I.H.182.Warren Buffett.Alignment
AI关于对齐（alignment）的思路是：“同一套压缩出来的原则，对“结构相同但表述不同”的两个句子，能不能给出同样的答案？”，巴菲特经常用的例子是一个汉堡的小测验：（1）如果一辈子要吃汉堡，不是养牛人，你希望牛肉价格高还是低？（2）未来很多年你是股票的净买方，你应该希望股市更高还是更低？很多人甚至是大部分人对这个“结构相同但表述不同”的两个句子会给出完全不一样的答案，这就是不对齐的现象，更进一步如果出现不对齐很可能处处不对齐，没有一个想法，甚至没有一句话是对齐的（前半句和后半句对不上）。
很多人不管讲的是什么，高度压缩后只是前后两个逻辑的几种变化，比如，不懂但想要试一试、不想懂但想要试一试、知道是错的但想要试一试。这是一种非常强的、内在的、强迫自己处处不对齐的力量，巴菲特的定义是“institutional imperative”，或者“institutional stupidity”。
相反，能对齐的会想着尽可能的对齐自己的想法和行为，我们之前提过“一致性”，王阳明的说法是“知行合一”，人工智能领域用的是“Alignment”，“Alignment”+“Attention”（人工智能的开创性论文：Attention Is All You Need），两者加在一起可以作为巴菲特的思想的补充。
Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?
事实上，许多企业管理者在对待股票的问题上表现出某种精神分裂。他们认为自家股票便宜得吓人，但与此同时又批准养老金政策，普遍拒绝买入普通股。同一位老板，戴上并购帽时，愿意为美国典型企业支付账面价值150%到200%的价格；可戴上养老金帽时，却鄙视以账面价值买入类似公司。难道他的才能如此独特，以至于当他能亲自掌控企业时，支付“两美元买一美元”就合理，而如果必须让商业圆桌会议的同行来经营，就断言“一美元买一美元”是不明智的养老金投资？
2、《1983-06-15 Steve Jobs.Before and After Steve’s Talk》
STEVE JOBS: Well, the major thing is that we’ve got to make things intuitively obvious. And it turns out that people know how to do a lot of things already. In other words, if you walk into a typical office, there’s all these…there’s stacks of paper on the desk, and the one on the top is the most important. And people know how to switch priority. Right? And people know how to deal with concurrent things going on at once. They’re constantly switching between things every few minutes. And they know how to deal with interruptions. The phone rings, they get an urgent message.
史蒂夫·乔布斯：嗯，主要的是我们必须让事情变得直观明了。事实证明，人们已经知道如何做很多事情。换句话说，如果你走进一个典型的办公室，桌子上有一堆堆的文件，最上面的那份是最重要的。人们知道如何切换优先级，对吧？人们知道如何处理同时发生的事情。他们每隔几分钟就会在不同的事情之间切换。他们知道如何处理中断。电话响了，他们收到一条紧急信息。
And so what we’ve got to do is leverage off of what people already know how to do. And part of the reason we model our computers on these metaphors that already exist out there, like the desktop, is because we can leverage all this experience that people already have, and they intuitively just take to it like water.
所以我们要做的是利用人们已经知道如何做的事情。我们将计算机建模为已经存在的比喻（如桌面）的部分原因是，我们可以利用人们已经拥有的所有经验，他们会直观地接受它。
The second thing we do is, right now, when you buy an application, each one works differently. In other words, not only do you have the specific knowledge about the application to learn, but it interacts with you through the computer differently than the last one. The word processor, you move the cursor around this way. VisiCalc, you move it around another way.
我们现在做的第二件事是，当你购买一个应用程序时，每个应用程序的工作方式都不同。换句话说，你不仅需要学习关于该应用程序的特定知识，而且它通过计算机与您的交互方式也与上一个不同。文字处理器，你这样移动光标。VisiCalc，你用另一种方式移动它。
And what we’ve got to do is make it so that when you learn how to use one application, all the rest of them work in pretty much the same way. And to come up with a general…we spent a lot of time coming up with a general mechanism that was so powerful that there was not one type of program where it wouldn’t be perfect for it. We think we did that. We think we absolutely did that. And so in trying to make some consistency throughout the system, we can leverage the learning.
我们要做的是，当你学会如何使用一个应用程序时，其他所有应用程序的工作方式基本相同。我们花了很多时间想出一个通用机制，这个机制非常强大，没有一种程序类型不适合它。我们认为我们做到了。我们认为我们绝对做到了。因此，在尝试使整个系统保持一致性时，我们可以利用这种学习。
泛化就是对齐。
... Incidentally, I would say that almost everybody I know in Wall Street has had as many good ideas as I have, they just had a lot of \[bad] ideas too. And I’m serious about that. I mean when I bought Western Insurance Security selling at \$16 and earning \$20 per share, I put half my net worth into it. I checked it out first – I went down to the insurance commission and got out the convention statements, I read Best’s, and I did a lot of things first. But, I mean, my dad wasn’t in it, I’d only had one insurance class at Columbia – but it was not beyond my capabilities to do that, and it isn’t beyond your capabilities.
……顺便说一句，我想说的是，在华尔街我认识的几乎所有人都有和我一样多的好主意，他们只不过也有很多[糟糕的]主意。我是认真的。比如当我以每股16美元买入、而每股赚20美元的Western Insurance Security时，我把自己一半的净资产都投了进去。我事先做过调查——我去了保险监管机构，调出了年会报告，我查阅了《贝斯特年鉴》，还做了很多其他功课。但我的父亲并没有参与，我在哥伦比亚大学也只上过一门保险课——然而做这件事并未超出我的能力范围，也不会超出你们的能力范围。
可靠性不足，运气是不确定的，没有自己的脑子是确定的，不确定的运气+确定性的没有脑子。
Now if I had some rare insight about software, or something like that – I would say that, maybe, other people couldn’t do that – or biotechnology, or something. And I’m not saying that every insight that I have is an insight that somebody else could have, but there were all kinds of people that could have understood American Express Company as well as I understood it in ‘62. They may have been...they may have had a different temperament than I did, so that they were paralyzed by fear, or that they wanted the crowd to be with them, or something like that, but I didn’t know anything about credit cards that they didn’t know, or about travelers checks. Those are not hard products to understand. But what I did have was an intense interest and I was willing, when I saw something I wanted to do, to do it. And if I couldn’t see something to do, to not do anything. By far, the most important quality is not how much IQ you’ve got. IQ is not the scarce factor. You need a reasonable amount of intelligence, but the temperament is 90% of it.
如果我对软件之类的领域有某种罕见的洞见——那我会说，也许别人就做不到——比如生物技术。但我并不是说我拥有的每一个洞见别人都可以拥有，不过在1962年，有很多人本可以像我一样理解美国运通公司。他们也许……他们也许与我有着不同的性情，以至于被恐惧麻痹，或者想要随大流，诸如此类；但关于信用卡或旅行支票，我并不比他们了解更多。这些产品并不难理解。但我拥有的是强烈的兴趣，并且当我发现想做的事情时，我愿意去做；而当我找不到可做之事时，就什么也不做。最重要的品质绝不是你的智商有多高。智商并不是稀缺因素。你需要适量的智力，但性格（气质）占了90%。
That’s why Graham is so important. Graham’s book \[The Intelligent Investor] talks about the qualities of temperament you have to bring to the game, and that is the game.
这就是格雷厄姆如此重要的原因。格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》讨论了你在投资游戏中必须具备的性格特质，而那正是游戏本身。
4、《1994-04-25 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Most managers are better off, in terms of their personal equation, if they’re running something larger. And they’re also better off if they’re running something larger and more profitable. But the first condition alone will usually leave them better off. We’re only better off if we’re running something that’s more profitable. We also like it if it’s larger, too. But our equation, actually, our personal equation is actually different than a great many managers in that respect. Even if that didn’t operate, I think most managers psychically would enjoy running something larger. And if you can pay for it with other people’s money, I mean, that gets pretty attractive. You know, how much would — and let’s just say you’re a baseball fan — well, how much would you pay to own whatever your hometown, the Yankees? You might pay more if you were writing a check on someone else’s bank account than if you were writing it on your own. It’s been known to happen. (Laughter) And in corporate America, animal spirits are there.
WARREN BUFFETT：就“个人收益函数”而言，大多数职业经理人经营更大的东西，个人处境会更好；若更大且更赚钱，处境当然更好，但往往仅仅“更大”这一条就够了。我们只有在“更赚钱”时才更好，当然我们也喜欢“更大”，但我们的“个人收益函数”与许多经理人不同。即便撇开这些，我认为大多数经理人从心理上也更享受运营更大的东西；而且如果还可以用“别人的钱”来支付，那就更有吸引力了。你知道，假设你是棒球迷——为了买下你家乡的球队，Yankees 也好，你会出多少钱？如果开的是“别人的账户”的支票，你可能会比用自己的账户付更多——这种事并不少见。（笑）在美国企业界，“动物精神”一直存在。
And those are our competitors on buying entire businesses. In terms of buying securities, most managers don’t even think about it. It’s very interesting to me, because they’ll say that — they’ll have somebody else manage their money in terms of portfolio securities. Well, all that is is a portfolio of businesses. And I’ll say, “Well, why don’t you pick out your own portfolio?” And they’ll say, “That’s much too difficult.” And then some guy will come along with some business that they never heard of a week before and give them some figures and a few projections, and the guy thinks he knows enough to buy that business. It’s very puzzling to me sometimes.
而这些人正是我们在整购市场上的竞争对手。至于买证券，大多数经理人甚至不会去想这件事。这点对我很有意思：他们会把证券投资组合交给别人管理——可那其实就是“企业组合”。我问他们：“那你为什么不自己挑选组合？”他们说：“那太难了。”可是一周后从未听说过的一家公司来做个路演，给几组数字、几份预测，他却觉得自己“懂得够多，值得买”。这有时真让人费解。
5、《1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
But that — I don’t want to bet on anybody else. I mean, in the end, we want to understand, ourselves, where we think a business is going. And if somebody tells us the business is going to change a lot, in Wall Street, they love to tell you that, you know, that’s great opportunity.
但问题在于——我不想押注任何其他人。归根结底，我们希望亲自理解一家企业将走向何处。如果有人告诉我们这门生意将发生巨变，华尔街最爱说“那是巨大机会”。
They don’t think it’s a great opportunity when Wall Street itself is going to change a lot, incidentally. (Laughter)
顺便说一句，当华尔街自身要发生巨变时，他们却并不认为那是巨大机会。（笑声）
But they — you know, it’s a great opportunity. We don’t think it’s an opportunity at all. I mean, we — it scares the hell out of us. Because we don’t know how things are going to change.
但他们——你知道，总说那是巨大机会。而我们根本不这么看。坦白讲——这会把我们吓坏。因为我们不知道事情会如何变化。
快速变化往往导致不理性的行为，我自己一直有一个简单的假设，人都是野生动物，对风险极其敏感，那些快速接近的事物很可能引起的不理性的行为。
6、《1997 《富爸爸穷爸爸》.心理上的富足》
“他与我的大多数雇员并没有太大差别，”富爸爸说，“我遇到过很多人，他们说‘我对钱没兴趣’，可他们却每天工作8小时。这只能说明他们并没有说出真相，如果他们对钱没兴趣，又何必工作呢？这种人比敛财的人病得更重。”
我坐在那儿听着富爸爸的话，脑中无数次地闪现我的亲爸爸曾说过的话：“我对钱不感兴趣。”他常常这么说。他还经常说：“我工作是因为我热爱这个职业。”用这句话来掩藏他内心真实的感受。
很多人说“我对钱没兴趣”，可他们却每天工作8小时。
7、《1998-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
How We Think About Market Fluctuations
我们如何看待市场波动
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer themselves.
来个小测验：如果你一辈子都要吃汉堡、但并非养牛人，你该希望牛肉价格更高还是更低？同理，如果你不时要买车、却不是汽车制造商，你该偏好更高还是更低的车价？这些问题当然不言自明。
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
但现在来一道期末题：如果你预期未来五年是净储蓄者，你该希望这段时间里股市更高还是更低？许多投资者答错了。尽管他们在很多年里都会是股票的净买方，但股价上涨时他们欣喜若狂，下跌时却沮丧不已。实质上，他们是在为即将买到的“汉堡”涨价而高兴。这种反应毫无道理。只有近期将卖出股票的人，才该在股价上涨时高兴；有购入计划的人更应偏好价格回落。
8、《2008-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s nothing wrong with the know-nothing investor practicing it. It’s exactly what they should practice. It’s exactly what a good professional investor should not practice. But that’s — you know, there’s no contradiction in that.
沃伦·巴菲特：对于一无所知的投资者来说，实践这种方法没有任何问题。这正是他们应该实践的。正是一个好的专业投资者不应该实践的。但这——你知道，这并不矛盾。
It — a know-nothing investor will get decent results as long as they know they’re a know-nothing investor, diversify as to time they purchase their equities, and as to the equities they purchase. That’s crazy for somebody that really knows what they’re doing.
一个一无所知的投资者只要知道自己是一无所知的投资者，并在购买股票的时间和所购买的股票上进行多元化，就会获得不错的结果。对于真正知道自己在做什么的人来说，这很疯狂。
9、《2012-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.
逻辑很简单：如果你未来将成为股票的净买入者——无论是直接用你自己的钱，还是间接地（通过你所持有、正在回购股份的公司）——当股价上涨时你会受损，当股价下跌时你会受益。然而情绪常常使问题复杂化：大多数人——包括那些未来会成为净买入者的人——看到股价上涨会感到欣慰。这类股东很像一位通勤者，仅仅因为自己的油箱还存着一天的油，就在油价上涨后感到高兴。
10、《2023-06-24 Ilya Sutskever.AI alignment》
A one sentence articulation (of existing ideas) for why AI alignment need not be straightforward:
一句话阐明（现有想法）为什么 AI 对齐不需要简单：
humans can lie, hide their intent (alignment), and do so for years. Why not AGI? This can be hard to detect.
人类可以撒谎，隐藏自己的意图（阵营），并且持续数年。为什么通用人工智能不行？因为这些很难被发现。
11、《2025-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
I’ve always told my kids that their sound isn’t my sound, but you don’t necessarily find it on the first job you take. But if you get lucky like I did, you find it when you’re very young and then you just keep doing it. Don’t worry too much about starting salaries and be very careful who you work for because you will take on the habits of the people around you. There are certain jobs you shouldn’t take.
我一直告诉孩子们：他们的“声音”不是我的“声音”，而且你未必能在第一份工作里就找到它。但如果你足够幸运，像我一样很早就找到，那就持续去做。别过分在意起薪，并且要谨慎选择你的雇主，因为你会沾染身边人的习惯。有些工作，你就不该去做。
Trying to change things in government is an interesting proposition in the country because you get self-selection in terms of the people that go into government and continue in it. And to some extent they keep having to make decisions that they don’t like as they go along and they learn to accept them or rationalize them or whatever it may be.
在这个国家，试图通过政府去改变，是一个“有趣”的命题，因为走进并留在政府的人群本身就具有自我筛选的特征。在某种程度上，他们一路上会做出自己并不喜欢的决定，并逐渐学会接受、或为之寻找理由，诸如此类。
But it’s still – this country’s worked out better than any country in the world. So you can’t argue it was a failure, but you can’t argue that there are certain problems that are terribly tough to figure out ways to solve. And of course, one of them gets back to the fiscal problem I mentioned before because it’s easy to spend money and it’s hard to cut people’s receipts.
但即便如此——这个国家的运转仍优于世界上任何国家。所以你不能称之为失败；但你也不能否认，有些问题极难找到解决路径。当然，其中之一又回到我之前提到的财政问题：花钱容易、削减他人收入很难。
And if you get elected, you’re going to say to yourself, well, I can do more good if I stay, and then if I really vote my conscience on this sort of thing. So, you give away a little bit here and a little bit there and a little bit there and finally you don’t recognize yourself in the mirror anymore. And that’s – I grew up in a political family, but I watched how people behaved and they behave like human beings which is what you have to expect and I behave like human beings.
而当你当选，你会告诉自己：如果我留在这里，我就能做更多好事；然后在这种事情上你若按良知投票……于是这里让一点，那里让一点，久而久之镜子里已认不出自己。我出身政治家庭，见过人们的行为模式，他们的表现与“人性”一致，这是你必须预期到的——而我也同样具有人的弱点。
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