55. “Hard to find real estate that’s really mispriced”
“很难找到真正定价错误的房地产”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特:第二个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Bob Kline (PH), from Los Angeles.
听众:我是洛杉矶的Bob Kline(音译)。
I wonder if you could give us a glimpse into your investment process, the way you approach looking at a particular industry. And I wonder if you could use real estate as an example.
我想知道你们的投资过程是什么样的,如何评估一个特定行业。如果可以的话,能否以房地产为例进行说明?
I know real estate hasn’t been a big, huge part of Berkshire’s portfolio over the years. And I wonder if that’s because you view real estate as a commodity business or if, maybe, the cash flows from real estate tend to be more predictable than, perhaps, from some other industries, and thus, it tends to be less likely to be mispriced, and therefore less likely to find terrific bargains in real estate. So —
我知道房地产多年来并不是伯克希尔投资组合的核心部分。我想知道这是否因为你们认为房地产是一个商品型业务,或者是因为房地产的现金流比其他一些行业更加可预测,因此,房地产更难定价错误,也就更难找到真正划算的投资机会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you’re — go ahead.
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,你说吧。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, just wondering if we could — if we were watching a discussion between you and Charlie hashing out the merits of real estate, [tell us] how it would go.
那么,如果我们看到你和查理讨论房地产的优缺点,讨论过程大概是怎样的?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it would go like all our other conversations. He would say no for about 15 minutes — (laughter) — and I would gauge by the degree to which he — the emotion he put into his ’no’s as to whether he really liked the deal or not. (Laughter) But the —
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这就像我们平时的所有对话。他大概会说“不要”大约15分钟——(笑声)——我会通过他“不要”的语气和情绪,判断他到底是否真的喜欢这个交易。(笑声)不过——
We’ve both had a fair amount of experience in real estate, and Charlie made his early money in real estate. The second point is the more important point.
我们俩在房地产方面都有相当多的经验,查理早期的财富就是通过房地产赚到的。第二点是更重要的。
Real estate is not a commodity, but I think it tends to be more accurately priced — particularly developed real estate — more accurately priced most of the time.
房地产不是商品,但我认为它通常更精确地定价——特别是已开发的房地产——大多数时候价格更加精准。
Now, during the RTC period, when you had huge amounts of transactions and you had an owner that didn’t want to be an owner in a very big way, and they didn’t know what the hell they owned, and all of that sort of thing, I mean, you had a lot of mispricing then. And I know a few people in this room that made a lot of money off of that.
然而,在RTC时期,当大量交易发生时,拥有者并不愿意继续持有,甚至不清楚自己拥有什么财产等等,那时候确实有很多定价错误。我知道这里有一些人从中赚了不少钱。
But under most conditions, it’s hard to find real estate that’s really mispriced.
但在大多数情况下,很难找到真正定价错误的房地产。
I mean, when I look at the transactions that REITs engage in currently — and you get a lot of information on that sort of thing — you know, they’re very similar. But it’s a competitive world and, you know, they all know about what a class A office building in, you know, in Chicago or wherever it may be, is going to produce.
我的意思是,当我看到目前REITs进行的交易时——你会得到很多关于这类信息——你会发现它们非常相似。但这是一个竞争激烈的市场,大家都知道,在芝加哥或任何地方,一座A级写字楼会产生什么样的收益。
So at least they have — they may all be wrong, as it turns out, because of some unusual events, but it’s hard to argue with the current conventional wisdom, most of the time, in the real estate world.
因此,至少他们有——虽然最终他们可能会因为某些不寻常的事件而都犯错,但大多数时候,很难反驳房地产行业的当前共识。
But occasionally there have been some, you know, there could be big opportunities in the field. But if they exist, it will certainly be because there’s a — there’ll probably be a lot of chaos in real estate financing for one reason or another.
但偶尔也有一些,比如说,这个领域可能会有大的机会。如果机会存在,肯定是因为某些原因,房地产融资可能会出现一些混乱。
We’ve done some real estate financing and you have to have the money shut off to quite a degree, probably, to get any big mispricing across the board.
我们做过一些房地产融资,你得在某种程度上限制资金流动,才可能在所有领域找到大规模的定价错误。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we don’t have any competitive advantage over experienced real estate investors in the field, and we wouldn’t have if we were operating with our own money as a partnership.
查理·芒格:是的,我们在这个领域没有任何竞争优势,甚至如果我们作为合伙人用自己的资金进行操作,也不会有。
And if you operate as a corporation such as ours, which is taxable under Chapter C of the Internal Revenue Code, you’ve got a whole layer of corporate taxes between the real estate income and the use of the income by the people who own the real estate.
如果你像我们这样作为公司运营,按《国内税收法典》第C章缴税,你就会面临一层公司税收,将房地产收入与拥有房地产的人使用这些收入之间隔开。
So, by its nature, real estate tends to be a very lousy investment for people who are taxed under Subchapter C of the code relating to corporations.
因此,房地产天生对根据《国内税收法典》C章缴税的公司来说是非常糟糕的投资。
So, the combination of having it generally allows the activity for people with our tax structure, and having no special competence in the field means that we spend almost no time thinking about anything in real estate.
所以,结合我们税收结构下的税务规则,以及我们在这一领域没有特别的专长,意味着我们几乎不花时间去考虑房地产相关事务。
And then such real estate as we’ve actually done, like holding surplus real estate and trying to sell it off, I’d say we have a poor record at.
至于我们做过的房地产事务,比如持有多余的房地产并尝试出售,我得说我们在这方面的记录不佳。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, C corps really, it doesn’t make any sense. I mean, I know there are C corps around that are in real estate, but there are other structures that are more attractive.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,C条款在房地产领域确实没有任何优势。我知道有些C条款涉足房地产,但实际上有其他结构在税务上更具吸引力。
There really aren’t other structures — I mean, Lloyd’s is an attempt at it, to some degree — but there aren’t other structures that work well for big insurance companies, or —
实际上没有其他结构——比如,Lloyd’s在某种程度上算是一个尝试——但没有其他结构能很好地适用于大型保险公司,或者——
I mean, you can’t have a Walmart very well that does not exist in a C corp. So, they are not subject to S corp, or partnership competition, that determines the returns on capital in the discount store field.
我的意思是,沃尔玛如果不是以C条款形式存在,几乎是不可能的。所以,它们不受S条款或合伙企业竞争的限制,这些竞争决定了折扣店领域的资本回报。
But if you’re competing with S — the equivalent of S corps — REITs or partnerships or individuals, you’ve just got an economic disadvantage as a C corp, which is, for those of you who don’t love reading the Internal Revenue Code, is just the standard vanilla corporation that you think of — all of the Dow Jones companies, all of the S&P companies, and so on.
但如果你与S条款——或者等同于S条款的——REITs、合伙企业或个人竞争,作为S条款,你将面临经济劣势。对于那些不喜欢读《国内税收法典》的人来说,S条款就是你们通常认为的标准公司——所有道琼斯公司、所有标准普尔公司等。
And as Charlie says, it’s unlikely that the disadvantage of our structure, combined with the competitive nature of people with better structures buying those kinds of assets, will ever lead to anything really interesting.
正如查理所说,结合我们结构的劣势以及那些拥有更好结构的人购买这些资产的竞争性,极不可能导致任何真正有趣的事情发生。
Although, I would say that we missed the boat, to some extent, during the RTC days. I mean, it was a sufficiently inefficient market at that time, and there was a lack of financing that— we could have made a lot of money if we were — had been geared up for it at that time.
尽管如此,我得说,在RTC时期,我们在某种程度上错失了良机。那时市场效率足够低,融资短缺——如果我们当时准备好了,我们本可以赚很多钱。
We actually had a few transactions that were pretty interesting, but not — but nothing that was significant in relation to our total capital.
实际上,我们确实做了一些非常有趣的交易,但并没有——但相对于我们总资本而言,并没有什么重大的交易。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We thought significantly about buying the Irvine Corporation —
查理·芒格:我们曾认真考虑收购Irvine公司——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — when it became available. So, but that’s the only big one I can remember that we seriously thought about.
查理·芒格:——当它开始出售时。但那是我记得的唯一一个我们认真考虑过的大交易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and that was in 1977 or so, as I remember?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我记得那是1977年左右?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Way back.
查理·芒格:很久以前了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Mobil Oil was interested, and you know, Don Bren ended up putting together a group for it.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,美孚石油也感兴趣,后来你知道,Don Bren组建了一个团队。
And that kind of thing could conceivably happen, but it’s unlikely.
这种事情可能会发生,但不太可能。