It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.

事实证明，我对第（4）点的判断大错特错。尽管1979年还有中等程度的盈利，但此后这门业务却持续消耗了大量现金。到1985年年中，就连我也清楚地看到，这种情况几乎肯定还会继续下去。如果我们能找到一个愿意继续经营这门业务的买家，我当然更愿意出售，而不是清算它，即使那意味着我们拿到的价款会稍微少一些。但那些最终对我变得显而易见的经济现实，对别人同样也显而易见，因此根本没有人感兴趣。

I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.

我不会仅仅为了把公司整体回报率提高零点几个百分点，就关闭那些盈利能力低于正常水平的业务。然而，我同样认为，即便是一家盈利极其出色的公司，一旦某项业务看起来前景中只有无穷无尽的亏损，再继续为其提供资金也是不合适的。Adam Smith 会不同意我的第一个命题，而 Karl Marx 会不同意我的第二个命题；只有站在这两者之间的中间地带，才让我感到自在。

I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice—“the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave”—and believed what I preferred to believe.

我需要再次强调，Ken 和 Garry 为了让我们的纺织业务走向成功，已经表现得足够足智多谋、精力充沛且富有想象力。为了实现可持续盈利，他们重新调整了产品线、机器配置和分销安排。我们还进行了一项重大的收购——Waumbec Mills，期望获得重要的协同效应（synergy，这个词在商业中常被用来解释那些若不用它就根本讲不通的收购）。但最终一切都没有奏效，而我应该为自己没有更早退出而受到责备。最近一篇 Business Week 的文章指出，自1980年以来已有250家纺织厂关闭。这些业主并没有掌握任何我所不知道的信息；他们只是更客观地处理了这些信息而已。我忽视了 Comte 的忠告——“理智应当是心灵的仆人，而不是它的奴隶”——相信了那些我更愿意相信的东西。

The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)

美国国内纺织业所处的是一种商品化生意（commodity business），它在一个存在大量过剩产能的全球市场中竞争。我们所经历的许多麻烦，不论直接还是间接，都要归因于来自外国的竞争——那些国家的工人工资只相当于美国最低工资的一小部分。但这绝不意味着我们的员工该为公司的关闭承担任何责任。事实上，与美国工业界整体的员工相比，我们的工人薪酬偏低，而这也一直是整个纺织行业的常态。在合同谈判中，工会领导人与成员充分理解我们在成本上的不利处境，并没有推动不现实的加薪要求或低效率的工作规则。恰恰相反，他们和我们一样努力地想让公司保持竞争力。即便在清算期间，他们的表现也极为出色。（具有讽刺意味的是，如果几年前我们的工会表现得更不讲道理一些，我们在财务上反而会过得更好；那样我们就会更早意识到自己所面对的是一个不可能的未来，及时关厂，并避免后来那些重大的亏损。）

Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.

多年来，我们本可以在纺织业务上进行大规模资本支出，从而在一定程度上降低可变成本。每一项此类提案看起来都是立竿见影的赢家。事实上，以标准的投资回报测试来衡量，这些提案所承诺的经济效益，通常还高于将同等资金投入我们盈利丰厚的糖果和报纸业务所能带来的回报。

But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company's capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.

但这些纺织业投资所承诺的收益不过是幻象。我们的许多竞争对手——无论国内还是国外——都在跟进同类支出，一旦足够多的企业这样做，它们降低的成本便成为全行业压低价格的新基准。单独来看，每家公司的资本投资决策似乎都合乎成本效益、合乎逻辑；但整体来看，这些决策彼此抵消，结果反而是非理性的（就像游行队伍旁的每个观众都觉得踮起脚尖能看得更清楚一样）。每经历一轮投资，所有参与者押注的资金都更多了，而回报依然惨淡。

Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: "More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly."

于是，我们面临着一个两难的痛苦抉择：大规模资本投入或许能勉强维系纺织业务的存活，却只会让我们在持续膨胀的资本上获得糟糕的回报。而且，即便投入之后，外国竞争对手在劳动力成本上的巨大优势依然长期存在。然而，若拒绝投资，我们将愈发失去竞争力，即便与国内纺织商相比亦然。我总觉得自己像是身处 Woody Allen 某部电影中描述的处境："在历史上任何其他时期，人类都未曾像今天这样面临一个十字路口。一条路通向绝望与彻底的无望，另一条路通向彻底的毁灭。让我们祈祷自己有足够的智慧做出正确的选择。"

For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.

要理解"投还是不投"的两难困境在大宗商品行业中如何演绎，Burlington Industries 是一个极具启发性的案例——它在21年前是美国最大的纺织企业，如今依然如此。1964年，Burlington 的销售额高达12亿美元，而我们仅有5000万美元。它在销售渠道和生产能力上的优势，都是我们望尘莫及的，其盈利记录自然也远胜于我们。1964年底，它的股价为60美元，而我们的股价只有13美元。

Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington's basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company's capital decisions were quite rational.

Burlington 决定坚守纺织业，到1985年销售额约达28亿美元。在1964至1985年间，该公司的资本支出约为30亿美元，远超美国其他任何纺织企业，折合到那只60美元的股票上，每股超过200美元。我相信，这些支出中有很大一部分用于降低成本和扩大产能。鉴于 Burlington 坚持留在纺织业的基本承诺，我也推断该公司的资本决策在当时是相当理性的。

Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34—on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.

然而，Burlington 的实际销售额已经萎缩，如今的销售回报率和股本回报率也远低于20年前的水平。1965年经过一拆二的股票分割后，其股价目前为34美元——经调整后，仅略高于1964年的60美元原始价格。与此同时，CPI已上涨逾两倍。因此，每股所代表的购买力，仅约为1964年底的三分之一。公司虽持续派发股息，但这些股息的实际购买力也已大幅缩水。

This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson's horse: "A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse—not a remarkable mathematician." Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company—but not a remarkable business.

这一对股东而言堪称毁灭性的结果，揭示了当大量智慧与精力被施加于一个错误前提之上时，会导致怎样的后果。这让我想起 Samuel Johnson 关于马的比喻："一匹能数到十的马，是一匹了不起的马——但不是一位了不起的数学家。"同理，一家在行业内资本配置极为出色的纺织企业，是一家了不起的纺织公司——但不是一门了不起的生意。

My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: "When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact." Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.

我从自身经历以及对众多企业的长期观察中得出结论：一位管理者的经营业绩（以经济回报衡量），在更大程度上取决于你选择进入哪条船，而非你划桨的技术有多高超（当然，在任何生意中，无论好坏，智慧与努力都大有裨益）。多年前我曾写道："当一支以才华著称的管理团队，遭遇一门以糟糕基本经济特征著称的生意，最终得以保全声誉的，往往是那门生意。"此后，没有任何事情改变过我对此的看法。如果你发现自己置身于一艘长期漏水的船，那么把精力用于换船，很可能比用于补漏更有成效。

There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.

在我们的纺织业故事中，还有一段投资后记。一些投资者在选股时非常看重账面价值（正如我早年亦曾如此）。还有一些经济学家和学者认为，重置价值对于计算整体股市的合理价格水平至关重要。而这两类人，都会在我们1986年初为处置纺织机械所举行的拍卖会上，得到一堂难忘的实地教育。

The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.

此次出售的设备（包括拍卖前数月已处置的部分）占据了 New Bedford 工厂约75万平方英尺的空间，且完全可以正常使用。这批设备最初耗资约1300万美元，其中200万美元花费于1980至1984年间，经加速折旧后，当前账面价值为86.6万美元。尽管任何头脑清醒的管理层都不会再做此类投资，但若要全新替置这批设备，或许需要花费3000万至5000万美元。

Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.

然而，我们出售这批设备的总收入仅为163,122美元。扣除必要的售前与售后费用后，净收益不足为零。那些我们1981年以每台5,000美元购入、尚属相对现代化的织机，以50美元的价格竟无人问津。最终，我们以每台26美元的废铁价将其卖出，而这个数字甚至不够支付拆除搬运的费用。

Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo—or a single See's candy store—considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.

请细细思量这一事实：Buffalo 两条送报线路所蕴含的经济商誉，或仅仅一家 See's 糖果门店所具备的经济商誉，都远远超过我们从这批庞大有形资产中所获得的全部收益——而这批资产在不久之前，在不同的竞争环境下，曾足以养活逾千名工人。