I.H.115.Warren Buffett.Utility system
有稳定的收益但也可能受到政治上的干扰。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的资本密集型业务
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.
我们的BNSF铁路公司和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”），即我们持股90%的公用事业公司，具有与Berkshire其他业务显著不同的重要特征。因此，我们在这封信中特别设立了一个章节讨论它们，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表和利润表中分别列示这两家公司合并的财务数据。这两家重要子公司在去年占据了Berkshire税后经营利润的33%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在使用寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入巨资，并通过大量长期债务进行部分融资，这些债务并不由Berkshire担保。事实上，这些公司的信用状况无需依赖我们，因为即便在极其糟糕的经济环境下，它们的盈利能力也远超其利息支出。例如，在铁路行业表现不佳的去年，BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过6倍。（我们对利息保障倍数的定义是“息税前利润除以利息费用”，而不是市面常用的“EBITDA除以利息”，我们认为后者是一个存在严重缺陷的指标。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
而对于BHE来说，有两个因素确保其在任何情况下都具备偿债能力。第一点是所有公用事业公司所共有的：抗衰退的盈利能力，因为这些公司提供的是需求极为稳定的基本服务。第二点则是其他公用事业公司少有的：收益来源日益多元化，使得BHE不会因某一个监管机构的政策而遭受重大损害。这些多元的利润来源，再加上BHE拥有一个实力雄厚的母公司这一固有优势，使得BHE及其旗下的公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实不仅对我们有利，也惠及我们的客户。
2、《2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
29. Not surprised “if we find good uses” for Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s capital
如果我们找到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的资本的良好用途，我并不感到惊讶。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？
GREGG WARREN: Warren, Berkshire Energy has benefited greatly from operating under the Berkshire umbrella. By not having to pay out 60 to 70 percent of earnings annually as a dividend, the company was able to amass 9 billion in capital the past five years, and closer to 12 billion in the past ten, money that can be allocated to acquisitions and capital spending, especially on renewables.
格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，伯克希尔能源在伯克希尔的庇护下受益匪浅。由于不必每年支付 60%到 70%的收益作为股息，公司在过去五年中积累了 90 亿美元的资本，在过去十年中接近 120 亿美元，这些资金可以用于收购和资本支出，特别是在可再生能源方面。
While tax credits for solar energy don’t run out until next year, we’ve already seen a dramatic reduction in Berkshire Energy’s capital commitment to solar projects. And even though spending on wind generation capacity is projected to be elevated this year and next, it does wind down in 2020 as the wind production tax credits are phased out.
虽然太阳能的税收抵免要到明年才会到期，但我们已经看到伯克希尔能源对太阳能项目的资本承诺大幅减少。尽管预计今年和明年风能发电能力的支出将保持在高位，但随着风能生产税收抵免的逐步取消，这一支出将在 2020 年减少。
Absent a major commitment to additional capital projects, it looks like Berkshire Energy’s expenditures in 2021 will be its lowest since 2012, leaving the firm with more cash on hand than it has had in some time.
在没有重大资本项目的承诺下，伯克希尔能源在 2021 年的支出看起来将是自 2012 年以来的最低水平，这使得该公司手头的现金比一段时间以来都要多。
Do you think it is likely at that point that Berkshire Energy starts funneling some of that cash up to the parent company? Or will it be earmarked for debt reduction, or just be left on the balance sheet as dry powder for acquisitions?
你认为在那时伯克希尔能源会开始将一些现金转移到母公司吗？还是会用于减少债务，或者仅仅留在资产负债表上作为收购的备用资金？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — you’re right about when tax credits phase out and all of that. Although, as you know, they’ve extended that legislation in the past. Who knows exactly what the government’s position will be on incentivizing various forms of alternative energy?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你说得对，关于税收抵免何时逐步取消等等。尽管你知道，他们过去曾延长过那项立法。谁知道政府在激励各种形式的替代能源方面的立场究竟会是什么呢？
But my guess is — I mean, if you take the logical expenditures that may be required in all aspects of the public — like regeneration and the utility business generally — I think there’ll be a lot of money spent.
但我猜——我的意思是，如果你考虑到公共领域可能需要的合理支出——比如再生和公用事业业务一般——我认为会花费很多钱。
And the question is whether we can spend it and get a reasonable return on it. There again, we’ll do what’s logical.
问题是我们是否可以花费它并获得合理的回报。在这里，我们将做出合乎逻辑的决定。
There are three shareholders, basically, of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Berkshire Hathaway itself owns 90 percent of it. And Greg Abel and his family, perhaps, and Walter Scott and, again, family members — own the other 10 percent. And we all have an interest in employing as much capital as we can at good rates.
伯克希尔能源的三个主要股东基本上是：伯克希尔本身拥有90%的股份。格雷格·阿贝尔及其家族，可能还有沃尔特·斯科特及其家族，拥有另外10%的股份。我们都希望尽可能地以良好的回报使用资本。
And we’ll know when it can be done and when it can’t be done. And we’ll do — there’s no tax consequences to Berkshire at all. So — but the three partners will figure out which makes the most sense.
我们会知道什么时候可以做到，什么时候做不到。我们会做出最合适的选择。对伯克希尔没有税收后果。因此——但三个合伙人将决定哪种方式最有意义。
But when you think of what might be done to improve the grid in the U.S. and the fact that we do have the capital, I wouldn’t be surprised if we find good uses for capital in Berkshire Hathaway Energy for a long time in the future.
但是当你考虑到可以采取什么措施来改善美国的电网，以及我们确实拥有资本这一事实时，我不会感到惊讶，如果我们在未来很长一段时间内在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源找到资本的良好用途。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I think there’ll be huge opportunities in Berkshire Energy as far ahead as you can see to deploy capital very intelligently. So I think the chances of a big dividend is approximately zero.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为，在伯克希尔能源方面，将会有巨大的机会来非常聪明地部署资本。 所以我认为大幅分红的可能性接近于零。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve not only got the money to an extent that virtually no utility company does — we’ve also got the talent, too. I mean, we’ve got a very, very talented organization there.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不仅拥有几乎没有公用事业公司能比拟的资金，我们还有人才。我是说，我们那里有一个非常非常有才华的团队。
So it’s a big field and we’ve got shareholders that are capitalists. And we’ve got managers that are terrific. And you would think we’d find something intelligent to do over time in the field.
所以这是一个大领域，我们有资本家的股东。我们有出色的管理者。你会认为我们会随着时间的推移在这个领域找到一些聪明的事情去做。
So far, we have. I mean, we’ve owned it now for close to 20 years. And we’ve deployed a lot of capital and so far, so good. I mean, it’s —
到目前为止，我们已经拥有它将近 20 年了。我们投入了大量资金，到目前为止，一切都很好。我的意思是——
If you look at the improvements that can be made in our utility system in the United States, you’re talking hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions. So — you know, where else but Berkshire would you look for that kind of money? (Laughs)
如果你看看我们在美国的公用事业系统可以做出的改进，你在谈论数百亿，甚至数万亿的美元。因此——你知道，还能去哪里寻找那样的资金呢？（笑声）
3、《2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
与BNSF不同，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）对普通股不支付任何股息，这在电力公用事业领域极为罕见。这一近乎苦行僧式的政策，贯穿了我们拥有该公司21年来的始终。与铁路不同，美国的电力行业需要进行大规模的现代化改造，最终所需成本将极为巨大。这项任务将在未来数十年内消耗BHE的全部利润。我们欢迎这一挑战，并相信额外的投资终将获得合理的回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its \$18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
让我向你们介绍一下BHE正在开展的一个项目——该公司计划投入180亿美元，对美国西部地区现有电力传输网络的大部分老旧线路进行升级改造和扩展。BHE于2006年启动该项目，预计将在2030年完成——是的，你没看错，就是2030年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.
可再生能源的兴起，让我们的项目成为社会必需品。从历史上看，长期占主导地位的煤电厂通常靠近人口密集的大城市。但在新能源时代，风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点却往往位于偏远地区。2006年，当BHE对形势进行评估时，很明显，美国西部地区输电线路需要大规模投资改造。然而，当各方算清楚项目成本后，很少有公司或政府机构能有底气站出来承担这个任务。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.
值得一提的是，BHE决定推进该项目，基于其对美国政治、经济和司法体系的充分信任。数十亿美元的资金投入后，才能看到实质的收入回报。这些输电线路需要跨越多个州和不同司法辖区，而每个辖区都有自己的规则和利益群体。此外，BHE还需与数百名土地所有者沟通协调，并与可再生能源发电供应商以及远距离输送电力的公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。利益冲突方、旧秩序的捍卫者，以及渴望一夜之间改变世界的空想家，都必须逐步赢得认同。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.
在这一过程中，遭遇各种意外和拖延几乎是必然的。但同样确定的是，BHE拥有实现承诺所需的管理人才、机构承诺以及财务能力。尽管我们的西部输电项目距离最终竣工尚需多年，但如今我们已经开始寻找其他规模相似的项目以继续推进。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
无论前方还有多少障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领先者。
And the way you get it is having something that doesn’t take too much capital. I mean, if you have to really put out tons and tons of capital — utility business is that way. It’s not a super-high return business. You just have to put out a lot of capital. You get a return on that capital, but you don’t get fabulous return. You don’t get Google-like returns, you know, or anything remotely close to it.
获得它的方法是拥有一些不需要太多资本的东西。我的意思是，如果你真的需要投入大量资本——公用事业就是这样。它不是一个超高回报的行业。你只需要投入大量资本。你会从这些资本中获得回报，但你不会获得惊人的回报。你不会获得像谷歌那样的回报，或者任何接近的回报。
You know, we’re proposing a return in the transaction — the proposition with Texas — I think it’s 9.3%, isn’t it —
你知道，我们提议在交易中进行回报——与德克萨斯州的提议——我想是 9.3%，不是吗——
GREG ABEL: Yeah, 9.3 —
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，9.3 —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you know, that — but if you look at the return on most American businesses on net tangible assets, it’s a lot higher than 9.3. But they aren’t utility businesses, either.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你知道，但如果你看看大多数美国企业在净有形资产上的回报率，它远高于 9.3。但它们也不是公用事业公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thank you. The second part is the easiest one to answer, so I’ll take that. Then I’ll throw the first one back to Charlie. (Laughter) But Berkshire Hathaway Energy actually is required with it’s regulated utilities — and it basically started pretty much with regulated utilities, and still is dominated by that. And we’re interested in buying more regulated utilities.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢。第二部分是最容易回答的，所以我来回答。然后我把第一部分抛给查理。（笑声）但伯克希尔哈撒韦能源实际上是与其受监管的公用事业相关的——它基本上是从受监管的公用事业开始的，并且仍然以此为主。我们有兴趣购买更多的受监管公用事业。
It’s required in different ways by different states and by different regulatory authorities to have a large amount of debt, because, in Iowa or to pick any state, the regulatory authorities are going to say you can get debt money cheaper than you can get equity money, which historically has largely almost always been true.
各州和不同的监管机构以不同的方式要求有大量债务，因为在爱荷华州或任何州，监管机构会说你可以以比获得股权资金更便宜的方式获得债务资金，这在历史上几乎总是正确的。
And they say that since we’re going to allow you a return on equity — we’ll say, just pick a figure. But let’s say they allow us a return on equity of 9%, and we can borrow a lot of capital at 3%, they say it’ll result in higher rates to customers if you put in all equity.
他们说，由于我们可以获得股本回报率——比如说，就选一个数字吧，假设他们允许我们获得9%的股本回报率，而我们可以以3%的利率借入大量资本，他们认为如果全部使用股本融资，最终会导致客户的费率更高。
9%是一个底线的要求。
We would love to have all equity (Laughs) in our utilities, but the regulator wouldn’t stand for it, because under the trad system it would result in higher prices to consumers. So that’s built into the system. And well, our regulator wouldn’t allow us, essentially, to get the same return on equity and have an all equity structure.
我们希望在我们的公用事业中拥有全部股权（笑），但监管机构不会允许，因为在传统体系下，这会导致消费者价格上涨。所以这已经内置于系统中。而且，我们的监管机构基本上不允许我们获得相同的股本回报并拥有全股本结构。
And the answer is, you know — well, you actually saw in the film earlier, which the people that are hearing the webcast didn’t see. But just in Iowa, you know, we recently got approval to spend three and a fraction billion dollars, but they want us — Iowa has a history, and like every other state in the union — except Nebraska, which is all public power.
答案是，你知道的——其实你们在之前的影片中已经看到了，而听网络直播的人没看到。就在爱荷华州，最近我们获得了批准，可以花费30多亿美元，但他们希望我们——爱荷华州有自己的历史，和其他州一样，除了内布拉斯加州，那里全部是公共电力。
But every private power, you know, they have a history of wanting X percent to be in debt. They want you to raise a lot of money in debt because it means cheaper power for the consumer. So the answer is if we owned 100% of Berkshire Energy, we would absolutely be following the same. We would be operating pursuant to what the utility commissions tell us they want us to do that. They represent the people of those states. Now Charlie, do you want —
但每个私营电力公司都有一个历史传统，他们希望负债占据一定比例。他们希望你通过举债筹集大量资金，因为这意味着对消费者来说电价会更便宜。所以答案是，如果我们100%拥有伯克希尔能源，我们也会完全按照同样的方式运营。我们会根据公用事业委员会告诉我们要做的去执行，因为他们代表那些州的人民。现在，查理，你有什么要补充的吗——
6、《2024-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
去年，我们遭遇的第二个、且更为严重的盈利失望发生在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）。其大部分电力公用事业以及庞大的天然气管网的表现大体符合预期，但少数州的监管环境却带来了零盈利甚至破产的阴影（加州最大的公用事业公司已出现此状况，夏威夷目前亦面临该威胁）。在这些司法管辖区里，预测利润和资产价值都十分困难，而电力公用事业曾被视为全美最稳定的行业之一。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（有时因卓越表现可获小幅奖励）筹集巨额资金，以支撑其扩张。凭借这种模式，企业得以提前进行大规模投资，以满足数年后可能出现的需求。这种前瞻性监管体现了公用事业建设发电与输电资产通常需要多年才能完工的现实。BHE 在美国西部跨多州的输电巨型工程始于 2006 年，目前距完工尚需数年；最终，该线路将服务于占美国本土面积 30%、横跨 10 个州的广大地区。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory- return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
在私营和公营电力系统均采取这一模式的情况下，即便人口增长或工业需求超出预期，电网依旧稳定运行。这种“安全边际”方法在监管者、投资者和公众看来皆属理性。然而，如今少数州已打破这一“固定且合理回报”的契约，投资者担心此局面会蔓延。气候变化令忧虑加剧——地下输电或成必需，但在几十年前，谁愿意承担其惊人的建设成本？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已对已发生损失作出最佳估算。这些损失源于森林火灾；若对流风暴愈发频繁，其发生频率与强度均将继续上升。
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
要想了解 BHE 因森林火灾造成的最终损失，并据此理性决定未来是否在西部易受灾州继续投资，还需要很多年时间。目前尚不清楚其他地区的监管环境是否会发生变化。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司或将遭遇与太平洋煤电公司及夏威夷电力公司类似的生存困境。如果现有问题以“没收式”结局收场，对 BHE 显然不利，但 BHE 与伯克希尔本身的架构都足以承受突发冲击。我们的保险业务经常面对此类意外——其核心产品本就是承担风险——其他领域亦难免发生。伯克希尔能承受财务冲击，却不会明知无望仍继续砸钱。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔如何，电力行业的最终局面或许令人担忧：部分公用事业公司可能再无法吸引美国民众的储蓄，被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 20 世纪 30 年代便已作此选择，全国也有众多公共电力机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们偏好的模式。
在 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条时期，内布拉斯加州决定 全面放弃以股东盈利为目的的私营电力公司（private-power systems），转而由公共机构或非营利合作社来拥有和运营电力系统，即采纳 public-power model。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当尘埃落定时，美国对电力的需求及其引发的资本支出将达到惊人规模。我当初既未预见、更未考虑监管回报的不利变化，与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两位合作伙伴一样，这一忽视让我付出了昂贵的代价。
Warren Buffett: I don’t want to go on too long on this, but this is important. It’s very obvious that the country needs an incredible improvement, rethinking, redirection to some extent in the electric grid. We’ve outgrown what would be the model that America should have. In a sense, it’s a problem something akin to the interstate highway system where you needed the power of the government really to get things done because it doesn’t work so well when you get 48 or 50 jurisdictions that each has their own way of thinking about things.
Warren Buffett：我不想在这个话题上说太久，但它很重要。很显然，这个国家在电网方面需要大幅改进、重新思考、在某种程度上需要重新定向。我们已经超出了美国应有的电网模型。从某种意义上说，这更像当年的州际高速公路系统——你需要政府的力量来推动，否则在 48 或 50 个辖区各自为政的情况下，事情很难推进。
In World War II, we called in people at a dollar an hour. We knew we had to turn out ships like crazy. We knew that we had to convert Ford Motor from being a car manufacturer into an aircraft manufacturer in a matter of days, not weeks or months.
在二战期间，我们按每小时一美元召集人手。我们知道必须疯狂造船。我们也知道必须在几天内（而不是几周或几个月）把 Ford Motor 从汽车制造商改造成飞机制造商。
There are certain really major investment situations where we have capital like nobody else has in the private system. We have particular knowhow in the whole generation and transmission arena. The country is going to need it. But we have to figure out a way that makes sense from the standpoint of the government, from the standpoint of the public, and from the standpoint of Berkshire, and we haven’t figured that out yet.
在一些重大的投资情境中，我们在私营体系里拥有他人不具备的资本实力。我们在发电与输电领域也有独到的能力。国家将需要这些。但我们必须找出一种对政府、公众以及 Berkshire 都讲得通的方式，而这点我们尚未完全想清。
It’s a clear and present use of hundreds of billions of dollars. You have people that set up funds and they’re getting paid for just assembling stuff, but that’s not the way to handle it. The way to handle it is to have some kind of government-private industry cooperation similar to what you do in a war. When they were doing the highway system, I don’t think the government set up its own guys that were going to pour cement, but you needed cooperation. We’re at that point in terms of energy, but I don’t think we’ve made any progress particularly.
这是一个“明确当下”需要数千亿美元投入的领域。有人设基金、靠“拼装项目”来收费，但这不是解决之道。正确方式应是类似战时那样的政企协作。当年修建高速公路时，政府也不是自己去浇筑水泥，但需要协作。能源领域现在正处于这一节点，但我认为我们在这方面并未取得实质性进展。
Greg Abel: These are very unique situations that reflect where we’re at. There will be very significant investment opportunities across a variety of industries. As Warren touched on, in the electric industry or energy space, we obviously know that well with our existing business. The capital required to meet the long-term needs of what’s currently projected as demand is enormous, and we as Berkshire will be in a good position to help address those needs. But the model around it and the risks that need to be addressed to deploy that type of capital will be different than they are today.
Greg Abel：这些非常独特的情境反映了我们的所处位置。未来在多个行业都会出现重大投资机会。正如 Warren 所说，在电力或更广义的能源领域，我们凭借既有业务非常熟悉。满足当前预测的长期需求所需的资本巨大，而 Berkshire 具备良好条件来帮助满足这些需求。但为部署那类资本所需的机制与必须解决的风险，与今天会有所不同。
The muscle of the federal government will be needed. But the test of whether you can have 48 or 50 jurisdictions that are cooperating to do something that has opposition – there will be opposition in every single state. If they’d taken a vote during World War II or on the interstate highway system, it would have been slowed down to an incredible degree.
我们需要联邦政府的“肌肉”。但难点在于：如何让 48 或 50 个辖区在存在反对声的情况下依然协作——每个州都会有反对意见。如果二战时期或修建州际高速时搞全民投票，推进速度会被严重拖慢。
So the question is how to use the strengths that this country has to actually turn it into what it should be capable of while still preserving a republic with 48 connected and a couple unconnected states. It’ll be interesting to see what happens. We do have capital and we actually have some knowledge that very few places have. We know what the game’s about, but putting together that energy with knowledge and with capital is just not easy.
问题在于，如何利用这个国家已有的优势，把潜力转化为应有的能力，同时仍然维持由 48 个相连、数个不相连州构成的共和国。接下来会很有意思。我们有资本，也确实拥有少数机构才具备的知识。我们懂这门“游戏”，但把动力、知识与资本结合起来并不容易。
It should be something that we’re capable of in the country, but the country was not designed for having 48 different jurisdictions that could mess up anything that you were attempting to do. During wartime, it’s one thing to get agreement, but during peace time, it’s a different problem. That’s going to be one for the next generation.
这本应是国家能力范围内的事，但我们的体制并非为“48 个辖区可能搅乱任何你尝试之事”而设计。战时达成共识是一回事，和平时期又是另一回事。这将留给下一代去解。
Becky Quick: This question comes from Matthew Teisac in Leighton, Utah. He said, “Please discuss your strategy on how to protect our company from future liabilities due to wildfires blamed on our electric utility companies out west.”
Becky Quick：下一个问题来自犹他州 Leighton 的 Matthew Teisac。他说：“请谈谈你们的策略，如何保护我们公司免受未来因西部地区电力公用事业公司被指责引发野火而产生的负债冲击？”
Warren Buffett: That’s a very good question. We made some mistakes in the past when we bought PacifiCorp in 2005. Walter Scott, David Sol, and myself – three guys who were capitalists at heart and dealing with our own money – we made a mistake by not carving it up into the seven states that we were buying. It came with an aggregation where it wasn’t state by state, and we kept the same structure. That was a big mistake.
Warren Buffett：这是个非常好的问题。2005 年我们收购 PacifiCorp 时，过去确实犯过一些错误。Walter Scott、David Sol 和我——三位内心都是资本家、并且拿着自己的钱办事的人——没有把所收购的业务按当时涉及的七个州拆分清楚，而是照原先的“打包结构”整体接手，并维持了这种结构。这是一个重大错误。
Every part of the country is going to need electricity, and there are going to be places where privately held electric utilities would be very foolish to operate. How that gets resolved in a democracy, we will find out.
全国各地都需要电力供应，但在某些地方由私人持有的电力公用事业继续经营将非常不智。如何在民主制度下解决这个问题，我们拭目以待。
Greg Abel: The reality is the risk around wildfires – do the wildfires occur – they’re not going away, and we know that. The risk probably goes up each year. But what we can do is reduce the risk of it impacting our system and our underlying assets, and unfortunately the liabilities that come with such events. We can’t eliminate the risk, but we can reduce it.
Greg Abel：现实是，关于野火的风险——野火是否会发生——并不会消失，这一点我们心知肚明，而且这种风险很可能每年都在上升。但我们能做的是降低其影响我们系统、核心资产以及（不幸的是）由此引发的法律责任的概率。风险无法消灭，但可以降低。
Our teams in the west are addressing this across all our energy infrastructure because wildfires have now occurred in Texas and throughout the US. We’re all very focused on how we manage that risk. We start by addressing the actual assets, how we’re maintaining them and where we invest in them. We try to make sure that they’re either not causing the fire or potentially even hardening the system as to what they can withstand. It’s very much an operational focus.
我们在西部的团队正把这一问题纳入全部能源基础设施的管理，因为如今野火不仅发生在德州，也在全美多地发生。我们都在高度关注如何管理这种风险。我们从资产本身入手，关注如何维护、在何处投入。我们力求确保这些资产不会成为起火源，并尽可能“加固”系统以提升其承受极端情形的能力。这是高度“运营导向”的工作。
We then take it even further. The utilities started to recognize when we have these unusual weather events – and Warren touched on what’s been happening in Nebraska with storms – but they’re equally occurring out west. When we have those, we’ve gotten very good at saying we have to manage the system differently and potentially de-energize because there’s likely to be an event.
我们还会更进一步。公用事业公司逐步认识到，当出现异常天气事件时——Warren 刚才谈到内布拉斯加的风暴，但西部同样频发——我们必须以不同方式管理系统，并在可能时主动“断电”（de-energize），因为极端事件很可能发生。
But the one thing we hadn’t tackled – this is very relevant to the significant event we had back in 2020 in PacifiCorp – is we didn’t de-energize the system as the fire was approaching. Our employees and the whole management team have been trained all their lives to keep the lights on, and the last thing they want to do is turn those lights off and have a system de-energized.
但我们此前有一项没有做到位——这与 2020 年 PacifiCorp 发生的重大事件密切相关——当大火逼近时我们没有切断电力。我们的员工与管理团队一直以来都被训练要“保持供电”，他们最不愿做的就是主动关灯、让系统断电。
After those events and as we looked at how we’re going to move forward in managing the assets and reducing risk, we recognized as a team that we have to de-energize those assets. Now as we get fires encroaching at a certain number of miles, we de-energize because we do not want to contribute to the fire nor harm any of our consumers or contribute to a death. We had to take our team to managing a different risk now. It’s not around keeping the lights on, it’s around protecting the general public and ensuring the fire does not spread further.
在那次事件之后，我们重新审视未来的资产管理与风险降低之道，团队达成共识：必须主动断电。如今当火势逼近到某一距离，我们就会断电，因为我们既不愿加剧火情，也不愿伤害任何用户或导致伤亡。我们必须引导团队去管理一种不同的风险：焦点不再是“保持照明”，而是保护公众安全、防止火势蔓延。
We’re probably the one utility or across our utilities that does that today, and we strongly believe in that approach.
我们可能是当下少数、甚至唯一一批真正这样做的公用事业公司，我们坚信这种做法。
Moderator (Becky): Doesn’t that open you up to other risk if you shut down your system, a hospital gets shut down, somebody dies?
Moderator（Becky）：但如果你们关闭系统，导致医院停电、造成人员伤亡，岂不是会带来其他风险？
Greg Abel: That’s something we do deal with a lot because we have power outages that occur by accident. When we look at critical infrastructure, that’s an excellent point and we’re constantly re-evaluating it. We do receive a lot of feedback from our customer groups as to how to manage that.
Greg Abel：这确实是我们经常需要处理的问题，因为意外停电也会发生。针对关键基础设施，你的提醒非常重要，我们在持续复盘与评估。我们从不同客户群体获得了大量反馈，用于改进管理。
We spend a lot more time educating the consumers and our customer groups. We explain what will happen and need to understand their unusual situations and how we can best tackle that so we don’t take on another liability. There’s a lot around de-energization.
我们投入更多时间去教育用户与客户群体。我们解释可能发生的情况，并了解他们的特殊需求，从而找到最佳应对之策，避免承担新的责任。围绕“断电”需要做的工作非常多。
To take it to the last step – and Warren touched on this in general on energy policy – we have to work with our states and our regulators to ensure they understand this was never a risk we took on or envisioned when we were investing in utilities, nor would any of the investors who’ve invested in other energy companies.
再说最后一步——Warren 也从能源政策层面提到过——我们必须与所在州及监管者合作，确保他们理解：在投资公用事业时，我们从未承担、也未预期承担这类风险，其他能源公司的投资者亦然。
You earn a very set return for taking on a very defined risk associated with that asset, and this has gone well beyond that. We don’t earn the type of returns nor can you earn a large enough return to take on these risks. So it’s not just solving the return side. We really have to solve the risk side, which means we work with our regulators and state legislators to get to the right answer. That’ll be an ongoing process. There are no silver bullets, but every day our teams across utilities are working hard to reduce that risk, recognizing the fundamental risk of the wildfires is not going away.
投资者获得的是与资产所定义风险相匹配的既定回报，而当前的风险已远超原有范畴。我们并没有、也不可能获得足以覆盖这些新增风险的回报。因此问题不仅在回报，更在风险本身。我们必须与监管者与州立法机构合作，寻找正确答案。这将是持续过程，没有灵丹妙药，但我们的各家电力公司团队每天都在努力降低风险，同时清醒认识到野火这种根本性风险不会消失。
Warren Buffett: There’s some problems that can’t be solved, and we shouldn’t be in the business of taking investors’ money and tackling things that we don’t know the solution for. You can present the arguments, but it’s a political decision when you are dealing with states or the federal government.
Warren Buffett：有些问题是无解的，而我们不应拿着投资者的钱去硬扛那些我们并不知其解的问题。我们可以陈述观点，但一旦牵涉到州或联邦政府，最终就是政治决策。
If you’re in something where you’re going to lose, the big thing to do is quit. You present your case as well as you can, but if you don’t hold the pen in the end, we don’t have any business taking your money and doing dumb things with it. We can do our best to explain what the intelligent things are, but it’s your money.
如果你参与的是一桩必输的事，最该做的就是退出。你尽力陈述理由，但若最终“笔不在你手里”，我们就没有资格拿着你的钱去做蠢事。我们能做的是尽力解释何为“明智之举”，但归根到底，那是你的钱。
It’s very hard to tell how to handle politically determined decisions that are going to go to court in many cases. We know what we think a sensible system would be, and we ought to explain what we think it is and do the best to get our position because it’s pro-social to have the right solution. But there’s some problems that can’t be solved, and we are not in the business of trying to solve insolvable problems.
很多政治性决定最终往往要诉诸法庭，如何应对并不容易。我们知道在我们看来什么是“合理的制度”，也应当阐明并努力争取，因为正确的解决方案有利于社会。但有些问题确实无法解决，而“解决无解之题”并不是我们的商业职责。
The problem you have, of course, is that the people that work for you – that’s their job. So they want to have reasons to keep going. Those are tough choices if you’re managing, but that’s why they have managers.
当然，问题在于为你工作的人——他们的工作就是“把事继续做下去”，他们会寻找继续前进的理由。身为管理者，这些都是艰难抉择，但这也正是为什么需要管理者存在的原因。
Greg Abel: I was just going to add that effectively, for example with the utilities and the wildfires, we can’t just become the insurer of last resort that’s going to cover any cost and all costs irrespective of what occurred. That’s a little bit of the situation we’re in right now with our largest challenge, a 2020 wildfire.
Greg Abel：我想补充一点，就像在公用事业和野火问题上，我们不可能成为“最后保险人”，不管发生了什么都要承担任何成本、所有成本。我们当前最大的挑战——2020 年的那场野火——在某种程度上就是这种局面。
There were four fires occurring at a challenging time. One we’ve always asserted was a lightning strike that was not inside our service territory. The fire burnt into our service territory and we became responsible for that fire effectively through the courts. We continue to hold firm that we’re not responsible for that – we didn’t contribute to it, we didn’t initiate it, nor did we feel we ever contributed to it. But it’s getting to where if you look at the risk that’s there, we have to manage through things like that.
当时在一个艰难时点上同时发生了四场火灾。其中一场我们一直坚持认为是一次不在我们服务辖区内的雷击所致。那场火蔓延进入我们的服务区，而我们最终通过法院裁定“被承担”了责任。我们依然坚称对此不负责任——我们没有促成、没有引发，也不认为曾对其有任何贡献。但现实是，面对这样的风险，我们必须设法应对。
We’ll get through that litigation. We’re happy to report, for example, on that one, after 5 years, the Oregon Forestry Department has come out and said the other fires we did have that we were able to manage and extinguish did not contribute to that fire. And that fourth fire is the largest fire of the four – it’s 60% of the claims. We’re 5 years into effectively getting that information into the courts.
我们会挺过这场诉讼。令人欣慰的是，以此案为例，经过 5 年时间，Oregon Forestry Department 已经表示，我们确实发生且已控制并扑灭的其他火情并未对那场火灾产生影响。此外，第四场火是四场中最大的一场——占到索赔金额的 60%。我们已花了 5 年时间，实质性地将这些信息提交法院。
That will outline our legal strategy going forward, but these are things we’re dealing with. We continue to learn from this as a utility industry. We’re working with each of the legislators to make sure we get clear definition of where liability falls, what the economic damages can be, but most importantly, what the non-economic damages can be. Again, with the thought we can’t be the insurer of last resort. We just can’t be responsible for everything that happens in a state.
这些进展将勾勒我们后续的法律策略，但这就是我们正在处理的现实。作为公用事业行业，我们在持续学习。我们正与各州立法者合作，确保明确责任归属、可判定的经济损害范围，更重要的是，非经济损害的界定。仍要重申，我们不能成为“最后保险人”，不可能对一个州里发生的所有事情都负全责。
Warren Buffett: If we want to do it with our own money, we can do it, but we’re not going to do things with your money that we think are stupid. You ought to get rid of us if we do. It’s easier to do stupid things with other people’s money than it is with your own. That’s one of the problems government has generally – we don’t want to bring it to private enterprise.
Warren Buffett：如果要用我们自己的钱，我们可以去做，但我们不会用你们的钱去做我们认为愚蠢的事。如果我们那样做，你们就该把我们换掉。用别人的钱干蠢事比用自己的钱容易得多。这是政府普遍存在的问题之一——我们不想把这种问题带到私营企业来。
But it is important that the United States have an intelligent energy policy, just as it was important during World War II that we learned how to make ships instead of cars extremely fast. We figured out the answer. We combined private enterprise with the power of government.
但美国拥有一项明智的能源政策非常重要，就像二战期间我们必须迅速学会造船而非造车一样重要。我们当时找到了答案——把私营企业与政府的力量结合起来。
But how feasible that is in a democracy – it was clearly obvious during World War II what needed to be done and we did it. But it’s not so clear when you get 330 million people all arguing their own self-interest and having the people often who are making the decisions reacting as they did 20 years earlier, when they don’t really bear the responsibility for the decision. But anyway, that’s management and we’ll do our best.
但在民主制度下要做到这一点有多可行——二战时期需要做什么一清二楚，我们也做到了。可当 3.3 亿人各自争论自身利益、而决策者往往仍沿用 20 年前的反应模式、并且并不真正承担决策后果时，情况就没那么清晰了。不管怎样，这就是管理，我们会尽力而为。
Becky Quick: This is a question that you touched on in a lot of ways in the last answer, but I did get this question from a few different people, so I’d like to ask it.
Becky Quick：这个问题你刚才的回答从很多角度都已涉及，但有不少人都提到了它，所以我还是想再问一次。
Ricardo Bri, a longtime shareholder based in Panama, says that he was very happy to see Berkshire acquire 100% of BHE. It was done in two steps: one in late 2022 – 1% was purchased from Greg Abel for $870 million implying a valuation of BHE of $87 billion, and then in 2024 the remaining 8% was purchased from the family of Walter Scott Jr. for $3.9 billion implying a valuation of $48.8 billion for the enterprise. That second larger transaction represented a 44% reduction in valuation in just two years.
来自 Panama 的长期股东 Ricardo Bri 表示，他很高兴看到 Berkshire 收购了 BHE 的 100% 股权。该交易分两步完成：第一步在 2022 年底——从 Greg Abel 手中以 8.7 亿美元购买 1%，对应 BHE 估值 870 亿美元；第二步在 2024 年——以 39 亿美元从 Walter Scott Jr. 家族手中购得剩余 8%，对应企业估值 488 亿美元。第二笔更大的交易意味着仅两年时间估值下调了 44%。
Ricardo writes that PacifiCorp liabilities seem too small to explain this. Therefore, what factors contributed to the difference in value for BHE between those two moments in time?
Ricardo 写道，PacifiCorp 的负债似乎不足以解释这一点。那么，在这两个时间点之间，是什么因素导致了 BHE 价值的差异？
Warren Buffett: Well, we don’t know how much we’ll lose out of PacifiCorp and decisions that are made, but we also know that certain of the attitudes demonstrated by that particular example have analogues throughout the utility system. There are a lot of states that so far have been very good to operate in, and there are some now that are rat poison, as Charlie would say, to operate in.
Warren Buffett：嗯，我们并不知道 PacifiCorp 最终会带来多少损失以及相关决策会如何落地，但我们也清楚，这个特定案例所体现的某些态度在整个公用事业体系中都有对应。很多州迄今为止经营环境不错，但也有一些州，如 Charlie 所说，如今经营起来就像“老鼠药”一样致命。
That knowledge was accentuated when we saw what happened in the Pacific Northwest, and it’s eventuated by what we’ve seen as to how utilities have been treated in certain other situations. So it wasn’t just a direct question of what was involved at PacifiCorp. It was an extrapolation of a societal trend.
当我们看到 Pacific Northwest 发生的情况时，这一认知被进一步强化；此外，我们也看到在其他一些情境下公用事业公司被对待的方式如何演变。因此，这并不仅仅是 PacifiCorp 个案的直接问题，而是对一种社会趋势的外推。
Secondly, we also had a decision we didn’t expect at all in the real estate business. Those kind of things can change values, and courts can change values. It’s a lot easier to make those decisions when you just own marketable securities than when you own businesses. I’ve made plenty of those decisions as I’ve watched what has happened in various industries and companies over 70 years.
其次，我们在房地产业务上也遇到了一项完全意料之外的裁决。这类事情会改变价值，法院也会改变价值。只持有流通证券时做这类决策要容易得多，而当你拥有的是企业本身时就难多了。过去 70 年里，我在观察各行各业与公司变化时，做过很多类似的决策。
Greg made the decision, which was fine with us, to get out. He had no knowledge of what was going to be happening in either the real estate field or the utility field.
Greg 做出了退出的决定，我们对此并无异议。彼时他并不知道房地产或公用事业领域会发生什么。
We’re not in the mood to sell any business. But Berkshire Hathaway Energy is worth considerably less money than it was two years ago based on societal factors. And that happens in some of our businesses. It certainly happened to our textile business. The public utility business is not as good a business as it was a couple of years ago.
我们并无出售任何业务的意愿。但基于社会层面的因素，Berkshire Hathaway Energy 的价值较两年前显著下降。这种情况在我们的部分业务中发生过——纺织业务就是一例。公用事业行业如今不如几年前那般“好做”。
If anybody doesn’t believe that, they can look at Hawaiian Electric and look at Edison in the current wildfires situation in California. There are societal trends that are changing things.
如果有人不相信，可以看看 Hawaiian Electric，以及在 California 当前野火情势下的 Edison。这些社会趋势正在改变一切。
I just got a note here on my monitor that says the books are now sold out. So you’ll have to spend your money on other things.
我刚在监视器上收到一条提示：那本书已经售罄了。所以你们得把钱花在别的地方了。
But that’s the explanation – values change and they don’t always change upward. When we made the deal with Greg, we would have been happy to buy out the Scott family at that price. And when we made a deal with the Scott company, we wouldn’t have been happy to pay Greg the price that he received.
不过这就是解释——价值会变化，而且并不总是向上。当我们和 Greg 达成交易时，我们也乐意用那个价格买下 Scott 家族的股份。而当我们与 Scott 家族达成交易时，我们已经不愿再按 Greg 当时的价格去支付了。
But that’s like Berkshire shares – we bought in stock at X and we buy in stock at less than X if conditions change. Over the years we pay more and more because it builds in value, but it doesn’t do it in a straight line.
但这就像 Berkshire 的自家股票——条件变化时，我们会在价格为 X 时回购，也会在低于 X 时回购。长期看我们支付的价格越来越高，因为内在价值在提升，但这并非一条直线。
I would say that our enthusiasm for buying public utility companies is different now than it would have been a couple years ago. That happens in other industries, too, but it’s pretty dramatic in public utilities. And it’s particularly dramatic in public utilities because they are going to need lots of money. So, if you’re going to need lots of money, you probably ought to behave in a way that encourages people to give you lots of money.
我想说，我们如今对收购公用事业公司的热情，与几年前已经不同。这种变化在其他行业也会出现，但在公用事业上尤为显著，尤其因为这个行业未来需要海量资本。因此，如果你需要大量资金，你大概就应当以一种能鼓励别人愿意提供资金的方式来行事。
We will see where we go. We’d like to see public utilities do well, but our responsibilities are to the shareholders of Berkshire.
我们走一步看一步。我们希望公用事业发展良好，但我们的职责在于 Berkshire 的股东。
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