I.H.1.Warren Buffett.Blue Chip Stamps
1、《Damn Right!: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger》
I've accused Father of being negative. He has a buoyant, cheerful upside, but also a negative side. He said, "No, no, I'm not negative. I jump like a little trout if it's a good idea." His hand went up in the air.
Molly Munger
我曾指责父亲消极。他有乐观开朗的一面，但也有消极的一面。他说："不，不，我不消极。如果是个好主意，我跳起来就像一条 小鳟鱼。他的手举到了空中。
——莫莉·芒格
IIARLES MIJNGLR, JR. KNEW SOMETHING was afoot in Munger's financial life when his father came to him to discuss a math problem. Charles, Jr. was studying to be a physicist and his math skills were advanced. The exercise involved a California company called Blue Chip Stamps, which had a pool of reserve funds to meet the obligation of redeeming stamps in the years ahead. It had a float account, similar to those used by insurance companies, to hold premiums for covering probable future losses-an account that is invested with investment returns accruing to the company. Each year a predictable number of Blue Chip Stamps were redeemed, causing a decline in funds, which in turn was offset by the proceeds of issuing stamps. What Munger really wanted to know was how fast Blue Chip's investable funds would decline under various scenarios.
小查理·芒格知道要是爸爸来找他讨论一个数学问题，那他的生意上一定有特别的事情发生。小查理正在攻读物理学，他的数学非常好。要计算的是一家加州公司，名叫“蓝筹印花”，蓝筹印花公司拥有一个储备资金池，以履行未来几年兑换邮票的义务。它有一个浮动账户，类似于保险公司使用的账户，用来存放保费，以弥补未来可能出现的损失--该账户的投资收益归公司所有。每年都会有一定数量的印花被赎回，导致资金减少，而资金减少又会被发行印花的收益所抵消。芒格真正想知道的是，在各种情况下，蓝筹印花公司的可投资资金会以多快的速度减少。
Blue Chip Stamps had been in the news because of a dispute it had with a group mom and pop retailers who wanted to participate as owners of the company alongside big retailers who had founded it. At the time Rick Guerin was just recovering from his losses in the company sold to him by Jack Wheeler.
蓝筹印花公司之所以成为新闻焦点，是因为它与一群母婴零售商发生了纠纷。当时，里克-盖林（Rick Guerin）刚刚从杰克-惠勒（Jack Wheeler）卖给他的公司的亏损中恢复过来。
"Three years later, I got my capital back together, which was next to nothing, and Charlie and I talked a lot about investment ideas," said Guerin. "I'd react about Blue Chip Stamps in the newspaper, and I had an idea," Charlie said, 'I'll take you to my friend who knows more about float than anyone.'"
“三年后，我把所有资金都取回来了，接下来没有投资计划，我和芒格讨论了很多投资的想法，”里克-盖林（Rick Guerin）说，“我在报纸上看到了蓝筹印花的事情，然后有了一个主意。”芒格对里克-盖林（Rick Guerin）说：“我要带你去见一个我的朋友，他比任何人都了解浮存金。”
When Guerin was introduced to Warren Buffett, Rick realized, as he had when he first met Munger, that he was talking to someone exceptional. Rick was pleased when Buffett immediately saw the same potential value of Blue Chip's float that he had seen. Just by investing the float alone, the company could amount to something. Buffett, Munger, and Guerin slowly began accumulating shares, with Buffett buying the stock both for his personal account and for the Buffett Partnership.
里克-盖林（Rick Guerin）被介绍给了沃伦·巴菲特，就和他第一次见到芒格一样，盖林意识到自己在和一个非常优秀的人说话。盖林非常高兴，因为巴菲特和他一样立即发现了蓝筹印花备用账户中的潜在价值，光是投资这个备用账户，这家公司也很有价值。巴菲特、芒格和盖林开始慢慢地购入股份，巴菲特同时用他的私人账户和巴菲特合伙公司的账户买入股票。
Tracing the story of Blue Chip Stamps from its inception to the present is confusing, but it is central to understanding how Munger, Buffett, and Guerin became so rich, and how Berkshire Hathaway evolved into the company it is today. Blue Chip became the vehicle through which See's Candy, the Buffalo Neu's, and Wesco Financial were acquired, and these three companies later became essential to the cultural and financial foundation of Berkshire.
要追溯蓝筹印花从头到尾的历史，会让人觉得扑朔迷离，但是对于理解芒格、巴菲特、盖林的资金如何成长，以及伯克希尔是如何演变成现在这样来说，非常重要。蓝筹印花在收购喜诗糖果、布法罗新闻集团和威斯科金融公司的过程中充当了载体。同时这三家公司后来成了伯克希尔的文化和金融基础。
First, the history: An early precursor to frequent flyer miles in the 1950s and 1960s, trading stamps, such as Green Stamps, Blue and Gold, and Blue Chip, were handed out as a customer incentive by merchants. Retailers deposited money at Blue Chip in return for their stamps, then the money was used to operate the stamp company and to purchase the merchandise handed out when stamps were redeemed. Shoppers were given a certain number of stamps for each dollar spent in a store, which they pasted into books, then redeemed for prizes such as toddler toys, toasters, mixing howls, watches, and other items. Because it took time to accumulate enough stamps to redeem merchandise-and because some customers tossed the stamps in the back of a drawer, forgot them, and never did redeem them-the float built up. By the early 1970s, Blue Chip's sales amounted to approximately $120 million per year (around $400 million, in today's dollars). Its float at the time was nearly $100 million.
首先是公司的历史：20世纪五六十年代有一位飞行里程积分的先驱，交易印花，有绿色、蓝色和金色印花，以及蓝筹印花，这些都是商家给予顾客的激励，零售商在蓝筹印花存入资金换取印花，公司会运作这笔资金，用于购买人们集齐印花后来兑换的商品。消费者在店内每消费一美元都会得到相应数量的印花，他们把印花贴在本子里，集齐后去换些奖品，比如说玩具、烤面包机、搅拌碗、手表以及其他各色物品。顾客通常要花较长的时间，才能够集齐足够数量的印花来换取商品，而有些人就把印花随手丢在抽屉里遗忘，从来不去兑换，于是就会产生浮存金。20世纪70年代初，蓝筹印花每年的销售额约为12 000万美元（折算到今天大约是4亿美元）。它当时的浮存金大约是1亿美元。
Stamps were popular with housewives and with merchants, who liked the increased sales and profits. One of the first trading stamp companies was S&H Green Stamps, but according to S&H's rules, only one type of retailera single grocery store, gasoline station, or drugstore-in each area could offer S&H stamps. A group of nine retailers, including Chevron Oil, Thrifty Drugs, and important California grocery chains, wanted the same competitive advantage, so they got together in 1956 and created Blue Chip Stamp Company. The Company was controlled by the nine retailers who organized it. Other store owners were allowed to offer the stamps, but they had no say in how the business was run nor did they share in the profits. Blue Chip became by far the largest trading stamp company in California and was so successful that eventually it faced a law suit from the small retailers who thought they weren't getting a fair shake from the founders. They claimed that the founding owners had violated antitrust laws by not providing ownership rights to small merchants.
除了主妇之外，商家同样欢迎印花，因为它们可以刺激销售增加利润。第一家优惠券公司是S＆H绿色印花，不过根据公司的规定，在同一地区的每个行业中，例如杂货店、加油站抑或是药房仅有一家可以提供S＆H印花。1956年，有9家公司，包括CHEVRON加油站、Thrifty药房，以及最重要的加州连锁杂货店希望获得同样的竞争优势，于是他们共同成立了蓝筹印花公司。公司由这9家发起的零售商控制，其他参与的商店可以通过向顾客提供印花来吸引客流，但它们无权过问蓝筹印花公司业务的运作，也无法分享公司的利润。蓝筹印花成了加州目前为止最大的优惠券公司，而恰恰是因为公司的巨大成功，招致了一场诉讼。小零售商们认为创始人没有给予他们公平的待遇，他们声称创始公司违背了反垄断法，因为小商家不能得到股东应有的权利。
In December 1963, the Department of justice filed an antitrust action against Blue Chip Stamp and the nine founding shareholders. After four years in court, a consent decree was entered in June 1967, calling for a complete reorganization of the company so that the founders could no longer exert complete control. Blue Chip Stamp Company then added an "s" to its name and became Blue Chip Stamps.
1963年12月，司法部向蓝筹印花及其9名创始股东提出反垄断措施。经过四年的法庭审理，双方于 1967 年 6 月达成一致，要求对公司进行全面重组，使创始人无法再完全控制公司。随后，Blue Chip Stamp Company 在其名称后添加了一个 "s"，成为 Blue Chip Stamps。
Under the court's decree, Blue Chip was required to offer approximately 621,600 shares of its common stock to the smaller, retail users of the stamps who previously were not shareholders. The shares were issued on a pro rata basis determined by the quantity of stamps given out by each of the nonstockholding retailers during a designated period. The offering consisted of three shares of common stock and a $100 debenture for a cash payment of $101. Any of the 621,600 shares not purchased by the nonstockholder users were to be sold on the open market. This new stock part of the offering amounted to 55 percent of the common stock of the company. To provide liquidity for old and new shareholders, the new Blue Chip shares were traded over-the-counter.
根据法庭判决，蓝筹印花要向那些原本不是股东的小商家提供约621 600股普通股。股份的数量将和一段指定时期内非股东商家派出的印花数量成正比，每付出101美元现金，就会得到3股普通股和100美元的公司债券。621 600股中没有被非股东类用户认购的部分将会在公开市场上出售。这部分新股票数量相当于整个公司普通股中的55%。为了给新老股东提供流动性，新蓝筹股在场外交易。
"Thousands of little retailers ended up with Blue Chip stock," said Buffett, and a market was born for the shares. "We saw this as a very cheap stock and bought aggressively. Charlie, Rick, and I ended up controlling Blue Chip."
“数以千计的小商家最后得到了蓝筹印花的股票，”巴菲特说，这些股票催生了一个市场。“我们认为这些股票非常便宜，于是买了很多。芒格、里克和我最后控制了蓝筹印花。”
They acquired their shares separately. "I started with $80,000," said Guerin, and built from there. Munger's investment matched Guerin's fairly closely.
他们分头购入股份。“我一开始买了80 000美元。”盖林，那是一个起点。芒格的投资额和盖林相当接近。
"At Blue Chip Stamps, we finally took over the company. It was a friendly, gradual kind of takeover, but we took it over," said Munger.
“在蓝筹印花，我们最终取得了公司的控股权。那次接管进行得相当友好而缓慢，不过最终还是接了过来。”芒格说。
By the early 1970s, Buffett's various entities had become Blue Chip's largest stockholder, Munger was the second largest and Guerin was somewhere behind. The three had accumulated enough shares to warrant positions on Blue Chip's board of directors.
20世纪70年代早期，巴菲特名下的几家公司成了蓝筹印花的最大股东，芒格排名第二，盖林则紧随其后。他们三人积累了足够的股份，可以成为蓝筹印花的董事会主席。
"Blue Chip had an `old boys' board, some of whom resisted new guys, especially these smart-alecky young guys," said Guerin. "Charlie went on the board first, then convinced them they should accept me, and finally Warren was accepted."
“蓝筹印花的董事会是‘老年人社团’，里面的人都很抗拒新人的加入，特别是那些在他们看来自作聪明的人，”盖林说，“芒格率先加入了董事会，然后说服他们接受了我，最后巴菲特也进来了。”
Soon, their shareholdings in Blue Chip became densely tangled. In 1971, Warren and Susan Buffett personally owned 13 percent; Berkshire Hathaway Inc., of which the Buffetts were 36 percent owners, held 17 percent, and Diversified Retailing Co. Inc., of which the Buffetts owned 42 percent, held 16 percent. In addition, Diversified Retailing owned shares in Berkshire, and Munger's partnership owned 10 percent of Diversified Retailing, plus 8 percent of Blue Chip. Guerin's partnership also owned 5 percent of Blue Chip. Eventually, after more purchases of Blue Chip stock, the liquidation of Wheeler, Munger, and the merger of Diversified Retailing into Berkshire, Berkshire's ownership reached 60 percent. Together Berkshire, Buffett, and Munger owned nearly 75 percent of the outstanding shares of Blue Chip.
很快，他们在蓝筹印花中的持股结构就变得非常混乱。1971年，巴菲特夫妇个人名下拥有13%的股份；巴菲特持股36%的伯克希尔公司则持有蓝筹印花17%的股份，巴菲特持股42%的多元零售公司也持有蓝筹印花16%的股份。此外，多元零售也拥有伯克希尔的股份。芒格的公司则持有多元零售10%的股份以及蓝筹印花8%的股份。盖林的公司也拥有蓝筹印花5%的股份。最终，在增持了蓝筹印花的股份一段时间后，惠勒和芒格证券公司清算了资产，多元零售则并入伯克希尔，伯克希尔的总持股数达到了60%。伯克希尔、巴菲特和芒格加在一起拥有蓝筹印花已发行股票中的75%。
For some years, trading stamps continued to be Blue Chip's main business. In 1970, Blue Chip sales peaked at more than $124 million, but soon the popularity of trading stamps waned, and by 1982 sales plummeted down to $9 million. Sales amounted to only $200,000 a year by the late 1990s when Blue Chip's trading stamps were primarily issued by a few bowling alleys.
有好几年，买卖印花仍是蓝筹印花的主要业务。1970年，处于高峰时期的蓝筹印花销售额高达1.24亿美元，不过很快买卖印花的受欢迎程度开始走下坡路，到1982年的时候销售额骤跌至900万美元。20世纪90年代末销售额更是只有20万美元一年，只有一些保龄球馆还向顾客提供印花。
Buffett and Munger gained control of the investment committee once they were board members, and so during the time that trading stamps were slipping from favor, the investment committee was at work building the value of Blue Chip's float.
成了董事后，巴菲特和芒格就得到了公司投资委员会的控制权。于是在印花交易业务日益受人冷落期间，投资委员会就致力于开发蓝筹印花的浮存金账户中的价值。
Among the investments that Buffett and Munger acquired through Blue Chip was the largest block of troubled Source Capital, a closed-end investment company established in 1968 by the infamous "Go-Go" manager Fred Carr. Carr was a phenomenon for a while, but soon was discredited by the choppy stock market of the early 1970s. When Carr quit Source Capital, the fund had $18 per share in asset value, but was trading for $9. It was a situation much like that at the Fund of Letters, except that after Carr left, portfolio managers at Source Capital had considerable talent and a mind-set similar to that of Munger and Buffett. Blue Chip acquired 20 percent of the fund and Munger went on the board where he got along well with the main portfolio managers. Source Capital remained an independent company and is stilled listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Munger and Buffett referred a lot of management clients to Source Capital in subsequent years.
巴菲特和芒格通过蓝筹印花进行的收购投资中，最大的一单是收购陷入困境的资源资本，这是一家成立于1968年的封闭式基金公司，由声名狼藉的“Go-Go”基金经理弗雷德·卡尔管理。卡尔一度是个响当当的人物，但很快就因为20世纪70年代早期动荡的股市表现而毁了名声。卡尔退出资源资本的时候，它的资产净值是18美元一股，但交易价只有9美元。这种情况和连锁信骗局很相似，只是卡尔离开后接手的基金经理相当有天分，投资思路与芒格和巴菲特很相似。蓝筹印花买入了资源资本20%的股份，芒格成了董事，他和负责的基金经理相处得很好。资源资本仍然是一家独立的公司，至今仍在纽约证交所挂牌交易。芒格和巴菲特在接下来的几年中为资源资本介绍了很多高端客户。
Most of Buffett's and Munger's acquisition attempts went smoothly, but they did not get all the properties they sought to acquire. In 1971, Blue Chip was outbid in an attempt to buy the Cincinnati Enquirer. The Enquirer at the time had a daily circulation of 190,000 and a Sunday circulation of 300,000. E.W. Scripps Co. was being forced to sell the newspaper to settle a U.S. Justice Department case charging it with having an illegal monopoly in the Cincinnati market. Blue Chip offered Scripps and its affiliate, ScrippsHoward, $29.2 million for the newspaper but was turned down. The Enquirer is now owned by the Gannett Company.
巴菲特和芒格的大部分收购尝试都很顺利，但他们并没有得到所有想要收购的产业。1971 年，蓝筹公司在试图收购《辛辛那提问讯报》时出价过高。当时，《询问者报》的日发行量为 190,000 份，周日发行量为 300,000 份。E.W. 斯克里普斯公司被迫出售该报，以解决美国司法部指控其非法垄断辛辛那提市场的案件。Blue Chip 公司向 Scripps 及其附属公司 ScrippsHoward 出价 2920 万美元收购该报纸，但遭到拒绝。现在，《询问者报》归甘尼特公司所有。
By 1980, Blue Chip had five areas of business: the remainder of its trading stamp business, See's Candy Shops, Wesco Financial, the Buffalo Evening News, and Precision Steel.
到了1980年，蓝筹印花旗下有5类业务：仍在运作中的买卖印花业务、喜诗糖果、威斯科金融、《布法罗晚报》以及精密钢业。
Along the way an uncomfortable incident involving Blue Chip's acquisition of Wesco Financial. The reaction of the Securities Exchange Commission caused Buffett and Munger to re-evaluate the way they were conducting their business.
在此期间，蓝筹印花对威斯科金融的收购引发了一场令人不愉快的事故，而证券交易所的反应让巴菲特和芒格重新评估了自己运作业务的方式。
The story began in the summer of 1972 when a broker offered Buffett and Munger a block of Wesco Financial, the parent company of Pasadenabased Mutual Savings and Loan Association. Wesco's stock was trading in the low teens, less than half its book value. Buffett and Munger agreed that it was a bargain, and through Blue Chip, acquired 8 percent of Wesco's shares. Even that early in its history, a $2 million stake was a relatively minor investment for Blue Chip.
故事始于1972年夏，有一位中间人向巴菲特和芒格出售一部分威斯科金融的资产，它是总部位于帕萨迪纳的互助储蓄借贷联盟的母公司。威斯科金融的股价不过10美元出头，还不到它的账面价值的一半。巴菲特和芒格都认同这是一桩有利可图的生意，于是通过蓝筹印花买入了8%的威斯科金融股份。即使在蓝筹印花公司历史的早期阶段，200万美元的投资也是相当小的一笔生意。
Then in January 1973, Wesco's management announced plans to merge with another savings and loan, Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara. Buffett and Munger felt that Wesco was selling itself at a fire sale price. The deal called for Wesco shareholders to swap their undervalued shares for those of overvalued Financial Corp. Munger and Buffett didn't think the deal was a good one for shareholders on the Wesco side.
然后在1973年的1月，威斯科金融的管理层发表声明，计划和另一家借贷公司——圣巴巴拉财务集团合并。巴菲特和芒格认为威斯科金融此举无疑是将自己清仓大拍卖出去。这笔交易会让威斯科金融的股东们将自己手中定价过低的股票拿出去换回财务集团的那些定价过高的股票。芒格和巴菲特不觉得这桩生意有利于威斯科金融股东们的利益。
Said Buffett: "I read these terms, and I didn't believe them. And I told Munger the terms and he couldn't believe it either. But it was there in black and white on the Dow Jones tape."
巴菲特说：“我读了一遍条款，简直难以置信。然后我跟芒格说了一遍那些条款，他也不敢相信，但的确白纸黑字地在道琼斯的公告牌上写着。”
Munger wanted to buy more Wesco stock to fight off the merger, but Buffett did not. Charlie prevailed, and for six weeks, Blue Chip bought every Wesco share it could find, accumulating about 17 percent of the company. They couldn't buy more than 20 percent without regulatory approval and that would take a long time to obtain.
芒格要多买些威斯科金融的股票来避免收购，但巴菲特不想。芒格占了上风，6周内，蓝筹印花买下了他们能找到的每一股威斯科金融股票，总计占公司股权的17%。如果没有明文批准，他们不得持有超过20%的股份，而这类批文通常要很久才能拿到。
Munger called on Louis R. Vincenti, Wesco's president, to inquire about his reaction to the existence of a large unhappy shareholder. Without being acrimonious, Vincenti said that Blue Chip was free to vote against the merger if it wished and to solicit other shareholders to do the same, but the outcome would be determined by shareholders, not Vincenti. This was the kind of straight talk Munger liked. He immediately developed an admiration for Vincenti, and Buffett soon did the same.
芒格去拜访了威斯科金融的总裁路易斯·文森特，看他对自己这个不满意的大股东有什么说法。没费什么口舌，文森特就说只要喜欢，蓝筹印花完全有权利投票反对合并，也可以去游说其他股东做同样的决定，但结果由股东们决定，而不是文森特自己。这是芒格喜欢的那种直截了当的谈话。他立即对文森特产生了好感，后来巴菲特也一样。
For shareholders to vote the merger down, Munger and Buffett would have to persuade Elizabeth Peters, a San Francisco heiress who owned a Napa Valley vineyard, and her brothers, to go along with them. Peters' father had founded the S&L and took it public in the 1950s and the Peters still owned a large block of shares. Elizabeth Peters hoped that the Financial Corp. merger would inflate Wesco's flagging share price. Donald Koeppel, Blue Chip's president, tried to persuade Betty Peters to change her mind, and when he failed, Buffett gave it a try.
为了让股东们投票阻止合并，芒格和巴菲特就一定要说服伊丽莎白·彼得斯。她是一名住在旧金山的女继承人，在那帕山谷拥有一片葡萄庄园。他们还必须让她的兄弟们也一致同意。彼得斯的父亲成立了S＆L并在20世纪50年代将其变成了上市公司，彼得斯家族持有其很大一部分的股份。伊丽莎白·彼得斯希望通过和财务集团的合并来提振威斯科金融低迷的股价。蓝筹印花的总裁唐纳德·科普尔试图劝彼得斯改变主意，但他失败了，巴菲特决定亲自试一试。
"I flew out and talked to her-out and back in one day-we talked in the American Airlines lounge at the San Francisco airport," said Buffett.
“我搭飞机过去和她谈，我们是在旧金山机场美联航的贵宾室里谈的。”巴菲特说。
Peters insisted that something had to be done to improve the S&L's performance, and Buffett said he'd like to try it himself. She was impressed with his self-confidence, but asked a question that would be posed again and again as Berkshire grew.
彼得斯坚持必须要采取一些措施来提振S＆L的市场表现，巴菲特说他愿意亲自来负责。她被他的自信所打动，但还是问了一个问题，同样的问题在伯克希尔后来的成长历史中也一再出现。
"Mr. Buffett, if I buy you, what happens if you get hit by a truck at the intersection? Who would save Wesco then?" Buffett assured her that Charlie Munger was waiting in the wings.'
“巴菲特先生，如果我相信了你，你却在十字路口被卡车撞死了怎么办？那时谁来拯救威斯科金融呢？”巴菲特跟她保证查理·芒格将随时待命。
Warren persuaded Peters to vote against the merger and to ride along with her family's Wesco shares, remaining as a Wesco director on a board that Munger would join. This turned out well for Peters, since Financial Corp. went bust and Wesco prospered mightily with the help of Buffett and Munger aboard.
巴菲特说服了彼得斯投票反对合并，仍然持有家族的威斯科金融股份，为芒格在即将加入的董事局中保留席位。最后的结果让彼得斯非常满意，因为财务集团破产了，而威斯科金融则由于巴菲特和芒格两位董事的加入变得欣欣向荣起来。
After squelching the merger, Munger and Buffett could legally buy only another 3 percent of Wesco's outstanding stock and they set out to do so. They had been paying about $17 per share right up to the time the merger was cancelled. They knew that Wesco stock was sure to decline in the short term. Nonetheless, they offered $17 per share, thinking it only fair since it was they who had interrupted the merger. "We decided in some quixotic moment that it was the right way to behave," said Munger.'
成功阻止了合并后，芒格和巴菲特在合法的情况下只能再买3%的威斯科金融剩余股份，于是他们立即着手去做。合并一取消，他们就出价17美元一股买下股票。他们知道短期内威斯科金融的股票一定会下跌，鉴于合并是被他们搅和的，出价17美元对威斯科金融来说才算公平。“我们在某个堂吉诃德式的时刻做出了这样的决定，认为只有这样解决才是正确的方法。”芒格说。
After some period of time passed and the regulatory hurdles were leaped, Blue Chip made several subsequent tender offers, and eventually raised its Wesco stake to 24.9 percent. By mid-1974, Blue Chip owned the majority of Wesco shares. Munger and Buffett would have acquired more Wesco shares, but stopped at 80 percent at the request of Peters, who remains a large minority shareholder.3 Buffett lets Peters set Wesco's divided policy and she increases the payout slightly every year.
过了一段时间，他们拿到了批文，蓝筹印花又发起了几次股权收购，最终将自己在威斯科金融中的持股比例增加到了24.9%。1974年年中，蓝筹印花拥有了威斯科金融的大部分股权。芒格和巴菲特原本打算继续增持，但在80%的时候应彼得斯的要求停止了，彼得斯还是公司的一位单一大股东。巴菲特让彼得斯设定威斯科金融的表决政策，她每年将支出预算上调一些。
All through this, however, the SEC for some reason had been tracking the activities of Buffett and Munger and had some questions about the Wesco deal.
然而，自始至终，证交所出于某种原因一直在追踪巴菲特和芒格的活动，同时对威斯科金融的交易存在一些疑虑。
"I've always suspected that someone who wanted the Financial Corp. merger to go through complained to the SEC," said Munger. And yet, he admitted, the convoluted ownership at Blue Chip did appear suspicious.
“我一直怀疑某个希望与财务集团合并的家伙跑去证交所告了状。”芒格说。不过他也承认，蓝筹印花错综复杂的股权关系的确看起来引人怀疑。
"When the SEC started looking, there were all these criss-crossed ownerships. That happened by accident. But it was complicated and because so many people create complications to hide fraud, the SEC delved and delved and finally fixed its attention on something-how we got Wesco. People assume if what you're doing is enormously complicated, you're probably doing something wrong."
“当证交所开始调查的时候，发现有三家交叉持股的公司。那只是一个巧合，但很复杂。而且因为很多人创造了一些复杂的东西来隐瞒欺诈，证交所研究了又研究，最终决定把注意力集中在一件事情上——我们如何收购威斯科金融。人们都假定如果你做的事情非常复杂，那你很有可能在做什么坏事。”
Indeed, Buffett, Munger, and to some extent Guerin, owned stakes in an incredibly intertwined bundle of companies. The three men's investments had grown this way and that, taking whatever structure seemed logical and fair at the time. The organization was a little too disorganized for the tastes of the SEC. But there also was a legal question.
的确，巴菲特、芒格在一堆关系错综复杂的公司中都拥有股份，古瑞恩也多少沾点边。这三个人的投资以这样那样的方式增长了起来，无论他们采用什么样的结构，在当时都是合法而公平的。对证交所来说，这种结构有点太杂乱无章了，不过还存在一个法律问题。
The SEC's concern was whether Blue Chip had unlawfully manipulated the stock of Wesco in some way. The SEC rightly concluded that Munger and Buffett bought shares at an obviously higher-than-necessary price, and suspected sonic sort of preemptive motive, rather than a benevolent one. Buffett responded to the inquiries by shipping three cartons of documents, memos, stock transfer documents, and so on to Washington. Buffett reacted calmly: Munger, on the other hand, was impatient.
证交所关心的是蓝筹印花是否以某种方式违法操控了威斯科金融的股价。证交所正确地总结出了芒格和巴菲特以明显偏高的价格收购了股份，并由此怀疑这是出于某种强制收购的目的，而不是他们自称的仁慈。巴菲特对这种询问的回应是：寄了三大箱文件、备忘录、股票交易文件等等去华盛顿。巴菲特的反应相当平静，然而，芒格却不耐烦起来。
The SEC investigation became an impediment to Blue Chip's everyday business, and in the fall of 1974, Munger wrote to his attorney, Chuck Rickershauser, "I hope the foregoing will satisfy everyone at the SEC and that, if not, you can arrange that I receive the promptest possible response, preferably by direct telephone calls to me, so that we can clear up any problems and get our merger consummated.""
证交所的调查成了蓝筹印花日常业务运作的障碍。1974年秋天，芒格写信给他的律师说：“我希望目前正在进行的调查能让证交所的人都满意，如果不，请你确保我及时收到任何回音，最好是直接打电话给我，以便于解决任何问题，让我们的收购圆满结束。”
Instead, the SEC opened a full-scale investigation of Buffett's investment practices: In the Matter of Blue Chip Stamps, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Warren Buffet [sic], HQ-784.
取而代之的是，证交所对巴菲特的投资公司展开了全面的调查：《关于蓝筹印花、伯克希尔和巴菲特的调查》，编号：HQ-784。
"Blue Chip, Berkshire, Buffet [sic], singly or in concert with others ... may have engaged in acts which may have directly or indirectly operated as a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or included in an untrue state of material of fact or omitted .....
“蓝筹印花、伯克希尔、巴菲特，单独或与他人联合……可能直接或间接地参与了某些行动，制定诡计、阴谋、欺诈或在一份材料中提供一些并非事实的陈述或遗漏某些要点……”
In the meantime, the Washington DC rumor mill churned with the news that Munger's former law partner, Rod Hills, had been offered the job of SEC chairman. Rickershauser, who also was acting as Buffett's lawyer, called Hills and asked him to reject the job offer, claiming that if he took the post, the SEC might feel compelled treat the Blue Chip case more harshly just to make sure there was no suggestion of favoritism. According to some reports, Munger called Hills several times and berated him for not standing by his friends, but Hills said that Munger never called him about the matter. They never discussed it at the time or later. At any rate, Hills dismissed Rickershauser's request as inappropriate and accepted the job anyway.
同时，在华盛顿特区盛传芒格以前的律师搭档罗德·希尔斯将会被任命为证交所主席。当时担任巴菲特律师的里克肖瑟给罗德打了电话，希望他能拒绝这个职位。里克肖瑟认为一旦罗德接受了任命，为避嫌，证交所对蓝筹印花案件的调查很可能会变本加厉。根据一些报告，芒格给罗德打了好几次电话，痛骂他不站在老朋友这边，不过罗德说芒格从来没有为这件事给他打过任何电话。他们当时和后来都没有讨论过这件事。无论如何，罗德没有理会里克肖瑟的非分要求，最后还是接受了任命。
The SEC did not stop its probe with Wesco. It extended the investigation to Source Capital, and when Buffett and Munger realized that their financial relationship had become so complex that it was difficult to explain it to the SEC, they decided to restructure their holdings and simplify matters. Charlie already had closed down Wheeler, Munger and assumed the chairmanship of Blue Chip at a salary of $50,000 per year. Buffett had closed his partnership and had turned his attention to Berkshire Hathaway.
证交所并没有停止对威斯科金融的调查，还将调查范围扩大到了资源资本身上。此时巴菲特和芒格意识到他们的财务关系过于复杂，很难向证交所解释清楚，于是他们决定进行重组，把事情简化下来。芒格已经结束了惠勒和芒格证券公司，以5万美元的年薪在蓝筹印花担任主席。巴菲特则关掉了自己的合伙公司，把注意力集中到伯克希尔身上。
In 1975, Munger testified before the SEC about the Blue Chip case, doing his best to convince regulators that he and Buffett only intended to play fair when they offered the higher-than-necessary share price after the Financial Corp. merger blew up. The SEC countered that it was a corporate investor's job to make a profit for its shareholders, not favor anonymous sellers on a stock exchange. Munger explained, with little effect, that he and Buffett hoped that conduct demonstrating fairness would enhance Blue Chip's reputation and this ultimately would benefit all shareholders. Munger and Buffett particularly hoped to make a good impression on Lou Vincenti, whom they wanted to stay on at his old job as CEO, which he did for many years. Such considerations got no favorable reaction from the SEC.
1975年，芒格在证交所就蓝筹印花事件出庭作证，竭尽全力想使那些官员相信他和巴菲特在合并计划流产后出高价收购股份只是出于公平的考虑。证交所认为公司投资者的工作是为股东赚取利润，而不是在股票交易中让那些无名卖家获利。芒格解释说，他和巴菲特希望那样的行为能够证明蓝筹印花的公正性，从而提升公司的声誉，最终会对所有的股东有利。不过这一解释收效甚微。芒格和巴菲特特别希望给路易斯·文森特留下好印象，他们希望他能够留在自己的老位子上做CEO，他在那个位子上已经待了很多年了。这样的考虑在证交所中没有得到任何积极的回应。
Following a standard practice, the SEC filed and concurrently settled a lawsuit against Blue Chip, charging that the company had purchased Wesco not just as an investment, but to defeat the merger. It also asserted that Blue Chip artificially propped up Wesco's share price for several weeks after the merger collapsed. Without admitting or denying guilt, Buffett and Munger agreed not to make the same mistake again. Blue Chip was required to give more than $115,000 to Wesco shareholders whom the SEC decided had been damaged by the business practices.
经过了一系列标准的流程后，证交所将文件归档，同时对蓝筹印花提出一项法律诉讼，指控公司购买威斯金融并不只是作为一项投资，而是为了阻止合并。同时也断言，蓝筹印花在合并计划流产后，人为地将威斯科金融的股价推高了好几个星期。巴菲特和芒格既没有承认也没有否认，只是同意再也不会犯同样的错误。蓝筹印花被要求向威斯科金融的股东支付115 000美元，因为证交所认定他们在那次商业行为中受到了损失。
It was a stressful time, but as a result. Berkshire Hathaway became a larger, simpler company. In the reorganization that followed, Blue Chip Stamps sold its interest in Source Capital, which by then had doubled in value. Wesco, for tax purposes, was consolidated with Blue Chip Stamps as its ownership proportion reached 80 percent. Both Diversified Retailing and Blue (:hip were merged into Berkshire, finally giving Munger a formal position at Berkshire. Munger got 2 percent of the stock of Berkshire and was named vice chairman, keeping his old salary of $50,000. Bob Denham, who worked on some of these legal maneuvers, said the organization of the company under a single corporation eliminated almost all appearance of conflict of interest. Before they were merged, Blue Chip and Berkshire had different shareholders, and when a true bargain investment came along, the possibility might exist that Buffett would allocate the bargain to one group of shareholders at the expense of the other. That could no longer happen.
那是一段压力很大的日子，不过最后伯克希尔成了一家规模更大、结构更简单的公司。在此后的重组过程中，蓝筹印花卖出了它在资源资本中的股份，当时已经翻了一倍。威斯科金融由于持股比例已经达到80%，出于税收的考虑与蓝筹印花合并。多元零售和蓝筹印花都并入了伯克希尔，让芒格最终得以在伯克希尔中有一个正式的职位。芒格得到了伯克希尔2%的股份，并担任副主席，薪水仍然是5万美元。罗伯特·德汉姆参与了这些法律事务中的一部分，他说：“在同一集团下设立公司的结构，消除了几乎任何表面上的利益冲突。在合并前蓝筹印花和伯克希尔的股东不同，一旦一项真正的有利可图的投资项目出现，很有可能巴菲特要以牺牲一方股东为代价让另一方股东获得收益，这种情况再也不会发生了。”
Until the merger, Blue Chip shareholders were sent their own annual report with a message written by Munger. When the merger took place, Buffett and Munger together wrote a letter to shareholders: "It will he somewhat simpler for us to run a combined enterprise, reducing sonic costs. Also, simplicity has a way of improving performance through enabling us better to understand what we are doing."
直到合并前，蓝筹印花的股东们都会收到他们自己的年报，附有一段芒格的话。当合并完成后，巴菲特和芒格一起写了一封致股东们的信：“管理合并后的企业对我们来说简单很多，成本也降低了。同时，简单让我们更了解自己在做什么，因此也有利于实现更佳的表现。”
By the time Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, Berkshire held 60 percent of Blue Chip stock. On July 28, 1983, Berkshire acquired the 40 percent interest that it did not already own. Each outstanding Blue Chip Stamps share was exchanged for .077 of a share of Berkshire.The combined assets of the merged companies amounted to $1.6 billion. Shareholders met at Omaha's former Red Lion Inn to approve the new
corporate structure. Warren and Susan Buffett held enough shares to enact the merger on their own, but told other shareholders they would vote for the merger only if it were approved by a majority of the remaining shareholders."
伯克希尔和蓝筹印花合并的时候，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花60%的股份。1983年7月28日，伯克希尔收购了其余的40%股份。每一股蓝筹印花都换得0.077股伯克希尔股份。合并后的公司总资产约16亿美元。股东们在奥马哈相聚，确定了新公司的结构。巴菲特夫妇持有足够的股份，自己就可以决定合并的事情，不过他们告诉其他股东要对合并进行投票表决，只有在大多数其他股东都同意的情况下才会执行。
Years later, Munger said the merger was the right thing to do. "It is so much less complicated now. Since then we have one of the simplest structures there is. At a high level, it's one big company, Berkshire Hathaway. But way down in the organization, there is still some complexity. Some of our companies are owned 100 percent, some 80 percent, and some positions merely involve big blocks of stock."
多年后，芒格说合并是正确的选择。“现在的情况简单得多。从那以后我们有一个最简单的结构。在最高层只有一家大公司——伯克希尔。不过结构图的下面，还是有点复杂。有些公司是100%持股的，有些是80%，有些只是持有一大笔股票而已。”
What Charlie finds interesting when thinking back about all this progress is how few big business decisions were involved in creating billions of dollars out of less than $40 million, fewer than one every three years. "I think the record shows the advantage of a peculiar mind-set-not seeking action for its own sake, but instead combining extreme patience with extreme decisiveness."
回想这一切的时候，芒格发现最有趣的是用不到4 000万美元的资金创造了几十亿的财富，在这个过程中真正重大的商业决定却并不太多，不会超过每三年一次。“我认为这样的记录显示出的是一个不同寻常的聪明人的优势，他不是只追求自己的利益，取而代之的是将无比的耐心和果断坚决结合在一起。”
Munger's stepson Hal Borthwick gives Charlie enormous credit for helping to work out Blue Chips' various problems. "Charlie made really tough calls in the early days. Those guys were still cigar butt investors. They were, you know, looking for assets on the cheap. And Charlie helped solve those problems."
芒格的继子哈尔·博思威克对芒格帮助蓝筹印花解决很多问题给予了高度评价：“早期继父做了很多非常艰苦的工作。那些人都是固守思路的投资人，你知道的，他们一直都在找便宜的资产。继父帮忙解决了这些问题。”
"WE MEGAN TILE 1970s wrru a single business, trading stamps, which was destined to decline to a small fraction of its former size, and a portfolio of securities, offsetting stamp redemption liabilities, which had been selected by previous owners and would have led to a disastrous result if held through to the present time,\" Munger wrote to shareholders in 1981.
“我们在20世纪70年代开始的时候只有一项业务，那就是买卖印花，最后业务注定衰退成了昔日规模的一个零头，以前的股东手中的一堆证券、抵消印花赎回的负债，如果留到现在就会带来灾难性的后果。”芒格1981年在致股东的信中这样写道。
As for the original business of Blue Chip Stamps: "I presided over a reduction in trading stamp sales from over $120 million down to less than $100,000. So I presided over a failure of 99.99 percent,\" said Munger. \"Even so, the company did wonderfully with the capital we invested elsewhere. But in terms of the trading stamp company, I laid an egg. So did everyone else. There is no big trading stamp company left in the United States."
“在我的管理下买卖印花的销售额从1.2亿美元下降至不到10万美元，所以我的管理失败率是99.99%，”芒格说，“即便如此，公司在其他方面的投资表现却非常优异。不过从一家印花交易公司的角度来看，我是完全失败的。其他人也都是。现在在美国没有剩下一家大型印花交易公司了。”
"But we had no expectation that the trading stamp business was a big winner-as it turned out it went bloo-ey. Meantime, we bought Sees, Buffalo News, and Wesco and made successful investments in marketable securities with the float and other capital. The money compounded like crazy," said Munger.
“不过我们没有料到印花交易业务会成为大赢家，这一天到来的时候它就开始走下坡路了。与此同时，我们收购了喜诗、《布法罗晚报》和威斯科金融，并且运用备用账户和其他资金在证券市场进行了相当成功的投资。财源滚滚，就像发了疯一样。”芒格说。
In 1972, Blue Chip's balance sheet net worth was about $46 million; By the end of 1981, net worth had increased to about $169 million, up 267 percent in 10 years. Return on shareholders investment in the company for the 10 years was 15 percent per year.
1972年，蓝筹印花的资产负债表上的净值约为4 600万美元；而到了1981年底，增长到了16 900万美元，10年间增长了267%。股东在这10年间的年投资回报率是15%。
Later, the gains were larger, according to Munger. If Blue Chip had remained a separate company, it would be it powerhouse today. Its former operating subsidiaries now earn over $150 million pretax. Moreover, Wesco has more than $2 billion in marketable securities, and by now Blue Chip, on its own, would have owned much more.
后来，据芒格说，回报更为丰厚。如果蓝筹印花仍然是一家独立公司，它今天会是一家发电厂。它以前运营的那些子公司税前收入超过15 000万美元。此外，威斯科金融有超过20亿美元的证券在手。时至今日，蓝筹印花自己的价值则高得多。
Though it is buried deep in the filing cabinets of Berkshire Hathaway, Blue Chip remains an intact company. When people dig into the back of their kitchen drawers or open their deceased mother's trunk and find books of Blue Chip Stamps, they can be redeemed.
虽然深埋在伯克希尔的文件柜里，蓝筹印花仍然是一家完整的公司。如果人们在厨房抽屉的角落里仔细找一找，或者打开过世的母亲留下的箱子发现了印花，他们还是可以拿去兑换。
"Most trading stamp companies just disappeared. Blue Chip still exists, a minuscule stamp business-redeeming stamps issued in 1961 and 1962," explained Buffett. "The numbers say they were issued 30-odd years ago. We keep this little redemption company. We've got a good looking catalog. We offer the same value we did 25 years ago."
“大部分印花交易公司直接消失了。蓝筹印花仍然存在，保留了很小一部分印花业务——兑换1961—1962年间发行的印花，”巴菲特解释，“上面的数字表明是30多年前发行的。我们保留了这家小兑换公司，还有一本很漂亮的目录，提供的价值和25年前一样。”
He and Munger are determined that the Blue Chip office will remain open as long as they believe that some significant number of unredeemed stamps are going to turn up. It also tickles them that Berkshire Hathaway became a great investment for the small retailers who fought for a piece of the company.
他和芒格决定把蓝筹印花公司一直开下去，只要他们认为还会有相当数量的未兑换印花会出现。想到伯克希尔成了那些曾经为争取在公司分一杯羹而斗争的小商家一生中最好的投资，他们就心花怒放。
"Years ago, before Warren and I bought our stock, Blue Chip Stamps mailed minor amounts of Blue Chip stock out to filling station operators as a litigation settlement in the antitrust case brought against the founders by small merchants," said Munger. "My wife told the guy who owns the automobile repair shop where she takes her car to hold onto it. Well, the other day when she stepped out of her car he hugged and kissed her. So maybe we should buy into another dying business.""'
“很多年前，在我和巴菲特买入股票之前，蓝筹印花寄给几位加油站老板少量的公司股份，作为小商家们打赢了反垄断官司后的解决方案，”芒格说，“我太太告诉我她时常去修车的那家汽修厂老板，有一天在她刚下车时就紧紧拥抱她并送上香吻。所以也许我们该再买一门日落西山的业务进来。”
THE SECURrrIE.S ANI) EXCHANGE. COMMISSION was finally placated, but Berkshire's problems with Blue Chip were not yet fully resolved. The remaining issue involved some of those filling station and other small business owners who were issued shares in the 1970s. Some 20
years later, a tiny group of shareholders who had forgotten about or lost track of their stock realized they'd missed out on an important event.
证交所的麻烦最终平息了下来，不过伯克希尔和蓝筹印花之间的问题却还没有完全解决。剩下的问题涉及那些在20世纪70年代收到过股份的加油站和其他小商家老板。20多年后，有一小群忘记有这些股票或是遗失股票记录的股东忽然间发现自己错过了这么重要的一件事。
The shareholders claimed that their stocks were lost in transfer agent records and that they were unaware that they were now holders of Berkshire shares. Under state laws, after a certain amount of time such shares are escheated, or turned over to the state for care taking, which Berkshire's transfer agent did. In some cases, the states were still holding the shares, which in the meantime had increased in value almost a hundredfold. In other cases, the states sold the Berkshire shares and held the money in the name of the original Blue Chip shareholder.
这些股东称他们的股票在交易经纪人的记录中遗失了，致使他们没有意识到自己现在持有伯克希尔的股份。根据加州法律，在一定时间后这些股份要么充公，要么会转交州政府保管，也就是伯克希尔交易经纪所执行。在一些案例中，州政府会继续持有这些股份，那样的话价值就已经增长了近100倍。还有一些案例中，州政府会卖出伯克希尔的股份，以最初蓝筹印花股东的名义保存这笔钱。
In 1993, legislation was passed in California permitting the state to save escheating costs by selling the stock it held as unclaimed property. The state then placed the funds in numbered accounts to hold in trust for future claimants. In November 1995, the State of California sold all Berkshire stock it held at $31,177.77 per share. By the time the misplaced Blue Chip shareholders learned what happened (with the help of a bounty hunter) and filed suit, Berkshire was selling at $37,950 per share."
1993年，加州通过了法律，允许州政府通过卖出它所持有的无人认领的股份来降低管理成本。州政府然后就将资金存入有编号的账户，以信托基金的方式保存这笔钱供后人认领。1995年11月，加利福尼亚州政府以31 177.77美元一股的价格售出手上所有的伯克希尔股份。当这些忘记股票在何处的蓝筹印花股东知道发生了什么情况时就提出了诉讼，当时伯克希尔的股价是37 950美元一股。
The New York and San Diego law firm of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, which is well known for handling shareholder class action lawsuits, sued Berkshire for failing to make enough effort to find 400 early Blue Chip Stamps shareholders to let them know that they now owned Berkshire shares. They wanted shareholders to be compensated for the growth they'd missed out on after the state sold their shares.
有一家在纽约和圣地亚哥都有分部的律师事务所以擅长处理股东共同起诉案件而出名，状告伯克希尔未尽全力寻找400名早期的蓝筹印花股东，让他们知道自己现在拥有的是伯克希尔的股份。他们希望公司补偿股东们在州政府售出股份后未能获得的价差。
"The issue is, they should've dropped me a note and let me know," said plaintiff John E. DeWitt, 61, who owned gasoline stations and delivered petroleum products in South El Monte, California. "We've been located in the same spot since 1972."'
“问题是，他们应该给我写封信让我知道。”61岁的原告约翰·德威特说。他拥有几家加油站，在加利福尼亚的南埃尔蒙特地区销售汽油。“我们从1972年开始就在同一个地方了。”
Although they were not listed as defendants, Munger, along with Warren Buffett and his wife Susan, were named in the complaint.
虽然没有被列入被告名单，芒格和巴菲特夫妇还是在申诉中被提及了。
"There is no truth to the stories that little retailers were taken advantage of," said Buffett, claiming that in some cases the shareholders simply ignored their mail. In the end, "People got their money. They are just mad because the state sold the Berkshire shares. We've found Berkshire holders from the 1930s. They are millionaires now."
“那些小商家所说的根本就是假的。”巴菲特说。他认为有时股东们只是忽略了自己收到的信件。最后，“他们拿到了钱。他们只是因为州政府出售了伯克希尔的股份而发了疯。我们还发现了从20世纪30年代就开始持有伯克希尔股份的人，他们现在都是百万富翁了。”
The court threw out the shareholders suit, saying that the statute of limitations had expired on their action. If the suit had run its full course, Berkshire may have had no liability anyway. Some stocks were "lost" long before Berkshire bought Blue Chip, and at any rate, due process had been followed for unclaimed shares.'
法院驳回了股东们的诉讼请求，认为已经过了诉讼时效。要是这次诉讼真的跑满全程，伯克希尔可能一点责任都不用担。有些股票在伯克希尔收购蓝筹印花之前很久就“掉了”，无论如何，对那些无人认领的股票，该走的程序都走了。
"Some shareholders are always going to get 'lost,' meaning out of contact with the corporate transfer agent. The inevitability of that outcome is why all advanced commercial nations have escheat laws," says Munger. "And Berkshire works harder than most corporations in pushing transfer agents to find lost shareholders."
“有些股东老是容易‘掉’，也就是和公司交易经纪失去联系。由此产生的不可避免的结果就是所有商业化程度高的国家都有无人认领法，”芒格说，“伯克希尔比多数公司都要积极地督促交易经纪去找到那些失踪的股东。”
As IMPLIED EARI.IER,THE RELATIONSHIP between Buffett, Munger, and Vincenti, chief executive officer of Wesco, worked out just as Buffett and Munger had hoped. Vincenti, one of Pasadena's best business lawyers, had become CEO of his best client. "He was brilliant, principled, decisive, and parsimonious," said Munger. "And he stayed on as CEO for many years, loving the business. Finally he got Alzheimer's disease. By that time we liked him so much that we kept him coming in as CEO until he could no longer function. Betty Peters cheerfully joined in this unusual decision."
就像前文中暗示的那样，巴菲特、芒格和威斯科金融的首席执行官文森特之间的关系就像他们所希望的那样好。文森特曾经是帕萨迪纳最好的商务律师之一，后来成了自己最佳客户的CEO。“他聪明、有原则、果断，还很节俭，”芒格说，“而且他做了很多年CEO，热爱这门业务。最后他得了阿尔兹海默症。那个时候我们非常喜欢他，只要他来上班就算他在履行CEO的职责，一直到他再也来不了为止。贝蒂·彼得斯也很高兴地参与了这个非同寻常的决定。”
AMONG THE SHAREHOLDERS BERKSHIRE inherited from Blue Chip was legendary investor Philip L. Carret. Carret had owned Blue Chip shares since 1968 and converted to Berkshire at about $400 per share. Carret had been involved in portfolio management for 78 years. He founded one of the first and most successful mutual funds, the Pioneer Fund, which operated through all sorts of economic conditions from 1928 until 1983. The annual total return for the Pioneer Fund in that period averaged 13 percent, compared with 9 percent for the S&P 500.
伯克希尔从蓝筹印花那里继承得来的股东中包括传奇投资人菲利普·卡雷特。卡雷特自1968年开始就持有了蓝筹印花的股份并以400美元一股的价格转成了伯克希尔的股份。卡雷特参与投资组合管理长达78年。最早一批最成功的对冲基金之一——先锋基金就是由他成立的，这个基金从1928—1983年在各种经济环境下都一直在运作。在此期间先锋基金的平均年投资回报率是13%，而标准普尔500指数则是9%。
Born in 1896, Phil Carret died May 28, 1998, at age 101. Just a year earlier he'd attended the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting in Omaha and although he was confined to a wheelchair, Carret spent much of the day chatting with other shareholders. Carret worked until two weeks before his death and was sharp of mind until the end.
菲利普·卡雷特生于1896年，于1998年5月28日去世，享年101岁。前一年他还参加了伯克希尔在奥马哈召开的年度股东大会。虽然坐着轮椅，卡雷特还是用了几乎一天的时间和其他投资人交谈。去世前两个星期卡雷特还在工作，至死都保持清醒的头脑。
FROM THE TIME THEY STARTED buying Blue Chip until the time it was merged into Berkshire, Buffett and Munger slowly but surely cemented their partnership. There never had been a written contract covering the terms of their work together. Rather, Munger and Buffett simply went forward on trust.
从他们开始买入蓝筹印花到这家公司并入伯克希尔的这段时间里，巴菲特和芒格缓慢而稳妥地巩固了他们的合伙人关系。从来都没有一份书面的合同来定义他们合作的条款。芒格和巴菲特只是凭着信任一路向前。
"To those of us who became lawyers," said Wendy Munger, "the lesson of his business life is that you don't want to do business with people you can't trust. The economics are irrelevant if you don't have trust. Most people are just thinking about the economics, thinking that the contract will save you when entering into a transaction with someone you can't trust. You must do business with high-grade people-that's all he will deal with."
“对我们这些成为律师的人来说，”温迪·芒格说，“从他的经商生涯中学到的宝贵一课就是不要和自己不信任的人做生意。如果没有信任，经济条件如何根本就不相干。大多数人只会考虑经济问题，认为当自己和一个不信任的人交易的时候合同会帮你把关。你一定要和高水准的人做生意——和他打交道的都是这类人。”
Charlie also puts it this way: "Never wrestle with a pig because if you do you'll both get dirty, but the pig will enjoy it."
芒格也用这种方式说：“永远不要和一头猪玩摔跤，因为如果你这么做了，你们两个都会变脏，但是猪会乐在其中。”
The sale of our 371,400 shares of Blue Chip Stamps was not completed in 1969. When the stock went into registration, it was selling at about $24 per share. The underwriters indicated a range where they expected to offer our shares (along with others) with heavy weight placed on a comparison with Sperry & Hutchinson. Shortly before the stock was to be offered, with the Dow-Jones Industrials much lower but S & H virtually unchanged, they indicated a price below their former range. We reluctantly agreed and felt we had a deal but, on the next business day, they stated that our agreed price was not feasible. We then withdrew and a much smaller offering was done.
1969年，我们没把我们的371,400股蓝筹印花（Blue Chip Stamps）都卖出去。这只股票注册上市后，股价是每股24美元。承销商给我们报了一个发行价范围。他们在确定这个发行价范围时，主要是参照斯佩里和哈钦森印花公司（Sperry＆Hutchinson Stamps）的股价。就在我们的股票很快就要上市的时候，道指大跌，斯佩里和哈钦森印花的股价几乎没变，但承销商把发行价范围调低了。我们不太情愿地答应了，以为这就定下来了，但是第二天，他们又说定好的价格不行。于是，我们就撤了，把发行规模大大缩小了。
I intend to hold our block of Blue Chip Stamps in BPL for a more advantageous disposal or eventual distribution to our partners. The odds are decent that we will do better in this manner -even if it takes a year or two - than if we had participated in a very large sale into a somewhat distressed market. Unless there is a material change in the market in the next few days, I plan to value our Blue Chip holdings at yearend at the price received by selling shareholders on the public offering after underwriting discount and expenses.
对于我们在巴菲特合伙金持有的蓝筹印花股份，我打算继续持有，等到以后价格合适时再出售，或者分配给合伙人。从概率上看，与其在行情低迷的时候把我们的大部分股票卖出去，不如像我们现在这么做，多等一两年也行。只要这几天蓝筹印花的股价不出现大幅变动，今年年末，在对它估值时，我打算采用发行价减去承销费用。
We are down to about $6 million of net assets, largely represented by our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps. However, we have miscellaneous other items, including such little gems as about 90% of a fractional interest in the royalty under a gas well in Bee County, Texas (producing less than $4,000 per year) and 80% of a small store building in South Chicago. It is much easier to get into business than to get out of it. My expectation is that we will get everything finally wound up during 1971, but this is very tentative -- in any event, I think it unlikely we make a further distribution in 1970. The office will be maintained at Kiewit Plaza (although perhaps on a different floor) through 1971 when our lease expires.
我们的净资产现在只剩下大约 600 万美元，主要是我们持有的蓝筹印花（Blue Chip Stamps）股票。除此以外，我们还有其他一些杂项资产，包括德克萨斯州比县（Bee County, Texas）一口天然气井（每年产生不到 4,000 美元的收入）特许权使用费约 90% 的权益，以及芝加哥南部一家小型商店 80% 的产权。进入一个生意比退出一个生意要容易得多。我预计我们最终将在 1971 年清算一切，但这只是一个初步的想法——无论如何，我都认为我们不太可能在 1970 年就作进一步的分配。在 1971 年我们的租约到期之前，我们将继续在 Kiewit Plaza 办公（尽管可能在不同的楼层）。
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花公司
Our holdings of stock in Blue Chip Stamps at year‐end amounted to approximately 19% of that company’s outstanding shares. Since year‐end, we have increased our holdings so that they now represent approximately 22.5%: implementation of the proposed merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. would increase this figure to about 38.5%.
去年年底我们所持有的蓝筹印花的股份约占其总发行股份的 19%。自年底以来，我们增加了持股比例，现在约占 22.5%，而合并多元零售公司将使这一比例增加到 38.5%。
Our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps became significant for the first time in 1973, and posed an accounting question as to just what period’s earnings should be recognized by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. as applicable to the financial statements covered by this annual report.
我们对蓝筹印花权益在 1973 年第一次显得如此重要，也就带来了一个会计上的问题：那就是哪一段时期的利润收入才应被记录到我们今年的财务报告中去呢。
Blue Chip’s fiscal year ends on the Saturday closest to February 28, or two months after the fiscal year‐end of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Or, viewed alternatively, their year ends ten months prior to Berkshire Hathaway’s. An acceptable accounting choice for us, and one which, if made, would not have required an auditor’s disclaimer as to scope, was to recognize in our 1973 income an equity of $632,000 in Blue Chip’s earnings for their year ended March 3, 1973 with regard to the fewer shares of Blue Chip we owned during this earlier period. But such an approach seemed at odds with reality, and would have meant a ten month lag each year in the future. Therefore, we chose to reflect as 1973 income our equity of $1,008,000 in Blue Chip’s earnings based upon unaudited interim earnings through November as publicly reported by Blue Chip Stamps and with regard to our shareholdings during 1973. Because we made this choice of unaudited but current figures, as opposed to the alternative of audited but far from current figures, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. were unable to express an opinion on our 1973 earnings attributable to Blue Chip Stamps.
蓝筹印花的会计年度截止于 2 月 28 号的周六，是伯克希尔会计年度结束之后两个月。或者说，他们的会计年度比我们的提早十个月结束。对于我们来说，一个可以接受的办法就是(如果做出的话，就不需要审计师对范围的免责声明)，鉴于我们之前拥有的蓝筹印花较少的股份，在我们 1973 年的收入中囊括进蓝筹印花 632,000 美元的权益收入(他们 1973 年的会计年截止于 3 月 3 号)。但是这种做法似乎与现实情况不符，并且意味着未来每年都要滞后 10 个月。因此，我们的选择是在蓝筹印花公布的截止到 11 月份的未经审计的中期收入的基础上，将 1,008,000 美元的蓝筹印花权益包括在我们 1973 年的收入中。由于我们采用了未经审计但却是当期的数据，而不是那种审计过却早已过时的数据， Peat,Marwick,Mitchell&Co. 会计公司(毕马威前身)无法对我们 1973 年盈利中来自蓝筹印花的部分发表意见。
The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ending March 2, 1974 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in early May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at that time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
蓝筹印花的年度报告，包括由 Price, Waterhouse & Co. 普华永道审计的截止于 1974 年 3 月 2 日的财务报表，在五月初就会公布。伯克希尔任何有兴趣获得报告的股东，都可以到时写信给加利福尼亚州洛杉矶东南大街 5801 号蓝筹印花公司秘书 Mr.RobertH.Bird,邮编 90040。
Blue Chip’s trading stamp business has declined drastically over the past year or so, but it has important sources of earning power in its See’s Candy Shops subsidiary as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 54% owned subsidiary engaged in the savings and loan business. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to achieve satisfactory earnings in future years related to capital employed, although certainly at a much lower level than would have been achieved if the trading stamp business had been maintained at anything close to former levels.
蓝筹印花公司的印花销售业务自去年来有了大幅下滑，但是其子公司喜诗糖果公司以及 Wesco 金融公司还有相当强大的盈利能力，后者是一家拥有 54% 股权的从事储蓄和贷款业务的子公司。预计蓝筹印花公司未来几年会有不错的盈利收入，当然如果印花业务不下滑的话，利润收入肯定会更高。
早期版本的BRK。
Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops Incorporated. Operating management of all three entities is in the hands of first‐class, able, experienced executives.
您的董事长是蓝筹印花，Wesco 金融公司的董事会成员，以及喜诗糖果公司的董事会主席，三家企业的管理人员也都是一流的、能干且经验丰富的。
5、《1975-03-31 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花公司
During 1974 we increased our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps to approximately 25.5% of the outstanding shares of that company. Overall, we are quite happy about the results of Blue Chip and its prospects for the future. Stamp sales continue at a greatly reduced level, but the Blue Chip management has done an excellent job of adjusting operating costs. The See’s Candy Shops, Inc. subsidiary had an outstanding year, and has excellent prospects for the future.
在 1974 年，我们继续增加对蓝筹印花公司的持股，大约占流通股的 25.5%。整体来看，我们很看好蓝筹印花公司的业绩和它未来的前景。印花的销售持续大幅下跌，但是蓝筹印花公司的管理层在调整运营成本方面做得很好。子公司喜诗糖果公司 (See's Candy Shops, Inc.) 今年的业绩很好，而未来也有极好的前景。
Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 64% owned subsidiary, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops, Inc. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to be a source of continued substantial earning power for Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
你们的董事长是蓝筹印花公司的董事会成员，同时也是拥有 64% 控股子公司威斯科金融公司 (Wesco Financial) 的董事会成员，还是喜诗糖果公司的董事会主席。我们预计蓝筹印花会成为伯克希尔持续强劲盈利能力的来源。
The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ended March 1, 1975 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at any time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
蓝筹印花公司的年报会在 5 月份发布，这里面包含截止到 1975 年 3 月 1 日年度财务状况，是由普华永道公司审计的。任何伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东想要获得一份蓝筹印花公司的年报，可以随时写信给 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址为加利福尼亚州洛杉矶市东南大街 5801 号，蓝筹印花公司秘书 Robert H.Bird 先生收，邮编 90040。
6、《1976-03-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花公司
During 1975 our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps remained at 25.5 of that company’s outstanding shares. However, early in 1976 our holdings were increased to 31.5%. We expect some increase in our equity in Blue Chip’s earnings in 1976 because of this increased ownership.
1975 年，我们持有的蓝筹印花公司股票仍占该公司已发行股份的 25.5%。但在 1976 年初，我们的持股比例增加到 31.5%。由于持股比例的增加，我们预计 1976 年我们在蓝筹印花公司收益中的权益会有一定程度的增加。
The stamp business continues its precipitous decline with volume in the year ended February 28, 1976 amounting to only one-sixth that of the peak year ended February 28, 1970. Don Koeppel and Bill Ramsey have done an extraordinary job of cost-cutting, which has served to moderate operating problems resulting from this evaporation of business. In addition, the acquisition of See’s Candies in 1972 has proven a real winner. Chuck Huggins’s management has been outstanding, and profits have moved up dramatically during the past several years.
印花业务继续急剧下降，截至 1976 年 2 月 28 日的一年中，印花业务量仅为截至 1970 年 2 月 28 日的高峰年的六分之一。唐-科佩尔（Don Koeppel）和比尔-拉姆齐（Bill Ramsey）出色地完成了削减成本的工作，从而缓解了业务流失带来的经营问题。此外，1972 年对 See's 糖果公司的收购也被证明是一个真正的赢家。查克-哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）的管理非常出色，在过去几年里，利润大幅增长。
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. desiring the current annual report of Blue Chip Stamps should write Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东如需蓝筹印花公司的最新年度报告，请致函蓝筹印花公司秘书 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。
7、《1977-03-21 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花公司
During 1976 we increased ourinterest in Blue Chip Stamps, and by yearend we held about 33% uf that company's outstanding shares. Our interest in Blue Chip Stampsis of growing importance to us. Summary financial reports of Blue Chip Stampsare contained in the footnotes to our attached financial statements. Moreover, shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. are urged to obtainthe current and subsequent annual reports of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting them from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
1976 年我们增加了在蓝筹印花公司的权益，年底前我们已持有该公司 33% 的流通股。蓝筹印花的股权对我们日益重要。蓝筹印花的简要财务报告在我们所附的财务报表的脚注里。另外，伯克希尔公司的股东可以从蓝筹印花公司的秘书 Robert H. Bird 那里得到现在和后续的年报。他的地址是加利福尼亚州洛杉矶东南大道 5801 号蓝筹印花公司，邮编 90040。
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花
We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.
我们再度增加对蓝筹印花的持股权益，截至 1977 年底，持有的股权比例大约是 36.5%，蓝筹印花去年的表现相当不错，经营收益达到 1,290 万美元，此外还有 410 万的已实现资本利得。
Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary of Blue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See’s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuck Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre‐tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth.[1] Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
蓝筹印花持有 80% 股权的 Wesco 金融公司(由 Louis Vincenti 管理)，及其持有 99% 股权的子公司 See's Candies 喜诗糖果(由 Chuck Huggins 管理)在 1977 年都有重大进展，自从喜诗糖果在 1972 年被蓝筹印花所买下后，就没有增加任何额外的资本，其税前收益从 420 万美元增长到 1,260 万美元，尤其难得的是，喜诗是在几乎没有增长的行业中取得这一成绩的[1]。伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东可向 Robert H. Bird 先生索取蓝筹邮票公司的年度报告，地址是 Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。
9、《1983-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Issuance of Equity 发行股份
Berkshire and Blue Chip are considering merger in 1983. If it takes place, it will involve an exchange of stock based upon an identical valuation method applied to both companies. The one other significant issuance of shares by Berkshire or its affiliated companies that occurred during present management’s tenure was in the 1978 merger of Berkshire with Diversified Retailing Company.
伯克希尔与蓝筹印花目前正考虑在 1983 年正式合并，如若实现，两家公司将会以一致的估值模式进行股权交换，伯克希尔上一次大量发行新股是在 1978 年并购 DRC 多元零售时。
24. Blue Chip Stamps is a disaster under Buffett and Munger
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This one is real easy. My wife was a collector of Blue Chip stamps for many, many years. And she brought some stamps with her. What should she do with them?
听众：这个问题很简单。我妻子收集蓝筹印花很多很多年了。她带来了一些印花。她该怎么处理这些印花呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that — we can give you a definitive answer to that. Charlie and I entered the trading stamp business to apply our wizardry to it in what, 1969 or so, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个--我们可以给你一个明确的答案。查理和我是在 1969 年左右进入印花交易行业的，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: We were doing what then, about 110 million?
沃伦·巴菲特：我们当时做了多少，大约 1.1 亿？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it went up to 120.
查理·芒格：不，涨到了 120。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. And then we arrived on the scene and we’re going to do what, about 400,000 this year?
沃伦·巴菲特：然后我们到了现场，我们今年要做多少，大约40万？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
That shows you what can be done when your management gets active. (Laughter)
这让你看到了当你的管理层积极行动起来的时候，可以做些什么。笑声
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have presided over a decline of 99 1/2 percent. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们主持了 99.5%的下降。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. But, we’re waiting for a bounce — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的 - 是的 - 但是，我们在等待反弹——（笑声）
I would say this. The trading stamp business, as those of you who have followed all know, it only works because of the float.
我想这样说。关注过印花交易的人都知道，印花交易之所以能成功，完全是因为浮存金。
I mean, there — a very, very high percentage of the stamps in the ’60s were cashed in. We have some years that we’ve gone up to 99 percent, I believe — we sampled the returns — because they were given out in such quantity.
我的意思是，60 年代的印花兑现率非常非常高，我相信有些年份的兑奖率高达 99% - 我们对兑奖情况进行了抽样调查 - 因为当时印花的发行量非常大。
But, our advice to anyone who has stamps is to save them because they’re going to be collector’s items, and besides if you bring them to us we have to give you merchandise for them.
但是，我们建议有印花的人保存好印花，因为它们会成为收藏家的藏品，此外，如果你把印花带给我们，我们必须给你商品。
Tell her to keep them. They’ll do nothing but gain in value over years. (Laughter)
让她留着吧，多年后它们只会增值。（笑声）
Secret to avoiding lawsuits: “You can’t make a good deal with a bad person”
避免诉讼的秘诀：“你无法与坏人达成好交易”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：区域 1。
Don’t think the mic —
别想麦克风 —
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do Berkshire and Berkshire companies protect themselves against lawsuit-happy lawyers? And is it possible for American businesses to survive the financial and time-consuming costs of dealing with lawyers?
观众：伯克希尔和伯克希尔公司如何保护自己免受好打官司的律师的影响？美国企业是否有可能在应对律师的财务和时间成本中生存下来？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question and we’ve probably had less litigation than any company, you know, with a $25 billion market value in America.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题，我们的诉讼可能比任何一家在美国市值 250 亿美元的公司都要少。
But it’s, you know — we were sued one time at Blue Chip Stamps — what was it for, Charlie, and how many billion by some guy?
但是，你知道——我们在蓝筹印花公司被起诉过一次——是因为什么，查理，还有多少亿被某个人起诉？
一个系统如果越来越碎片化，自然会有这样的烂事，巴菲特和芒格被起诉以后立即精简了整个企业系统。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Lots.
查理·芒格：很多。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It was — you know, there — you cannot protect yourself against lawsuits, and there are certainly a lot of frivolous ones we’ve — like I say, we have — it’s not been a drain on our time or money — but particularly time — to date.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你知道，无法保护自己免受诉讼，当然有很多无谓的诉讼——就像我说的，我们——这并没有对我们的时间或金钱造成负担——但特别是时间——到目前为止。
And I think one thing you’d have to do is, if you ran into anything of that sort, you would not pay and you would make life as — try to make life comparably difficult for the other party as they made it for you. But that has not been our experience so far.
我认为如果你遇到这种情况，你需要做的一件事是，你不会支付，并且会尽量让对方的生活变得和他们让你一样困难。但到目前为止，这并不是我们的经历。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I can tell an Omaha story on that one which demonstrates the Berkshire Hathaway technique for minimizing lawsuits.
查理·芒格：是的。我可以讲一个关于奥马哈的故事，这个故事展示了伯克希尔·哈撒韦在减少诉讼方面的技巧。
When I was a very young boy, I said to my father, who was a practicing lawyer here in Omaha, “Why do you do so much work for X,” who was an overreaching blowhard — (Laughter) — “and so little work for Grant McFayden,” who was such a wonderful man?
当我还是个很小的男孩时，我对我父亲说，他在奥马哈是一名执业律师：“你为什么为 X 做这么多工作，”他是个过于自负的吹牛者——（笑声）——“而为格兰特·麦克法登做的工作却这么少，”他是个如此优秀的人？
And my father looked at me as though I was slightly slow in the head. And he said, “Charlie,” he said, “Grant McFayden treats his employees right, his customers right, everybody right.
我父亲看着我，仿佛我有点迟钝。他说：“查理，”他说，“格兰特·麦克法登对待他的员工、客户，人人都很好。”
“When he gets involved with somebody who’s a little nuts, he gets up from his desk, and walks to where they are, and extricates himself as soon as he can.” And he says, “Charlie, a man like Grant McFayden doesn’t have enough law business to keep you in school. (Laughter)
“当他跟一个有些疯狂的人打交道时，他会从办公桌旁站起来，走到他们跟前，然后尽快抽身离开。”他继续说，“查理，像格兰特·麦克法登这样的人没有足够的法律业务让你继续上学。（笑）”
“Ah, but X,” he said, “he’s a walking minefield of continuous legal troubles, and he’s a wonderful client for a lawyer.”
“啊，但 X，”他说，“他是一个不断陷入法律麻烦的行走雷区，他是律师的一个绝佳客户。”
Now, my father was trying to teach me, and I must say it worked beautifully, because I decided that I would adopt the Grant McFayden approach.
现在，我父亲试图教我，我必须说这效果很好，因为我决定采用 Grant McFayden 的方法。
And I would argue that Warren independently reached the same approach very early in life. Boy has that saved us a lot of trouble. That is a — it is a good system.
我想说的是，沃伦早年也是这样做的。天哪，这可给我们省了不少麻烦。这是一个--一个很好的系统。
WARREN BUFFETT: You can’t — yeah, we basically have the attitude that you can’t make a good deal with a bad person. And you can — that means we just forget about it.
沃伦·巴菲特：你不能——是的，我们基本上持有这样的态度：你无法与坏人达成好交易。这意味着我们就忘了它。
I mean, we don’t try and protect ourselves by contracts, or getting into all kinds of, you know, due diligence, or —
我意思是，我们并不试图通过合同来保护自己，或者进行各种尽职调查，或者——
We just forget about it. We can do fine over time, dealing with people that we like, and admire, and trust.
我们就忘了它。随着时间的推移，我们可以很好地应对我们喜欢、钦佩和信任的人。
So we have never — and a lot of people do get the idea, because the bad actor will tend to try and tantalize you in one way or another, and —you won’t win. It just pays to avoid them.
所以我们从来没有——很多人确实会有这样的想法，因为坏演员往往会试图以某种方式挑逗你，而——你不会赢。避免他们是有益的。
We started out with that attitude, and you know, maybe one or two experiences have convinced us, even more so, that that’s the way to play the game.
我们一开始就是这种态度，你知道，也许一两次经历让我们更加相信，这就是玩这个游戏的方式。
12、《1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting-Afternoon Session》
37.Not all “float” businesses are attractive
并非所有“浮动”业务都具有吸引力
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? Oh, the question was about other kinds.
沃伦·巴菲特：第三区？哦，问题是关于其他类型的。
We’ve always had an interest in float businesses of one sort or another, but —
我们一直对某种浮存金感兴趣，但——
You know, Blue Chip Stamps was such a business, until it disappeared — (laughs) — one day, and we couldn’t find it. We went — looked in the closet. We looked everywhere, out in the backyard. (Laughs) Where was it?
你知道，蓝筹印花曾经是这样的一个生意，直到有一天它消失了——（笑）——我们找不到它。我们去——在衣柜里找。我们到处找，后院也找了。（笑）它在哪里？
So we like that sort of business. But most of the float businesses, the costs are pretty explicit. And like I say, we don’t like most insurance companies as float businesses. We are not interested in buying the typical insurance business, because we think the float will end up costing us too much.
所以我们喜欢那种业务。但大多数浮存金的成本是相当明确的。正如我所说，我们不喜欢大多数保险公司作为浮存金。我们对购买典型的保险业务不感兴趣，因为我们认为浮存金最终会让我们付出太高的成本。
We’d rather borrow money with an explicit cost attached to it rather than have the implicit costs of an underwriting loss with most companies.
我们宁愿借款并明确附加成本，而不是承担大多数保险公司承保损失的隐性成本。
But we’re always — we are interested in businesses that provide cash rather than use up cash. We’re willing to have them use cash, if the — if what they use will produce high enough returns. But we’ve got this bias toward things that throw off cash.
但我们始终对提供现金而不是消耗现金的业务感兴趣。如果他们使用的现金能够产生足够高的回报，我们也愿意让他们使用现金。但我们对能够产生现金流的事物有这种偏好。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we go into the pre-need funeral home business, that’ll be the day. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，如果我们进入预收款的殡仪馆业务，那将是那一天。（笑声）
13、《2000-04-29 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting-Afternoon Session》
WARREN BUFFETT: But Berkshire comes from three companies that came together: Diversified Retailing, Blue Chip Stamps, and Berkshire. Those were the three base companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：但是伯克希尔是由三家公司合并而成的：多元零售、蓝筹印花和伯克希尔，这三家公司是基础公司。
And Diversified started when we bought a company called Hochschild Kohn in Baltimore in 1966, a department store. And that company disappeared over time.
多元零售始于我们在 1966 年收购了一家位于巴尔的摩的公司，名为 Hochschild Kohn，一家百货商店。随着时间的推移，那家公司消失了。
Fortunately, in 19 — I think — 70, we sold it to Supermarkets General. Blue Chip, we’ve told you about the record of that.
幸运的是，在 19——我想——70 年，我们将其出售给了Supermarkets General。蓝筹印花，我们已经告诉过你们关于它的记录。
So, we started out with three disasters, and put them all together. (Laughter)
所以，我们一开始有三个灾难，然后把它们都放在一起。（笑声）
And it’s worked out pretty well.
而且效果很好。
But it was a mistake to be working from that kind of a base. Don’t follow our example in that respect. Start out with a good business and then keep adding on good businesses.
但从那种基础上工作是个错误。在这方面不要效仿我们的例子。先从一个好的业务开始，然后不断增加好的业务。
人性中有倾向于碎片化的基因，喜欢做一些新奇的尝试，巴菲特、芒格早期经历中大家对现金流的概念都不够深刻，几十年后的今后如果不借鉴前辈的经验，盲目瞎干是没有道理的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But the example of quickly identifying the mistakes and taking action, there, our example is a good one.
查理·芒格：但是快速识别错误并采取行动的例子，我们的例子是一个很好的例子。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
1. Blue Chip Stamps plunges under Buffett and Munger
1. 蓝筹邮票在巴菲特和芒格的影响下暴跌
WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve heard us talk here about the importance of our managers. However, occasionally, Charlie and I get involved in management ourselves. And we would normally be too modest to claim any great accomplishments.
沃伦·巴菲特：你们听我们谈论过管理者的重要性。然而，偶尔，查理和我会亲自参与管理。我们通常会过于谦虚，不会声称有什么伟大的成就。
But we have had one rather incredible performance which, since Charlie participated in it as well I do — I think if we put up the slide on the company that Charlie and I have managed personally, you’ll see that this entity — you can’t — Charlie, here it is, right here.
但我们有过一次相当令人难以置信的表现，因为查理也参与了其中。我认为如果我们展示查理和我亲自管理的公司的幻灯片，你会看到这个实体——你不能——查理，这里就是。
It’s one where we took over 30-odd years ago. And as you can see, the 46,000 became — what?
这是我们大约三十多年前接手的项目。正如你所看到的，46,000 变成了——什么？
VOICE: That’s the wrong slide.
声音：那是错误的幻灯片。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Excuse me. Are you sure? Oh.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦。抱歉。你确定吗？哦。
VOICE: Oh, yeah. 声音：哦，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well, I guess we better put up the next slide.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我想我们最好展示下一张幻灯片。
We — (laughter) — they got that first one — they got it reversed. We were doing 120 million when we took over, and we’re now doing $46,000 a year. But we may get a bounce one of these years. (Laughter)
我们——（笑）——他们把第一个搞反了。我们接手时的年收入是 1.2 亿，现在每年只有 46,000 美元。但我们可能在未来某一年会有反弹。（笑）
That was a company that also had a lot of float — (laughs) that we were attracted to. And the interesting thing is, you know, this was Blue Chip Stamps.
那是一家也有很多浮存金的公司——（笑）我们对此很感兴趣。有趣的是，你知道，这就是蓝筹印花。
Although Blue Chip was a copy, of a sort, of Sperry & Hutchinson, which really was the main inventor of trading stamps on any large scale in the country, and they go back to the 19th century.
尽管蓝筹印花在某种程度上是 Sperry & Hutchinson的复制品，而 Sperry & Hutchinson确实是美国大规模交易印花的主要发明者，他们可以追溯到 19 世纪。
But if you think about it, S&H Stamps — Green Stamps — or Blue Chip Stamps, had many similarities to frequent flyer miles. You know, the only difference being that, you know, you got them a lot at, like, grocery stores and all of that and then you had to lick them and put them in a book. Whereas now, it’s all done electronically.
但如果你仔细想想，S&H 印花——绿色印花——或蓝筹印花，与飞行里程有很多相似之处。你知道，唯一的区别是，你知道，你在杂货店等地方获得它们的频率很高，然后你得舔它们并把它们放在一本书里。而现在，这一切都是电子化的。
But the basic underlying business was very similar to frequent flyer miles, which have this incredible hold on the American public. But somehow, we were not able to make the transfer.
但基本的商业模式与飞行里程非常相似，这对美国公众有着不可思议的吸引力。但不知为何，我们未能实现转移。
We haven’t yet made the transformation, let’s put it that way, from the lick-it stamp to something that the public will accept.
我们还没有完成这种转变，可以这么说，从舔印花到公众会接受的东西。
But we’ve still got $47,000 of revenue annually from the entire state of California, so we’re building a base. (Laughter)
但我们仍然从整个加利福尼亚州获得每年 47,000 美元的收入，所以我们正在建立一个基础。（笑声）
Charlie and I continue to spend most of our time working on this one.
查理和我继续花大部分时间在这个项目上。
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