2008-02-29 Warren Buffett.Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
企业类型——极佳、良好与糟糕
Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.
让我们看看什么样的企业会让我们眼前一亮。同时，也谈谈我们希望回避的公司类型。
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
我和 Charlie 寻找具备以下特征的公司：a）我们看得懂的业务；b）长期经济特性良好；c）有能力且值得信赖的管理层；d）合理的价格标签。我们偏好买下整个公司，或者在管理层愿作我们伙伴时，至少持有 80%。当无法获得此类优质控股型收购时，我们也乐于通过二级市场购买伟大企业的一小部分股权。拥有一部分 Hope Diamond 要胜过把整块人造水晶握在手里。
A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
真正伟大的企业必须拥有可持续的“护城河”，以守护其出色的投入资本回报。资本主义的动力机制决定了：凡是能获得高回报的商业“城堡”，竞争者都会一再攻城。因此，像成为行业低成本生产者（GEICO、Costco）或拥有强大的全球品牌（Coca-Cola、Gillette、American Express）这样的坚固壁垒，是长期成功的关键。商业史充斥着“Roman Candles”式的公司——它们的护城河被证明是虚幻的，很快就被跨越。
能成为护城河的只有两个途径，一是“a powerful world-wide brand”；二是“lowcost producer”，如果不能在定价权上掌握主动，获得低成本的竞争优势是退而其次的选择。
Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
我们强调“可持续”，这使我们排除那些处于快速且持续变革行业的公司。尽管资本主义的“创造性破坏”对社会大有裨益，但它排除了投资的确定性。若护城河必须不断重建，最终就等同于没有护城河。
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
此外，这一标准也排除了那些成败系于“名帅”的企业。诚然，卓越的 CEO 对任何企业都是巨大的资产，Berkshire 也不乏此类经理人。他们的能力创造了数十亿美元的价值——若换作普通 CEO 掌舵，这些价值很可能根本不会出现。
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.
但是，如果一家企业要依赖“超级明星”才能取得卓越业绩，那么这家企业本身就称不上伟大。由本地顶尖脑外科医生领衔的医疗合伙机构，也许能获得超额且增长的收益，但这对其未来并无太多说明。一旦这位医生离开，合伙机构的护城河也随之消失。相反，你可以相信 Mayo Clinic 的护城河会持续存在，尽管你未必叫得出它的 CEO 名字。
Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.
我们在企业中寻找的是：处于稳定行业中的长期竞争优势。如果还能伴随快速的内生增长，那当然更好。即便没有内生增长，这类企业同样值得拥有。我们会把企业丰厚的利润拿去在别处购买类似的企业。并没有“钱必须投回赚到它的地方”的规则。事实上，这样做往往是错误的：真正伟大的企业，凭借有形资产获得高额回报，但从长期看，它们无法把大部分盈利在内部以高回报率持续再投资。
护城河最终都是为资本效率服务的，1块钱的投入至少要产生1块钱的价值。
1、如果没有增长，贴现率是10%，至少1块钱的价值=每年0.1块的净现金流；
2、如果有增长，假设年复合增长率是7%，每年的净现金流可以少到0.03块，对应33倍的PE。
Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.
以我们的 See’s Candy 这家“梦想企业”的原型为例。它所在的盒装巧克力行业并不吸引人：美国的人均消费极低且没有增长。许多曾经重要的品牌已消失，而在过去 40 年里，只有三家公司获得了超过象征性的利润。事实上，我相信 See’s 虽然主要收入只来自少数几个州，却贡献了整个行业近一半的利润。
At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.
1972 年 Blue Chip Stamps 收购 See’s 时，其年度糖果销量为 1,600 万磅。（当时我和 Charlie 控制着 Blue Chip，后来将其并入 Berkshire。）去年 See’s 的销量为 3,100 万磅，年均增速仅 2%。然而，See’s 家族 50 年来打造的持久竞争优势，随后又由 Chuck Huggins 和 Brad Kinstler 进一步加强，为 Berkshire 带来了非凡的回报。
有品牌、有提价的能力，销量增速低一点也不是问题。
We bought See’s for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
我们以 2,500 万美元买下 See’s 时，其销售额为 3,000 万美元，税前利润不到 500 万美元。当时经营业务所需资本为 800 万美元。（每年有几个月还需要少量季节性负债。）由此，公司在投入资本上的税前回报达 60%。两点因素帮助将经营所需资金降至最低：第一，产品现金销售，从而消除了应收账款；第二，生产与配送周期短，从而将存货压到最低。
Last year See’s sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)
去年 See’s 的销售额为 3.83 亿美元，税前利润为 8,200 万美元。如今运营该业务所需资本为 4,000 万美元。这意味着自 1972 年以来，我们仅需再投资 3,200 万美元，便能支撑业务有限的物理扩张——以及相当“不有限”的财务扩张。同时期累计税前利润已达 13.5 亿美元。除这 3,200 万美元外，全部利润都上缴给了 Berkshire（早年则交给 Blue Chip）。在缴纳公司所得税后，我们用剩余资金去收购其他有吸引力的企业。正如 Adam and Eve 开启了最终导致 60 亿人口的活动一样，See’s 为我们“繁衍”出了多条新的现金流。（“要生养众多”这一圣经训令，在 Berkshire 我们是认真的。）
See’s的赚钱能力主要来自定价权，少了竞争上的摩擦，比如，不需要时刻保持聪明；“松松垮垮”地管理也能做的不错，无能的经理人可能会降低特许经营的盈利能力，但无法造成致命伤害，等等，这是品牌最有价值的地方。
There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
在美国企业界，像 See’s 这样的公司并不多见。通常，将盈利从 500 万美元提升到 8,200 万美元的公司，往往需要大约 4 亿美元的资本性投入来支撑增长。原因在于，成长中的企业既有随销售增长按比例上升的营运资金需求，也有大量固定资产投入需求。
A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation. It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.
一家企业若需要大量增资来驱动增长，最终也完全可能成为一项令人满意的投资。延续上面的例子，用 4 亿美元净有形资产赚到 8,200 万美元税前利润，并不寒碜。但对所有者而言，这与 See’s 的等式有天壤之别。更理想的是几乎不需要重大资本开支，却能源源不断扩大盈利的企业——去问问 Microsoft 或 Google 就知道了。
当年企业所得税的法定税率是35%，整体有效税率的统计大约在 约 27% 左右，8200万的税后利润是5986万，对应4 亿美元净有形资产的回报率是15%。
One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.
一个“良好但称不上惊艳”的商业经济学范例是我们的 FlightSafety。这家公司为客户创造的价值不亚于我所知的任何企业。它也具备持久的竞争优势：在飞行训练中选择非最优供应商，就像外科手术只图最低报价。
FlightSafety虽然不如See's Candy，但这个业务是有提价能力的，跟Helzberg/Borsheim和NetJets比较接近。
Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.
尽管如此，这项业务若要增长，就需要对盈利进行大量再投资。我们在 1996 年收购 FlightSafety 时，其税前经营利润为 1.11 亿美元，固定资产净投资为 5.7 亿美元。自收购以来，累计折旧为 9.23 亿美元；但资本开支合计达到 16.35 亿美元，其中大部分用于采购与不断推出的新机型相匹配的模拟机。（一台模拟机成本可超过 1,200 万美元，我们共拥有 273 台。）目前我们的固定资产（扣除折旧后）为 10.79 亿美元。2007 年税前经营利润为 2.7 亿美元，较 1996 年增加 1.59 亿美元。就这 5.09 亿美元的增量投资而言，回报“不错”，但远非 See’s 式的卓越。
Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
因此，若仅以经济回报衡量，FlightSafety 是一家“优秀但不非凡”的企业。它“多投才能多赚”的体验，正是大多数公司所面对的现实。比如，我们对受监管公用事业的大额投资就完全属于这一类。十年后我们将在这项业务上赚到更多的钱，但为此需要投入数十亿美元。
FlightSafety的投入是“被动且强制”的：FlightSafety 的大部分资本开支（16.35亿美元）是用于“采购与不断推出的新机型相匹配的模拟机” 。如果它不花这笔钱，它的护城河就会被侵蚀，客户就会流失。这意味着它的现金流是被“绑架”在自己内部的。
这个地方存在悖论，最好的生意不需要投入但能吐出大量的利润，这样的生意少之又少，问题是吐出来的利润如果找不到好的出处可能更麻烦，不产生任何收益，就像BRK现在的处境。
“被动且强制”的（institutional imperative，制度性强制力）是个危险的信号，如果失去定价权就个生意就麻烦了，很少有生意想投入就投入，想停下来就停下来，BRK的再保险可能具备这样的特点，但保险本身又很难赚到钱。
institutional imperative，这个词应该是巴菲特自己创造的，用来描述人的心理状态，同样适用于企业，这个词的另一面就是护城河（持久的竞争优势），如果没有就会进入“institutional imperative”的状态，对institutional imperative保持敏感，对护城河（持久的竞争优势）有持续的追求是一回事，要么同时存在，要么同时消失。
Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
现在说说“糟糕至极”的类型。最糟糕的企业是那种增长很快、需要大量资本来支撑增长，但最终几乎赚不到钱的公司。想想航空业。从 Wright Brothers 的年代起，行业内一直难以形成持久的竞争优势。事实上，如果当年 Kitty Hawk 现场有一位有远见的资本家，朝 Orville 开一枪，倒可能是对其后继者的大恩大德。
The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
自首次飞行以来，航空业对资本的渴求从未满足过。投资者被增长所诱惑，把资金倒进了无底洞，而他们本该被这种增长吓退。羞愧的是，1989 年我让 Berkshire 购买了 U.S. Air 的优先股，亲自参与了这场愚蠢。当我们的支票墨迹未干，公司就陷入急转直下，不久连优先股股息都停发了。随后我们走了大运：在航空业周期性、但总是被误导的乐观情绪又一次来临时，我们在 1998 年竟然高位卖出了持股并获得了可观收益。在我们卖出后的十年里，这家公司破产了两次。
“被动且强制”（institutional imperative，制度性强制力）+没有护城河的保护（没有持久的竞争优势），一旦进入这种状态往往很难停下来，可能被逼着做出艰难的决策，并且越来越难，航空公司就非常典型。
1、极高的固定成本，如果飞机停飞，巨额的折旧费和债务利息依然会按月产生，这会导致短期内出现极其恐怖的现金流断裂。为了覆盖这些固定成本，即使机票价格低到只够勉强支付燃油和机组人员工资（边际成本），航空公司也必须硬着头皮飞。
2、被迫的“军备竞赛”，产品高度同质化（从A飞到B的航班，对消费者来说唯一的区别就是价格，如果竞争对手投入巨资购买了更省油、单座成本更低的新机型，它就能打价格战。此时面临那个艰难的决策：如果不跟进投入，你的老飞机成本太高，立刻就会被市场淘汰；如果跟进投入，你就必须再次去借入或投入大量资本。
3、管理层的幻觉与痛苦的终局，管理层总是会产生一种幻觉：“只要我们再投入一笔钱，熬死对手，或者扩大规模降低单价，明年就能扭亏为盈。” 这种不断追加投资的冲动，让资本像倒进黑洞一样消失。
增加投入都是冲着重塑护城河去的，也有防御性质，但最终都是冲着塑造竞争优势去的，比如，购买新的设备、新的技术，等等，但是，巴菲特认为除品牌和结构化的成本优势以外，其他的护城河或者持久的竞争优势都是虚的，FlightSafety的例子偏品牌，而结构化的成本优势能不能通过新的设备、新的技术实现？好像很难，GEICO和Costco都不是因为新的设备、新的技术。
没有护城河的保护（没有持久的竞争优势），投入的资本就有可能被吞蚀，先是不知不觉，后面是“被动且强制”的走向失败。
To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.
总结一下，可以把企业想象成三类“储蓄账户”。“极佳”的账户支付异常高的利率，且会随时间推移不断上升；“良好”的账户支付颇具吸引力的利率，而且新增存款也能享受同样的回报；“糟糕”的账户不仅利率低得令人失望，还要求你不断以同样令人失望的回报继续往里加钱。
“以很高的回报率吸纳大量增量资本”是最好的生意但非常罕见，参考：《1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite — that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.
撇开价格不谈，最好的生意是在较长时期内能以很高的回报率吸纳大量增量资本的那类；最差的生意则恰好相反——持续以很低的回报率吞噬越来越多的资本。不幸的是，前一种生意极难寻找：多数高回报企业需要的资本相对不多。对于这类企业，如果把绝大部分利润以股息形式发放，或进行大规模回购，股东通常会受益。
巴菲特给“Right Business”设置的前置条件：“处于稳定行业中的长期竞争优势”和“以很高的回报率吸纳大量增量资本”存在悖论，长期稳定和“高增长”难以匹配，可能出现的缝隙是某种心理上难以复制的能力，比如，汽车保险和零售业都是非常传统并且稳定的行业，GEICO和Costco因为革新的做法一点点吞蚀呆在原地不动的竞争对手。
1、GEICO
GEICO的直销不是秘方但竞争对手就是难以复制，该行业从传统代理到专属代理，再到直销，后浪推前浪，前浪都行进在火车的铁轨上，只能按照既定的路线往前走，眼睁睁看着被后浪一点点吞蚀市场份额，汽车保险还有一个特点是变化缓慢，因为当年吃进的新业务需要承担更高的风险，参考：《2016-02-27 Warren Buffett.Auto insurance》。
即使是走一般代理人（general agents）渠道销售的NICO，导致竞争对手难以复制的是某种心理状态，参考：《2005-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
When we purchased the company — a specialist in commercial auto and general liability insurance — it did not appear to have any attributes that would overcome the industry’s chronic troubles. It was not well-known, had no informational advantage (the company has never had an actuary), was not a low-cost operator, and sold through general agents, a method many people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of the past 38 years, NICO has been a star performer. Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be lucky to be worth half of what it is today.
当我们收购这家公司时——它专注于商业车险（commercial auto）和一般责任险（general liability insurance）——它看起来并不具备任何足以克服行业长期困境的优势。它不出名，没有信息优势（公司从来没有雇过精算师），也不是低成本运营者，而且通过一般代理人（general agents）渠道销售——许多人认为这种方式已经过时。尽管如此，在过去 38 年中的几乎所有年份里，NICO 都是明星级的表现者。事实上，如果当年我们没有完成这笔收购，Berkshire 今天的价值能有现在的一半就算走运了。
What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers — but they left us.
我们真正的优势，是一种大多数保险公司根本无法复制的管理者心态（managerial mindset）。看看对页的数据：你能想象有任何一家上市公司，会主动拥抱一种商业模式——它会导致我们在 1986 到 1999 年间经历的那种营收下滑吗？必须强调的是，这种断崖式下滑并不是因为拿不到业务。只要我们愿意降价，市场上有“数十亿美元”的保费规模可以轻易被 NICO 拿到。但我们始终坚持：定价的目标是赚取利润，而不是去匹配我们最乐观的竞争对手的价格。我们从未离开客户——是客户离开了我们。
2、Costco
Costco跟GEICO有相似的地方，GEICO两个创始人Leo 与 Lillian Goodwin来自USAA，这家汽车保险公司只服务美军军官，而Costco用会员制挑选客户，他们不想要占着他们的停车场却不在店里大额消费的人，所以通过会员制度，只接纳特定类型的会员，他们的顾客一下子全都是一次买很多东西的人。
Costco另一个特点是极其有限的SKU所带来的各种优势，比如，库存的高速流转，单品海量采购带来的极限议价权，再配合极其克制的毛利率（绝不超过 15%）在整体上塑造了持久的竞争优势。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now it’s confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.
现在该“忏悔”了。需要说明的是，我接下来要谈到的错误，并非由任何顾问、董事会或投行推动。用网球术语讲，它们都是“非受迫性失误”。
To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase. The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.
首先，我几乎把 See’s 的收购搞砸了。卖方要价 3,000 万美元，而我坚持不超过 2,500 万美元。幸运的是，他妥协了。否则我就会打退堂鼓，而那 13.5 亿美元的后来收益就会落入别人手中。
About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.
在收购 See’s 的差不多同一时期，当时掌管 Capital Cities Broadcasting 的 Tom Murphy 打电话给我，开价 3,500 万美元，出售 Dallas-Fort Worth 的 NBC 电视台。该电视台与 Capital Cities 正在收购的 Fort Worth 报纸捆绑，而根据“交叉持有”规则，Murph 必须剥离电视台。我很清楚，电视台是类似 See’s 的业务：几乎无需资本投入，且增长前景极佳；经营简单，并源源不断向所有者“洒钱”。
Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear. But I didn’t listen.
更何况，Murph 当时（直到现在）都是我的至交，我钦佩他既是卓越的管理者，又是出色的人。他对电视业务了如指掌；若不是确信这笔收购一定可行，他不会打这个电话。等于是他在我耳边轻声说“买”。但我没听。
In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion – almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say “no”? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)
到 2006 年，这家电视台实现了 7,300 万美元税前利润；自我拒绝那笔交易以来，其累计利润至少达 10 亿美元——几乎全部可供所有者用于其他用途。而且，这项资产如今的资本价值约为 8 亿美元。我当初为什么说“不”？唯一的解释是我的大脑去度假了，却忘了通知我。（我的表现像 Molly Ivins 描述过的一位政客：“如果他的智商再低一点，你就得一天给他浇两次水。”）
Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that’s just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business – one now valued at $220 billion – to buy a worthless business.
最后，我说“行”的 Dexter（鞋业）更是一个更糟糕的错误：1993 年我用 4.33 亿美元的 Berkshire 股票（A 股 25,203 股）收购了它。我当初判断的“持久竞争优势”几年内就烟消云散。但这只是开始：使用 Berkshire 股票支付对价，让我把这个错误“几何级放大”。这一举动使 Berkshire 股东付出的代价不是 4 亿美元，而是 35 亿美元。本质上，我拿走了一家极其优秀企业 1.6% 的股权——这家公司如今市值 2,200 亿美元——去换一桩一文不值的生意。
To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made. But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”
迄今为止，Dexter 是我做过的最糟糕的一笔交易。但将来我还会犯更多错误——你可以对此下注。正如 Bobby Bare 的乡村歌曲里一句歌词所言，恰好说明并购中常常发生的事：“上床时我从没遇到丑女人，但醒来时确实有过几次。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们来审视 Berkshire 的四大运营板块。每个板块的资产负债表和损益结构差异极大。因此，把它们混在一起会妨碍分析。我们会将其作为四家独立的业务来呈现——这也是我和 Charlie 看待它们的方式。
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