I.H.113.Warren Buffett.Consumer Products

I.H.113.Warren Buffett.Consumer Products

有些消费品包含潜藏在大众心智中的资产。
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.
这类不同于我在上一次论述中已提出并回答过的反对意见,人们或许也会针对对美国个体公民行使立法的原则提出异议。有人会说,这样做会使联邦政府过于强大,并使其能够吞并那些本应为地方目的而保留给各州的剩余权力。即便把合理之人所能要求的对权力之爱的最大限度都予以承认,我仍承认,我难以想见掌管国家政府的人会出于何种诱因而愿意剥夺各州此等性质的权力。仅仅是一州内部之治安与行政的规制,在我看来,对雄心并无多大诱惑。商业、财政、外交与战争,似乎囊括了所有能吸引受此激情支配之心灵的对象;而为达成这些对象所必需的一切权力,理当首先存放于国家层面的总汇之处。至于同一州公民之间的私法裁判、对农业以及性质相近的其他事务的监督——简言之,一切适宜由地方立法加以规定之事——绝不可能成为一般层级管辖所乐于承担的关切。因此,联邦当局间存在篡取与之相连之权力的倾向,实属不大可能;因为试图行使这些权力,将同样麻烦且徒劳无益;正因如此,占有这些权力也不会给国家政府的尊严、重要性或辉煌增添分毫。

But let it be admitted, for argument’s sake, that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
但且为论辩起见,纵使仅凭恣意与支配之欲就足以滋生那种倾向;仍可坦然断言,国家代表之选民团体——换言之,各州人民——的意志,会抑制如此过分的嗜好。州政府侵犯国家权力,永远要比国家政府侵犯州权来得容易得多。此命题之根据,在于:若州政府以正直与审慎治理其务,便通常会对人民拥有更大的影响力;而这一情形也同时教导我们:一切联邦宪制中,皆潜藏着一种与生俱来的内在弱点;因此在其组织设计上,必须不遗余力,使之具备与自由原则相容的最大力度。

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
各州政府在影响力上的优势,部分源于国家政府结构的分散与广布,更主要则源于州级行政所要关注之事物的性质。

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.
众所周知,人性之情感,往往随对象之距离或分散程度的增加而减弱。基于同一原理,一个人对家庭的依恋强于对邻里的依恋,对邻里的依恋又强于对整个共同体的依恋;因此,各州人民极易对其地方政府抱有较之对联邦政府更为强烈的偏向;除非联邦政府的施政远为优越,以至于抵消此一原理之作用。

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
人心这种强烈的倾向,在州政府所规制的诸多事务中,还会找到有力的助缘。

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.
种种更为细微的利益,必然落入地方行政的督察之下,并化作无数影响力的细流,流经社会的每一处;若要一一细述,势必陷入冗长而乏味的铺陈,所获教益不足以抵偿其枯燥。

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,–I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not un-frequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
州政府职权范围内,有一项卓绝的优势,足以单独将问题阐释得明白而令人满意——我指的是刑事与民事司法的日常实施。在所有来源之中,此事最为强大、最为普遍、亦最具吸引力,足以激发民众的服从与依附。它作为生命与财产的直接且可见的守护者,其利益与威惧不时显现于公众眼前,规制着一切与个人切身相关、与日常相熟之事;因而较诸任何其他因素,更能在人民心中烙下对政府的亲爱、敬重与崇敬。这个社会之大粘合剂,几乎将完全经由各州政府的渠道而弥散开来;即便撇开其他一切影响因素不论,也足以使各州政府对其各自公民拥有如此明确的支配力,以至于在任何时候都能构成对联邦权力的完全抗衡,并且不止一次地成为其危险的对手。

The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
反之,国家政府的运作较少直接处于广大公民的目光之下;由此获得的利益,多半只会为思辨之士所感知并加以留意。此类运作关涉较为宏泛的一般性利益,因此不太容易切近人们的情感;相应地,也就不大可能激发一种习惯性的义务感与一种积极的依附情绪。

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
关于此点的推理,凡我们所熟悉的一切联邦宪制,以及一切与其稍有类比之政体的经验,已提供了充分的例证。

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
虽则古代封建制度严格说来并非邦联,但它们带有此类联合的性质。全国之上有一共同之首,即酋长或君主,其权威扩及全境;其下有若干从属的封臣或采邑领主,他们分得广袤土地,并各自拥有众多更下级的封臣或扈从,这些人以向所依附者宣誓忠诚或服从为土地占有之条件,占据并耕种土地。每一位主要封臣在其特定领地之内,皆是一种意义上的君主。此等格局的后果,是不断与君主权威相对抗,以及大贵族或主要封建领主之间频繁的战争。国家元首的权力通常太弱,无足以维持公共安宁,亦不足以保护人民免受其直属领主的压迫。史家强调地将欧洲事务的这一时期称为封建无政府时代。
Idea
商业模式中有非常相似的地方。
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
当君主恰好具备勇悍好战之性情并兼有卓越才能时,他会获得一份个人分量与影响,暂时可起到较为正规权威的作用。但一般而言,伯爵等贵族之力常常胜过君主之力;在许多情形里,君主的统治被完全摆脱,广大封地被树立为独立的侯国或邦国。在那些君主最终战胜其封臣的案例中,其成功主要得益于封臣对其部属的暴虐。那些贵族既是君主之敌,又是平民之压迫者,因此同时为双方所畏惧并憎恶;终于,在共同危险与共同利益的驱使下,二者结成联盟,从而致使贵族权势覆亡。若贵族以仁恕与正义行事,得以维系其侍从与追随者的忠诚与奉献,则他们与君主之间的争斗几乎总会以贵族取胜而告终,并导致王权的缩减或颠覆。

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
此并非仅凭臆测或揣度而下的断言。诸多可资佐证的例子之中,苏格兰便提供了一个有力的样本。该王国早期引入的氏族精神,将贵族与其部属以近乎血亲的纽带联结起来,使得贵族阶层长期压倒君主之力;直至与英格兰的合并,方才制服其凶悍而难驯之气,并将之纳入后者王国先前所确立的更为理性且更具活力的市民政体之服从规则内。

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
邦联中的各个分立政府,颇可与封建采邑相类比;就其有利之处而言,基于前述缘由,它们通常能获得人民的信任与善意;凭借如此重要的支撑,它们足以有效抗拒国家政府的一切蚕食。若它们尚不足以抵消国家政府正当且必要的权威,那已属幸事。二者相似之处,在于彼此皆存在权力之争,以及把社会相当大一部分力量集中于特定“蓄积”之中——前者由个人所支配,后者则由政治团体所支配。

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
对历来伴随邦联政体而生的事件作一番简要回顾,将进一步阐明这一重要原理;忽视此点,正是我们政治错误的根源所在,并使我们的猜忌指向了错误的一边。此一回顾,将成为后续若干篇文章的主题。

2、《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

51. “It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts”
“重要的不是市场份额,而是心智份额”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特: 再次到第一区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City.
听众: 我是来自纽约市的迈克·阿塞尔(音)。

Could you explain a little more about what you call the “mind of the consumer” and the “nature of the product” and explain how you actually apply these concepts to find the companies with the growing demand and the best investment potential? And thank you for being two of the greatest professors I’ve ever had.
您能否详细解释一下您所说的“消费者心智”和“产品的本质”,以及您如何实际应用这些概念来寻找具有增长需求和最佳投资潜力的公司?感谢你们二位成为我遇到过的最伟大的老师。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特: 谢谢。(掌声)

You know, what you really — when you get into consumer products, you’re really interested in finding out — or thinking about — what is in the mind of how many people throughout the world about a product now, and what is likely to be in their mind five or ten or 20 years from now?
你知道,当你研究消费品时,你真正感兴趣的是了解——或思考——世界上有多少人现在对某种产品的看法是什么,以及五年、十年或二十年后,他们对该产品的看法可能会是什么。

Now, virtually every person on the globe — maybe, well, let’s get it down to 75 percent of the people on the globe — have some notion in their mind about Coca-Cola. They have — the word “Coca-Cola” means something to them. You know, RC Cola doesn’t mean anything to virtually anyone in the world, you know, it does to the guy who owns RC, you know, and the bottler.
目前,几乎全球的每个人——或者说,让我们将范围缩小到全球75%的人——对可口可乐都有某种看法。对他们来说,“可口可乐”这个词有着某种意义。而RC可乐几乎对世界上的任何人都没有意义,除了拥有RC可乐的人和装瓶商。

But everybody has something in their mind about Coca-Cola. And overwhelmingly, it’s favorable. It’s associated with pleasant experiences.
但是每个人对可口可乐都有某种看法。而且绝大多数情况下,这种看法是积极的。它与愉快的体验联系在一起。

Now, part of that is by design. I mean, it is where you are happy. It is at Disneyland, at Disney World. And it’s at ballparks. And it’s every place that you’re likely to have a smile on your face, including the Berkshire Hathaway meeting I might add. (Laughter)
这其中有一部分是精心设计的。它存在于让你感到快乐的地方,比如迪士尼乐园、迪士尼世界。它也出现在球场上,以及其他任何可能让你面带微笑的地方,包括我可以补充的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东大会。(笑声)

And that position in the mind is pretty firmly established. And it’s established in close to 200 countries around the world with people.
这种心智中的定位已经非常牢固地建立起来了。而且这种定位在全球近200个国家的人们心中都已形成。

A year from now, it will be established in more minds. And it will have a slightly, slightly, slightly different overall position. In ten years from now, the position can move just a little bit more.
一年之后,它将在更多人的心中扎根。整体定位会有轻微的、非常轻微的变化。十年后,这种定位可能会再稍微发生一点变化。

It’s share of mind. It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts.
关键在于心智份额,而不是市场份额。重要的是心智份额。

Disney, same way. Disney means something to billions of people. And if you’re a parent of a couple young children and you got 50 videos in front of you that you can buy, you’re not going to sit down and preview an hour and a half of each video before deciding what one to stick in front of your kids. You know, you have got something in your mind about Disney. And you don’t have it about the ABC Video Company. Or you don’t even have it about other — you don’t have it about 20th Century. You know, you don’t have it about Paramount.
迪士尼也是一样。迪士尼对数十亿人来说有着特别的意义。如果你是有两个小孩的家长,面前有50部可以购买的视频,你不会花时间去预览每一部视频的90分钟内容来决定给孩子看哪部。你对迪士尼有印象,但对ABC视频公司却没有印象。甚至对其他公司,比如二十世纪影业或者派拉蒙,也没有相同的印象。

So that name, to billions of people, including lots of people outside this country, it has a meaning. And that meaning overwhelmingly is favorable. It’s reinforced by the other activities of the company.
所以这个名字,对包括很多外国人在内的数十亿人来说,有其特定的意义。这种意义是积极的,并且通过公司其他活动得到了强化。

And just think of what somebody would pay if they could actually buy that share of mind, you know, of billions of people around the world. You can’t do it. You can’t do it by a billion-dollar advertising budget or a $3 billion advertising budget or hiring 20,000 super salesmen.
想想看,如果有人真的可以购买这种“心智份额”,即获得全球数十亿人的认知,他们会付出什么代价?这是买不到的。你用十亿美元、甚至三十亿美元的广告预算,或者雇用两万名超级销售员,也做不到。

So you’ve got that. Now, the question is what does that stand for five or ten or 20 years from now? You know they’ll be more people. You know they’ll be more people that have heard of Disney. And you know that there will always be parents that are interested in having something for their kids to do. And you know that kids will love the same sort of things.
所以你已经拥有了这一点。现在的问题是,这种意义在五年、十年或二十年后将代表什么?你知道会有更多人。你知道会有更多人听说迪士尼。而且你知道父母总是希望为孩子寻找一些事情做。你也知道孩子们会喜欢同样的东西。

And, you know, that — (Munger accidentally knocks over his microphone) — what’s? (Laughter)
然后,你知道,这——(芒格不小心碰倒了他的麦克风)——怎么了?(笑声)

He emphasizes the key points when we get to those. (Laughter)
他总是在关键点上加以强调。(笑声)

But that is what you’re trying to think about with a consumption product. That’s what Charlie and I were thinking about when we bought See’s Candy. I mean, here we were. It’s 1972. You know, we know a fair amount about candy. I know more than when I sat down this morning. (Laughs)
但这就是你在考虑消费品时需要思考的问题。这也是查理和我在1972年购买See’s糖果时所考虑的。我是说,当时我们知道不少关于糖果的事情。我现在可能比今天早上坐下时知道得更多了。(笑声)

I mean, I had about 20 pieces already. (Laughter)
我已经吃了大约20块了。(笑声)

But, you know, what — whose, you know — does their face light up on Valentine’s Day, you know, when you hand them a box of candy and say, you know, it’s some nondescript thing and say, “Here, honey, I took the low bid,” you know, or something of the sort, and — (Laughter)
但是,你知道,当你在情人节递给他们一盒糖果时,他们的脸上会绽放笑容吗?而且你还说,“亲爱的,这是一种毫不起眼的糖果,我挑了最便宜的。”(笑声)

No. I mean, you want something — you know, you’ve got tens of millions of people — or at least many millions of people — that remember that the first time they handed that box of candy, it wasn’t that much thereafter that they got kids for the first time or something.
当然不是。我是说,你想要的是某种东西——比如,你有成千上万,甚至至少数百万的人记得,他们第一次递给对方那盒糖果后没多久,就有了第一个孩子之类的事情。

So it’s — the memories are good. The association’s good.
所以这是——美好的记忆和联想。

Total process. It isn’t just the candy. It’s the person who takes care of you at Christmastime when they’ve been on their feet for eight hours, and people have been yelling at them because they’ve been in line with 50 people in line, and that person still smiles at them.
整个过程。它不仅仅是糖果。还有那个圣诞节时照顾你的员工,他们已经站了八个小时,还有排着50人长队向他们大喊的顾客,但他们仍然对你微笑。

The delivery process. It’s the shop in which they get all kinds of things, the treat we give them. It’s all part of the marketing personality.
交付过程也是一部分。从他们进入商店、获取各种物品,到我们为他们提供的款待,这一切都是营销个性的一部分。

But that position in the mind is what counts with a consumer product. And that means you have a good product — a very good product — it means you may need tons of infrastructure, because you’ve got to have that — I had a case of Cherry Coke awaiting me at the top of the Great Wall when I got there in China. Now that — you’ve got to have something there so that the product is there when people want it.
但对于消费品来说,关键是心智中的定位。这意味着你需要一个好的产品——非常好的产品——同时,你可能需要大量的基础设施支持。比如,当我到达中国长城顶端时,有一箱樱桃可乐在那里等着我。你需要确保产品在消费者需要时能够随时到达。

And that happened — in World War II, General Eisenhower, you know, said to Mr. Woodruff that he wanted a Coca-Cola within arm’s length of every American serviceman in the world. And they built a lot of bottling plants to take care of that.
二战期间,艾森豪威尔将军告诉伍德拉夫先生,他希望全世界每个美国士兵都能随手喝到可口可乐。于是,他们建立了许多装瓶厂来满足这一需求。

That sort of positioning can be incredible. It seems to work especially well for American products. I mean, people want certain types of American products worldwide, you know, our music, our movies, our soft drinks, our fast food.
这种定位是非常强大的。尤其对美国产品特别有效。全球范围内,人们对某些类型的美国产品有极大的需求,比如我们的音乐、电影、软饮料和快餐。

You can’t imagine, at least I can’t, a French firm or a German firm or a Japanese firm having that — selling 47 or 48 percent of the world’s soft drinks. I mean, it just doesn’t happen that way. It’s part of something you could broadly call an American culture. And the world hungers for it.
你无法想象,至少我无法想象,一个法国公司、德国公司或日本公司能够做到这一点——占据全球47%或48%的软饮料市场。这种情况不会发生。这是你可以广义上称之为“美国文化”的一部分,而全世界都渴望它。

And Kodak, for example, probably does not have quite the same — and George Fisher’s doing a great job with the company. This goes back before that.
比如说,柯达可能不再拥有同样的地位——尽管乔治·费舍尔在领导公司时做得很棒。这种变化早在那之前就开始了。

But Kodak probably does not have the same place in people’s mind worldwide quite as it had 20 years ago. I mean, people didn’t think of Fuji in those days, we’ll say, as being in quite the same place.
但柯达在全球人们心中的地位可能不如20年前那么牢固。比如说,那时人们并不认为富士在市场上的地位与柯达相当。

And, then, Fuji took the Olympics, as I remember, in Los Angeles. And they just — they put them — they pushed their way to more of a parity with a Kodak. And you don’t want to ever let them do that.
后来,我记得富士赞助了洛杉矶奥运会。通过这种方式,他们逐渐提升自己的地位,接近了柯达的水平。而你绝不能让竞争对手做到这一点。

And that’s why you can see a Coca-Cola or a Disney and companies like that doing things that you think, well, this doesn’t make a hell of a lot of sense. You know, if they didn’t spend this $10 million, wouldn’t they still sell as much Coca-Cola?
这就是为什么你会看到像可口可乐或迪士尼这样的公司做一些看起来没什么意义的事情。比如,如果他们不花这1000万美元,难道他们就不会卖出同样多的可口可乐吗?

But, you know, that — I quoted from that 1896 report of Coca-Cola and the promotion they were doing back then to spread the word. You never know which dollar’s doing it. But you do know that everybody in the world, virtually, has heard of your product. Overwhelmingly, they’ve got a favorable impression on them and the next generation’s going to get it.
但你知道,我曾引用过1896年可口可乐的一份报告,描述了当时他们为了推广品牌所做的宣传活动。你永远不知道哪一美元的投入起到了作用。但你知道,几乎全世界的人都听说过你的产品。他们大多数对你的品牌有正面的印象,而下一代人也会延续这种印象。

So that’s what you’re doing with consumer products.
这就是你在消费品领域需要做的事情。

With See’s Candy, you know, we are no better — we want — no better than the last person who’s been served their candy or the last product they’ve been served.
对于See’s糖果来说,我们的声誉仅仅取决于最后一个购买糖果的顾客,或是最后一次提供的产品质量。

But as long as we do the job on that, people can’t catch us. You know, we can charge a little more for it because people are not interested in taking the low bid. And they’re not interested in saving a penny a bottle on colas. Remember we’ve talked about in these meetings, private labels, in the past.
只要我们把工作做到位,别人就无法赶上我们。你知道,我们可以多收一点钱,因为人们对选择最低价格并不感兴趣。他们也不愿意为了每瓶可乐省一分钱而选择替代品。记得我们在这些会议上谈过私人品牌的问题。

And private label has stalled out in the soft drink business. They want the real thing. And 900 and some odd million eight-ounce servings will be served today of Coca-Cola product around the world. Nine-hundred million, you know. And it’ll go up next year, the year after. And I don’t know how you displace companies like that.
私人品牌在软饮料行业已经停滞不前。消费者想要的是正品。今天,可口可乐的产品在全球范围内将提供超过9亿份8盎司的饮料。9亿份!明年还会更多,后年也会更多。我不知道你如何取代这样的公司。
Idea
茅台镇的各种假茅台。
I mean, if you gave me a hundred billion dollars — and I encourage if any of you are thinking about that to step forward — (laughter) — if you gave — and you told me to displace the Coca-Cola Company as the leader in the world in soft drinks, you know, I wouldn’t have the faintest idea of how to do it. And those are the kind of businesses we like.
我的意思是,如果你给我1000亿美元——如果有人真考虑这样做,我欢迎你站出来——(笑声)——你让我用这笔钱取代可口可乐成为全球软饮料的领导者,我根本不知道该怎么做。而这种企业正是我们喜欢的类型。

Charlie?
查理?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the See’s Candy example has an interesting teaching lesson for all of us.
查理·芒格: 是的,我认为See’s糖果的例子对我们所有人来说有一个有趣的启示。

Warren said we were — it’s the first time we really stepped up for brand quality. And it was a very hard jump for us. We’d been used to buying dollar bills for fifty cents.
沃伦说,这是我们第一次真正重视品牌质量。这对我们来说是一个非常大的飞跃。在此之前,我们习惯以五十美分的价格购买价值一美元的资产。

And the interesting thing was that if they had demanded an extra $100,000 for the See’s Candy company, we wouldn’t have bought it. And that was after Warren had been trained under the greatest professor of his era, and had worked 90 hours a week.
有趣的是,如果他们对See’s糖果的报价再多10万美元,我们就不会买下它。这是在沃伦接受了他那个时代最伟大的教授的训练,并且每周工作90小时之后发生的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: And eaten a lot of chocolates, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特: 还吃了很多巧克力。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Absorbing everything in the world. I mean, we just didn’t have minds well enough trained to make an easy decision right. And by accident, they didn’t ask the extra $100,000 for it. And we did buy it. And as it succeeded, we kept learning.
查理·芒格: 是的,吸收了世界上的一切知识。但我想说,我们的思维训练得还不够好,无法轻松做出正确的决定。碰巧的是,他们没有多要那10万美元,于是我们买下了它。随着它的成功,我们不断学习。

I think that shows that the name of the game is continuing to learn. And even if you’re very well-trained and have some natural aptitude, you still need to keep learning.
我认为,这表明关键在于持续学习。即使你受过良好训练,并且有一些天赋,你仍然需要不断学习。

And that brings along the delicate problem people sometimes talk about: two aging executives. (Laughter)
这也带来了人们有时会提到的一个微妙问题:两个年事已高的高管。(笑声)

I don’t know what the hell that means as an adjective because I don’t know anybody that is going in the other direction. (Laughter and applause)
我不知道“年事已高”这个形容词究竟是什么意思,因为我从没见过有人在朝相反的方向前进。(笑声和掌声)

But you people who hold shares are betting, for a while at least, until younger successors come along, you’re betting to some extent on what we’ll now tactfully continue to call “aging executives” continuing to learn.
但是你们这些持有股票的人,至少在一段时间内,直到年轻的继任者出现为止,你们某种程度上是在押注我们这些“年事已高的高管”能够继续学习。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, if we hadn’t have bought See’s, with some subsequent developments after that because that made us aware of other things, we wouldn’t have bought Coca-Cola in 1988. I mean, you can give See’s a significant part of the credit for the, I guess, $11 billion-plus profit we’ve got in Coca-Cola at the present time.
沃伦·巴菲特: 是的,如果我们没有买下See’s糖果,而在此之后的某些发展使我们意识到了其他事情,我们在1988年就不会买下可口可乐。我想说,可口可乐目前超过110亿美元的利润,有很大一部分功劳可以归于See’s糖果。

And you say, “Well, how could you be so dumb as not to be able to recognize a Coca-Cola?” Well, I don’t know, but —
你可能会问,“你怎么会这么愚蠢,以至于看不出可口可乐的价值?”嗯,我也不知道,但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You were only drinking about 20 cans a day.
查理·芒格: 毕竟你每天只喝了大约20罐而已。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Right. It wasn’t that I hadn’t been exposed to it, or — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特: 是的,没错。这不是因为我没有接触过它,或者——(笑声)

It’s amazing. But it just made us start thinking more. I mean, we saw how decisions we made in relation to See’s played out in a marketplace and that sort of thing.
这很令人惊讶。但这确实让我们开始更多地思考。我的意思是,我们看到我们与See’s相关的决策在市场上是如何发挥作用的,以及类似的事情。

And we saw what worked and didn’t work. And it made us appreciate a lot what did work and shy away from things that didn’t work. But it led — it definitely led to a Coca-Cola. And we’ve had the good luck to buy some businesses themselves in their entirety that taught us a lot.
我们看到什么有效,什么无效。这让我们非常感激那些有效的事情,同时避免无效的事情。但这确实引导我们走向了可口可乐。而且我们很幸运,能够完全买下某些业务,而这些业务教会了我们很多东西。

You know, we bought — and it’s worked in the other direction. I mean, we were in the windmill business, one time. I was. Charlie stayed out of the windmill business. But I was in the windmill business and pumps and — third-level department — or second-level — department stores.
你知道,我们也曾向相反的方向尝试过。比如,有一次我们进入了风车业务。我参与了,查理则避开了风车业务。我还进入了泵业,以及三线或二线百货商店的业务。

And I just found out how tough it was and how it didn’t — you could apply all kinds of energy to them. And it didn’t do any good. It made a great deal of sense to figure out what pond to jump in. And what pond you jumped in was probably more important than how well you could swim.
我发现这些业务有多难,无论你投入多少精力都没有效果。选择跳进哪片池塘是非常重要的,甚至比你游泳技巧有多高超更为重要。

Charlie?
查理?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s necessary that people be as ignorant as we were, as long as we were. (Laughter)
查理·芒格: 我认为人们不必像我们一样在那么长时间里表现得那么无知。(笑声)

I think American education could be better, but not in the hands of any of the people who are now teaching. (Laughter)
我认为美国的教育可以更好,但不是在现在这些教书人的手中。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there any group we’ve forgotten to offend? I mean — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特: 我们是不是漏掉了某个还没得罪的群体?我的意思是——(笑声)
42. It’s hard to challenge a well-established, popular brand
很难挑战一个知名的、受欢迎的品牌

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12?
沃伦·巴菲特:第十二号?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Harold Yulean (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.
观众成员:你好。我的名字是哈罗德·尤利安(音)。我来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。

I’d like you to describe the economic characteristics of the Kraft Corporation, why you feel this is a good business.
我想请你描述一下卡夫公司的经济特征,并说明你为什么认为这是一家好公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say most of the big food companies are good businesses in that they earn good returns on tangible assets.
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我会说大多数大型食品公司都是好企业,因为它们在有形资产上获得了良好的回报。

And I don’t want to get into — particularly into specifics on Kraft — but if you own important, branded products in this country, whether it’s Wrigley’s or Mars or Coca-Cola, or a number of the Kraft brands, or See’s Candy, you have good assets.
我不想特别深入讨论卡夫的细节,但如果您拥有一些国家重要的品牌产品,无论是箭牌(Wrigley)、玛氏(Mars)、可口可乐(Coca-Cola),还是卡夫的一些品牌,或是喜诗糖果(See’s Candy),那您就拥有了不错的资产。

It’s not easy to take on those products. Just imagine, you know, taking on — Coca-Cola will sell a billion and a half eight-ounce servings of its product around the world today.
很难去挑战这些产品。试想一下,今天可口可乐在全球销售15亿个8盎司的份量。

There’s something in everybody person’s mind virtually in the globe about Coca-Cola. It’s a product of — since 1886 has been associated with happiness and good value in terms of refreshment and all that.
在全球每个人的心中都有关于可口可乐的某种印象。自 1886 年以来,这款产品一直与快乐和物有所值的清爽体验等联系在一起。

It’s just about impossible, you know, to, in my mind, anyway, to take on a product like that. It’s clearly satisfies people in a huge way, you know, everywhere on the globe.
在我看来,挑战像可口可乐这样的产品几乎是不可能的。这显然是一个能满足全球人们需求的巨大产品。

And, you know, it may not be the same — Kraft, for example, has Kool-Aid in the powdered soft drink business. You know, I don’t think I’d want to take on Kool-Aid. I’d rather have Coca-Cola. But it’s a tough product.
虽然可能不会完全相同,但例如卡夫有柯露爱(Kool-Aid)粉末饮料。我认为我不想去挑战柯露爱。我更喜欢可口可乐,但这确实是一个强大的产品。

And to get implanted — just think of — to get implanted in people’s mind RC Cola around the world. And RC Cola has been around a long, long time. You know, it isn’t going to go anyplace. I mean, that is very, very difficult.
想要在人的头脑中植入一种新的可乐品牌,比如RC可乐,而RC可乐已经存在了很长时间,但它始终无法大有作为。这是非常非常困难的。

And actually, Richard Branson came over to this country — you know, they say that a brand is a promise. I mean, there’s a promise involved in picking up a Milky Way, or picking up a Coca-Cola, as to what it’s going to deliver to you.
实际上,理查德·布兰森(Richard Branson)几年前来到这个国家——人们常说品牌是一种承诺。拿起一块麦丽素(Milky Way)或可口可乐,其中包含一种承诺,关于它将会为您带来什么。

Richard Branson came over seven or eight years ago, 10 years ago, you know, a fellow with a famous airline and all of that, and he came out with something called Virgin Cola. And I thought that was kind of an unusual promise to have in a product. (Laughter)
理查德·布兰森大概七八年前,或者十年前,推出了一款叫做“维珍可乐”(Virgin Cola)的饮品。我觉得这产品的承诺有些不寻常。(笑声)

Never could quite figure that one out, what the promise was. But whatever it was, it didn’t work.
从来没能弄明白,那承诺是什么。但不管是什么,它没有奏效。

And there have been — I don’t know how many — Don Keough would know — but there have been hundreds of colas over the years. But in the end, who is going to, you know, buy some substitute cola for a penny a can less, or two cents a can less, than Coca-Cola, or the same thing with See’s Candy, or the same thing with Kool-Aid, or whatever it may be.
而且有过——我不知道有多少——Don Keough 会知道——但多年来有数百种可乐。但最终,谁会为了便宜一分钱或两分钱去买某种替代可乐,而不是可口可乐呢?对于喜诗糖果、柯露爱等产品也是如此。

So we feel pretty good about branded products when they’re runaway leaders in their field. And there’s nothing unusual about Kraft in their position versus Kellogg or some other people like that.
所以,当品牌产品在市场中处于绝对领先地位时,我们对它们的表现感到满意。卡夫的地位并没有什么特别之处,与凯洛格(Kellogg)等公司类似。

So there’s — the specifics of which one we buy may depend a little bit how we feel about the price. It certainly will make a difference how we feel about the price, the management, and some other factors.
具体选择哪一个可能取决于我们对价格的感觉,也肯定会取决于价格、管理层以及其他一些因素。

But if you buy in with good branded products and you don’t pay too much, you’re probably going to do OK.
但如果您买入优质的品牌产品并且不支付过高的价格,那么大概率会有不错的回报。

On the other hand, you’re not going to get super rich because the attributes that I’ve just laid out are pretty well recognized.
另一方面,您不太可能因此变得超级富有,因为我刚刚提到的这些优点已经被广泛认可了。

Charlie? 查理?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
查理·芒格:我没有什么要补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特:好的。

4、《2014-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

27. Trying, and failing, to expand See’s Candies’ geographic market
尝试并未成功地扩展 See's Candies 的地理市场

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特:乔纳森?

JONATHAN BRANDT: See’s Candy is obviously small in the context of Berkshire’s currently expansive operations, but has long been one of your favorite businesses.
乔纳森·布兰特:在伯克希尔目前庞大的运营背景下,See's Candy 显然规模较小,但它一直是你最喜欢的业务之一。

And no wonder, given that its pre-tax profits grew consistently from less than $5 million in 1972 when Berkshire acquired it, to $74 million in 1999.
难怪,考虑到其税前利润从 1972 年伯克希尔收购时的不到 500 万美元,持续增长到 1999 年的 7400 万美元。

However, since 1999, profit growth appears to have stalled.
然而,自 1999 年以来,利润增长似乎已经停滞。

Can you explain why See’s was able to grow its profits through the ’70s, ‘80s and ’90s, but not, so far, in this millennium?
你能解释一下为什么 See's 在 70 年代、80 年代和 90 年代能够增长利润,但到目前为止在这个千年却没有吗?

Did something change about the business, for instance, the growth and demand for boxed chocolates or its market position?
关于业务是否发生了变化,例如,盒装巧克力的增长和需求或其市场地位?

Could you or Brad Kinstler discuss whether the relatively recent geographic expansion could help reignite See’s growth? Thank you.
您或布拉德·金斯特勒能否讨论一下最近的地理扩张是否有助于重新点燃 See 的增长?谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the boxed chocolate business is, basically, not growing.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,盒装巧克力业务基本上没有增长。

I mean, if you go back 100 years, the — each city of any size was characterized by lots of candy shops. Chicago was a big leader. New York was a big leader.
我的意思是,如果你回到 100 年前,每个有一定规模的城市都有很多糖果店。芝加哥是一个重要的领导者。纽约也是一个重要的领导者。

Believe it or not, the predecessor company to Pepsi Cola was the — a company with the most — it was a company called Loft’s — that had the most candy shops in New York City.
信不信由你,百事可乐的前身公司是——一家拥有最多——它是一家名为洛夫特的公司——在纽约市拥有最多糖果店。

It was a candy shop company, originally, that a fellow that — what was his name?
这是一家糖果店公司,最初,一个叫——他叫什么名字的家伙?

CHARLIE MUNGER: [Charles] Guth.
查理·芒格:[查尔斯] 古斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What was it?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。那是什么?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Guth. 查理·芒格:古斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He acquired Pepsi for a few thousand bucks, stuck it in Loft’s.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。他花了几千美元收购了百事可乐,把它放在洛夫特的。

And the corporate — the corporate name, if you go all the way back on Pepsi, is Loft’s.
而公司的——公司的名称,如果追溯到百事可乐,便是洛夫特的。

So there were loads of candy shops around everyplace. And including in Omaha.
所以到处都有很多糖果店,包括在奥马哈。

Boxed chocolates have lost position dramatically. Primarily, I would guess, to salted snacks of one sort or another. Various things.
盒装巧克力的市场地位急剧下降。主要原因,我猜,是因为某种咸味零食的竞争。各种各样的东西。

See’s has done remarkably well, far better than any chocolate company in the country.
See's 表现得非常出色,远远超过了国内任何一家巧克力公司。

Russell Stover did very well for a while. Very well, with a different business model. But, you know, they ran into their problems as well.
拉塞尔·斯托弗一度表现得非常好。非常好,采用了不同的商业模式。但是,你知道,他们也遇到了问题。

So, we can’t do much about increasing the size of the market. And we’ve tried a lot of ways. And we’ve tried moving out of our strong geography, multiple times.
所以,我们对扩大市场规模无能为力。我们尝试了很多方法,也多次尝试走出我们的强势地区。

I mean, Charlie and I looked at what we were earning in California in the ’70s and said to ourselves, “If we could do this in 50 states instead of one, you know, we’ll get very rich.”
我意思是,查理和我看着我们在 70 年代加利福尼亚的收入,心里想着:“如果我们能在 50 个州而不是一个州做到这一点,你知道的,我们会变得非常富有。”

So we tried it and we didn’t get very rich. It doesn’t travel that well.
所以我们尝试了,但并没有变得很富有。它的流通性不太好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. And you figure out whether it’s going to work by trying it.
查理·芒格:有时候有效,有时候无效。你可以通过尝试来判断它是否会奏效。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve tried it many times.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。我们已经尝试过很多次。

But so far — it’s interesting. Two-thirds — people in the East prefer dark chocolate, two-thirds to one-third. In the West, they prefer milk chocolate, two-thirds to one-third.
但到目前为止——这很有趣。东部地区的人们更喜欢黑巧克力,比例为三分之二对三分之一。在西部,他们更喜欢牛奶巧克力,比例也是三分之二对三分之一。

They like miniatures in the East. They won’t eat miniatures in the West. There’s a lot of different things.
他们在东部喜欢小巧克力,在西部则不吃小巧克力。有很多不同的因素。

But in the end, there isn’t a lot of boxed chocolates volume.
但最终,盒装巧克力的市场份额并不大。

And we’ve done very, very, very well in See’s. And it not only has provided us with earnings that we’ve used to buy other businesses, so we’ve added lots of earnings power through See’s, beyond the earning power we’ve added at See’s.
我们在 See’s 方面做得非常好。它不仅为我们提供了收益,我们用这些收益购买了其他业务,从而增加了很多盈利能力。

But it opened my eyes to the power of brands and probably you could say that we made a lot of money in Coca-Cola partly because we bought See’s, or at least in my case, bought See’s, because I’d understood brands to some degree, but there’s nothing like owning one, and sort of seeing the possibilities with it as well as the limitations, to educate yourself about things you might do in the future.
但这让我意识到了品牌的力量,或许可以说,我们在可口可乐上赚了很多钱,部分原因是我们收购了 See's,或者至少在我看来,收购了 See's,因为我在某种程度上理解了品牌,但没有什么比拥有一个品牌更能让人看到它的可能性和局限性,这能让你对未来可能做的事情有更深的了解。
Idea
品牌是一种纵向的能力。

And in 1972, we bought See’s. And in 1988 we bought Coca-Cola.
1972 年,我们收购了 See's。1988 年,我们收购了可口可乐。

And I wouldn’t be at all surprised, if we had not owned See’s, whether we would’ve owned Coca-Cola later on.
我一点也不惊讶,如果我们没有拥有 See's,后来是否会拥有可口可乐。

Charlie? 查理?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s no question about the fact that its main contribution to Berkshire was ignorance removal. And it’s not the only big contributor to ignorance removal.
查理·芒格:是的。毫无疑问,它对伯克希尔的主要贡献是消除无知。而且这并不是唯一一个对消除无知有重大贡献的因素。

If it weren’t for the fact we were so good at removing our ignorance, step by step, Berkshire would be practically nothing today.
如果不是因为我们在逐步消除无知方面做得如此出色,伯克希尔今天几乎一无所有。

What we knew originally wasn’t enough. We were pretty damn stupid when we bought See’s. We were just barely smart enough to buy it.
我们最初知道的还不够。当我们购买 See's 时,我们真是太愚蠢了。我们只是勉强聪明到足以买下它。

And if there’s any secret to Berkshire, it’s the fact that we’re pretty good at ignorance removal. And the nice thing about that is we have a lot of ignorance left to remove. (Laughter)
如果说伯克希尔有什么秘密,那就是我们在消除无知方面相当出色。而这件事的好处在于,我们还有很多无知需要去消除。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s what happens when I call on him. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特:好吧,这就是我叫他时发生的事情。(笑声)

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