the sort of hypocrisy that it pushes people into, and then which becomes accepted and sort of a norm, particularly when leaders do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：几年前——我认为一个额外的问题是，就会计而言，它迫使人们陷入的那种虚伪，然后这种虚伪被接受并成为一种常态，特别是当领导者这样做的时候。
And you know, you had a situation a few years back when there’s no question that any manager would say that stock options are a form of compensation. They would say that compensation is a form of expense, and they would say that expense belongs in the income account. But they didn’t want to have stock options counted because they felt that it might restrict their use.
而且你知道，几年前，毫无疑问，任何经理都会说股票期权是一种薪酬形式。他们会说薪酬是一种费用形式，他们会说费用属于损益表。但他们不想将股票期权计算在内，因为他们觉得这可能会限制他们的使用。
So when the federal — the FASB, Financial Accounting Standards Board — came up with a proposal to actually have reality reflected en masse, corporate chieftains descended on Washington to pressure legislators to have Congress start enacting accounting standards, which as I mentioned, one time in Indiana in the 1890s, there was a legislator that introduced a bill to have the value of pi changed to an even 3 because he thought that 3.14159 was too tough for the schoolchildren and it would ease computational problems.
因此，当联邦——FASB，财务会计准则委员会——提出一项真正反映现实的提案时，企业首领们纷纷前往华盛顿向立法者施压，要求国会开始制定会计准则，正如我所提到的，在 19 世纪 90 年代的印第安纳州，有一位立法者提出了一项法案，将 π 的值更改为整数 3，因为他认为 3.14159 对学童来说太难了，这将简化计算问题。
Well, that sort of behavior by corporate chieftains when they are in there, you know, arguing that black is white, in order to feather their own nest and maybe create a little higher stock prices, I think that it means that they forfeit, to some degree, their right to be taken seriously when they claim they’re operating for the good of the Republic, and march on Washington in other regards.
嗯，当企业首领们在那里，你知道，为了中饱私囊，也许是为了创造更高的股价，而争论黑白颠倒时，这种行为，我认为这意味着他们在某种程度上放弃了在他们声称自己是为了共和国的利益而运作并在其他方面向华盛顿进军时被认真对待的权利。
And I just think that when the organization recognizes its hypocrisy and so on, I think there’s a degradation that can set in through an organization that — whose leaders are also leaders in hypocrisy.
我只是认为，当组织认识到自己的虚伪等等时，我认为一个组织可能会出现退化——其领导人也是虚伪的领导人。
Like I say, we have no strong feelings on this subject, but — (Laughter)
就像我说的，我们对这个问题没有强烈的感觉，但是——（笑声）
Charlie, do you have anything?
查理，你有什么要说的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s rather interesting, though. There’s an earlier example. Commodore Vanderbilt took no salary from his railroads. After all, he controlled the railroads. They paid all the dividends that he needed, and he got the fun of running the whole railroad, and he thought it was beneath Commodore Vanderbilt to take a salary.
查理·芒格：不过，这很有趣。还有一个更早的例子。范德比尔特准将没有从他的铁路公司拿过一分钱的薪水。毕竟，他控制着铁路。他们支付了他所需的所有股息，他得到了经营整个铁路的乐趣，他认为拿薪水有失范德比尔特准将的身份。
We’ve never quite reached the Vanderbilt standard, but — (Laughter)
我们从未完全达到范德比尔特的标准，但是——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t have any dividends, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们没有任何股息，查理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. (Laughs)
查理·芒格：是的，是的。（笑）
Well, maybe that’s the reason. (Laughter)
嗯，也许这就是原因。（笑声）
2、《2000-04-29 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
24. Most companies hide the true cost of stock options
大多数公司掩盖了股票期权的真实成本
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, if area one is ready, we’re ready to start answering.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好了，如果第一区准备好了，我们可以开始回答问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi.
观众提问： 你好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Steve Check. I’m from Costa Mesa, California.
观众提问： 我叫史蒂夫·切克，来自加利福尼亚州的科斯塔梅萨。
My question is regarding stock options. I’ve taken your suggestion and have been attempting to subtract stock option compensation from reported income when evaluating companies. When I read annual reports, I usually find companies estimating option costs using the Black-Scholes model.
我的问题是关于股票期权的。我听取了您的建议，尝试在评估公司时将股票期权补偿从报告的收入中扣除。当我阅读年报时，通常会发现公司用布莱克-舒尔斯模型来估算期权成本。
However, the assumptions going into the Black-Scholes model seem quite different from company to company. These assumptions, of course, are what is used for risk-free interest rates — quote unquote, “risk-free” interest rates, expected option lives — even though options have stated lives, and expected volatility.
然而，不同公司使用布莱克-舒尔斯模型的假设似乎差别很大。这些假设包括无风险利率——所谓的“无风险”利率、期权的预期寿命（尽管期权有明确的期限），以及预期的波动率等。
Help me out a little bit. What is the best way to calculate option costs? Do you think Black-Scholes is appropriate? If so, how should we normalize the assumptions?
请帮我解答一下，计算期权成本的最佳方法是什么？您认为布莱克-舒尔斯模型合适吗？如果合适，我们该如何规范这些假设？
And just one short follow-up: how can we possibly estimate future earnings for companies, when companies, such as even Microsoft last week, in response to a lower stock price, simply reissue a bunch of new options?
还有一个简短的后续问题：当公司（比如上周的微软）因为股价下跌而重新发行大量新期权时，我们如何可能估算公司的未来收益？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — I can tell you, from some personal experience, that companies attempt to use the lowest figure they can, even though it doesn’t hit the income account.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我可以根据一些个人经验告诉你，公司会尽量使用最低的数值，尽管这些数值不会影响收益账户。
So they like to make fairly short assumptions as to the life of the options, even though they’re granted on a ten-year basis. Because they’ll make certain assumptions about exercise date or forfeiture and so on.
因此，他们倾向于对期权的寿命做出较短的假设，即使这些期权是按十年期授予的。这是因为他们会对行权日期、期权失效等做出某些假设。
I think the most appropriate way, when you’ve got a pattern, which you have at many companies, of what they do on options, is simply to make an educated guess as to the average option issuance that they’re going to incur, or they’re going to elect to do over time.
我认为，对于很多公司在期权上的操作模式，最合适的方法是做一个合理的猜测，估算他们在未来平均会发行多少期权。
And, generally, what you really want to — if you were to be precise — you would try to figure out what they could’ve sold those options for in the open market. Because that’s the opportunity cost of giving them to the employees instead of selling the same option in the market.
通常，如果你想更精确一些，你需要计算出他们在公开市场上能够卖掉这些期权的价格。因为这就是把期权给员工而不是在市场上出售的机会成本。
I think you’ll find, generally, that if you take a value of about a third, for a ten-year option, if you take a value of about a third — obviously, it depends on dividend rate and volatility and a whole bunch of things — but about a third of the market value, strike price, at the time they’re issued, that’s the expectable cost.
我认为，对于十年期的期权，通常你可以取大约三分之一的价值——当然，这取决于股息率、波动率以及许多其他因素——大约是发行时市场价格和执行价格的三分之一，这可以作为预期成本。
We believe in using the expectable cost versus the actual cost. I mean, that is how we would look at it.
我们认为应该使用预期成本而不是实际成本来衡量。这是我们的看法。
If we were issuing options at Berkshire, and we issued options on $100 million worth of stock a year, we would figure it was costing us, probably in our case, with no dividend, at least $35 million a year to issue those options.
如果伯克希尔每年发行价值1亿美元的股票期权，我们会认为，鉴于我们没有分红，这些期权的成本可能至少为每年3500万美元。
And we would figure that if we gave people $35 million in some other form of result-oriented compensation, that it would be a wash. And that is not the way most managements, of course, figure. At least that’s my experience.
我们会认为，如果我们用3500万美元以其他形式的成果导向的补偿方式给予员工，这将是一种对等补偿。当然，大多数管理层并不是这样计算的。这至少是我的经验。
And we would figure we could use that 35 million in a more shareholder-oriented way and one where the employee (who) was productive would be sure of getting results, as opposed to having it be at the whims of the market.
我们会认为，可以用这3500万美元以一种更关注股东利益的方式进行分配，让有生产力的员工能够确定获得回报，而不是让回报取决于市场的波动。
And I think you’ll see a lot of option repricing. Everybody says they won’t reprice their options, until they do it. And, you’ll see that with a lot of schemes.
我认为，你会看到许多期权重新定价的情况。每个人都说他们不会重新定价期权，直到他们真的这么做。而且你会在许多计划中看到这种情况。
It would be interesting to see whether CONSICO is willing to bankrupt all the executives who made loans to buy the stock and had those loans guaranteed by the company.
有意思的是，看看 CONSICO 是否会让所有通过贷款购买股票并由公司担保的高管破产。
And the company initially said they would enforce those loans. And we’ll see whether they do it. I would say, in many cases, they won’t. I don’t know what CONSICO will do.
公司最初表示他们会执行这些贷款。我们将看看他们是否会这么做。我会说，在很多情况下，他们不会。我不知道 CONSICO 会怎么做。
But, a lot of things that are said in connection with executive option schemes and that sort of thing are what they’ll do if it works in their favor. And then they’ll do something else if it doesn’t work in their favor. And that’s not spelled out in the initial approval that’s granted.
但与高管期权计划相关的很多声明，都是在符合他们利益的情况下所说的。如果不符合他们的利益，他们会做其他事情。这些内容在最初的批准中并未明确说明。
Charlie, you have anything to add?
查理，你有要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren’s somewhat critical attitude is very understated compared to mine. (Laughter)**
查理·芒格： 嗯，沃伦对这一问题的批评态度比我的要委婉得多。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to leave raisins out of this particular — (laughter) — analysis. Let’s go to area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们在这次分析中就不涉及葡萄干了——（笑声）——让我们转到第二区。
We do believe, incidentally, if a company is going to end up giving out 10 percent of the company over a 10-year period or 15 percent on options, that is like buying an apartment house and letting the seller keep a 10 or 15 percent interest in the upside.
顺便说一句，我们确实认为，如果一家公司在10年内通过期权分发了公司10%或15%的股份，这就像买了一栋公寓楼，却让卖方保留了10%或15%的增值权益。
Or it’s like buying an oil field and giving somebody a 10 or 15 percent interest-free override. It changes the value of the property. Make no mistake about it.
或者就像买了一片油田，却让某人获得10%或15%的免息权益。这会改变资产的价值，这一点毋庸置疑。
It is a — it has a huge economic impact on the value of a property. And just go out and try and sell your house and say, “I want to keep 15 percent of the appreciation in it,” and ask the buyer whether he’s going to pay the same price for the house.
这对资产价值的经济影响是巨大的。试想，如果你去卖房子时说，“我要保留15%的增值收益”，然后问买家他是否还愿意支付同样的房价。
Options subtract value the moment they are granted. And, like I say, unless companies — some companies follow a practice of making a mega-grant every three or four or five years. A lot of them just issue a fairly constant amount annually. And you can figure out the cost.
期权在授予的那一刻就会减少价值。就像我说的，除非有些公司每隔三、四或五年进行一次大额授予，但很多公司每年都会发行相对固定的数量。你可以计算出其成本。
And, you know, they don’t want to tell the shareholders there’s a cost. And that’s why they fought through Congress and everything else in order to prevent it from being the truth. But, you know, Galileo had that problem many years ago and finally won out. So maybe we will, too. (Laughs)
你知道，他们并不想告诉股东这是有成本的。这也是为什么他们会通过国会及其他途径来避免真相被揭露。但你知道，加利略多年前也遇到了类似的问题，最终他胜利了。所以，也许我们也能胜利。（笑声）
3、《2017-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
31. “If the board hires a compensation consultant after I go, I will come back”
“如果董事会在我离开后聘请了薪酬顾问，我会回来。”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren. This comes from a shareholder who I think is here, who asked to remain anonymous.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦。这来自一位我认为在场的股东，他要求匿名。
Writes: “Three years ago, you were asked at the meeting about how you thought we should compensate your successor. You said it was a good question, and you would address it in the next annual letter. We’ve been patiently waiting. (Laughter)
三年前，在会议上有人问你应该如何补偿你的继任者。你说这是个好问题，你会在下一封年度信中提到这个问题。我们一直在耐心等待。（笑声）
“Can you tell us now, at least philosophically, how you’ve been thinking about the way the company should compensate your successor, so we don’t have to worry when the pay consultants arrive on the scene?”
“你能告诉我们现在，至少从哲学上讲，你是如何考虑公司应该如何补偿你的继任者的，这样我们就不必担心薪酬顾问到场时的情况？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that — unfortunately, at my age I don’t have to worry about things I say — said three years ago, but this guy, obviously much younger, remembers. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这——不幸的是，到了我这个年纪，我不必担心我三年前说过的话——但这个家伙，显然年轻得多，记得。 （笑声）
I’m not — well, I’ll accept his word that I said that. But the — there’s a couple possibilities, actually.
我不是——好吧，我会接受他的话，承认我说过那句话。但是——实际上有几种可能性。
I don’t want to get into details on them, but you may have — and I, actually, would hope that we would have somebody, A) who’s already very rich — which they should be if they’ve been working a long time and have got that kind of ability — that’s very rich, and really is not motivated by whether they have 10 times as much money that they and the families can need or a hundred times as much.
我不想详细讨论这些，但你可能有——而我实际上希望我们能有一个，A）已经非常富有的人——如果他们工作了很长时间并具备那种能力，他们应该是非常富有的——这个人非常富有，实际上并不受他们和家庭需要的金钱是十倍还是一百倍的动机所驱动。
And they might even wish to perhaps set an example by engaging for something far lower than actually what you could say their true market value is. And that could or could not happen, but I think it’d be terrific if it did. But I can’t blame anybody for wanting their market value.
他们甚至可能希望通过以远低于他们真正市场价值的价格参与来树立一个榜样。这可能会发生，也可能不会发生，但我认为如果发生的话会很棒。但我不能责怪任何人想要他们的市场价值。
And then — if they didn’t elect to go in that direction, I would say that you — would probably pay them a very modest amount and then have an option which increased in value by — or increased in striking price — annually.
然后——如果他们不选择朝那个方向走，我会说你——可能会支付他们一个非常适中的金额，然后拥有一个每年增加价值或增加行使价格的选择权。
Nobody does this, hardly. The Washington — Graham Holdings has done it, The Washington Post Company did a little bit — but would increase because it’s assuming that there were substantial retained earnings every year.
几乎没有人这样做。华盛顿——Graham Holdings 做过一点——华盛顿邮报公司做过一点——但会因为假设每年有实质性的保留收益而增加。
Because why should somebody retain a bunch of earnings and then claim they’ve actually improved the value, simply because they withheld the money from shareholders?
因为为什么有人要保留一大笔收益，然后声称他们实际上提高了价值，仅仅因为他们将钱从股东那里扣留了？
So it’s very easy to design that, and in private companies people do design it in that way. They just don’t want to do it in public companies, because they get more money the other way.
这很容易设计，在私营公司中，人们确实以这种方式设计它。他们只是不愿意在上市公司中这样做，因为他们可以得到更多的钱。
But they might have a very substantial one that could be exercised, but where the shareholder’s — the shares had to be held for a couple years after retirement, so that they really got the result over time that the majority of the stockholders would be able to get, and not be able to pick their spots, as to when they exercised and sold a lot of stock.
但他们可能会有一个非常重要的期权，可以在退休后持有几年的股票，以便他们真正得到大多数股东能够得到的结果，而不是能够挑选他们的时间，何时行使和出售大量股票。
It’s — it would — it’s not hard to design. And it really depends who you’re dealing with, in terms of actually how much they care about money and having money beyond what they can possibly use.
这并不难设计。实际上，这真的取决于你所接触的人，他们对金钱的看重程度以及他们拥有的金钱是否超出了他们的实际需求。
And most people do have an interest in that, and I don’t blame them.
大多数人确实对此感兴趣，我不怪他们。
But I don’t know. What do you think, Charlie?
但我不知道。你觉得怎么样，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — one thing I think is that I have avoided, all my life, the compensation consultants. To me it’s a — I hardly can find the words to express my contempt. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我一生中一直避免薪酬顾问。对我来说，这是一种——我几乎找不到词来表达我的蔑视。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I will say this. If the board hires a compensation consultant after I go, I will come back. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我会这么说。如果董事会在我离开后聘请了一位薪酬顾问，我会回来。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Mad. Mad.
查理·芒格：疯狂。疯狂。
So I think there’s a lot of mumbo jumbo in this field, and I don’t see it going away.
所以我认为这个领域有很多胡言乱语，我看不出它会消失。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it isn’t going to go away. No, it’s going to get worse. It — I mean, the — if you look at, I mean, the way compensation gets handled, I mean, it — you know, everybody looks at everybody else’s proxy statement and says, “We can’t possibly hire a guy that hasn’t been — ”
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，这不会消失。不，这只会变得更糟。我的意思是，如果你看看，补偿是如何处理的，我的意思是，大家都在看其他人的代理声明，然后说：“我们绝对不能雇佣一个没有——”
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s ridiculous.
查理·芒格：这太荒谬了。
WARREN BUFFETT: —so on. And the human relations department, you know, who work for the CEO, come in and suggest a consultant.
沃伦·巴菲特：——等等。人力资源部门，你知道，负责 CEO 的，进来建议一个顾问。
What consultant is ever going to get another assignment if he says, “You should pay your CEO below the — down in the fourth quartile because you’re getting a fourth quartile result?” It —
什么顾问会在说“你们应该把 CEO 的薪水定在第四分位以下，因为你们的结果也在第四分位”之后再得到另一个任务呢？这——
I mean, it just, you know — it isn’t that the people are evil or anything. It’s just the nature of the situation just — it produces a result that is not consistent with how representatives of the owners should behave.
我的意思是，这只是，人们并不是邪恶的或其他什么。只是情况的性质就——它产生了一个与业主代表的行为不一致的结果。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s even worse than that. Capitalism is the golden goose that we all live on. And if people generally get so they have contempt for it because they don’t like the pay arrangements in the system, your capitalism may not last as well. And that’s like killing the golden goose.
查理·芒格：情况甚至更糟。资本主义是我们所有人赖以生存的金蛋。如果人们普遍对它产生蔑视，因为他们不喜欢系统中的薪酬安排，你的资本主义可能也不会长久。这就像是在杀死金蛋。
So I think the existing system has a lot wrong with it.
我认为现有的系统有很多问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think there is something coming in pretty soon — I may be wrong about this — where companies are going to have to put in their proxy statement the CEO’s pay to the average pay, or something like that. That isn’t going to change anything. I mean —
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为很快会有一些事情发生——我可能错了——公司将不得不在其代理声明中披露首席执行官的薪酬与平均薪酬的比例，或者类似的内容。这不会改变任何事情。我的意思是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It won’t change a thing.
查理·芒格：这不会改变任何事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: It won’t change a thing. And, you know, it’ll cost us virtually —
沃伦·巴菲特：这不会改变任何事情。而且，你知道，这几乎不会给我们带来任何成本——
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, it won’t get any headlines, either. It’ll be tucked away.
查理·芒格：顺便说一下，这不会引起任何头条新闻。它会被藏起来。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’ll cost us a lot of money, with 367,000 people employed around the world. And, I mean, we’ll hope to get something that makes it somewhat simpler so we can use estimates or something of the sort.
沃伦·巴菲特：这将花费我们很多钱，我们在全球有 367,000 名员工。我意思是，我们希望得到一些使其更简单的东西，以便我们可以使用估算值或类似的东西。
But to get the median income or mean income or whatever, however the rules may read, you know, and —
但是要获得中位数收入或平均收入，或者无论规则如何规定，你知道的，——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what consultants are for, Warren. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这就是顾问的作用，沃伦。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It — it’s, you know, it is human nature that produces this. And, you know, the most —I write in this letter to the managers every two years, I said, “The only excuse I won’t take on something is that everybody else is doing it.”
沃伦·巴菲特：这——这就是人性所导致的。你知道，我每两年给经理们写这封信，我说：“我唯一不会接受某件事的理由就是大家都在做。”
But of course, “everybody else is doing it,” is exactly the rationale for why people did not want to count the costs of stock options as a cost — I mean, it was ridiculous.
但当然，“其他人都在这样做”正是人们不想将股票期权的成本算作成本的理由——我的意思是，这太荒谬了。
All these CEOs went to Washington and they got the Senate, I think, to vote 88 to 9 to say that stock options aren’t a cost. And then a few years later, you know, it became so obvious that they finally put it in so it was a cost. You know, it reminded me of Galileo or something, I mean, all these guys.
所有这些首席执行官都去了华盛顿，我认为他们让参议院以 88 票对 9 票投票，认为股票期权不是成本。然后几年后，你知道，这变得如此明显，以至于他们最终将其列为成本。你知道，这让我想起了伽利略之类的事情，我的意思是，所有这些人。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Worse. It was way worse. The pope behaved better to Galileo in the —and he was —
查理·芒格：更糟。糟糕得多。教皇对伽利略的态度要好得多——而他是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anyway, it’s — it — I would hope, you know, like I say, somebody — well — and it doesn’t even have to be, I’m not talking about the current successor or anybody else.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，无论如何，我希望，你知道，就像我说的，某个人——好吧——而且这甚至不必是，我不是在谈论当前的继任者或其他任何人。
I mean, successors down the line are probably going to have gotten very wealthy by the time they’re running Berkshire. And the incremental value of wealth gets very close to zero at some point. And there is a chance to use it as a different sort of model.
我意思是，将来会有接班人，他们在管理伯克希尔时可能会非常富有。财富的增量价值在某些时候会非常接近零。而且有机会使用不同的模型。
But I don’t have any problem, if it’s — a system is devised that recognizes retained earnings. Nobody wanted — I’ve never heard anybody talk about it, you know, in the 20 boards I’ve been on.
但我没有任何问题，如果有一个系统能够识别留存收益。没有人想过——我从未听到过有人谈论这个，在我参与的 20 个董事会中。
You know, if you and I were partners in a business, you know, and we kept retaining earnings in the business and I kept having the value to buy a portion of you out at a constant price, you’d say, “This is idiocy.”
你知道，如果你和我是合伙人，你知道，我们继续在公司中保留收益，而我不断以固定价格购买你的一部分，你会说，“这简直是愚蠢。”
But of course that’s the way all option systems are designed, and it’s better to be — for the CEO and for the consultants. And of course, usually if there’s — there’s some correlation between what CEOs are paid and what boards are paid.
但当然，这就是所有期权系统的设计方式，对首席执行官和顾问来说更好。当然，通常首席执行官的薪酬与董事会的薪酬之间是有一定关联的。
If CEOs were getting paid at the rate that they got paid 50 years ago, adapted to present dollars, director pay would be lower. So it’s — you know, it’s got all these built-in things that, to some extent, sort of kindle the —
如果首席执行官的薪酬按照 50 年前的水平支付，经过调整后以现在的美元计算，董事的薪酬会更低。因此，这里面有很多内在因素，在某种程度上激发了——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No Berkshire director is in it for the money.
查理·芒格：没有哪个伯克希尔董事是为了钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they are if they own a lot of stock. And they bought it in the market just like the —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果他们拥有很多股票的话，那就是这样。他们在市场上购买的就像——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s —
查理·芒格：是的，这就是——
WARREN BUFFETT: — shareholder did.
沃伦·巴菲特：——股东做了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a very old-fashioned system.
查理·芒格：这是一种非常老式的系统。
WARREN BUFFETT: I looked at one company the other day, and seven of the directors had never bought a share of stock with their own money. Now they’d been given stock, but not one of them — I mean, I shouldn’t say not one — seven of the directors had never actually bought a share of stock.
沃伦·巴菲特：我前几天看了一家公司，七位董事从未用自己的钱购买过一股股票。他们确实得到了股票，但没有一位——我不应该说没有一位——七位董事实际上从未购买过一股股票。
And there they are, you know, making decisions on who should be CEO and how they should be paid and all that sort of thing. But, you know, they never felt like shelling out a dollar themselves. Now they’d been given a lot of stock.
他们在那里，你知道，决定谁应该成为首席执行官，应该如何支付他们的薪酬，以及所有这些事情。但是，你知道，他们从来没有觉得自己应该掏出一美元。现在他们获得了很多股票。
And it’s, you know, we’re dealing with human nature here, folks. (Laughs) And that — what you want is to have a system that works well in spite of how human nature’s going to drive it.
而且，你知道，我们在这里处理的是人性，朋友们。（笑）而你想要的是一个能够良好运作的系统，尽管人性会影响它。
And we’ve done awfully well in this country in that respect. I mean, American business has — overall has done very well for the Americans generally. But not every aspect of it is exactly what you want to teach your kids.
在这方面，我们在这个国家做得非常好。我的意思是，美国的商业总体上对美国人来说做得很好。但并不是每个方面都是你想教给孩子的。
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