I.H.177.Warren Buffett.A Word About Par and Feedback Mechanism
没有衡量标准和反馈机制=幻觉。
1、《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
A Word About Par 关于衡量标准
The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.
我在最初选择合伙人，以及随后处理与合伙人的关系时，最看重的就是我们要达成一致，使用同样的衡量标准。如果我的业绩差，合伙人就该撤资，我自己也不会继续再股市投资了。如果业绩好，我明确知道自己表现出色，我可以很坦然。
The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
问题在于，什么是好，什么是差，我们一定要达成一致。衡量标准应该事先定好。事后再找参照标准，无论业绩如何，总能找到更差的。
I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
我一直把道指作为我们的衡量标准。我的个人观点是要检验投资表现，至少要看三年时间，最能检验出真实水平的是期末道指点位与期初很接近，看在此期间投资表现如何。
While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
什么衡量标准都不十全十美，道指也如此，但是参照道指的好处是，它众所周知、历史悠久，可以相当准确地反映一般投资者的表现。我不反对使用其他标准来衡量股市表现，例如，可以用其他的指数、大型基金、银行共同信托基金等。
You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
你可能认为，道指不就是无人管理的 30 只蓝筹股吗，跑赢道指应该很容易，我选的参照标准是不是太低了。道指其实是很难战胜的。亚瑟·威辛保 (Arthur Wiesenberger) 写过一本很有名的书，是关于基金公司的，其中列出了所有大型基金从 1946 到 1960 这 15 年里的业绩。目前，美国基金掌管的资产规模是 200 亿美元，基金的整体表现可以反映几千万投资者的收益率。我没有相关数据，但我认为大多数投资咨询机构和银行信托的收益率和这些基金不相上下。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.
在《Charts & Statistics》中，威辛保统计了 1946 年以来有持续业绩记录的 70 只基金。我把其中 32 只基金剔除了，它们有些是平衡型基金（因此没充分参与股市上涨），有些是专门投资某个行业的基金。我觉得用这 32 只基金进行比较不合适。这 32 只基金里，有 31 只跑输道指，排除它们不会影响我们得出的结论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.
剩下的 38 只基金与道指更有可比性，其中 32 只跑输道指，6 只跑赢。1960 年末，跑赢道指的 6 只基金资产规模约为 10 亿美元，跑输的 32 只基金资产规模约为 65 亿美元。跑赢的这 6 只基金，每年领先幅度也不到几个百分点。
Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don't have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:
以下是我们这几年的业绩与最大的两只开放式股票基金与最大的两只封闭基金的对比情况（没有 1961 年的对比，因为我没有这年的准确数据，粗略估算应该和 1957-60 差不多）：
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)
（来源：Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961）
COMPOUNDED 复合收益率
Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.
Massachusetts Investors Trust 的净资产有 18 亿美元左右；Investors Stock Fund 约有 10 亿美元；Tri -Continental Corporation 约 5 亿美元；Lehman Corporation 约 3.5 亿美元。它们的净资产总和是 35 亿美元以上。
I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.
我整理上述表格和信息，目的不是批评基金公司。让我管这么多钱，受到种种限制，不能像管理我们的合伙基金这样投资，我的业绩也不会比它们强多少。我是想用上述数据说明战胜道指没那么容易，别说跑赢，美国大多数基金连跟上道指都很难。
Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.
我们的投资组合和道指的成分股完全不同。我们的投资方法和基金的投资方法差别很大。
However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.
我们的大多数合伙人，如果不把资金投到我们的合伙账户中，可供选择的投资方式可能就是买基金，获得与道指类似的收益率，因此，我认为把道指作为我们的业绩衡量标准很合理。
2、《1964-07-08 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self- management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
道指不是衡量股票投资业绩的唯一标准，但所有投资管理活动（包括管理自己的资金在内）都要经受客观的检验，检验标准应该事先确定，不能事后自己随便选。
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
资管行业规模庞大。基金经理非常重视评估汽车、钢铁、化工等各行各业的公司的管理层。为了分析公司管理层优劣，他们会严肃认真地投入大量时间和精力。基金经理不辞辛苦地评估投资组合中公司的管理层，他们自己却不会受到同样的评估，这实属不该。我们认为，投资者和基金经理必须确立业绩评估标准，并且像研究自己的投资标的一样，经常客观地审视自己的业绩。
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
我们就这么做，不管评估结果如何。不用我说，大家也知道，我们有确定的业绩衡量标准，只能保证我们能做到客观评估，绝对不等于我们就能取得良好的业绩。提到衡量业绩，我们再回顾一下“基本原则”(Ground Rules) 是怎么说的。基本原则中说，鉴于我们的投资方式，衡量我们的表现，至少要看三年，而且投机气氛浓厚时，我们很可能落后。有一点，我可以向各位保证。既然我们已经把标准定在了 90 厘米，标准就始终是 90 厘米。我们不会因为达不到标准而修改标准。依我之见，在规模高达几千亿的资管行业中，如果人人都确立合理的标准来衡量能力，并有意识地付诸实践，这个行业会更健康地发展。在日常商业活动中，无论是评估市场、人员、机器，还是流程，人们普遍遵循既定标准，资管可是世界上规模最大的商业行业。
3、《2002-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
30. Staying rational and avoiding confirmation bias
保持理性并避免确认偏误
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：区域6。
We have a break in about five minutes. In fact, we’ll do this question and then we’ll break.
我们大约五分钟后休息。实际上，我们先回答这个问题，然后休息。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. My name’s Paul Tomasik from Illinois.
听众：好的，我是来自伊利诺伊州的保罗·托马斯基。
I’d like to talk about your thinking, if you don’t mind.
我想谈谈你们的思考方式，如果你们不介意的话。
In the “Fortune” magazine article that you sent to all the shareholders, you referenced a practice by Darwin that when he found something that was contrary to his established conclusions, he quickly wrote it down because the mind would’ve pushed it out.
在你们发给所有股东的《财富》杂志文章中，您提到达尔文的一种做法：当他发现某些与已建立结论相悖的东西时，他会迅速把它写下来，因为大脑会把这些信息排除。
And if you read “The Origin of Species,” Darwin’s very careful to avoid fooling himself. He very carefully asks and answers the hard questions.
如果你读过《物种起源》，你会发现达尔文非常小心地避免自欺。他非常仔细地提出并回答那些艰难的问题。
It’s a feedback mechanism, and you’ve picked up on one of his feedback mechanisms to avoid fooling yourself.
这是一种反馈机制，而你们也采用了他的一种反馈机制来避免自欺。
So the two questions are this:
所以我有两个问题：
If you look — model — how you think, Charlie thinks, how physicists think, how mathematicians think, you see the same pattern.
如果你看一下——建模——你们如何思考，查理如何思考，物理学家如何思考，数学家如何思考，你会发现相同的模式。
You want to use logic. You’re dedicated to logic. But logic’s not enough. You have to avoid fooling yourself, so you build feedback mechanisms.
你们想运用逻辑。你们致力于逻辑。但逻辑不够。你们必须避免自欺，所以你们建立了反馈机制。
So the first question is, do you see it that way? That you’re thinking just like mathematicians, physicists, and some of the other exceptional businessmen, by being logical and being careful to have feedback mechanisms?
第一个问题是，您是否这样看待自己？你们的思维方式是否像数学家、物理学家和一些其他杰出商人一样，通过逻辑思维并小心地建立反馈机制？
And the second question is about other feedback mechanisms.
第二个问题是关于其他反馈机制的。
Your partnership — sitting next to you is a great feedback mechanism. Hard to fool yourself when you partner with Charlie Munger.
你们的合作伙伴关系——坐在你旁边的人是一个很好的反馈机制。与查理·芒格合作时，难以自欺。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
沃伦·巴菲特：对。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This meeting’s a feedback —
听众：这个会议也是一个反馈机制——
WARREN BUFFETT: Hard to fool him, too. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：同样很难愚弄他。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But that’s not an accident.
听众：但这不是偶然的。
The meeting is one level of feedback mechanism, the way you attack the annual report letter is a feedback mechanism.
这个会议是一个反馈机制，您处理年报信件的方式也是一种反馈机制。
So you could comment, both of you, on other feedback mechanisms you developed? Thank you.
那么，您能否评论一下，您俩开发的其他反馈机制？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ve come up with two very good ones. I mean, there’s no question that Charlie will not accept anything I say because I say it, whereas a lot of other people will.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，您提出了两个非常好的问题。我的意思是，毫无疑问，查理不会接受我说的任何话，仅仅因为我说了，而很多其他人会。
You know, I mean, it’s just the way the world works.
你知道，我的意思是，这就是世界运作的方式。
And it’s terrific to have a partner who will say, you know, you’re not thinking straight.
能有一个合作伙伴直言不讳地告诉你：“你思考得不对”真是太棒了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It doesn’t happen very often.
查理·芒格：这可不常发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s no question, the human mind — what the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact. I mean, that is a talent everyone seems to have mastered.
毫无疑问，人类的大脑——人类最擅长做的事就是解读所有新信息，从而保持自己先前的结论不变。我的意思是，这几乎是每个人都掌握的天赋。
And how do we guard ourselves against it? Well, we don’t achieve it perfectly.
那么我们如何防止这种情况呢？嗯，我们并没有做到完美。
I mean, Charlie and I have made big mistakes because, in effect, we have been unwilling to look afresh at something.
我的意思是，查理和我也犯过大错，因为实际上，我们不愿意重新审视某些事情。
You know, that happens.
这种情况会发生。
But we do have — I think the annual report is a good feedback mechanism. I think that reporting on yourself, and giving the report honestly, whether you do it through an annual report or do it through some other mechanism, is very useful.
但我们确实有——我认为年报是一个很好的反馈机制。我认为，无论是通过年报还是通过其他机制，诚实地报告自己都是非常有用的。
But there — I would say a partner, who is not subservient, and who himself is extremely logical, you know, is probably the best mechanism you can have.
但我想说，一个不是盲从的合作伙伴，且他自己极为理性，可能是你能拥有的最好的反馈机制。
I would say that on the contrary, to get back to looking things you have to be sure you don’t fall into, I would say the typical corporate organization is designed so that the CEO opinions and biases and previous beliefs are reinforced in every possible way.
我想说，相反，为了重新审视事物，你必须确保自己不会陷入常见的陷阱。我认为典型的公司组织结构被设计得能够以各种方式加强CEO的意见、偏见和既有信念。
I mean, having staff surround you that know what you want to do, you are not going to get a lot of — you’re not going to get a lot of contrary thinking.
我的意思是，身边有些员工知道你想做什么，你是不会得到很多——不会得到很多反向的思考的。
I mean, most staffs, if they know you want to buy a company, you’re going to get a recommendation.
大多数员工，如果他们知道你想收购一家公司，他们会给你推荐意见。
Whatever your hurdle rate, if it’s 15 percent internal rate of return, which very few deals ever work out at, you know, or 12 or — they’re going to come back, and they’re going to come back with whatever they feel that you want.
无论你的门槛回报率是多少，如果是15%的内部回报率，而实际上很少有交易能达到这个水平，或者是12%——他们会回来说出他们认为你想要的东西。
And if you arrange your organization so that you basically have a bunch of, you know, sycophants who are cloaked in other, you know, titles, you’re not going to get — you are going to leave your prior conclusions intact, and you’re going to get whatever you go in with your biases wanting.
如果你安排你的组织结构，使得你周围的人基本上是一些披着其他头衔的拍马屁者，你是不会得到——你将保持你先前的结论不变，且只会得到符合你偏见的东西。
And the board is not going to be much of a check on that. I’ve seen very, very few boards that can stand up to the CEO on something that’s important to the CEO and just say, you know, “You’re not going to get it.”
董事会也不会对这一点产生太大制约。我见过的董事会很少能在对CEO至关重要的事情上与CEO对立，并且直言：“你无法获得它。”
You’ve hit on a terribly important point. All of us in this room want to read new information and have it confirm our cherished beliefs. I mean, it is just built into the human system.
你触及到了一个非常重要的点。我们在座的每个人都希望读到新的信息，并且让这些信息验证我们珍视的信仰。我的意思是，这就是人类系统的固有部分。
And that can be very expensive in the investment and business world.
在投资和商业世界中，这可能会非常昂贵。
And, like I say, I think we’ve got a pretty good system. And I think that most of the systems aren’t very good, that exist in corporate America, to avoid falling into the trap you’re talking about.
正如我所说，我认为我们有一个相当好的系统。而且我认为，大多数现有的企业体系并不太好，无法避免陷入你所说的陷阱。
Steve Forbes: Now, in terms of that, many times, a foundation gets set up. And...
Steve Forbes：不过在实际操作中，很多时候，基金会设立之后，会……
Warren Buffet: Goes off in a different direction.
Warren Buffet：跑偏，朝着不同的方向去了。
Steve Forbes: And there's this thing called Parkinson's Law, that an organization becomes self-centered, in for itself, and forgets its purpose that it was created for.
Steve Forbes：还有所谓的 Parkinson's Law：组织会变得以自我为中心，为自身而存在，忘了最初的使命。
Warren Buffet: I see it all the time.
Warren Buffet：我经常见到这种情况。
Steve Forbes: You see it in business--that's why they go broke oftentimes. But in foundations, you see it. So you made a provision that that was not going to happen with your funds, and they had to be... those monies had to be deployed what, within 10 years?
Steve Forbes：商业里也是如此——这往往就是他们破产的原因之一。基金会也不例外。所以你设了条款，避免你的资金出现这种情况，要求这些钱必须在——多久之内花完？十年？
Warren Buffet: 10 years after my estate's completed. Yeah, and the money has to all be spent--it can't go to institutions which in turn put it in there endowment or anything like that. I want people that I know, and I know are in sync with me, and I know will be true to certain ideals. I want them to dispense it because who the hell knows, 50 years from now, when the place becomes some large institution, what will happen. People will rationalize then that what's good for the institution is exactly what old Warren thought 40 years ago on his deathbed. So I've seen that happen too often. And I... foundations are not tested by a market system. If you've got a business idea, and he's got music, it's being tested by a market system. People will make a decision was whether that next album is good, and they'll make a decision whether Coca Cola still keeps them happy, and all that sort of thing. A foundation has no market tests. So it's very easy, if there's not a market test, as people will find out in government and other places, it's very easy to start rationalizing things that are a long way from what you originally--people thought you were setting out to do.
Warren Buffet：在我的遗产清算完成后的10年内。对，而且这些钱必须全部花掉——不能给那些再把钱放进自己捐赠的机构。我希望把钱交给我认识、与我理念一致、忠于特定理想的人去使用。因为谁也不知道50年后，当某个机构变成庞然大物时会变成什么样。到那时人们会自圆其说，把“对机构有利”的事，解释成“老 Warren 在四十年前临终时的本意”。这种事我见得太多了。再者……基金会没有“市场检验”。你有商业点子，他有音乐作品——都会被市场检验。人们会用脚投票：下一张专辑好不好、Coca Cola 是否还能令他们满足，等等。而基金会没有市场检验。没有市场检验，就很容易——政府和其他领域的人也会发现——很容易开始把事情合理化，离最初的使命越来越远。
必定进入幻觉。
5、《2013-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
DOUG KASS: Thank you, Warren.
DOUG KASS: 谢谢你，沃伦。
Mae West once said, “The score never interested me, only the game.”
梅-韦斯特曾说过："我从不关心比分，只关心比赛"。
。。。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think, actually, you have to love something to do well at it. There may be exceptions on that, but it is an enormous, enormous advantage if you absolutely love what you’re doing, every minute of it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为，事实上，你必须热爱某件事情，才能做好它。也许会有例外，但如果你热爱你正在做的事情，每时每刻都热爱它，这将是一个巨大的优势。
And the nature of it is that that intensity adds to your productivity.
其本质是，这种强度会提高你的工作效率。
And I have every bit of the intensity — not manifested exactly the same way — but it’s there every minute. I mean, I love thinking about Berkshire. I love thinking about its investments. I love thinking about its businesses. I love thinking about its managers. It’s part of me.
我的每分每秒都充满激情--虽然表现方式不尽相同--但每时每刻都在。我的意思是，我喜欢思考伯克希尔。我喜欢思考伯克希尔的投资。我喜欢思考伯克希尔的业务。我喜欢思考伯克希尔的管理者。这是我的一部分。
And it is true, you can’t separate the game from the scorecard. I mean, you — so your score card is part of playing the game and loving the game.
的确，游戏和记分卡是分不开的。我的意思是，你的记分卡是玩游戏和热爱游戏的一部分。
The proceeds are — you know, to me — are unimportant, but the proceeds are part of the score card, so they come with a score card.
收益--你知道，对我来说--并不重要，但收益是记分卡的一部分，所以它们附带记分卡。
But it’s much more important — I mean, I would — no question about it, I wouldn’t be — feel — the same way about Berkshire at this point if I didn’t own a share of it, if I didn’t get paid. I mean, it’s what I like doing in life, and that’s why I do it.
但更重要的是，如果我没有伯克希尔的股份，如果我没有报酬，我毫无疑问不会对伯克希尔有同样的感觉。我的意思是，这是我生活中喜欢做的事，这也是我做这件事的原因。
PM hiring PM 招聘
If you are a hedge fund looking to hire a portfolio manager from a competitor, how can you tell if she has investing skill? There are two main sources of information:
如果你是一家对冲基金，想要从竞争对手那里雇佣一名投资组合经理，你如何判断她是否具备投资技能？有两个主要信息来源：
1.You can look at her results. If she was up a lot last year, that could just be luck, but if she was up a little bit every day for the last five years, that probably isn’t.
你可以看看她的成绩。如果她去年涨了很多，那可能只是运气，但如果在过去五年里她每天都涨一点，那可能就不是了。
2.You can interview her, look at her resume and ask about her process. If she worked at increasingly fancy hedge funds with increasingly fancy titles, those are good signs. If you interview her and she thoughtfully describes a surprising but intuitively plausible investment process that seems like it ought to work, that’s a good sign. If she’s like “I keep flipping coins to pick stocks and it works great,” that’s a bad sign.
你可以采访她，查看她的简历，并询问她的投资流程。如果她曾在越来越高端的对冲基金工作，并拥有越来越高级的头衔，那是一个好迹象。如果你采访她时，她能深思熟虑地描述一个令人惊讶但直觉上合理的投资流程，并且看起来确实可行，那是一个好迹象。如果她说“我一直抛硬币来选股票，而且效果很好”，那就是一个坏迹象。
These sources are complementary. Good results backed up by a good process are encouraging. Good results with a bad process could be luck. Bad results with a good process could be bad luck — her luck has to change, and you can get a good portfolio manager at a discount! — though they could also indicate that you’re wrong about the process being good. “She went to Harvard and worked at Point72, so she must be good” is perhaps a useful heuristic, but it can be refuted by performance data.
这些来源是互补的。良好的结果加上良好的流程是令人鼓舞的。良好的结果伴随糟糕的流程可能只是运气。糟糕的结果伴随良好的流程可能是坏运气——她的运气总会改变，而你可以以折扣价获得一位优秀的投资组合经理！——不过，这也可能表明你对流程良好的判断是错误的。“她毕业于哈佛，并曾在 Point72 工作，所以她一定很优秀”或许是一个有用的启发法，但可以通过业绩数据加以反驳。
There is a problem, though. You can look at her resume, and interview her about her process, to your heart’s content; she’ll probably be happy to talk to you. (Perhaps she cannot disclose proprietary information about her process but, you know.) And you can ask her about her results, and she’ll probably be happy to tell you, but you can’t check. Your competitor fund is not going to send over a spreadsheet listing the returns attributable to her investment calls. That’s definitely proprietary information, and they don’t want to help you out.
不过，有一个问题。你可以查看她的简历，并尽情采访她的投资流程；她可能会很乐意与你交流。（也许她不能透露流程中的专有信息，但你明白的。）你可以询问她的投资结果，她可能也会乐意告诉你，但你无法核实。你的竞争对手基金不会送来一份电子表格，列出归因于她投资决策的回报率。这绝对是专有信息，他们也不想帮你的忙。
At Business Insider, Alex Morrell and Bradley Saacks have a fun story about this problem:
在 Business Insider，Alex Morrell 和 Bradley Saacks 写了一篇有趣的报道，探讨了这个问题：
Multimanager funds now regularly fork over eight-figure deals to PMs, with some coveted stars receiving packages north of $50 million. But firms often must take it on faith that PMs claiming tens or hundreds of millions in profits at their former employers are being forthright.
多经理基金现在经常向投资组合经理提供八位数的交易，一些备受追捧的明星甚至获得超过 5000 万美元的薪酬。但公司往往只能凭信任相信，那些声称在前雇主那里赚取数千万或数亿美元利润的投资组合经理是坦诚的。
The dirty secret, according to conversations with nearly two dozen portfolio managers, recruiters, hedge fund execs, and business-development professionals, is that many of them aren't. When it comes to performance, traders regularly prevaricate and exaggerate; it's just a matter of degree and audacity.
根据与近二十位投资组合经理、招聘人员、对冲基金高管和业务发展专业人士的对话，隐藏的秘密是，其中许多人并非如此。谈到业绩，交易员经常含糊其辞并夸大其词；只是程度和胆量的问题。
And possible — but also problematic — solutions:
可能的解决方案——但也存在问题：
Last summer, a senior headhunter who places PMs at multimanagers saw a change emerging on the hiring front lines. Before finalizing multimillion-dollar deals to hire candidates, funds were making a bold request: direct, proprietary evidence of the PM's trading performance. Some, for example, asked PMs to jump on FaceTime or Zoom while at home and pan the camera over to their computer screen to show their P&L in their company's internal system. Others were meeting candidates at coffee shops or going to their homes. ...
去年夏天，一位为多经理制基金招聘投资组合经理的高级猎头在招聘前线发现了变化。在最终确定数百万美元的招聘交易之前，基金公司提出了一个大胆的要求：提供直接的、专有的投资组合经理交易业绩证据。例如，一些基金要求投资组合经理在家中通过 FaceTime 或 Zoom 通话，并将摄像头对准电脑屏幕，以展示其公司内部系统中的损益情况。还有一些基金选择在咖啡店与候选人会面，或直接前往他们的住所。
Another senior headhunter said he also observed a change starting around the summer, with multiple funds asking candidates to bring their laptop to a café, log onto their internal system, and show their P&L to finalize a hire. …
另一位高级猎头表示，他也注意到从夏季左右开始出现变化，多家基金要求候选人带上笔记本电脑到咖啡馆，登录其内部系统，并展示其损益情况以最终确定聘用。…
"It violates all the confidentiality agreements," another PM who's worked at multiple funds said. "I don't think reputable firms would ask you to do that."
“这违反了所有的保密协议，”另一位曾在多家基金工作过的 PM 说。“我认为有信誉的公司不会要求你这么做。”
I wonder if there are any cases of a hedge fund asking a PM “hey please show us your firm’s P&L records,” and the PM saying “sure here you go,” and the hedge fund saying “no that was a trick, we expected you to say no, we only hire ethical people here and you have proven that you can’t be trusted.” I bet the answer is no.
我想知道是否有对冲基金要求一位投资组合经理“嘿，请给我们看你公司的损益记录”，然后投资组合经理回答“当然，给你”，接着对冲基金说“不，这是个陷阱，我们本以为你会拒绝，我们只雇佣有道德的人，而你已经证明了自己不值得信任。”我敢打赌答案是否定的。
There is a simpler solution:
有一个更简单的解决方案：
Perhaps the most popular and ubiquitous way of corroborating a trader's performance is by obtaining the candidate's pay history through W-2 tax records and deferred-compensation statements.
也许验证交易员业绩最常见且普遍的方法是通过 W-2 税务记录和递延薪酬报表获取该候选人的薪酬历史。
Because hedge fund payouts are formulaic — most multimanagers pay a standard percentage of a trader's profits that's typically upward of 20% — a PM's compensation is a direct indicator of their past performance.
由于对冲基金的支付方式是公式化的——大多数多经理基金会支付交易员利润的标准百分比，通常超过 20%——因此，投资组合经理的薪酬直接反映了他们的过往业绩。
One multimanager exec said he asked for W-2s and screenshots of P&L, describing these requests as "the same thing everyone else asks for." But many states, including the hedge fund hot spots New York, California, and Connecticut, have barred employers from asking about salary history.
一位多经理制公司的高管表示，他要求提供 W-2 表格和 P&L 截图，并称这些要求是“和其他人要求的一样。”但包括对冲基金热点地区纽约、加利福尼亚和康涅狄格在内的许多州已禁止雇主询问薪资历史。
If you tell a potential employer that you are making $100 million of profits at your current firm, and your pay stubs say you are getting paid $200,000, then either you are on a very bad deal or you’re lying.
如果你告诉潜在雇主你在当前公司赚取了 1 亿美元的利润，而你的工资单显示你只拿到 20 万美元，那么要么你的协议非常糟糕，要么你在撒谎。
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