I.H.125.Warren Buffett.Retailing
零售业者必须时时保持聪明警惕，因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者总是被各种可能的方式吸引去尝试新的商家，在零售业一旦业绩滑坡，注定就会失败。
I was in the department store business for a while — don’t ask me why — but I was in it and if my competitor air-conditioned, I had to air condition. If my competitor offered 18-month terms instead of 12-month terms, I had to offer [the same thing]. If he put in an escalator, I had to put in [an escalator]. All of those were defensive decisions. I had to make those [decisions] like that snaps fingers. He was throwing pitches at me and I had to swing — no matter whether the ball was good or not.
我曾经做过一阵子百货商店生意——别问我为什么——但我确实干过。如果竞争对手装了空调，我也得装。如果他把分期从 12 个月改成 18 个月，我也得跟。如果他装了自动扶梯，我也得装。这些全是防守性的决策。我必须这样**（打响指）**做决定。他不断向我投球，我不得不挥棒——不管那球好不好。
大量的竞争，美团、京东、阿里都是这种防守性的决策。
2、《1995-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have not put out the figures on Helzberg’s, and we won’t be. But we evaluate — the sales have been published at about 280 million for the year that ended in February, and there’ll be considerably more in the current year. But we have not put out the figures. I can tell you that, obviously, that we think that, in terms of the amount we are laying out in terms of shares and/or cash — we think, over time, that it’s going to be a very decent acquisition. It’s the same line of reasoning we’ve applied in other businesses. Retailing, as I mentioned earlier, is the kind of business where you have to stay smart over time, and we have a terrific manager, a fellow named Jeff Comment, who’s going to be running it. And his record is extremely good, and I would bet the record would stay good. It earns good returns on invested capital or we wouldn’t be buying into it. We always look for good returns on capital. And a lot of companies in the jewelry business do not get good returns on capital.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们没有公布 Helzberg 的具体数字，也不会公布。不过外界披露了截至 2 月份财年的销售额大约为 2.8 亿美元，而本财年会显著更高。但我们没有对外提供这些数字。我可以明确的是，就我们投入的股票和/或现金金额而言，从长期看这会是一笔相当不错的收购。这与我们在其他业务上的思路一致。正如我先前所说，零售是一门需要长期保持“聪明”的生意；我们有一位出色的经理人 Jeff Comment 来负责经营，他过去的成绩极为出色，我敢打赌未来的纪录也会保持优秀。若非其对投入资本的回报足够好，我们不会买入。我们始终追求良好的资本回报。而珠宝行业中，不少公司在资本回报上表现并不好。
I mean, it’s not an industry that — where most of the participants are prosperous. It takes unusual sales per square foot compared to competitors to succeed in that, and we have one operation that does that in spades at Borsheims, and then a different type of operation that does it at Helzberg’s. The typical jewelry store operation is not a very good business, but we think we’ve got two good operations. Charlie?
我的意思是，这并不是一个大多数参与者都能繁荣发展的行业。要想成功，需要在单位面积销售额上明显胜过对手；我们在 Borsheims 就做到了这一点，而 Helzberg 以另一种运营模式也达成了同样的效果。典型的珠宝店并不是很好的生意，但我们认为自己拥有两项不错的业务。Charlie？
零售业务中的细分+高端用户。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we frequently find that owners of entire businesses have schizophrenia. They want to sell their business for a little more than it’s worth, taking stock, so they don’t have to pay taxes. And they want the stock to be the kind of — to be in a kind of business that will make just one dumb acquisition — theirs, and thereafter will guard the stock like gold, making no more dumb acquisitions. (Laughter) Needless to say, the world is not that easy. And I think over time, we’ve made acquisitions that were fair on both sides, and averaged out, they’ve worked well for Berkshire. And I think a company that behaves that way is giving the best long-term value to the private owner who wants to sell. You do not want to sell your business for stock to a firm that likes issuing stock.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我们经常发现整家公司卖方有点“精神分裂”。他们想把企业以略高于其价值的价格卖掉、并且收股票，这样就不用缴税；同时又希望所获得的股票来自那种“只会做一次蠢收购——也就是收他们这家——此后就像金子一样护着股票、再也不做蠢收购”的公司。（笑声）不用说，现实没那么简单。我认为长期来看，我们做的并购对双方都公平，平均下来对 Berkshire 很有效。我也认为，这种做法能为想出售公司的私人老板提供最佳的长期价值。你绝不该把企业以换股方式卖给一家“热衷于发股票”的公司。
3、《1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
零售业的经营相当不易，在我个人的投资生涯中，我看过许多零售业曾经拥有极高的成长率与股本回报率，然后突然间表现急速下滑，很多甚至被迫以倒闭关门收场，比起一般制造业或服务业，这种流星般的现象在零售业履见不鲜，部分的原因是，这些零售业者必须时时保持聪明警惕，因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者总是被各种可能的方式吸引去尝试新的商家，在零售业一旦业绩滑坡，注定就会失败。
零售业是个缺少本质的业务（卖的都是别人的产品），巴菲特的观察很仔细，他说：“因为你的竞争对手随时准备复制你的做法。。。”，因为产品都是别人的，自己所能提供的服务是有限的，困境是制造骗子的地方，《Supplying Saks Was a Soapmaker’s Dream Until He Got a $74 Check》这个例子比较典型，最终极的原因都是因为不够“本分”，这是一个不“本分”的商业模式。
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy.
与这种必须时时保持聪明的业务相反，有一种我称之为只要聪明一次的业务。举个例子来说，如果你足够聪明，在很早以前就买下一家地方电视台，你甚至可以把它交给懒惰又差劲的亲人来经营，而这项事业却仍然可以好好地经营个几十年，当然若是你懂得将汤姆·墨菲摆在正确的位置上，你会做得更惊人，但没有他你也可以舒服的赚钱。但是对零售业来说，用人不当将是快速破产的入场券。
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you - win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
不过今年我们买下的这两家零售业，却很幸运的拥有喜欢面对竞争挑战的经理人，同时过去几十年来也表现的相当优异，就像是我们旗下其它事业的经理人，他们将独立自主地经营，我们希望他们觉得就好象是在经营自己的事业一样，这意味着查理和我不会在旁边指手画脚。我们尽量避免像校友会常常对足球校队教练所说的那样：不论赢或是打平，我们都站在你这边。身为所有权人，我们的基本原则是，我们期望怎么对待自己，就怎么对待我们的经理人。
要看当时的机会成本，肯定不是太好的选择。
As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon, that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar caliber.
随着我们旗下事业越来越多，有时我被问及，我到底可以应付多少个经理人同时向我报告，我的回答相当简单，要是我只管一个经理人，而他是一个讨厌鬼，那么管一个人都太多了。相反的，要是我所面对的是像我们现在所拥有的经理人的话，那么这个数目将没有上限，我们很幸运能与Bill跟Sheldon共事，我们也很希望在不久的未来，还能有更多相同水准的经理人加入我们公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: We'll find out over time. But we did pay too much, in my view, for Kraft. We didn't pay too much for Heinz.
WARREN BUFFETT：时间会给出答案。但在我看来，我们为 Kraft 付得太多了。至于 Heinz，我们并没有付多。
So when we started out, it was originally a non-public partnership between us. And we did pay too much, in my view, for Kraft. There's not much you can do about things if you pay too much.
一开始，这本来是我们之间的非公开合伙。在我看来，我们确实为 Kraft 付得太多了。一旦付多了，很多事就无能为力。
And secondly, there's always been a struggle between the retailer and brands. If I've got a terribly weak brand, and I want to get into Walmart, I'm not to be able to do it. I'd have to offer all kinds of crazy concessions, you know? And I want to be in Walmart if I have some sort of consumer-packaged goods.
其次，零售商与品牌之间一直在博弈。如果我有一个非常弱的品牌，却想打入 Walmart，我基本做不到。你懂的——我得提出各种离谱的让步。而如果我做的是消费品，我当然想进 Walmart。
The negotiation is way different if you have something essential versus nonessential. 10 years ago, Costco tried to get rid of Coca-Cola. Costco's got terrific loyalty among customers, and their own Kirkland brand is a $39 billion brand now. And it moves from category to category, and they only started in 1992.
当你卖的是必需品还是非必需品，谈判完全不同。10 年前，Costco 试着下架 Coca-Cola。Costco 在顾客中有极强的忠诚度，他们自有的 Kirkland 品牌如今已是 390 亿美元级别，并且能在不同品类间迁移，而他们也才从 1992 年开始做。
So they know brands. But in the end, they put Coca-Cola back in. If had been Royal Crown Cola, they wouldn't have had to put it back in. So there's always that struggle between the brands, and there always will be. But the retailers net has been moving in their direction, particularly, I think, because of the Amazon revolution.
所以他们懂品牌。但最终他们还是把 Coca-Cola 上架了。要是 Royal Crown Cola，就不必非得上回来了。品牌之间的这种拉锯一直存在，也会一直存在。但总体上，零售商的优势在增强，尤其在我看来，Amazon 的革命推动了这种趋势。
ANDY SEWER: First Walmart, and then--
ANDY SEWER：先是 Walmart，然后——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Walmart. But it's been accentuated, I think. We have a new retailing environment now. It isn't like it goes from night to day, but it moves somewhat. And brands that people spent billions of dollars developing and sponsoring TV shows or sponsoring radio shows in the old days-- Campbell's soup was always on there with Jack Benny or something when I was a kid, and it was big.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，Walmart。但我觉得这种趋势被进一步放大了。我们现在处在一个新的零售环境中。它不是一夜之间天翻地覆，但确实在变化。过去人们花数十亿美元打造品牌、赞助电视节目或广播节目——我小的时候，Campbell's soup 经常出现在 Jack Benny 的节目里之类，那影响可大了。
And adult brands, and people obviously like the product, too. But people are more willing to change, and it's a somewhat different world than what-- it is night and day. You're very unlikely to keep changing brands everyday. But it really surprised me that Gillette lost position. Men don't like to experiment much. Women are better at experimenting.
还有面向成年人的品牌，而且人们显然也喜欢这些产品。但如今大家更愿意改变偏好，世界与以往相比在某种程度上不同——并不是天翻地覆。你不太可能每天都换品牌。但让我吃惊的是 Gillette 的地位下滑。男性并不喜欢尝试，女性在尝试方面更积极。
When you were a kid, Gillette cavalcade of sports was your pal, and brought you the Rose Bowl and the World Series, and all that sort of thing. You just shaved with Gillette the rest of your life. And you still do to a great degree. But it's not exactly the same as it was, even five years ago or so, when we bought Kraft.
你小时候，Gillette 的体育转播就是你的伙伴——给你带来 Rose Bowl、World Series 之类。然后你这辈子就用 Gillette 刮胡子。到今天很大程度上依然如此。但情况已不完全相同了——甚至和大约五年前我们买 Kraft 时相比都不同。
Not much has gone right for Walgreens Boots Alliance WBA -1.40%decrease; red down pointing triangle in the past decade.
过去十年里，沃尔格林联合博姿公司（Walgreens Boots Alliance）几乎没有什么顺利的事情。
Customers bought more and more household items online at sites such as Amazon.com, instead of Walgreens’s more than 8,000 stores across the U.S. The pharmacy chain inked deals with other drug suppliers and doctors offices, but stood pat while rivals, including CVS and Express Scripts, merged with big health insurers, gaining control of the medical-reimbursement purse strings that were squeezing pharmacies.
顾客越来越多地在亚马逊等网站上在线购买家庭用品，而不是去沃尔格林在美国各地超过 8000 家的门店。这家连锁药店虽然与其他药品供应商和医生诊所签订了协议，但在竞争对手（包括 CVS 和 Express Scripts）纷纷与大型健康保险公司合并、掌控医疗报销资金并挤压药店利润空间时，却按兵不动。
Walgreens cash flow sagged, its debt piled up and shares sank. And on Thursday, Walgreens was sold to private-equity firm Sycamore for $10 billion, down a staggering 91% from its $106 billion peak in 2015.
沃尔格林的现金流下滑，债务累积，股价暴跌。周四，沃尔格林以 100 亿美元的价格被私募股权公司 Sycamore 收购，较 2015 年 1060 亿美元的峰值暴跌了惊人的 91%。
The storied pharmacy chain—which became a ubiquitous seller of everything from diabetes injections to nail files as retailers consolidated across the U.S.—fell after it neglected to keep up with customer preference to buy online and failed to navigate the fierce competition and intense cost pressures of healthcare.
这家历史悠久的连锁药店曾随着美国零售商的整合而遍布各地，销售从糖尿病注射剂到指甲锉等各种商品，但由于未能跟上顾客转向线上购物的趋势，也未能应对医疗保健领域的激烈竞争和巨大成本压力，最终走向衰落。
6、《2025-05-16 Warren Buffett vs American Capitalism》
Speaker 2:
But do you want a cool Charlie Costco story just because I'm looking at him here? But if you wanted to think of something extraordinary—because you could look at that membership fee and say if instead of,
说到这儿，我刚好看到查理·芒格的照片，要不要讲一个很酷的Costco故事？这事其实挺特别的——我们可以从它的会员费来讲起，
there's certain people that will not pay a membership fee. Right. Just they are against it in principle or they're disorganized.
因为确实有些人就是不愿意为会员付费，要么出于原则反对，要么就是性格上不爱搞这些。
So there are customers that do not go to a Costco that would go to a Costco if they didn’t have to pay a membership fee.
所以，有些本来可能是Costco顾客的人，最终没去，就因为这道门槛：会员费。
Speaker 1:
Yes.
对。
Speaker 2:
And if Costco raised their prices, the membership fee, I think, represents about 2% of revenue.
而如果Costco提高价格，会员费这部分其实只占它营收的大约2%。
Michael Batnick:
But it drives the rest.
但它驱动了整个商业模式的其他部分。
Speaker 2:
Well, it's their net margin is 2%. Their average markup is 10%. Now, I think I could be wrong. I think Walmart's average markup is about 28%. But here's the interesting thing that Charlie said to me once is, as he said,
Costco的净利润率是2%，平均加价幅度是10%。我记得可能有误，沃尔玛的平均加价幅度大约是28%。但查理曾经跟我说过一件很有趣的事，他说，
if you were to look at the difference in shrink, which is the fancy word for theft, shoplifting, stealing, between Costco and the average big box retailer, that would be 100% of their profit margin. So people steal less.
如果你看Costco和一般大卖场在“Shrink”——这是零售业内说法，指偷窃、顺手牵羊、员工盗窃等损耗——方面的差距，那就等于他们全部的利润。也就是说Costco被偷得更少。
And remember, theft is half employees and half shoplifters. And that's an incredible thing. And of course, part of that is the membership fee.
记住，偷窃损耗一半来自员工，一半来自顾客。而这点非常惊人。当然，这和会员制度有关系。
Michael Batnick:
It's very unlikely you're going to register as a Costco member and then try to loot the place.
毕竟你不太可能去注册一个Costco会员，然后再进去偷东西吧。
Speaker 2:
Well, in the same way that if you're a government employee, you are likely to be a safer driver. If you are a USAA, your army officer is less likely to commit fraud against an insurance company.
对，就像如果你是公务员，你可能会开车更谨慎；如果你是美军军官，用USAA的保险服务，你更不太可能骗保。
So you were intelligently choosing who you wanted as customers. But using a separate variable. And so it's an interesting part of Costco's model that I admire. But anyway, so I just felt that monopoly was a bit provocative because it,
所以Costco其实在用一种“隐含变量”来聪明地筛选顾客。这是我非常欣赏的商业模型的一部分。无论如何，我只是觉得“垄断”这个词有点挑衅性，
whereas moats I think isn't, and I don't think they're the same thing. I think they are different things because of, you know, a culture can create a moat.
而“护城河”这个词则没有这种感觉。我不认为这两个词是等同的，它们是不同的概念。因为比如说，文化也可以形成护城河。
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