I.H.208.Right People.Warren Buffett.Quality Decision

为什么对某件事感兴趣的大前提应该占到 80% 左右，我们没有能力追逐每一个想法，所以应该事先要有一个强有力的假设。

1、《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》

The Question of Conservatism 关于保守

The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.

从上述三类投资中，你可以对我们投资组合的保守程度有个大概了解。很多年以前，许多人买了中期或长期市政债券或国债，以为自己很保守。这些债券的市值多次大跌，这些人很多肯定也没做到资产保值或提升实际购买力。

Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.

现在，很多人意识到通货膨胀的问题了，但可能又担心过头了，他们几乎不看市盈率或股息率就买入蓝筹股，以为自己很保守。那些以为买债券就是保守的人，我们看到他们后来的结果了，现在以为买蓝筹股就是保守的人，结果如何还不得而知，但我认为这么投资风险很大。猜测贪婪善变的大众会给出多高的市盈率，毫无保守可言。

You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.

不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致，你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致，你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时，正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。

You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.

在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确，你最后就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。

I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.

我们的投资组合和一般人的不一样，完全不能证明我们是否比一般人更保守。是否保守，必须看投资方法如何，投资业绩如何。

I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 1/2 of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.

我认为，要客观评判我们投资的保守程度，就应该看我们在市场下跌时业绩如何，最好是看我们在市场大跌时的表现。1957 年和 1960 年，市场温和下跌，从我们的业绩可以看出来，我说的没错，我们的投资方法确实极为保守。我欢迎任何合伙人提出客观评判保守程度的方法，看一下我们做的如何。我们实现的亏损从来没超过净资产总额的 0.5%，我们实现的收益总额与亏损总额之比约为 100 ：1。这表明我们一直处在上行的市场中，但是，在这样的市场里，一样可能出现很多亏钱的交易（你自己就能找到一些例子），所以我觉得这个比例还是能说明一些问题的。

2、《1967-10-09 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》

The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.

在投资中，对证券和公司进行评估时，总是既有定性因素，又有定量因素。一个极端是纯粹的定性派，他们的主张是：“挑好公司买（前景好、行业状况好、管理层好），不用管价格。”另一个极端是纯粹的定量派，他们会说：“挑好价格买，不用管公司（和股票）。”证券投资领域是个好行当，两种方法都能赚钱。其实，所有分析师都会或多或少同时用到这两种方法，没有只使用一种，不用另一种的。至于一个人到底算是定性派，还是定量派，就看他在分析过程中更强调哪种方法。

Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.

有意思的是，虽说我认为我自己基本上算是定量派的（我写这句话的时候正是课间休息，大家都出去了，教室里可能就我一个人），这些年来我真正抓住的大的投资机会都是特别偏向定性的，都是我“看准了的大概率机会”。这些机会是给我们赚大钱的。这样的机会不常有，能真正看准的机会本来就少。至于通过定量分析发现的投资机会，用不着看得多准，数字应该一目了然，就像当头棒喝一样。所以说，真正能赚大钱的，是那些定性决策看得准的。不过，在我看来，通过定量分析，找到那些明显的投资机会，赚钱赚得更稳。

Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.

这些年来，通过统计数据就能找到的便宜货几乎绝迹了。或许是因为过去二十年里，没再出现 30 年代时的经济危机，没有人们对股票的厌恶，就没有遍地都是的便宜货，人们把股票筛选了一遍又一遍。或许是因为杠杆收购被日益接受并随之广泛应用（日益接受和广泛应用，哪个在先，哪个在后，让行为学家研究吧）。能吸引杠杆收购的本来就是便宜的品种。或许是因为证券分析从业人员暴增，现在研究股票的分析师比前几年多多了。无论原因如何，摆在我们面前的现实是用定量方法能找到的便宜货已经基本绝迹了，我们赖以为生的主食没了。用定量方法可能偶尔还能找到几个便宜货。偶尔也可能发现我在定性方面非常确定的股票，这里有我们赚大钱的机会，但是，这种机会很稀少。在过去三年里，我们的业绩那么好，主要就是得益于发现了一个这样的好机会。

3、《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

98. How Phil Fisher’s “scuttlebutt” method changed Buffett’s life

菲尔·费雪的“边界调查法”如何改变了巴菲特的人生

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：请第5区提问？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Travis Heath (PH). I’m from Dallas, Texas.

观众提问：我叫特拉维斯·希思（音），来自德克萨斯州达拉斯。

And my question regards what Phil Fisher referred to as “scuttlebutt.” When you’ve identified a business that you consider to warrant further investigation — more intense investigation — how much time do you spend commonly, both in terms of total hours and in terms of the span in weeks or months that you perform that investigation over?

我的问题是关于菲尔·费雪提到的“边界调查法”。当您确定一家值得进一步深入调查的企业时，通常您会花多少时间进行这项调查？总时长是多少？调查通常会持续几周或几个月？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that question is that now I spend practically none because I’ve done it in the past. And the one advantage of allocating capital is that an awful lot of what you do is cumulative in nature, so that you do get continuing benefits out of things that you’d done earlier.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个问题的答案是，我现在几乎不花时间了，因为过去我已经做过这些调查了。而资本配置的一大优势在于，很多事情的性质是累积性的，因此你会从之前做过的事情中持续受益。

So by now, I’m probably fairly familiar with most of the businesses that might qualify for investment at Berkshire.

因此，到现在为止，我可能已经相当熟悉那些可能符合伯克希尔投资标准的业务了。

But when I started out, and for a long time I used to do a lot of what Phil Fisher described — I followed his scuttlebutt method. And I don’t think you can do too much of it.

但在我刚起步的时候，以及很长一段时间里，我做了很多菲尔·费雪描述的事情——我遵循了他的“边界调查法”。而且我认为这方面的调查永远不会做得过多。

Now, the general premise of why you’re interested in something should be 80 percent of it or thereabouts. I mean, you don’t want to be chasing down every idea that way, so you should have a strong presumption.

不过，你感兴趣的某件事情的总体前提应该占到80%左右。我的意思是，你不想用这种方法追踪每一个想法，所以你需要有一个强有力的假设前提。

You should be like a basketball coach who runs into a seven-footer on the street. I mean, you’re interested to start with; now you have to find out if you can keep him in school, if he’s coordinated, and all that sort of thing. That’s the scuttlebutt aspect of it.

你应该像一个篮球教练在街上遇到一个七英尺高的球员一样。我的意思是，你一开始就应该感兴趣；然后你需要了解他是否能留在学校，是否协调，诸如此类的事情。这就是“边界调查法”的一个方面。

But I believe that as you’re acquiring knowledge about industries in general, companies specifically, that there really isn’t anything like first doing some reading about them, and then getting out and talking to competitors, and customers, and suppliers, and ex-employees, and current employees, and whatever it may be.

但我相信，在你获取行业一般知识和具体公司信息时，确实没有什么比先阅读资料，然后与竞争对手、客户、供应商、前雇员、现雇员以及其他相关人士交流更有效的方法了。

And you will learn a lot. But it should be the last 20 percent or 10 percent. I mean, you don’t want to get too impressed by that, because you really want to start with a business where you think the economics are good, where they look like seven-footers, and then you want to go out with a scuttlebutt approach to possibly reject your original hypothesis.

你会从中学到很多。但这应该是最后的20%或10%的工作。我的意思是，你不想对这些印象过深，因为你确实应该从一家你认为经济状况良好的企业开始，就像那些七英尺高的球员一样，然后用“边界调查法”来验证或否定你的原始假设。

And if you talk to a bunch of people on an industry and you ask them what competitor they fear the most, and why they fear them, and all of that sort of thing. You know, who would they use the silver bullet of Andy Grove’s on and so on, you’re going to learn a lot about it.

如果你和一群业内人士交谈，问他们最害怕的竞争对手是谁，为什么害怕，以及相关的事情，比如他们会用“安迪·格罗夫的银弹”瞄准谁，你会从中学到很多东西。

You’ll probably know more about the industry than most of the people in it when you get through, because you’ll bring an independent perspective to it, and you’ll be listening to everything everyone says rather than coming in with these preconceived notions and just sort of listening to your own truths after a while.

等你完成调查时，你可能比业内大多数人对行业的了解更多，因为你带来了一个独立的视角，并且会倾听每个人的看法，而不是抱着预设立场，仅仅听从自己一开始的成见。

I advise it. I don’t really do it much anymore. I do it a little bit, and I talked in the annual report about how when we made the decision on keeping the American Express when we exchanged our Percs for common stock in 1994, I was using the scuttlebutt approach when I talked to Frank Olson.

我建议大家使用这种方法。我现在几乎不怎么用了，只是偶尔用一下。我在年度报告中提到过，当我们1994年决定将我们的优先股换成美国运通的普通股时，我就是通过与弗兰克·奥尔森的对话使用了“边界调查法”。

I couldn’t have talked to a better guy than Frank Olson. Frank Olson, running Hertz Corporation, lots of experience at United Airlines, and a consumer marketing guy by nature. I mean, he understands business.

没有人比弗兰克·奥尔森更适合交谈了。他经营着赫兹公司，有丰富的United Airlines经验，本质上是一个消费品营销专家。他真的很懂生意。

And when I asked him how strong the American Express card was and what were the strengths and the weaknesses of it, and who was coming along after it, and so on, I mean, he could give me an answer in five minutes that would be better than I could accomplish in hours and hours and hours or weeks of roaming around and doing other things.

当我问他美国运通卡有多强，它的优势和劣势是什么，以及未来可能有哪些竞争对手时，他能在五分钟内给我一个比我花数小时甚至数周时间调查得到的答案更好、更全面的答案。

So you can learn from people. And Frank was a user of it. I mean, Frank was paying X percent to American Express for his Hertz cars. And Frank doesn’t like to pay out money, so why was he paying that? And if he was paying more than he was paying on Master Charge or Visa, why was he paying more? And then what could he do about it?

你可以从人那里学到很多东西。弗兰克自己就是美国运通的用户。他为赫兹的租车业务向美国运通支付了X%的费用。而弗兰克并不喜欢支付额外的费用，那么他为什么愿意支付这笔钱？如果这比他支付给万事达或Visa的费用更高，他为什么还愿意支付？他还能做些什么？

I mean, you just keep asking questions.

我的意思是，你需要不断地问问题。

And I guess Davy [Lorimer Davidson] explained that in that video we had ahead of time. I’m very grateful to him for doing that, because that was a real effort for him.

我想洛瑞默·戴维森在我们之前的视频中解释过这一点。我非常感激他这么做，因为这对他来说确实是一次重要的付出。

But that was really what I was doing back in 1951 when I visited him down in Washington, because I was trying to figure out why people would insure with GEICO rather than with the companies that they were already insuring with, and how permanent that advantage was.

但实际上，这正是我1951年去华盛顿拜访他时所做的事情。当时我试图弄清楚，人们为什么会选择和GEICO投保，而不是继续使用他们已经在使用的保险公司，这种优势能持续多久。

You know, what other things could you do with that advantage? And you know, there were just a lot of questions I wanted to ask him, and he was terrific in giving me the answer. It, you know, changed my life in a major way. So I have nobody to thank but Davy on that.

这种优势还能带来什么？我有很多问题想问他，而他给了我非常出色的答案。这在很大程度上改变了我的人生。所以，这方面我只能感谢戴维。

But that’s the scuttlebutt method and I do advise it.

但这就是“边界调查法”，而且我确实建议大家使用它。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：无可补充。

4、《2003-05-24 Steve Jobs.I think I got lucky and had the chutzpah to call these guys up.》

Leslie Berlin: And when you think of Bob giving you the lay of the land, is it along these sorts of lines, in some sense?

莱斯利·柏林：当你想到鲍勃给你介绍情况时，这在某种意义上是否是这样的？

Steve Jobs:Oh yeah, absolutely. I mean, it’s sort of like … you know your olfactory sense is your most poignant sense in terms of its connection to your memory? You can smell something, in your thirties, and it’ll take you right back to when you were seven years old. The gift that Bob gave me was that connection and sense of smell, that strong connection back to some wonderful era of this valley that I lived in but [only] through him got a very strong sense of what it was.

史蒂夫·乔布斯：哦，是的，绝对如此。我的意思是，这有点像……你知道你的嗅觉是与你的记忆联系最紧密的感官吗？你可以在三十多岁时闻到某种气味，它会让你立刻回到七岁时。鲍勃给我的礼物就是这种联系和嗅觉，那种强烈的联系让我回到了我生活过的这个山谷的美好时代，但[只有]通过他，我才对那段时期有了非常强烈的感受。

It’s hard to explain. But if you could sort of transmit—when you smell that smell, and it takes you back to when you were seven—if you could give that to somebody else, that was kind of what he was able to give to me. And I don’t know how it happens, but you know it. And I was curious.

这很难解释。但如果你能传达那种感觉——当你闻到那种气味时，它让你回想起七岁时的事情——如果你能把这种感觉传递给别人，那就是他能够给我的那种感觉。我不知道这是怎么发生的，但你知道它的存在。我很好奇。

Leslie Berlin: Why does that sense of connection matter? Why is it so important to you?

莱斯利·柏林：这种连接感为什么重要？对你来说为什么如此重要？

Steve Jobs:There’s a human drama to most everything. You look at it sometimes, and it seems dry as history. But if you peel the onion, there’s humanity underneath.

史蒂夫·乔布斯：大多数事情都有一种人性戏剧。你有时看它，似乎干巴巴的像历史。但如果你剥开洋葱，下面就有人性。

Just to understand what’s going on now—you can’t really do that unless you understand how it got here. There’s a great quote by Schopenhauer. It’s a great quote. I should pull this up. I’ll get it all wrong. I’ve got to go up and get it.

为了理解现在发生的事情，你必须了解它是如何发展到这个地步的。舒本华有一句很好的名言。这是一句很好的名言。我应该把它找出来。我会搞错的。我得去找一下。

[Goes upstairs, grabs Schopenhauer’s On the Suffering of the World, and then reads from it on the stairs.] “He who lives to see two or three generations is like a man who sits some time in the conjurer’s booth at a fair and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were meant to be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, their effect is gone.”

[上楼，拿起叔本华的《世界的痛苦》，然后在楼梯上阅读。] “活到见证两三代人的人，就像一个人在集市的魔术师摊位上坐了一段时间，连续目睹表演两三次。这些把戏本来只应该看一次；当它们不再新奇并停止欺骗时，它们的效果就消失了。”

这就是商业模式中定性的部分。

5、《2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV》

AM: But does it also act as a constant pressure to outperform because that’s the parameter he’s setting?

AM：但这是否也会成为一种持续的压力，促使超越，因为这是他设定的参数？

AJ: It does and it doesn’t. It does in as much as you always want to live up to the expectations people have for you. It doesn’t because, unlike a lot of executives, he’s very rational about expectations. And, more than rational, I think he’s one of the few executives and bosses that I can think of who does a very good job in terms of distinguishing between outcome and decision-making before the event happened.

AJ：有时候是，有时候不是。是因为你总是想要达到人们对你的期望。不是因为，与许多高管不同，他对期望非常理性。而且，我认为他不仅理性，他是我能想到的少数几位在事件发生之前能够很好地区分结果和决策的高管和老板之一。

The world, the way it works, they look at outcome and you may have made a good decision which ends up in a bad outcome — and everyone comes down on [you] like a ton of bricks. By the same token, on the flip side, you might make a bad decision and end up with a good outcome and you get all of the glory under the sun. Warren does an incredible job in terms of decoupling the two — and measuring and evaluating people and the people who work for him in terms of the quality of the decision that was made before you know the outcome.

世界的运作方式是，他们关注结果，而你可能做出了一个好的决定，但最终却导致了不好的结果——然后每个人都会像一吨砖头一样压在你身上。反之，你可能做出了一个坏决定，却得到了一个好的结果，这时你就会获得所有的荣耀。沃伦在这方面做得非常出色，他将这两者分开——在你知道结果之前，衡量和评估人以及为他工作的人，关注的是所做决定的质量。

巴菲特的精髓，I.C.S。

In a sense, that makes it very easy to work for a human being who’s rational, who you’re very clear about what is it that’s important, and he sets very clear guidelines in terms of expectations [and] in terms of the ethics and how business should be conducted. And, pretty much, within those very broad boundaries he leaves you to manage the business as you think best.

从某种意义上说，这使得与一个理性的人合作变得非常简单，因为你非常清楚什么是重要的，他在期望、伦理和商业运作方面设定了非常明确的指导方针。在这些非常宽泛的界限内，他基本上让你按照自己的想法来管理业务。

6、《2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, here’s the question:

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，问题是：

“Please tell us more about your experience this past year with Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. What did they do well, and did they make any mistakes? And please discuss how you compensate them a bit more.

请告诉我们您过去一年与托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒的经历。他们做得很好，是否犯过错误？请多谈谈您是如何补偿他们的。

In an interview, you said that Todd Combs was well compensated for the performance of his stock picks last year.

在一次采访中，你说托德·科姆斯因去年股票选择的表现得到了很好的报酬。

Should we be worried about a short-term horizon for compensation? How do you ensure that Todd and Ted don’t chase high-flying stocks for the sake of compensation?

我们是否应该担心短期的薪酬前景？你如何确保托德和泰德不会为了薪酬而追逐高飞的股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve always been more concerned about how our record is achieved than the precise record itself. And with both Todd and Ted, Charlie and I were struck by, not only a good record, but intellectual integrity and qualities of character, a real commitment to Berkshire, a lifelong-type commitment.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们一直更关心的是我们的业绩是如何取得的，而不是具体的业绩本身。对于托德和泰德，查理和我不仅被良好的业绩所打动，更被他们的知识诚信和品格品质所吸引，对伯克希尔的真正承诺，这是一种终身的承诺。

And we’ve seen hundreds and hundreds of good records in our lifetimes; we haven’t seen very many people we want to have join Berkshire.

我们在一生中见过成百上千的好记录；但我们没有见过很多我们想要让他们加入伯克希尔的人。

7、《2023-05-03 Todd Combs.Meeting Munger, Buffett and Joining Berkshire》

TC: Yeah — and it matters! That’s where details matter.

TC: 是的——这很重要！细节在这里很重要。

When Warren and I would talk about stocks, acquisitions, whatever, it’s 95-99% qualitative, qualitative, qualitative.

当沃伦和我谈论股票、收购或其他事情时，95-99%都是定性的，定性的，定性的。

That comes down to all the stuff that he talks about in terms of moats, barriers to entry. You’re not getting that, necessarily, in a filing or an annual report. You get a sense for it — it’s a starting point — but you want to work, essentially, inside out. What I mean by that is starting with the details and, then, those details form the foundation from which you can build upon — that you then gain a qualitative understanding.

这归结于他所谈论的所有内容，比如护城河和进入壁垒。你在文件或年报中不一定能得到这些信息。你会对它有一个大致的了解——这只是一个起点——但你想要从内到外地工作。我所说的意思是，从细节开始，然后这些细节构成了你可以在其基础上构建的基础——这样你就能获得定性的理解。

I personally feel like too many people start outside in. And what I mean by that is they’re starting with a narrative. They’re starting because they heard something from someone or they saw it on CNBC or they read a research report or what have you. If you start with any narrative… One of the real cognitive dissonances that we can all have, or blind spots, is that then you start forming all of your opinions based on a loose narrative that you formed that was completely erroneous to begin with.

我个人觉得太多人是从外部开始的。我的意思是，他们是从一个叙述开始的。他们开始是因为听到了某人的话，或者在 CNBC 上看到了什么，或者读了一份研究报告，或者其他什么。如果你从任何叙述开始……我们所有人都可能有的一个真正的认知失调，或者盲点，就是你开始根据一个你形成的松散叙述来形成你所有的观点，而这个叙述一开始就是完全错误的。

It’s no different than the scientific process: You don’t start with a narrative and try to prove it. You start with the facts and build it from there.

这与科学过程没有什么不同：你不是从叙述开始并试图证明它。你是从事实开始，然后从那里构建。

NFM: You’ve said that you try to clear the noise of the narrative until you’ve done your own research.

NFM：你说过你会努力清除叙述中的噪音，直到你自己做了研究。

从一个聪明的假设开始，包括商业模式和企业文化，但凡有一个不符合就不能进入备选的清单。

TC: I don’t even look at the market cap of a name. A game that I’ve always played with myself is, like, look at the name, do your work, build up what you would buy that entire business for, and 80-90% of the time you’re within 20% of what the enterprise value or the market cap trades for. But, sometimes, it’s just completely [different].

我甚至不看一个公司的市值。我一直在和自己玩一个游戏，比如，看一下这个名字，做你的功课，估算一下你愿意为整个业务支付的价格，80-90%的时间你会在企业价值或市值交易价格的 20%以内。但有时候，它就是完全不同。

Mastercard is a good example of that. I think it came public for $3-3.5 billion and I purposely didn’t want to know — and did not know or hear that at the time — and I valued it at like $30 [billion] or something like that.

万事达卡就是一个很好的例子。我记得它上市时的市值在30-35亿美元左右，而我当时有意不去了解这些信息，并且确实不知道或没听到这些消息。我自己估值大概是在300亿美元左右。

I.H.208.Right People.Warren Buffett.Quality Decision

I.H.208.Right People.Warren Buffett.Quality Decision

1、《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》

2、《1967-10-09 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》

3、《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

4、《2003-05-24 Steve Jobs.I think I got lucky and had the chutzpah to call these guys up.》

5、《2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV》

6、《2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

7、《2023-05-03 Todd Combs.Meeting Munger, Buffett and Joining Berkshire》

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