I.C.S.402.Capital.P&C insurance.BRK
未来能够以高回报持续投入新增资本的稀缺企业。
1、Intelligent hypotheses（聪明的假设）
长期不分红，能够长期投入新增资本，留下的每一块钱都能创造超过一块钱的价值，预期的回报率大概率能超过S&P500（美国大企业的平均回报率）。
2、 Correct facts（正确的事实）
能长时间、持续创造价值必须有一些非常重要的差异化，做到别人做不到的事，最好是大家都想的明白但做不明白的事（simple idea）。
（1）长期不分红，留下每一块钱都能创造超过一块钱的价值，独一无二；
（2）唯一可以拿浮存金投资股票的保险公司，其他保险公司想的明白但做不明白，参考：《2021-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》；
Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.
整体而言，我们的保险舰队运用的资本规模远超全球任何竞争对手。凭借这一财务实力，再加上伯克希尔每年从非保险业务源源不断获得的大量现金流，使得我们的保险公司能够安全地实施股权占比极高的投资策略——这一点绝大多数保险商因监管和评级原因只能专注债券，难以效仿。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望获得这一可喜结果，这种愿望导致了激烈的竞争，竞争之激烈有时甚至使整个财产/意外险行业出现显著的承保亏损。实际上，这种亏损就是行业为持有浮存金所支付的代价。竞争态势几乎保证了保险业——尽管所有公司都享有浮存金收入——相较于其他美国企业，仍将继续在有形净资产收益率上表现低迷。
（3）优质企业的收藏家，总部不设人员以规避机构的官僚和僵化，没有其他企业能做到；
（4）“直布罗陀式”（the Rock of Gibraltar）的财务状况，2008年股东信中提到的概念，在2015年50周年的信中做了更具体的描述，参考：《2015-02-27 Berkshire - Past Present and Future》。
I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is essentially zero. We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.
我认为，任何事件导致伯克希尔遭遇财务问题的可能性基本为零。我们将永远为千年的洪水做好准备；事实上，如果它发生了，我们将把救生衣卖给那些没有准备的人。在2008-2009的金融危机中，伯克希尔作为"第一反应者"发挥了重要作用，从那以后，我们的资产负债表强度和盈利能力增加了一倍多。贵公司是美国商业的直布罗陀并将继续如此。
Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.
财务持久力要求一家公司在任何情况下保持三个优势：1)庞大且可靠的收入流；(2)大量的流动资产；(3)近期没有重大的现金需求。忽视了最后一条的必要性，常常导致公司遇到意想不到的问题：太多时候，盈利的公司的CEO们感觉他们总是能够偿还到期债务，不论债务规模多大。在2008-2009年，许多管理层认识到这种思维方式有多么危险。
3、Sound reasoning（合理的推理）
2024年账面资产6516.55亿美元，保险浮存金1710亿美元（约等于所有者权益），递延所得税835.63亿美元（约等于所有者权益），三者相加9062.18亿，以市值9062.18亿买入约等于PB=1，实际PB=9062.18/6516.55=1.39，预期的年化收益率是7.38%，如下表所示：
| Year | Investment Gains/Losses | Operating Earnings | Net earnings | Book Value | Float | Net Deferred Tax Liability | Total | Yield Rate |
| 2024 | 415.58 | 474.37 | 889.95 | 6,516.55 | 1,710.00 | 835.63 | 9,062.18 | 9.82% |
| 2023 | 588.73 | 373.50 | 962.23 | 5,707.70 | 1,690.00 | 923.44 | 8,321.14 | 11.56% |
| 2022 | (536.12) | 308.53 | (227.59) | 4,816.81 | 1,640.00 | 764.17 | 7,220.98 | -3.15% |
| 2021 | 623.40 | 274.55 | 897.95 | 5,149.30 | 1,470.00 | 896.79 | 7,516.09 | 11.95% |
| 2020 | 205.99 | 219.22 | 425.21 | 4,513.36 | 1,380.00 | 732.61 | 6,625.97 | 6.42% |
| 2019 | 574.45 | 239.72 | 814.17 | 4,285.63 | 1,290.00 | 658.23 | 6,233.86 | 13.06% |
| 2018 | (207.60) | 247.81 | 40.21 | 3,525.00 | 1,230.00 | 505.03 | 5,260.03 | 0.76% |
| 2017 | 304.83 | 144.57 | 449.40 | 3,519.54 | 1,140.00 | 561.82 | 5,221.36 | 8.61% |
| 2016 | 64.97 | 175.77 | 240.74 | 2,854.28 | 915.77 | 769.59 | 4,539.64 | 5.30% |
| 2015 | 67.25 | 173.58 | 240.83 | 2,586.27 | 880.00 | 631.99 | 4,098.26 | 5.88% |
| 4,733.10 | 64,099.51 | 7.38% | ||||||
| 44,869.66 | 10.55% |
巴菲特最早定下的回购条件是PB<=1.2，很难出现这样的机会，往年大部分的回购记录是PB<=1.4。
Appendix.1.《1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
35. Insurance float: “Above all, get it cheap”
保险浮存金：“最重要的是，要获得廉价资金”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特：第3区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Maurus Spence. And I have a serious question and, then, a less serious question first.
观众提问：我是莫鲁斯·斯潘斯。我有一个严肃的问题，以及一个不太严肃的问题要先提。
The less serious: you said that you and Charlie had lost, between you, a hundred pounds. I was curious who had lost more?
先说不太严肃的：您说您和查理两个人一起减掉了100磅。我想问一下，谁减得更多呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. I said the board had lost a hundred pounds. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。我说的是董事会成员合计减掉了100磅。（笑声）
I have some members of the board who would take umbrage of the fact that they weren’t included in that total. (Laughter)
我们董事会有些成员会因为自己没被算进那个总数而生气的。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, Who lost —?
观众提问：好的。那么——谁减掉——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I, we’re pretty close at the moment, aren’t we? Modesty prevents — (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我和查理现在都差不多，不是吗？谦虚使我无法明说……（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I must say you’re both looking very good, anyway.
观众提问：不管怎样，我必须说你们两个看起来都很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re feeling good.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们感觉不错。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering who lost the most and what your diet secrets were. (Laughter) And, then, the more serious question was about float.
观众提问：我想知道谁减掉的最多，以及你们的减肥秘诀是什么？（笑声）然后，我的那个更严肃的问题与浮存金有关。
You touched on this a little bit earlier. But you’ve often said that your insurance business is probably the most important business that you own.
这个话题你们之前稍微提到过。可你们经常说，保险业务大概是你们最重要的业务。
On page 12 of the annual report, you said, “We have benefitted greatly to a degree that has not been generally understood, because our liabilities have cost us very little.”
在年报的第12页，你们说“我们获得的好处非常大，但一般人都没怎么意识到，因为我们的负债成本非常低。”
I was wondering if you could describe this a little bit better so we can understand it.
我想请你们进一步解释一下，让我们更好地理解这一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — Charlie and I have lost about the same amount, at about 20 pounds each.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我和查理各减了差不多20磅。
The insurance business provides us with float. And float is money that we hold that doesn’t belong to us.
保险业务给我们带来了浮存金。所谓浮存金是我们持有但并不属于我们的资金。
It’s like a bank having deposits. A bank has deposits. The money doesn’t belong to it. But it holds the money.
这有点类似银行持有存款。银行有存款，而这些钱并不属于银行，但银行却保管着这些钱。
Now, when a bank holds deposits, on everything except demand deposits, there’s an explicit cost, an interest rate attached to it. And, then, there are the costs of running the system and gathering the money which is — also must be attributed both to demand and time deposit.
当银行持有存款时，除活期存款外的所有存款都需要付出显性的成本，也就是利率。除此之外，还有运营体系和吸收资金的成本——这些也得算在活期和定期存款中。
So there’s a cost to getting what they would call deposits and we could call float.
因此，他们所谓的存款、而我们称之为浮存金，都是有成本的。
In the insurance business, a similar phenomenon takes place in that policy holders give us their money at the start of the policy period. And therefore, we get the money paid in advance for the product.
在保险业务中，也存在类似的现象：保单持有人在保单生效之初就将保费交给我们，因此我们预先收到了这笔产品费用。
And secondly, it takes time to settle losses, particularly in the liability area. If you bang up a fender on your car, you — it’s going to get settled very quickly, so there’s — but if there’s a complicated injury or something, it may take some years to settle. And during that period, we hold the money.
其次，理赔需要时间，尤其是在责任保险领域。如果你只是把车的保险杠撞坏了，理赔会很快结案。但如果是复杂的人身伤害或其他问题，可能需要几年才能结案。而在这段时间里，钱都由我们来持有。
So, we have, in effect, something that is tantamount to the deposits of a bank. But whereas the deposits of a bank, it’s quite easy to calculate the approximate cost, in the case of the float that the insurance company has, you don’t really know what the cost of that float is until all your policies and losses — policies have expired and your losses have all been settled. Well, that’s forever, in some cases.
因此，实际上我们拥有了一种类似于银行存款的资金。然而，与银行存款不同的是，银行存款的成本很容易计算，而保险公司所持有的浮存金，你并不知道它的成本到底是多少，除非所有保单都到期并且所有理赔都结清。有时候，这几乎是个没有尽头的过程。
So, you’re only making an estimate, as you go along, of what that float is costing.
因此，你只能在进行中估算这一浮存金的成本。
To date with Berkshire, in the 29 years we’ve been in the business, it appears — never certain, because you don’t know for sure what’s going to happen — but it appears that our float has not cost us anything, in — on average.
对伯克希尔而言，到目前为止，我们做保险生意有29年了。现在看来——当然不能完全确定，因为谁也不知道将来会发生什么——但看上去我们的浮存金平均来说几乎没有成本。
There’s been years when we’ve had an underwriting loss when there’s a cost. There’s been years when we had an underwriting profit. And so, we had a reverse cost.
有些年份我们承保亏损时确实会出现成本，有些年份我们承保盈利，于是成本就会倒挂。
So we have obtained that float on very advantageous terms over the years. Far more than — fully as important as that— it’s important to get it at a low cost, in our case, no cost. But the other important thing is that we’ve grown it dramatically.
多年来我们以非常有利的条件获取了浮存金。比“以极低甚至无成本获得浮存金”更重要或者同样重要的是，我们的浮存金规模还大幅增长了。
And so, we’ve gotten more and more money without having any cost attached to it. And if we still had our 16 — or 17 million, I guess — of float that we had in 1967 and it was no cost, it would be very nice.
也就是说，我们获得了越来越多的资金，却不需要支付成本。如果我们现在还和1967年一样，只有1600万或1700万美元的浮存金，且没有成本，虽然不错，但毕竟规模有限。
But 17 million of free money is worth something, but it’s not worth a ton.
1700万美元的无成本资金当然有价值，但也没大到让人瞠目结舌的程度。
Having seven billion, if we can achieve that as free money, it’s worth a lot of money. And that growth has not, probably, generally, been appreciated fully in connection with Berkshire nor has the interplay of how having zero-cost money, in terms of affecting our gain in value over time.
如果我们能把那70亿美元当成无成本的资金，那么它的价值就非常高了。而且，就伯克希尔而言，人们大概并没有充分认识到这种增长的意义，也没有充分理解在我们价值增长的过程中，持有零成本资金所产生的作用。
People have looked at — always looked at our asset side, but they haven’t paid as much attention to the liability side. Charlie and I pay a lot of attention to that.
人们往往只关注我们的资产端，却没有那么关注负债端。而我和查理对此非常重视。
And, I mean, this — it’s not entirely an accident that the business has developed in this manner. And we have intentions of trying to make it continue to develop in this manner, and in that manner, in the future. But we’ve got competitors out there, too.
也就是说，我们能够这样发展并非完全是偶然。我们也希望未来能继续以这种方式、或者类似的方式发展。不过我们在市场上也有竞争对手。
Float, per se, is not a blessing. We can show you many insurance companies that thought it was wonderful to generate float. And they have lost so much money in underwriting that they’d be better off if they’d never heard of the insurance business.
浮存金本身并不一定是好事。我们可以给你看很多保险公司，他们曾经觉得获得浮存金很美好，结果却在承保业务上赔了大量的钱，如果他们从没涉足过保险业务，或许会更好。
But, you know, the job is to get it, get it in increasing quantities, but above all, get it cheap. And that’s what we work at.
但是，你要知道，我们的工作就是争取拿到浮存金，而且数量越来越多，不过最关键的是要拿到便宜的浮存金。这就是我们努力的方向。
And you do that in the business through having some kind of competitive advantages. You won’t do it just by having an ordinary insurance company. The ordinary insurance company is not a good business.
要想在这门生意里做到这一点，就必须拥有某些竞争优势。仅仅是办一家普通的保险公司，你是做不到的。普通的保险公司并不是什么好生意。
We have it, in certain respects, because of our attitude toward the business. We have it because of our financial strength gives us certain competitive advantages, and we have it in the case of GEICO, because of a very low-cost operation.
我们能够做到这一点，部分原因在于我们对待这项业务的态度。我们能做到，是因为我们的财务实力给我们带来了某些竞争优势；在GEICO的案例中，则是因为它的运营成本非常低。
And it’s us — up to us — to try and figure out ways to maximize each one of those competitive advantages over time.
而我们要做的，就是设法在时间的推移中，将这些竞争优势最大化。
We’ve built those advantages. I mean, in 1967, we were not looked at that way in the insurance business. We were — we’ve built a position of competitive strengths. And in the case of GEICO, they had it without us. But we have bought into it over time.
这些优势是我们一点点建立起来的。要知道，在1967年，我们在保险业并不是以这样的形象示人的。我们一步步建立了自己的竞争实力。至于GEICO，它自己就已经拥有这样的优势，而我们是逐步买入这家公司并与之结合的。
It’s a very important asset. And you ought to pay a lot of attention over the years as to what is happening in — with that asset as to both growth and costs. And that will aid you in calculating intrinsic value.
浮存金是一项非常重要的资产。你需要长年累月地关注这项资产的发展状况，包括规模的增长以及成本的变化。这样做能帮助你更好地评估我们的内在价值。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没有补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
Appendix.2.《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
38. When Berkshire is cheap, other things are usually cheaper
当伯克希尔便宜时，其他东西通常更便宜
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If Mr. Market goes in the depressed phase that Berkshire Hathaway has got an investment portion of its book value about 28,000 per Class A share, that would put that Berkshire Hathaway share much lower than what it is now. Would Berkshire Hathaway consider buying back its own share? Or has it done so in the past? Or is it out of the question?
听众： 如果市场进入低迷阶段，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资部分每A类股的账面价值为28,000美元，这将使伯克希尔的股价远低于现在的水平。伯克希尔是否会考虑回购自己的股票？或者是否在过去做过？还是根本不可能？
WARREN BUFFETT: If the market went in the tank, Berkshire stock would go in the tank, too. And so there shouldn’t be anybody in this room that owns the stock that would not find it palatable, if not become positively enthusiastic, about the stock going down 50 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果市场崩盘，伯克希尔的股票也会下跌。所以，这个房间里持有伯克希尔股票的人都应该觉得股价下跌50%不是难以接受的事情，甚至可能感到兴奋。
It would not bother Charlie. It wouldn’t bother me, because we would have very intelligent things, then, to do with whatever capital we came into. And we would be generating capital as we went along.
这不会困扰查理，也不会困扰我，因为那时我们会有非常明智的事情可以用手头的资金去做。而且我们在经营过程中会不断产生资本。
We wouldn’t have sold our Coke. We wouldn’t have sold our Gillette. We wouldn’t have sold our businesses. So most of our capital would’ve ridden that down. But at least, we would have intelligent things to do with the money.
我们不会卖掉我们的可口可乐股份，也不会卖掉我们的吉列股份，更不会卖掉我们的业务。所以，我们的大部分资本会经历这场下跌。但至少，我们会有明智的事情可以用这些资金去做。
One of the intelligent things, possibly, could be to buy in our own stock. But that would imply that our own stock was cheaper relative to value than anything else we could find among possible opportunities. And the chances are we could find things that were more attractive.
其中一个明智的选择可能是回购我们的股票。但这意味着我们的股票相对于其价值比我们能找到的其他投资机会更便宜。而实际情况是，我们可能会发现更有吸引力的东西。
Back in 1973 or ’4, when we were buying Washington Post at a fraction of what it was worth, Berkshire stock may have been cheap then. But it wasn’t as cheap as the Washington Post.
回到1973年或1974年，当我们以其价值的一小部分价格买入《华盛顿邮报》时，伯克希尔的股票可能当时很便宜。但它没有《华盛顿邮报》那么便宜。
In 1987 or — well, in 1988 and ’89, you know, Berkshire stock may or may not have been cheap. But it wasn’t as cheap as Coca-Cola.
在1987年，或者说1988年和1989年，伯克希尔的股票可能便宜，也可能不便宜。但它没有可口可乐那么便宜。
And it’s unlikely that among the thousands of the possible investments that Berkshire will be the most attractive at any time. But if it were, you know, obviously, we would buy in our own stock.
在数千种可能的投资中，伯克希尔的股票成为最具吸引力的选择的可能性很小。但如果它是最吸引人的，显然，我们会回购自己的股票。
But I think if the Dow went down 50 percent, we would have plenty of interesting things to do. And we would not be unhappy.
但我认为，如果道琼斯指数下跌50%，我们会有很多有趣的事情可以做。我们不会感到不高兴。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We don’t have any rule against it. Opportunity cost is the game around here.
查理·芒格： 是的，我们对此没有任何限制。机会成本是我们这里的游戏规则。
40. Businesses with “natural limits” welcomed at Berkshire
伯克希尔欢迎具有“自然限制”的企业
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Richard Tomkins (PH) from Gallatin, Tennessee. And I have just two quick questions.
听众： 我是来自田纳西州加拉廷的Richard Tomkins（音）。我有两个简短的问题。
Could both of y’all discuss the Kansas Bankers business and its competitors? How big of a moat Kansas Bankers has in the industry and if they’re going to expand, you know, outside of the 22 or 20 states that they’re currently in. And that’s A.
你们能否谈谈Kansas Bankers这项业务及其竞争对手？Kansas Bankers在行业中的护城河有多宽？他们是否会扩展到目前覆盖的20到22个州以外？这是第一个问题。
And, then, secondly, just clue us in a little bit more on the five-year discount notes that you did that were tied to the Salomon stock. And was that a way to unload it? Or just kind of give us a little more than what we saw in the annual.
其次，能否更详细地解释一下你们发行的与所罗门股票挂钩的五年贴现票据？这是为了减持这些股票吗？还是可以补充一些年报中没有提到的细节？
WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes in the insurance business, you have a choice between being a good business or a big business. And fortunately, Don Towle, who runs Kansas Banker Surety, has chosen for a good business.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在保险行业，有时你需要在成为一家好公司和一家大公司之间做出选择。幸运的是，运营Kansas Banker Surety的Don Towle选择了成为一家好公司。
It’s a specialized operation that sells, as its name implies, to bankers, and primarily policies that have fidelity coverage.
这是一项专注的业务，正如其名称所暗示的，它主要为银行家提供保险，尤其是涵盖忠诚保证的保单。
That is just not a big volume business in the whole United States. They do it exceptionally well. Don knows every, you know, he knows every account. He knows every claim. You know, he runs a fabulous operation. But it’s not an operation that can double or triple in size doing what it does and doing well. There just aren’t — there’s not the opportunity there.
在整个美国，这并不是一个大规模的业务。他们做得非常出色。Don了解每一个账户、每一个理赔。他的运营非常出色。但这并不是一个可以通过现有业务翻倍或三倍增长的公司。这样的机会并不存在。
On the other hand, I think it’s tough to compete against Don because he brings an element of knowledge and personal attention to the account and factors of that sort that a really large company would have trouble duplicating.
另一方面，我认为与Don竞争很困难，因为他对账户的了解和个人关注是大型公司难以复制的。
Charlie, you want to add anything on Kansas Bankers?
查理，你有什么想补充的吗，关于Kansas Bankers？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s a huge class of businesses in America which are very strong and will throw out large amounts of cash in relation to their size but which can’t rationally be expanded very much. And if you try and expand certain kinds of businesses, you’re throwing money down the rat hole.
查理·芒格： 是的，美国有一大类企业，它们非常强大，相对于其规模能产生大量现金，但无法合理地大幅扩展。如果你试图扩展某些类型的业务，你可能就是在把钱打水漂。
The beauty of the Berkshire Hathaway system is that such businesses are very welcome here because the cash comes into headquarters and is allocated there.
伯克希尔哈撒韦系统的优点在于，这类企业在这里非常受欢迎，因为这些现金会流入总部，然后由总部分配。
If there’s anything sensible to do at the subsidiary level, we always want it done. But there are businesses where — lots of businesses — where there isn’t much of a way of redeploying the cash.
如果在子公司层面有合理的事情可以做，我们总是希望它能被完成。但对于许多业务来说，几乎没有太多重新部署现金的方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: Part the reason they have a moat around them is that they’re of a size and have specialized skills that other organizations just can’t get into it. I’ll give you another example, and that’s somewhat the same field.
沃伦·巴菲特： 它们之所以有护城河，部分原因是它们的规模和专业技能让其他组织无法进入这个领域。我再给你一个例子，这与该领域有些相似。
There’s a company called Western Surety. It’s changed ownership a couple of times. Charlie and I went up to see them 15 years ago about buying it at Sioux Falls.
有一家叫Western Surety的公司，已经易主了几次。15年前，查理和我曾经去苏福尔斯看过这家公司，想要收购它。
They write notary bonds. And they write a whole bunch of things that have $50 premiums or $25 premiums. They have — it was a company doing not that many millions of premiums, but they had 30,000 agents. But each agent, you know, may have done $500 worth of business within a year or a thousand dollars.
他们经营公证担保业务，还有许多保费只有50美元或25美元的项目。这家公司保费总额不算太多，但他们有3万名代理。每个代理可能一年只能做500美元或1000美元的业务。
Well, Chubb can’t go after that business the same way. We certainly can’t at National Indemnity. They have a distribution system that works wonders. But you can’t pump two or three times the volume through that distribution system. And if you could pump it through, there would’ve been more competition.
Chubb公司无法以同样的方式进入这个业务领域。我们在National Indemnity也做不到。他们的分销系统非常有效，但你无法通过该系统增加两到三倍的业务量。而如果能做到，就会有更多的竞争。
So there are businesses that have certain natural limits that, you know, you want to be careful that you don’t talk yourself into thinking a business that has limits and find out that it really has way more potential.
因此，有些业务有某种自然限制。你需要小心，不要让自己误以为一个业务有其限制，而实际上它还有更大的潜力。
I mean, it would’ve been a shame if Mr. [Asa Griggs] Candler decided that Coca-Cola only appealed to people in Atlanta or something of the sort. So you have to be a little careful on that.
比如，如果阿萨·格里格斯·坎德勒先生认为可口可乐只吸引亚特兰大的消费者，那将是一个遗憾。所以你需要对此稍加谨慎。
But we — a fellow like Don will be very good at understanding, you know, where his competitive advantages can take him and where they don’t take him. He’s done a terrific job over the years doing it.
不过，像Don这样的人非常擅长理解他的竞争优势可以带他到哪里，以及不能带他到哪里。他多年来在这方面做得非常出色。
63. Love it when a wonderful business buys back its stock
喜欢一家优秀的公司回购自己的股票
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone one?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区？
EVERETT PUREE: I’m Everett Puree (PH) from Atlanta, Georgia. And I wanted to ask you if you could comment on the matter of intrinsic value as it applies to some of “The Inevitables,” given that the overpayment risk now is high and the share repurchases that are going on there.
埃弗里特·普瑞： 我是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的埃弗里特·普瑞（音）。我想请您谈谈内在价值的问题，尤其是在一些“必然”的公司中，考虑到现在溢价风险较高以及这些公司正在进行的股票回购。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we won’t stick a price on them. We just — we tell you that they are absolutely wonderful businesses run by sensational people, and that they are selling at prices that are higher than they sold at most of the time. And then — but that — you know —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。嗯，我们不会为它们定一个价格。我们只是告诉您，它们是非常出色的企业，由卓越的人管理，而且目前的价格高于它们大多数时间的交易价格。但——不过——您知道——
They may be — they may well be worth it and worth a lot more, even in terms of present terms. Or it may turn out they’re a couple years ahead of themselves. We don’t know the answer to that. We know we’re very happy owning them.
它们可能——它们很可能是值得的，甚至在目前的情况下也值得更多。或者事实证明它们的估值可能超前了几年。对此我们并不知道答案。我们知道我们很高兴持有它们。
Gillette does not repurchase its shares, or hasn’t in any significant quantity for many years. Coke consistently repurchases its shares.
吉列没有回购自己的股票，或者说多年来没有进行大规模回购。而可口可乐则持续回购自己的股票。
We generally like the policy of companies that have really wonderful businesses repurchasing their shares.
我们通常喜欢那些拥有真正优秀业务的公司进行股票回购的政策。
There aren’t that many super businesses in the world. And the idea of owning more and more of a company like that over a period of time has an appeal to us, and almost an appeal regardless of price.
世界上没有多少超级企业。随着时间推移，逐渐持有一家这样的公司更多股份的想法对我们很有吸引力，几乎无论价格如何都具有吸引力。
The problem is that most companies that repurchase their shares, you know, are so-so — are frequently — so-so businesses. And they’re being done for motivations other than intensifying the interests of the shareholders in a wonderful business.
问题是，大多数进行股票回购的公司，您知道，往往是普通公司。它们进行回购的动机通常并不是为了加强股东在一家优秀企业中的利益。
But we really know you have a wonderful business. And we think most of the ones we own are anywhere from extremely good to wonderful. We think it usually makes a lot of sense.
但我们确实知道您拥有一家优秀的企业。我们认为我们持有的大多数企业都介于非常优秀到卓越之间。我们认为这通常非常有意义。
It’s hard to do things intelligent with money in this world. And Coke has been very intelligent about using their capital to, particularly, to fortify and improve their bottler network around the world. I mean, they’ve done a terrific job that way. That was a neglected area for a long time. And that comes first.
在这个世界上，用钱做聪明的事情很难。而可口可乐在使用资本方面表现得非常聪明，特别是用来加强和改进他们在全球的装瓶商网络。我是说，他们在这方面做得非常出色。这是一个被忽视了很长时间的领域，而这必须优先考虑。
But there’s only so far you can go with that — and to enhance the ownership of the shareholders in a company like Coca-Cola — when we bought our first Coca-Cola in ’88, we bought about 6.2 percent of the company. And at that time, they may have been 600 million servings — not any more than that — a day. So we had an interest in 36 or 37 million servings.
但在那方面能做的也有限——为了增强股东在像可口可乐这样的公司中的所有权——当我们在1988年第一次买入可口可乐时，我们买下了公司大约6.2%的股份。当时，他们每天可能有6亿份的销量——不会超过这个数字。所以我们拥有其中约3600万或3700万份的权益。
Now we have 8 percent of 900 million-plus. So we have an interest in 75 million or so servings a day. Seventy-five million people are drinking Berkshire Hathaway’s share of Coca-Cola products today, in an eight-ounce serving. And you know, the profit’s gone up a little per serving.
现在我们拥有超过9亿份销量中的8%。所以我们每天大约有7500万份的权益。今天，有7500万人正在饮用伯克希尔·哈撒韦所拥有份额的可口可乐产品，每份8盎司。您知道，每份的利润也略有增加。
So that gets pretty attractive. And we’d just as soon they keep doing that.
因此，这变得非常有吸引力。我们很希望他们继续这样做。
Appendix.3.《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
53. Intrinsic value: “Easy to say and impossible to figure”
内在价值：“说起来容易，计算起来不可能”
WARREN BUFFETT: The intrinsic value question. I mean, by definition, intrinsic value is the present value of the stream of cash that’s going to be generated by any financial asset between now and doomsday.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于内在价值的问题。按定义，内在价值是从现在到世界末日，任何金融资产所能产生的现金流的现值。
And that’s easy to say and impossible to figure, but it’s the kind of thing that we’re looking at when we look at a Coca-Cola, where we think it’s much easier to evaluate the stream of cash that comes in the future than it is in a company such as Intel, marvelous as it may be. It’s easier for us. Andy Grove may be better at figuring out Intel than Coke.
说起来容易，计算起来却不可能。但这就是我们在评估像可口可乐这样的公司时所关注的方面。我们认为，评估可口可乐未来的现金流比评估像英特尔这样的公司要容易得多，尽管英特尔很出色。对我们来说更容易些。而安迪·格罗夫可能比我们更擅长评估英特尔，而不是可口可乐。
And in Berkshire, it is complicated by the fact that we have no business that naturally employs all of the capital that flows to us, so it is dependent, to some extent, on the opportunities available and the ingenuity used when that cash pours in, as it does.
在伯克希尔，这一问题更加复杂，因为我们没有任何业务可以自然地利用流向我们的全部资本。因此，这在某种程度上取决于当现金流入时，我们是否能找到合适的机会，以及我们如何巧妙地利用这些机会。
Some businesses have a natural use for the cash. Actually, Intel has a good natural use for the cash over time as they’ve expanded in their business. And many businesses do.
有些业务对现金有天然的用途。实际上，英特尔在其业务扩张过程中，对现金有良好的天然需求。许多企业都是如此。
But we do not have a natural use. We have some businesses that use significant amounts of cash. FlightSafety will buy a lot of — build a lot of simulators this year and they cost real money.
但我们并没有这种天然用途。我们有一些业务确实需要大量现金。今年，FlightSafety将购买并建造许多模拟器，这需要真金白银。
But in relation to the resources available, we have to come up with new uses, new ways to use cash. And that makes for a more difficult valuation job than if you’ve got — well, the classic case used to be a water or electric utility where the cash could be deployed and the return was more or less guaranteed within a narrow range, and it was very easy to make calculations then as to the expectable returns in the future.
但相对于我们可用的资源，我们必须找到新的用途、新的现金使用方式。这使得我们的估值工作比那些经典案例更困难，比如以前的水务或电力公司，现金可以被部署，并且回报在一个较小的范围内几乎是有保证的，因此很容易计算出未来的预期回报。
But that’s not the case at Berkshire. We’ve got very good businesses, both directly and partially owned. And those businesses are going to do well for a long, long time.
但伯克希尔并非如此。我们拥有非常好的业务，无论是直接控股还是部分持股。这些业务将在很长时间内表现出色。
But we do have new cash coming in all the time, and sometimes we have good ideas for that cash and sometimes we don’t. And that does make your job more difficult, in terms of computing intrinsic value.
但我们不断有新现金流入，有时我们有很好的想法来利用这些现金，有时却没有。这确实让计算内在价值变得更加困难。
We’ll have — yeah, we’re going to break after the next question. At that time — we break whenever Charlie and I run out of candy up here, actually. (Laughter)
我们会——是的，我们将在下一个问题后休息。实际上，每当查理和我吃完糖果，我们就会休息。（笑声）
We’re going to let everybody — you can get something to eat, if you want to stick around, and we will be here till 3:30 when we reconvene at 12:30.
大家可以去吃点东西，如果你想留下来，我们会一直在这里，直到下午3:30再次开会，中间在12:30继续。
And those of you who have been with us this morning and had enough, we thank you for being here this weekend. We’ve had a terrific time with you, so I’m very appreciative of that.
对那些今天上午陪伴我们、觉得已经足够的观众，我们感谢你们这个周末的到来。和你们共度的时光非常美好，我对此深表感激。
Appendix.4.《2004-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
44. Why Berkshire’s insurance companies never have layoffs
为什么伯克希尔的保险公司从不裁员
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 10, and see if we can get 50 cents. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看看第十个，看看能不能得到 50 美分。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about a dollar? (Laughter)
观众成员：一美元怎么样？（笑声）
David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Thank you, Warren and Charlie, for a fabulous weekend and for the discussion about governance in the mutual fund industry in the shareholder letter.
大卫·温特斯，新泽西州山湖市。感谢沃伦和查理带来的精彩周末，以及在股东信中关于共同基金行业治理的讨论。
Specifically, have you altered the compensation potential for the insurance underwriters to make sure, as Charlie has described, the incentive-caused bias creates an environment that encourages writing new policies that, when the tide goes out again in the property and casualty business, Berkshire Hathaway minimizes losses, maximizes float, while compensating underwriters for not writing business?
具体来说，您是否改变了保险核保人的薪酬潜力，以确保正如查理所描述的那样，激励造成的偏见创造出一种环境，鼓励写新保单，当财产和意外伤害业务的潮水再次退去时，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能够最大限度地减少损失，最大化浮存金，同时补偿核保人不开展业务？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you, that feeds into an interesting set of slides I’ve got, if I can find them here to tell the projector what to put up, because that’s a very important point you raise.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢，这正好引出了我准备的一组有趣的幻灯片，如果我能找到它们来告诉投影仪要放什么，因为你提到的这个点非常重要。
I mean, we are very big in insurance, and having the wrong incentives in place could be very harmful.
我的意思是，我们在保险业非常大，而设置错误的激励措施可能会非常有害。
So let’s put up a couple of slides. Let’s put up slide number one, if we would, please.
那么让我们放上几张幻灯片。请放上第一张幻灯片。
Slide number one is the situation at Berkshire, and Shirley, I’ll give you one of these, but that’s the situation at Berkshire shortly before we bought National Indemnity.
幻灯片一是伯克希尔的情况，雪莉，我会给你一份，但这是我们购买国家赔偿公司前不久伯克希尔的情况。
There’s our balance sheet there. And as you’ll notice, we just had a few million dollars extra. We had about $20 million tied up in the textile business.
这是我们的资产负债表。正如您所注意到的，我们刚刚有几百万美元的盈余。我们在纺织业务中投入了大约 2000 万美元。
And then I heard that Jack Ringwalt wanted to sell his company. Some of you here in the audience know him. He — for 15 minutes every year, Jack would feel like selling his company. He would get mad at something or other.
然后我听说杰克·林瓦尔特想要卖掉他的公司。这里的一些观众认识他。他——每年有 15 分钟，杰克会想要卖掉他的公司。他会因为某些事情生气。
And so my friend Charlie Heider knew Jack pretty well, and I’d said to Charlie, “Charlie, next time Jack is in heat, have him, you know, get him over here.” (Laughter)
所以我的朋友查理·海德尔对杰克很了解，我对查理说：“查理，下次杰克情绪发作的时候，让他过来。”（笑声）
And so Jack, early in 1967, came by 11:30, 11:45 in the morning, and said he’d had it with insurance, and with the insurance regulators and everything, he’d like to sell. So we bought it.
于是，杰克在 1967 年初，大约上午 11:30 或 11:45 过来，说他受够了保险、保险监管机构和一切，他想卖掉。所以我们买下了。
Now, we bought, that was the — made a major — that’s when we really embarked on what has happened subsequently.
现在，我们买了，那是——做了一个重大——这是我们真正开始实施后续发展战略的重大决策。
As you can see from that slide, the following year the textile business made all of $55,000. So sticking with textiles would not have been a great idea. We spent $8 1/2 million to buy National Indemnity.
正如你从那张幻灯片中看到的，第二年纺织业务总共赚了 55,000 美元。因此，坚持纺织业并不是一个好主意。我们花了 850 万美元收购了 National Indemnity。
Now, on the next slide, slide two, you will see a record like has never been, I don’t think there’s another insurance company in the world that has a record like this. That’s the premium volume of National Indemnity’s traditional business.
现在，在下一张幻灯片，幻灯片二，你将看到一个前所未有的记录，我认为世界上没有另一家保险公司有这样的记录。这是国家赔偿公司传统业务的保费额。
And you will see a company that went from 79 million in that first year of premiums — if you go all the way back to the time we bought it — it was 16 million, but by 1980 we were up to 79 million.
你会看到一家公司从第一年的保费 7900 万——如果你回到我们购买它的时候——是 1600 万，但到 1980 年我们已经达到 7900 万。
And you will see that in what was known as the “hard market” of the mid-’80s, we got up to 366 million.
你会看到，在 80 年代中期被称为“艰难市场”的时期，我们达到了 3.66 亿。
And then we took it down — not intentionally, but just because the business became less attractive — all the way from 366 million down to 55 million. And now the market became more attractive in the last few years, and it soared up to almost $600 million.
然后我们把它降下来了——不是故意的，而是因为业务变得不那么有吸引力——从 3.66 亿一直降到 5500 万。现在市场在过去几年变得更有吸引力，飙升到近 6 亿美元。
I don’t think there’s a public company in America that would feel they could survive a record of volume going down like that, year after year after year after year.
我不认为美国有其他上市公司会觉得它们能以这样的记录生存下来，年复一年地保费量不断下降。
But that was the culture of National Indemnity. It was the culture started by Jack Ringwalt, and it was the culture all the way through several other managers, Phil Liesche, and Rolly [Roland] Miller, to Don Wurster, who has done a fabulous job. And we don’t worry about premium volume.
但这就是国家赔偿公司的文化。这是由杰克·林格沃尔特创立的文化，并且贯穿于其他几位经理，菲尔·利舍和罗利·米勒，到唐·沃斯特，他做得非常出色。而且我们不担心保费收入。
But if you’re not going to worry about premium volume, then you have to take a look at slide three. Because if the silent message had gone out to our employees that unless you write a lot of business, you’re going to lose your job, they would have written a lot of business. You could —
但是，如果你不打算担心保费收入，那么你必须看看第三张幻灯片。因为如果无声的信息传达给我们的员工，除非你做很多业务，否则你会失去工作，他们就会做很多业务。你可以——
National Indemnity can write a billion dollars’ worth of business in any month it wanted to, all it has to do is offer silly prices. If you offer a silly price, brokers will find you in the middle of the ocean at four in the morning. I mean, you cannot afford to do that.
国家赔偿公司可以在任何一个月内写下价值十亿美元的业务，只要它愿意，所要做的就是提供荒谬的价格。如果你提供一个荒谬的价格，经纪人会在凌晨四点在大海中找到你。我的意思是，你不能这样做。
So what we have always told people in our insurance businesses generally, specifically at National Indemnity, is that if they write no business, their job is not in jeopardy.
所以我们一直告诉我们保险业务中的人，特别是在国家赔偿公司，如果他们没有业务，他们的工作不会有危险。
We cannot afford to have our unspoken message to employees, that you write business, or your job, or the guy sitting next to you’s, you know, may be lost.
我们不能让员工感受到这样一个未明说的信息：你要么做出业绩，否则你的工作，或者你旁边那个人的工作，可能会丢掉。
So when we bulged up to 366 million, we — employment went up modestly, and when we went all the way down, you’ll see it trickle downward, but that was all by attrition. We never had a layoff during that period. Other people would have, but we didn’t.
所以当我们膨胀到 3.66 亿时，我们——就业略有增加，当我们一路下降时，你会看到它逐渐减少，但那都是通过自然减员实现的。在那段时间里，我们从未裁员。其他人可能会裁员，但我们没有。
And now we’re going back up some, and we’ll go back down again at some time in the future.
现在我们要往上走一些，未来的某个时候我们会再往下走。
Now, if you go to the next slide, you’ll see that that created an expense ratio that went up dramatically, up as high as 41 percent in 1999, as volume shrunk back. And when we were writing a lot of business, our expense ratio was as low as 25.9.
现在，如果你翻到下一张幻灯片，你会看到这导致了费用比率急剧上升，1999 年高达 41%，因为业务量缩减。而当我们业务量很大时，我们的费用比率低至 25.9%。
Now, some companies would feel that was intolerable, but what we feel is intolerable is writing bad business. And again, we can take an expense ratio that’s out of line, but we can’t afford to write bad business. For one thing, if you get a culture of writing bad business, it’s almost important to get rid of.
现在，一些公司会觉得这是不可容忍的，但我们认为不可容忍的是做不好的生意。同样，我们可以承受不合理的费用比率，但我们不能承受承保不好的生意。首先，如果形成了承保不好的生意的文化，几乎就必须要消除。
So we would rather suffer of having too much overhead, than we would want to teach our employees that to retain their jobs, they needed to write any damn thing that came along, because that’s a very hard habit to get rid of once you get hooked on it.
所以我们宁愿承受过多的管理费用，也不愿教导员工为了保住工作而随便写任何东西，因为一旦养成这种习惯，就很难摆脱。
Now, move on to slide number five, you will see what the result has been of that policy. And it’s been that we had a few years, bad years, in the early ’80s — that’s what led to that hard market. But even with a high expense ratio, you’ll see that we made money underwriting in virtually every year.
现在，请移到第五张幻灯片，您将看到该政策的结果。我们在 80 年代初经历了几年的艰难时期——这导致了那个困难的市场。但即使费用比率很高，您会看到我们几乎每年都通过承保赚钱。
You’ll see the year 2001 at 108.4, but that will, in my view, that will come down. I think that will turn out to be quite a good year. These are the — that year is not fully developed yet.
你会看到 2001 年是 108.4，但在我看来，那会下降。我认为那一年会是相当好的一年。这些是——那一年还没有完全发展。
Now, you’ll see in 1980 — in ’86 — we had this incredible year, when we wrote at 69.3, that’s a 30 percent underwriting margin. And the nice thing about it is, we did it with the most volume we ever had to that point, 366 million.
现在，你会看到在 1980 年——在 1986 年——我们有一个令人难以置信的年份，当时我们的承保比率是 69.3，这意味着 30%的承保利润率。更好的是，我们在当时创下了最高的承保量，达到 3.66 亿。
So we coined money when we wrote huge amounts of business, and we made a little money when we wrote small amounts of business.
所以，当我们做大量业务时，我们赚了很多钱，而当我们做少量业务时，我们赚了一点钱。
So it’s absolutely imperative in our view, and I think we’re almost the only insurance company like this — certainly public — in the world that sends the absolutely unequivocal message to the people that are associated with us, that they will never be laid off because of lack of volume, and therefore, we don’t want them to write one bit of bad business.
因此，在我们看来，这绝对是至关重要的，我认为我们几乎是世界上唯一这样做的保险公司——当然是上市公司——向与我们相关的人传达绝对明确的信息，即他们永远不会因为业务量不足而被解雇，因此，我们不希望他们做任何不良业务。
And we’ll make mistakes, and we’ll have a high expense ratio when business is slow, but we’ll win the game. And that’s what National Indemnity has done over a period of time.
我们会犯错误，当业务缓慢时，我们的费用比率会很高，但我们会赢得比赛。这就是国家赔偿公司在一段时间内所做的。
National Indemnity was a no-name company 30 years ago operating through a general agency system which everybody said was obsolete.
30 年前，国家赔偿公司还是一家无名公司，通过一个被大家认为过时的普通代理系统运营。
It had no patents, no real estate, no copyrights, no nothing, that distinguished it, essentially, from other insurance — dozens of other insurance companies could do the same thing. But they have a record almost like no one else’s because they had discipline. You know, they really knew what they were about.
它没有专利，没有房地产，没有版权，没有任何东西能使它本质上区别于其他保险公司——几十家其他保险公司都可以做同样的事情。但他们有几乎无人能及的记录，因为他们有纪律。你知道，他们真的知道自己在做什么。
And they’ve stayed with that. In fact they’ve intensified it over time. And their record has left, you know, other people in the dust.
他们一直坚持这一点。事实上，随着时间的推移，他们更加强化了这一点。他们的成绩让其他人望尘莫及。
It wouldn’t be a record you would point to Wall Street, you know, if you went to Wall Street with that record alone in 1990 or 1995, they’d say, “What’s wrong with you?”
如果你在 1990 年或 1995 年仅凭那份记录去华尔街，你知道，那不会是一个你会向华尔街展示的记录，他们会说：“你怎么了？”
But the answer’s nothing’s wrong with it. And you put your finger on having the incentives in place to write the right kind of business for the shareholders at Berkshire. And we try to think those things through.
但答案是没有问题。你指出了为伯克希尔的股东制定正确的业务激励措施的重要性。我们努力仔细考虑这些事情。
I mean, you can’t run a — you can’t run an auto company without having layoffs. You know, you can’t run a steel company that’s this way. But this is the right way to run an insurance company.
我的意思是，你不能在没有裁员的情况下经营一家汽车公司。你知道，你不能这样经营一家钢铁公司。但这是经营保险公司的正确方式。
And that’s why these cookie-cutter approaches to employment practices, or bonuses, and all that are nonsense. You have to think through the situation that faces you in a given industry with its given competitive conditions, and its own economic characteristics.
这就是为什么这些千篇一律的就业做法或奖金等等都是无稽之谈。你必须考虑在特定行业中面临的情况，以及其特定的竞争条件和自身的经济特征。
Charlie, you want to comment on that?
查理，你想对此发表评论吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the main thing is that practically nobody else does it. And yet to me it’s obvious it’s the way to go.
查理·芒格：嗯，主要是几乎没有其他人这样做。然而对我来说，很明显这是正确的做法。
There’s a lot in Berkshire that is like that. It’s just a little different from the way other people do it, partly the luxury of having a controlling shareholder of strong opinions.
在伯克希尔有很多这样的情况。它只是与其他人做事的方式有些不同，部分原因是拥有一个有强烈意见的控股股东的奢侈。
That accounts for this. It would be hard for a committee, including a lot of employees, to come up with these decisions.
这就是这一切的原因。对于一个委员会，包括许多员工来说，很难做出这样的决定。
Appendix.5.《2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
29. “Lumpy” earnings as competitive advantage
“波动”收益作为竞争优势
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 12 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Ashish Texali (PH). I am from New Delhi, India.
观众成员：你好，我的名字是阿希什·特克萨利（PH）。我来自印度新德里。
First of all, I would like to thank Kelly Bruce (PH) and Carol from American Express to the help they’ve extended to make this event possible.
首先，我要感谢凯莉·布鲁斯（PH）和来自美国运通的卡罗尔，感谢他们提供的帮助，使这次活动成为可能。
The question regarding General Re and reinsurance business.
关于 General Re 和再保险业务的问题。
As the insurance business uses complex models, how is Berkshire more comfortable that insurance business models are not exposing you to significant risks like the models did for Wall Street?
由于保险业务使用复杂的模型，伯克希尔如何确保保险业务模型不会将您暴露于像华尔街那样的重大风险？
Also, if it is not confidential, is there concentration of risk? That is, what are those few events which can cause significant loss for insurance businesses?
另外，如果这不是机密信息，是否存在风险集中？也就是说，哪些少数事件可能会对保险业务造成重大损失？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I got all of that, but we run significant risks from earthquakes. We had, in the Chilean quake — I don’t know how much would have been in the first quarter. When you read our 10-Q there will be a number in there. But we insure 20 percent of Swiss Re. We will take 20 percent of their loss from that.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定我是否完全理解，但我们面临着来自地震的重大风险。在智利地震中——我不知道第一季度会有多少。当你阅读我们的 10-Q 时，里面会有一个数字。但我们为瑞士再保险公司承保 20%。我们将承担他们 20%的损失。
We have various other exposures in something like that. We included our best estimate in those figures I put up earlier.
我们在类似的事情中有各种其他的曝光。我们在我之前提到的数字中包含了我们最好的估计。
Our peak risks now, in terms of earthquakes or hurricanes — which are the two biggest natural catastrophes, in terms of frequency and severity — are probably down quite considerably from a few years ago, not because of any diminished appetite for risk. But we just haven’t felt that the rates were that attractive in those areas.
我们现在的高峰风险，在地震或飓风方面——这两者是频率和严重性上最大的自然灾害——可能比几年前大幅下降，并不是因为我们对风险的胃口减弱了。而是我们只是觉得这些领域的费率并不那么有吸引力。
But if we thought the rates were attractive, we’re perfectly willing to take on a group of risks where, if something very close to worst case happened, you know, we would lose $5 billion or something like that.
但如果我们认为这些费率具有吸引力，我们完全愿意承担一系列风险，如果发生非常接近最坏情况的事情，我们可能会损失 50 亿美元或类似的金额。
We lost 3 billion-plus in Katrina. We lost well over 2 billion, I think quite a bit more than that actually, on 9/11.
我们在卡特里娜飓风中损失了超过 30 亿。我认为在 911 事件中我们损失了超过 20 亿，实际上可能更多。
There will be things come along like that. Nothing that ever remotely comes close to making us uncomfortable, though, in terms of the level. I don’t know whether I got his full question there or not, Charlie, but you —
会有这样的事情发生。不过，在这个层面上，没有任何事情会让我们感到不适。我不知道我是否完全理解了他的提问，查理，但你——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, pretty close. I would say that the main difference between our practice and that of most other people is that we are deliberately seeking a method of operation which will give us occasional big losses in a single year, big overall losses.
查理·芒格：嗯，非常接近。我会说我们的方法与大多数其他人的主要区别在于，我们故意寻求一种操作方法，这种方法会让我们在某一年遭受偶尔的大损失，整体上也会有大的损失。
And everybody else is trying to avoid that. And we just want to be rich enough so a big loss in a single year is a blip.
而其他人则试图避免这种情况。我们只想确保自己足够富有，这样一年的大损失只会是一个小插曲。
And that’s a competitive advantage, that willingness to endure fluctuating annual results. Big advantage, wouldn’t you say?
这就是一种竞争优势，愿意承受波动的年度业绩。你不觉得这是一个很大的优势吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a huge advantage. It’s a huge advantage. And it’s one that no one else is going to pick up on. I mean, they know what we do, they just don’t want to do it, or they’re unable to do it, in terms of financial resources.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是一种巨大的优势。这是一种巨大的优势。而且这是其他人无法掌握的。我是说，他们知道我们在做什么，他们只是不想做，或者在财务资源方面无法做到。
So, I would say that comes very close to a permanent and substantial advantage at Berkshire.
所以，我会说这接近于在伯克希尔的一个永久性和实质性的优势。
I don’t — forget about — you shouldn’t forget about it, but forget about the human suffering and all that. Just the financial consequences of a Katrina, you know, when we lose 3 billion in that, I don’t feel any different the next day than I felt the day before, financially. I mean, it just doesn’t make any difference, because we are in that particular game.
我不——忘记——你不应该忘记，但忘记人类的痛苦和所有这些。仅仅是卡特里娜的财务后果，你知道，当我们在那方面损失 30 亿时，我第二天的感觉和前一天没有任何不同，财务上。我是说，这根本没有任何区别，因为我们正处于那个特定的游戏中。
And as long as we make the right decisions over time, in terms of the premiums we get, and as long as we never expose ourselves to a loss that would really shake up our capital structure or anything, you know, that is a game in which we have a huge competitive edge. And it gets wider every year.
只要我们在时间上做出正确的决策，获得合适的保费，并且永远不让自己面临会真正动摇我们资本结构的损失，你知道，这是一场我们拥有巨大竞争优势的游戏。而且这种优势每年都在扩大。
So, you know, risk — we are in the business — in insurance, we are in the business of taking the other guys’ desire to smooth their earnings, and, in exchange, get what we think are larger, lumpy earnings over time. We like the business.
所以，您知道，风险——我们在保险中，就是在于利用其他人希望平滑他们收益的愿望，换取我们认为在时间上能获得更大、不规则收益的机会。我们喜欢这个行业。
保险业务的本质，任何性质的平滑都是有成本的，比如，锁定外汇汇率。
Carol? Oh, go ahead, Charlie.
卡罗尔？哦，继续吧，查理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I was going to say Warren has a different position than a lot of other people in the insurance business. After a year in which Berkshire has a big loss, he can look into his shaving mirror and say, “Your shareholder still loves you.” (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我想说沃伦在保险行业中的立场与许多其他人不同。在伯克希尔经历了一年的重大亏损后，他可以照着剃须镜看自己，并说：“你的股东仍然爱你。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right.
沃伦·巴菲特：没错。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Other people are not in that position.
查理·芒格：其他人并不处于那种位置。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I knew a guy from Omaha who, 40 or 50 years ago, was one of the richest guys in the United States, named Howard Ahmanson. And Howard had a fetish about owning 100 percent of everything that he came in contact with.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我认识一个来自奥马哈的人，40 或 50 年前，他是美国最富有的人之一，名叫霍华德·阿赫曼森。霍华德对拥有他接触到的所有事物的 100%拥有权有一种执念。
And so he said, when asked why, he said, “I like to look in the mirror and say, ‘All my shareholders love me.’” (Laughter)
于是他回答，当被问及原因时，他说：“我喜欢照镜子并说，‘我所有的股东都爱我。’”（笑声）
And I’m not quite that extreme, but I like to look in the mirror and say, “Enough of my shareholders love me.” (Laughter)
我并没有那么极端，但我喜欢照镜子对自己说：“我的股东们足够爱我。”（笑声）
Appendix.6.《2016-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
The big thing, the goal, what Charlie and I think about, we want to add, every year, something to the normalized — you know, the normalized earning power per share of the company.
大事，目标，查理和我所考虑的，我们希望每年为公司的每股正常化收益能力增加一些东西。
And we think we can do it because we should be able to do it. We have retained earnings to work with every year to get that job done.
我们认为我们可以做到，因为我们应该能够做到。我们每年都有留存收益可以用来完成这项工作。
自我更新。
Sometimes it doesn’t look like we’ve accomplished much, and we haven’t accomplished much.
有时候看起来我们并没有取得太多成就，实际上我们也没有取得太多成就。
And other years, we — something big happens, and we don’t know ahead of time which year is going to be which. Charlie?
还有其他年份，我们——发生了一些大事，而我们事先不知道哪一年会是哪个。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are very few companies that have ever been similarly advantaged.
查理·芒格：嗯，很少有公司曾经拥有过类似的优势。
In the whole history of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve lived in a torrent of money, and we were constantly deploying it, and disbursed assets, and we were wising up as we went along. That’s a pretty good system.
在伯克希尔哈撒韦的整个历史中，我们生活在一股资金的洪流中，我们不断地投入资金和分配资产，同时我们也在不断地变得聪明。这是一个相当不错的系统。
Appendix.7.《2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
30. “We do expect that normalized earning power to increase over time”
“我们确实预计正常化的盈利能力会随着时间的推移而增加。”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，9 号站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Richard Sercer (PH) from Tucson, Arizona.
观众成员：我来自亚利桑那州图森的理查德·塞尔瑟（PH）。
“At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power.” That was in your last letter. What is our normalized per-share earning power, as you estimate it?
“在伯克希尔，最重要的是我们每股正常盈利能力的增长。”这是你在上封信中提到的。你估计我们的每股正常盈利能力是多少？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that what you saw in the first quarter, under these tax rates, would probably be a reasonable guess. You know, obviously, it depends on the economy in any given year. I would say that would — is a reasonable estimate.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，在这些税率下，你在第一季度看到的情况可能是一个合理的猜测。显然，这取决于任何给定年份的经济状况。我会说这是一个合理的估计。
But we have firepower we haven’t used. And we’ll have more firepower as we go along. So we do expect that normalized earning power to increase over time. And if it doesn’t, you know, one way or another, we’re failing you because we’re retaining those earnings.
但我们还有未使用的火力。随着时间的推移，我们将拥有更多的火力。因此，我们确实预计正常的盈利能力会随着时间的推移而增加。如果没有，你知道，无论如何，我们都在辜负你，因为我们在保留这些收益。
So — I don’t see anything abnormal in our earnings, figured now at a 21 percent federal rate. But as I look at the 5 1/4 billion in the first quarter — seasonally, insurance is better in the first quarter — but seasonally, most of our businesses, the first quarter is not the strongest quarter for us. I don’t see anything abnormal with it.
所以——我在我们的收益中没有看到任何异常，目前的联邦税率为 21%。但是当我看到第一季度的 52.5 亿美元时——季节性地，第一季度的保险表现更好——但从季节性来看，我们大多数业务的第一季度并不是最强的季度。我没有看到任何异常。
And then I think you can expect, you should expect, we expect, substantial capital gains over time in addition to what comes from the operating businesses.
然后我认为你可以期待，你应该期待，我们期待，随着时间的推移，除了来自运营业务的收益外，还会有可观的资本收益。
So how much you figure in for that — I would say that the retained earnings beyond dividends of our 770 billion of equities — in other words, how much they’re keeping from us, but that our share of the earnings, which can be used by them, whether it’s Apple or American Express or Coca-Cola or Wells Fargo or whatever, our share, you know, is in many billions of dollars annually. And one way or another, we think that those dollars will benefit us as much as if they had been paid out.
那么你考虑到的金额是多少——我会说，我们7700亿美元的股票的保留收益——换句话说，他们从我们这里保留的金额，但我们的份额，诸如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐或富国银行等，我们的份额，每年都在数十亿美元。无论如何，我们认为这些美元将使我们受益，就像它们被支付出来一样。
Now, in certain cases, they won’t. But in certain cases, they’ll excel the amount, in terms of market value created.
现在，在某些情况下，它们不会。但在某些情况下，它们在创造的市场价值方面会超出这个金额。
So there’s many billions of dollars we are not showing in our earnings that is being retained by our investees. And one way or another, I think we’ll get value received out of those.
因此，有许多数十亿美元我们没有在我们的收益中反映出来，而这些是我们的投资公司保留的。无论如何，我认为我们会从中获得价值。
So you can take 20 or 21 billion under present tax rates, present economic conditions, and then we should get something from that and we should get more when we get 100 billion of cash invested. And we should get more as we retain the earnings. So we hope it adds up to a bigger number as we go along.
所以在目前的税率和经济条件下，你可以获得 200 亿或 210 亿美元，然后我们应该从中获得一些收益，当我们投资 1000 亿美元现金时，我们应该获得更多。随着我们保留收益，我们应该获得更多。因此，我们希望随着时间的推移，这些数字能够累加成一个更大的数字。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think our shareholders are going to see another increase in net worth of $65 billion in a single year. They may have to wait a while for another. But I don’t think that — I think eventually there — another will come, and then another. Just be patient. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们的股东在一年内不会再看到 650 亿美元的净资产增长。他们可能需要等一段时间才能再看到一次。但我认为——我认为最终会有另一次增长，然后再来一次。耐心点。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t regard the present situation as, you know, as disadvantageous, except we’d like to get more money out. But we like the businesses we have. We like the businesses that we own part of. We are not reflecting — in the way we look at earnings — the dividends we get from those partially-owned companies falls far short of what they’re going to contribute, in our view, to Berkshire’s overall earnings over time. We wouldn’t own those stocks otherwise. So —
沃伦·巴菲特：我们并不认为目前的情况是，不利的，除了我们希望能提取更多资金。但我们喜欢我们拥有的企业。我们喜欢我们拥有部分股份的企业。我们并没有反映--在我们看待收益的方式上--我们从这些部分持有的公司获得的股息远远低于它们对伯克希尔整体收益的贡献，在我们看来，随着时间的推移。否则，我们不会持有这些股票。所以
CHARLIE MUNGER: And you also like the Apple and airline stocks you’ve recently purchased better than the cash you parted with.
查理·芒格：你最近购买的苹果和航空公司股票比你放弃的现金更让你喜欢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：当然。是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And that’s quite a lot.
查理·芒格：这可真不少。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah, yeah. OK. We won’t pursue that further. Carol? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的，是的。好的。我们不再追究这个了。卡罗尔？（笑声）
Looking ahead, Powell said the Fed could keep rates on hold for much longer if inflation doesn’t continue to move down to its target and the economy remains solid. He said the Fed could cut rates if the labor market weakened unexpectedly or inflation made faster-than-expected progress declining to its 2% goal.
展望未来，鲍威尔表示，如果通胀未能继续向目标下降且经济保持稳健，美联储可能会更长时间维持利率不变。他表示，如果劳动力市场意外走弱或通胀下降至 2%目标的速度快于预期，美联储可能会降息。
Powell repeated his view that the neutral interest rate had moved up meaningfully from very low levels before the pandemic. (The neutral rate is the rate that keeps the economy at full employment with stable inflation, but it can’t be directly observed.) Those hazy estimates of a higher neutral rate could also explain why policymakers have taken a more relaxed approach to further rate cuts.
鲍威尔重申了他的观点，即中性利率已从疫情前的极低水平显著上升。（中性利率是使经济保持充分就业且通胀稳定的利率，但无法直接观察到。）对较高中性利率的模糊估计也可能解释了为何政策制定者对进一步降息采取了更为宽松的态度。
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