I.H.RB.05.Utility system
有稳定的收益但也可能受到政治上的干扰。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管的资本密集型业务
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.
我们的BNSF铁路公司和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”），即我们持股90%的公用事业公司，具有与Berkshire其他业务显著不同的重要特征。因此，我们在这封信中特别设立了一个章节讨论它们，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表和利润表中分别列示这两家公司合并的财务数据。这两家重要子公司在去年占据了Berkshire税后经营利润的33%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在使用寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入巨资，并通过大量长期债务进行部分融资，这些债务并不由Berkshire担保。事实上，这些公司的信用状况无需依赖我们，因为即便在极其糟糕的经济环境下，它们的盈利能力也远超其利息支出。例如，在铁路行业表现不佳的去年，BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过6倍。（我们对利息保障倍数的定义是“息税前利润除以利息费用”，而不是市面常用的“EBITDA除以利息”，我们认为后者是一个存在严重缺陷的指标。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
而对于BHE来说，有两个因素确保其在任何情况下都具备偿债能力。第一点是所有公用事业公司所共有的：抗衰退的盈利能力，因为这些公司提供的是需求极为稳定的基本服务。第二点则是其他公用事业公司少有的：收益来源日益多元化，使得BHE不会因某一个监管机构的政策而遭受重大损害。这些多元的利润来源，再加上BHE拥有一个实力雄厚的母公司这一固有优势，使得BHE及其旗下的公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实不仅对我们有利，也惠及我们的客户。
All told, BHE and BNSF invested \$8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to their segments of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
总体而言，BHE和BNSF去年在厂房和设备上投资了89亿美元，这是对美国基础设施领域的一项巨大投入。只要这些投资能带来合理回报，我们就乐于进行这类支出——在这方面，我们对未来的监管体系抱有高度信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心来自过去的经验，也来自一个事实：社会永远需要对交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。对政府而言，以确保关键项目能持续获得资金支持的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同样地，以赢得监管机构及其所代表公众认可的方式运营企业，也符合我们的自身利益。
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 7.1¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.9¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.5¢, Illinois 9.2¢, Minnesota 10.0¢. The national average is 10.3¢. We have promised Iowans that our base rates will not increase until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低价是一种强有力的方式来赢得相关利益方的满意。在爱荷华州，BHE的平均零售电价为每千瓦时7.1美分。该州另一家主要电力公司Alliant的平均电价为9.9美分。邻近州的行业平均电价如下：内布拉斯加9.0美分，密苏里9.5美分，伊利诺伊9.2美分，明尼苏达10.0美分，全国平均为10.3美分。我们已向爱荷华州居民承诺，最早到2029年之前都不会上调基础电价。对工资拮据的客户来说，我们的超低价格可实实在在地节省一大笔开支。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance the load is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads ranged from 4¢ to 5¢.
在BNSF，与其他主要铁路公司进行价格比较要困难得多，因为货物种类和运输距离差异显著。然而，作为一个粗略的衡量标准，我们去年的每吨英里收入为3美分，而美国其他四大铁路公司的客户运输成本在每吨英里4美分到5美分之间。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to rivaling Iowa, where last year the megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to our Iowa retail customers. New wind projects that are underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.
BHE和BNSF在推动环保技术方面都处于领先地位。在风力发电方面，没有哪个州能与爱荷华州相提并论，去年我们在该州通过风力发电产生的兆瓦时数占向零售客户售出总电量的55%。正在进行的新风能项目将在2020年将这一比例提高至89%。
Bargain-basement electric rates carry second-order benefits with them. Iowa has attracted large hightech installations, both because of its low prices for electricity (which data centers use in huge quantities) and because most tech CEOs are enthusiastic about using renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy, Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.
极低的电价还带来了间接的好处。爱荷华州吸引了大量高科技企业的入驻，这既得益于其低廉的电价（数据中心对电力需求巨大），也因为多数科技公司CEO热衷于使用可再生能源。就风能而言，爱荷华州堪称“美国的沙特阿拉伯”。
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. Those economics make railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.
BNSF与其他一级铁路公司一样，只需消耗一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输近500英里。这种效率使铁路的燃油利用率是卡车的四倍！此外，铁路在缓解公路拥堵方面也起到了巨大作用，从而大大减少了由此带来的纳税人资助的道路维护支出。
对比铁路和卡车运输的成本。
1、铁路
铁路的每英里收入是0.03美元，BNSF的经营利润率是29%，按20%计算，每英里成本=0.03*80%=0.024，参考：《Freight Rail Facts & Figures》。
2、卡车
ATRI 的 2024 行业数据里，每辆卡车每英里成本2.260 美元，燃油约占 21.3%，司机成本的成本占40%，参考：《New ATRI Report Shows Trucking Profitability Severely Squeezed by High Costs, Low Rates》。卡车的每英里成本2.26/20=0.113（一辆卡车约 20 吨）。
大概5倍的差距，Tesla的电动卡车目前还很难改变铁路在长途运输上的成本优势，技术能降低卡车运输的成本也能降低铁路运输的成本，但如果Tesla把燃油和司机的成本全部抹掉，铁路运输的护城河可能会变窄。
这里有一个基本的判断，越靠近终端，运输成本在商品总价值中的占比越低，系统性的改进方案越有优势，比如，煤炭和iPhone是两个极端的例子。
- 煤炭：价值密度极低，运费可能占到货物价值的30-50%，每吨英里省1分钱是生死问题，铁路护城河极深；
- iPhone：价值密度极高，从工厂到消费者的全程运费占货物价值不到0.1%，没有人会因为省运费而牺牲时效和灵活性。
铁路的护城河，本质上是对价值密度低、时效不敏感这个象限的垄断。而经济发展的方向是制造业附加值不断提升、消费品品类不断扩张——这个象限在整体货运中的占比是长期收缩的。
电动卡车或者自动驾驶的电动卡车有可能进一步压缩铁路运输的空间，想一想餐饮的外卖，10块钱的东西，外卖的费用是5块，甚至是10块，这样的需求非常大，已经做成产业。如果下游企业可以更灵活的进货，那么库存积压的资金会少去很多，卡车的灵活性在整体上也可能更有成本优势，因为中间环节少了，在途的商品会减少。
2、《2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
29. Not surprised “if we find good uses” for Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s capital
如果我们找到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的资本的良好用途，我并不感到惊讶。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？
GREGG WARREN: Warren, Berkshire Energy has benefited greatly from operating under the Berkshire umbrella. By not having to pay out 60 to 70 percent of earnings annually as a dividend, the company was able to amass 9 billion in capital the past five years, and closer to 12 billion in the past ten, money that can be allocated to acquisitions and capital spending, especially on renewables.
格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，伯克希尔能源在伯克希尔的庇护下受益匪浅。由于不必每年支付 60%到 70%的收益作为股息，公司在过去五年中积累了 90 亿美元的资本，在过去十年中接近 120 亿美元，这些资金可以用于收购和资本支出，特别是在可再生能源方面。
While tax credits for solar energy don’t run out until next year, we’ve already seen a dramatic reduction in Berkshire Energy’s capital commitment to solar projects. And even though spending on wind generation capacity is projected to be elevated this year and next, it does wind down in 2020 as the wind production tax credits are phased out.
虽然太阳能的税收抵免要到明年才会到期，但我们已经看到伯克希尔能源对太阳能项目的资本承诺大幅减少。尽管预计今年和明年风能发电能力的支出将保持在高位，但随着风能生产税收抵免的逐步取消，这一支出将在 2020 年减少。
Absent a major commitment to additional capital projects, it looks like Berkshire Energy’s expenditures in 2021 will be its lowest since 2012, leaving the firm with more cash on hand than it has had in some time.
在没有重大资本项目的承诺下，伯克希尔能源在 2021 年的支出看起来将是自 2012 年以来的最低水平，这使得该公司手头的现金比一段时间以来都要多。
Do you think it is likely at that point that Berkshire Energy starts funneling some of that cash up to the parent company? Or will it be earmarked for debt reduction, or just be left on the balance sheet as dry powder for acquisitions?
你认为在那时伯克希尔能源会开始将一些现金转移到母公司吗？还是会用于减少债务，或者仅仅留在资产负债表上作为收购的备用资金？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — you’re right about when tax credits phase out and all of that. Although, as you know, they’ve extended that legislation in the past. Who knows exactly what the government’s position will be on incentivizing various forms of alternative energy?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你说得对，关于税收抵免何时逐步取消等等。尽管你知道，他们过去曾延长过那项立法。谁知道政府在激励各种形式的替代能源方面的立场究竟会是什么呢？
But my guess is — I mean, if you take the logical expenditures that may be required in all aspects of the public — like regeneration and the utility business generally — I think there’ll be a lot of money spent.
但我猜——我的意思是，如果你考虑到公共领域可能需要的合理支出——比如再生和公用事业业务一般——我认为会花费很多钱。
And the question is whether we can spend it and get a reasonable return on it. There again, we’ll do what’s logical.
问题是我们是否可以花费它并获得合理的回报。在这里，我们将做出合乎逻辑的决定。
There are three shareholders, basically, of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Berkshire Hathaway itself owns 90 percent of it. And Greg Abel and his family, perhaps, and Walter Scott and, again, family members — own the other 10 percent. And we all have an interest in employing as much capital as we can at good rates.
伯克希尔能源的三个主要股东基本上是：伯克希尔本身拥有90%的股份。格雷格·阿贝尔及其家族，可能还有沃尔特·斯科特及其家族，拥有另外10%的股份。我们都希望尽可能地以良好的回报使用资本。
And we’ll know when it can be done and when it can’t be done. And we’ll do — there’s no tax consequences to Berkshire at all. So — but the three partners will figure out which makes the most sense.
我们会知道什么时候可以做到，什么时候做不到。我们会做出最合适的选择。对伯克希尔没有税收后果。因此——但三个合伙人将决定哪种方式最有意义。
But when you think of what might be done to improve the grid in the U.S. and the fact that we do have the capital, I wouldn’t be surprised if we find good uses for capital in Berkshire Hathaway Energy for a long time in the future.
但是当你考虑到可以采取什么措施来改善美国的电网，以及我们确实拥有资本这一事实时，我不会感到惊讶，如果我们在未来很长一段时间内在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源找到资本的良好用途。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I think there’ll be huge opportunities in Berkshire Energy as far ahead as you can see to deploy capital very intelligently. So I think the chances of a big dividend is approximately zero.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为，在伯克希尔能源方面，将会有巨大的机会来非常聪明地部署资本。 所以我认为大幅分红的可能性接近于零。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve not only got the money to an extent that virtually no utility company does — we’ve also got the talent, too. I mean, we’ve got a very, very talented organization there.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不仅拥有几乎没有公用事业公司能比拟的资金，我们还有人才。我是说，我们那里有一个非常非常有才华的团队。
So it’s a big field and we’ve got shareholders that are capitalists. And we’ve got managers that are terrific. And you would think we’d find something intelligent to do over time in the field.
所以这是一个大领域，我们有资本家的股东。我们有出色的管理者。你会认为我们会随着时间的推移在这个领域找到一些聪明的事情去做。
So far, we have. I mean, we’ve owned it now for close to 20 years. And we’ve deployed a lot of capital and so far, so good. I mean, it’s —
到目前为止，我们已经拥有它将近 20 年了。我们投入了大量资金，到目前为止，一切都很好。我的意思是——
If you look at the improvements that can be made in our utility system in the United States, you’re talking hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions. So — you know, where else but Berkshire would you look for that kind of money? (Laughs)
如果你看看我们在美国的公用事业系统可以做出的改进，你在谈论数百亿，甚至数万亿的美元。因此——你知道，还能去哪里寻找那样的资金呢？（笑声）
3、《2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
与BNSF不同，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）对普通股不支付任何股息，这在电力公用事业领域极为罕见。这一近乎苦行僧式的政策，贯穿了我们拥有该公司21年来的始终。与铁路不同，美国的电力行业需要进行大规模的现代化改造，最终所需成本将极为巨大。这项任务将在未来数十年内消耗BHE的全部利润。我们欢迎这一挑战，并相信额外的投资终将获得合理的回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its \$18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
让我向你们介绍一下BHE正在开展的一个项目——该公司计划投入180亿美元，对美国西部地区现有电力传输网络的大部分老旧线路进行升级改造和扩展。BHE于2006年启动该项目，预计将在2030年完成——是的，你没看错，就是2030年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.
可再生能源的兴起，让我们的项目成为社会必需品。从历史上看，长期占主导地位的煤电厂通常靠近人口密集的大城市。但在新能源时代，风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点却往往位于偏远地区。2006年，当BHE对形势进行评估时，很明显，美国西部地区输电线路需要大规模投资改造。然而，当各方算清楚项目成本后，很少有公司或政府机构能有底气站出来承担这个任务。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.
值得一提的是，BHE决定推进该项目，基于其对美国政治、经济和司法体系的充分信任。数十亿美元的资金投入后，才能看到实质的收入回报。这些输电线路需要跨越多个州和不同司法辖区，而每个辖区都有自己的规则和利益群体。此外，BHE还需与数百名土地所有者沟通协调，并与可再生能源发电供应商以及远距离输送电力的公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。利益冲突方、旧秩序的捍卫者，以及渴望一夜之间改变世界的空想家，都必须逐步赢得认同。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.
在这一过程中，遭遇各种意外和拖延几乎是必然的。但同样确定的是，BHE拥有实现承诺所需的管理人才、机构承诺以及财务能力。尽管我们的西部输电项目距离最终竣工尚需多年，但如今我们已经开始寻找其他规模相似的项目以继续推进。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
无论前方还有多少障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领先者。
And the way you get it is having something that doesn’t take too much capital. I mean, if you have to really put out tons and tons of capital — utility business is that way. It’s not a super-high return business. You just have to put out a lot of capital. You get a return on that capital, but you don’t get fabulous return. You don’t get Google-like returns, you know, or anything remotely close to it.
获得它的方法是拥有一些不需要太多资本的东西。我的意思是，如果你真的需要投入大量资本——公用事业就是这样。它不是一个超高回报的行业。你只需要投入大量资本。你会从这些资本中获得回报，但你不会获得惊人的回报。你不会获得像谷歌那样的回报，或者任何接近的回报。
You know, we’re proposing a return in the transaction — the proposition with Texas — I think it’s 9.3%, isn’t it —
你知道，我们提议在交易中进行回报——与德克萨斯州的提议——我想是 9.3%，不是吗——
GREG ABEL: Yeah, 9.3 —
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，9.3 —
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you know, that — but if you look at the return on most American businesses on net tangible assets, it’s a lot higher than 9.3. But they aren’t utility businesses, either.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你知道，但如果你看看大多数美国企业在净有形资产上的回报率，它远高于 9.3。但它们也不是公用事业公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thank you. The second part is the easiest one to answer, so I’ll take that. Then I’ll throw the first one back to Charlie. (Laughter) But Berkshire Hathaway Energy actually is required with it’s regulated utilities — and it basically started pretty much with regulated utilities, and still is dominated by that. And we’re interested in buying more regulated utilities.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢。第二部分是最容易回答的，所以我来回答。然后我把第一部分抛给查理。（笑声）但伯克希尔哈撒韦能源实际上是与其受监管的公用事业相关的——它基本上是从受监管的公用事业开始的，并且仍然以此为主。我们有兴趣购买更多的受监管公用事业。
It’s required in different ways by different states and by different regulatory authorities to have a large amount of debt, because, in Iowa or to pick any state, the regulatory authorities are going to say you can get debt money cheaper than you can get equity money, which historically has largely almost always been true.
各州和不同的监管机构以不同的方式要求有大量债务，因为在爱荷华州或任何州，监管机构会说你可以以比获得股权资金更便宜的方式获得债务资金，这在历史上几乎总是正确的。
And they say that since we’re going to allow you a return on equity — we’ll say, just pick a figure. But let’s say they allow us a return on equity of 9%, and we can borrow a lot of capital at 3%, they say it’ll result in higher rates to customers if you put in all equity.
他们说，由于我们可以获得股本回报率——比如说，就选一个数字吧，假设他们允许我们获得9%的股本回报率，而我们可以以3%的利率借入大量资本，他们认为如果全部使用股本融资，最终会导致客户的费率更高。
9%是一个底线的要求。
We would love to have all equity (Laughs) in our utilities, but the regulator wouldn’t stand for it, because under the trad system it would result in higher prices to consumers. So that’s built into the system. And well, our regulator wouldn’t allow us, essentially, to get the same return on equity and have an all equity structure.
我们希望在我们的公用事业中拥有全部股权（笑），但监管机构不会允许，因为在传统体系下，这会导致消费者价格上涨。所以这已经内置于系统中。而且，我们的监管机构基本上不允许我们获得相同的股本回报并拥有全股本结构。
And the answer is, you know — well, you actually saw in the film earlier, which the people that are hearing the webcast didn’t see. But just in Iowa, you know, we recently got approval to spend three and a fraction billion dollars, but they want us — Iowa has a history, and like every other state in the union — except Nebraska, which is all public power.
答案是，你知道的——其实你们在之前的影片中已经看到了，而听网络直播的人没看到。就在爱荷华州，最近我们获得了批准，可以花费30多亿美元，但他们希望我们——爱荷华州有自己的历史，和其他州一样，除了内布拉斯加州，那里全部是公共电力。
But every private power, you know, they have a history of wanting X percent to be in debt. They want you to raise a lot of money in debt because it means cheaper power for the consumer. So the answer is if we owned 100% of Berkshire Energy, we would absolutely be following the same. We would be operating pursuant to what the utility commissions tell us they want us to do that. They represent the people of those states. Now Charlie, do you want —
但每个私营电力公司都有一个历史传统，他们希望负债占据一定比例。他们希望你通过举债筹集大量资金，因为这意味着对消费者来说电价会更便宜。所以答案是，如果我们100%拥有伯克希尔能源，我们也会完全按照同样的方式运营。我们会根据公用事业委员会告诉我们要做的去执行，因为他们代表那些州的人民。现在，查理，你有什么要补充的吗——
6、《2024-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
去年，我们遭遇的第二个、且更为严重的盈利失望发生在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）。其大部分电力公用事业以及庞大的天然气管网的表现大体符合预期，但少数州的监管环境却带来了零盈利甚至破产的阴影（加州最大的公用事业公司已出现此状况，夏威夷目前亦面临该威胁）。在这些司法管辖区里，预测利润和资产价值都十分困难，而电力公用事业曾被视为全美最稳定的行业之一。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（有时因卓越表现可获小幅奖励）筹集巨额资金，以支撑其扩张。凭借这种模式，企业得以提前进行大规模投资，以满足数年后可能出现的需求。这种前瞻性监管体现了公用事业建设发电与输电资产通常需要多年才能完工的现实。BHE 在美国西部跨多州的输电巨型工程始于 2006 年，目前距完工尚需数年；最终，该线路将服务于占美国本土面积 30%、横跨 10 个州的广大地区。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory- return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
在私营和公营电力系统均采取这一模式的情况下，即便人口增长或工业需求超出预期，电网依旧稳定运行。这种“安全边际”方法在监管者、投资者和公众看来皆属理性。然而，如今少数州已打破这一“固定且合理回报”的契约，投资者担心此局面会蔓延。气候变化令忧虑加剧——地下输电或成必需，但在几十年前，谁愿意承担其惊人的建设成本？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已对已发生损失作出最佳估算。这些损失源于森林火灾；若对流风暴愈发频繁，其发生频率与强度均将继续上升。
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
要想了解 BHE 因森林火灾造成的最终损失，并据此理性决定未来是否在西部易受灾州继续投资，还需要很多年时间。目前尚不清楚其他地区的监管环境是否会发生变化。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司或将遭遇与太平洋煤电公司及夏威夷电力公司类似的生存困境。如果现有问题以“没收式”结局收场，对 BHE 显然不利，但 BHE 与伯克希尔本身的架构都足以承受突发冲击。我们的保险业务经常面对此类意外——其核心产品本就是承担风险——其他领域亦难免发生。伯克希尔能承受财务冲击，却不会明知无望仍继续砸钱。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔如何，电力行业的最终局面或许令人担忧：部分公用事业公司可能再无法吸引美国民众的储蓄，被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 20 世纪 30 年代便已作此选择，全国也有众多公共电力机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们偏好的模式。
在 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条时期，内布拉斯加州决定 全面放弃以股东盈利为目的的私营电力公司（private-power systems），转而由公共机构或非营利合作社来拥有和运营电力系统，即采纳 public-power model。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当尘埃落定时，美国对电力的需求及其引发的资本支出将达到惊人规模。我当初既未预见、更未考虑监管回报的不利变化，与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两位合作伙伴一样，这一忽视让我付出了昂贵的代价。
[00:17:47] Warren Buffett: I don’t want to go on too long on this, but this is important because it’s very obvious that the country, for example, needs an incredible improvement, rethinking, redirection, even to some extent. We’ve outgrown what would be the model that America should have. And in a sense, it’s a problem something akin to the interstate highway system, where you needed the power of the government really to get things done because it doesn’t work so well when you get 48 or 50 jurisdictions that each have their own way of thinking about things. Of course, in World War Two, we called in people at a dollar an hour, and we knew we had to turn out ships like crazy, and we knew that we had to convert Ford Motor from being a car manufacturer into an aircraft manufacturer in a matter of days, not weeks, not months.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不想在这个问题上讲得太久，但它确实很重要。因为很明显，例如这个国家在很多方面都需要巨大的改进，需要重新思考，甚至在某种程度上需要重新调整方向。我们已经成长到了一个阶段，原本适用于美国的发展模式可能已经不再完全适合了。从某种意义上说，这有点像当年建设州际高速公路系统的问题——那时确实需要政府的力量才能把事情完成，因为当48个或50个州各自按照自己的方式行事时，事情往往很难顺利推进。当然，在第二次世界大战期间，我们曾经以每小时一美元的工资动员大量人力，我们知道必须疯狂地生产舰船，同时我们也知道必须在几天之内，而不是几周或几个月，把 Ford Motor 从一家汽车制造商转变为一家飞机制造商。
There are certain really major investment situations where we have capital like nobody else has in the private system. We have particular knowhow in the whole generation and transmission arena. The country is going to need it. But we have to figure out a way that makes sense from the standpoint of the government, from the standpoint of the public, and from the standpoint of Berkshire, and we haven’t figured that out yet. I don’t know whether Greg wants to even explain a few of the major problems, but that is a clear and present use of hundreds of billions of dollars. You know, you have people that set up funds and say, they’re getting paid for just assembling stuff. But that’s not the way to handle it. The way to handle it is to have some kind of government-private industry cooperation similar to what you do in a war. I don’t think when they were doing the highway system, that the government set up his own guys that were going to pour a whole cement or anything like that, but they you needed a cooperation and we’re at that point, I think in terms of energy, but I don’t think we’ve made any progress particularly. Tell us more about that.
在某些真正重大的投资领域，我们拥有私人体系中几乎无人可比的资本规模。同时，在发电和输电这一整套体系中，我们也拥有相当专业的经验。这个国家未来会需要这些能力。但我们必须找到一种方式，使其从政府的角度、公众的角度以及 Berkshire 的角度来看都是合理的，而目前我们还没有完全找到这样的方式。我不知道 Greg 是否愿意解释一下其中的一些重大问题，但这确实是一个明确而现实的领域，需要投入数千亿美元的资本。现在有些人设立基金，说他们只是把一些东西拼装在一起就能赚钱，但那不是解决问题的方式。真正的方式应该是政府和私人产业之间形成某种合作，就像战争时期那样。我不认为当年建设州际高速公路系统时，政府是自己组建一批人去浇筑所有水泥之类的工程，而是需要一种合作机制。我认为在能源领域，我们现在也到了类似的阶段，但到目前为止，我觉得我们并没有取得什么实质性的进展。Greg，你可以多讲一点吗？
BHE’s valuation
BHE 的估值
[00:47:04] Becky Quick: This is a question that you touched on in a lot of ways, and the last answer from before, but I did get this question from a few different people. So I’d like to ask it. Ricardo Briz, a long-time shareholder based in Panama, says that he was very happy to see Berkshire acquire 100% of BHE. It was done in two steps, one in late 2022, 1% was purchased from Greg Abel for $870 million, implying a valuation of BHE of $87 billion. And then two, in 2024, the remaining 8% was purchased from the family of Walter Scott Jr. for $3.9 billion, implying a valuation of $48.8 billion for the enterprise. That second larger transaction represented a 44% reduction in valuation in just two years. Ricardo writes that PacifiCorp’s liabilities seemed too small to explain this. Therefore, what factors contributed to the difference in value for BHE between those two moments in time?
Becky Quick：这个问题其实在你刚才的回答中已经间接涉及到，但我确实从几位不同的人那里收到了类似的问题，所以还是想再问一次。来自巴拿马的长期股东 Ricardo Briz 表示，他非常高兴看到 Berkshire 最终收购了 BHE 的100%股权。这个过程分两步完成：第一步是在2022年底，从 Greg Abel 手中购买了1%的股份，价格是8.7亿美元，这意味着当时 BHE 的估值约为870亿美元。第二步是在2024年，从 Walter Scott Jr. 家族手中购买剩余的8%股份，价格为39亿美元，这意味着企业估值约为488亿美元。第二笔规模更大的交易意味着在短短两年内估值下降了44%。Ricardo 认为 PacifiCorp 的相关负债似乎不足以解释这么大的估值差异。因此，在这两个时间点之间，究竟是什么因素导致了 BHE 估值出现如此大的变化？
[00:48:06] Warren Buffett: We don’t know how much we’ll lose out on PacifiCorp and decisions that are made, but we also know that certain of the attitudes demonstrated by that particular example, I’ve got analogues throughout the utility system and there’s a lot of States that so far have been very good, decent to operate in. And there are some, now, they’re rat poison.
Warren Buffett：我们目前还不知道在 PacifiCorp 这件事上最终会损失多少，这要取决于未来做出的各种判决。但我们已经看到，在这个案例中所表现出来的一些态度，其实在整个公用事业体系中都有类似的例子。有很多州目前仍然是非常好的经营环境，但也有一些州，现在几乎可以说是“老鼠药”。
As Charlie would say, to operate in that knowledge was accentuated. When we saw what happened in the Pacific Northwest and it’s accentuated by what we’ve seen as to how utilities have been treated in certain other situations. And then on top of that, it wasn’t just a direct question of what was involved at PacifiCorp. It’s an extrapolation of a societal trend.
正如 Charlie 会说的，这些事情让我们对风险的认识更加清晰。当我们看到太平洋西北地区发生的情况时，再加上我们在其他一些场合看到的公用事业公司所受到的对待，这种认识就更加明显了。而且，这不仅仅是 PacifiCorp 本身的问题，它实际上反映出了一种更广泛的社会趋势。
Secondly, we also had a decision we didn’t expect at all in the real estate business. Those kinds of things can change values, and courts can change values. It’s a lot easier to make those decisions when you just own marketable securities than when you own businesses.
第二，我们在房地产行业也遇到了一个完全没有预料到的判决。类似这样的事情会改变资产价值，法院的判决也会改变价值。当你持有的是可以随时交易的证券时，做出买卖决定要容易得多；但当你持有的是一家企业时，情况就完全不同了。
I’ve made plenty of those decisions as I’ve watched what has happened in various industries and companies over 70 years. But Greg made the decision, which was fine with us, to get out. He had no knowledge of what was going to be happening in either the real estate field or the utility field, and we’re not in the mood to sell any business of it.
在过去70年里，我看着各个行业和公司发生变化，也做过很多类似的判断。不过 Greg 当时决定退出（出售他持有的股份），我们对此完全没有意见。他当时并不知道房地产行业或公用事业行业后来会发生什么变化。而对我们来说，我们并没有打算出售这些业务。
But Berkshire Hathaway Energy is worth considerably less money than it was two years ago, based on societal factors, and that happens in some of our businesses. It certainly happened to our textile business. The public utility business is not as good a business as it was a couple of years ago, and if anybody doesn’t believe that thing, look at Hawaiian Electric and they look and look at Edison in the current wildfires situation in California and their societal trends.
但由于社会环境的变化，Berkshire Hathaway Energy 现在的价值明显低于两年前。这种情况在我们的一些业务中也发生过，比如当年的纺织业务就是如此。公用事业这个行业现在已经不像几年前那样是一个好生意了。如果有人不相信这一点，可以看看 Hawaiian Electric，也可以看看目前在加州野火事件中受到影响的 Edison，以及这些事件背后所反映出的社会趋势。
Oh, I just got a note here on my monitor that says, “The books are now sold out.” So you spend your money on other things. Here’s fudge. This is what I’m eating.
哦，我刚刚在显示器上收到一条提示，说“书已经卖完了”。所以你们可以把钱花在别的东西上，比如这里的软糖。我现在就在吃这个。
But that’s the explanation—values change, and they don’t always change upwards. When we made the deal with Greg, we would have been happy to buy out the Scott family at that price, and when we needed to deal with the Scott Company, we wouldn’t have been happy to pay Greg the price he received. But that’s like Berkshire shares we bought in stock at X, and we buy in stock at less than X if conditions change. Over the years, we pay more and more because it builds in value, but it doesn’t do it in a straight line.
但这就是原因——价值是会变化的，而且并不总是向上变化。当我们当初和 Greg 做交易的时候，如果当时能以那个价格把 Scott 家族的股份买下来，我们会非常乐意。而当后来需要和 Scott 家族交易的时候，如果要用当初 Greg 得到的价格去买，我们就不会愿意了。这就像 Berkshire 自己的股票一样：有时候我们在价格 X 回购股票，如果环境发生变化，我们也可能在低于 X 的价格回购。长期来看，我们通常会支付越来越高的价格，因为企业价值在增长，但这个过程并不是一条直线。
I would say that our enthusiasm for buying public utility companies is different now than it would have been a couple of years ago. That happens in other industries, too, but it’s pretty dramatic in public utilities. And it’s particularly dramatic in public utilities because they are going to need lots of money. So, if you’re going to need lots of money, you probably ought to behave in a way that encourages people to give you lots of money, and then we will see where we go. We’d like to see Public Utilities do well, but our responsibilities to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. OK, station 1, again.
我会说，现在我们对于收购公用事业公司的热情，已经和几年前不一样了。这种变化在其他行业也会发生，但在公用事业行业里尤其明显。而之所以特别明显，是因为这个行业未来需要大量资本。如果你需要大量资金，那你就应该以一种能让投资者愿意提供资金的方式行事，然后我们再看看事情会发展到哪里。我们当然希望公用事业公司能够经营得很好，但我们首先要对 Berkshire Hathaway 的股东负责。好了，再回到1号提问点。
规模扩大-》进入受监管的公共事业-》资本充公/或者成为国家的资产，这两者之间有时候是比较模糊的，反正都差不多，这个问题很难有好的答案。
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Refer To：《1986-03-04 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 Shutdown of Textile Business 关闭纺织业务 In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is ...