I.C.S.106.我们的长期主义
长期主义的背后是坚实财务实力。
1、A large and reliable stream of earnings.
大量且可靠的收益流。
2、Massive liquid assets.
大量流动资产。
3、No significant near-term cash requirements.
没有显著的短期现金需求。
4、Appendix
Appendix.1.《1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s better, if you’re out selling the future, it may be better to forget the past, if you’re getting paid on selling it and not on betting your life on it in some way.
对。如果你的工作是“兜售未来”，那忘掉过去或许更有利——毕竟你的报酬来自“销售”，而不是用自己的身家去押注。
One situation at Berkshire that really is somewhat different than many companies: we assume, and unfortunately, it’s in error, but we assume we’ll be around forever.
Berkshire 有一点跟很多公司真的不同：我们假定——虽然这在现实上是错误的——但我们假定自己会永远存在。
So when we — in our insurance business, we assume we’re going to be here to pay every claim. And we’re not going to retire at 65 and hand over something to someone else. And there wouldn’t be any sense paying games on accounting because it would catch up with us later on.
因此，在我们的保险业务里，我们假设自己会一直在场，履行每一笔理赔。我们不会在 65 岁退休把摊子交给别人。玩会计花样毫无意义，因为迟早会“找上门”。
And whereas, in many businesses, I don’t think they have quite the same horizon on things. They do at a Coca-Cola, or they do at a Gillette.
而在许多企业里，我不认为他们看问题有同样的时间视野。当然在 Coca-Cola、在 Gillette 这样的公司里会有。
But many companies are thinking about what kind of — I think, I’m afraid that, more than you’d like — are thinking about what little pictures they can paint for the next four quarters or so. And that’s easy to do.
但很多公司——恐怕远超你所希望的数量——在思考的是未来四个季度要“画出怎样的小图景”。而这很容易做到。
But our problem is we’re going to be around a lot longer, we think, than four quarters, so that’s not an option available to us. And we have to — we really run it as if, in the year 2050 or something, somebody’s going to look and say, “Did — how’d it work out?”
可我们的难处在于：我们自认为会存在远超四个季度的时间，所以那种做法对我们不可用。我们必须——我们真的要把公司当作会在 2050 年之类的某一天被人回望、然后问一句“结果怎样？”来经营。
Reproduced from moom.cn 2020 and updated through 2024.
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