财务上最大的风险是负债，除非等同于股本金，但如果把借来的钱等同于自己的钱又会衍生更大的问题。
Financing
融资
Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.
年末不久，Berkshire 发行了两期债券（debentures），合计2.5亿美元。两期债券都在2018年到期，并将从1999年开始通过偿债基金（sinking fund）以均匀节奏逐步赎回。我们整体的利息成本（计入发行费用后）略高于10%。Salomon 担任我们的投资银行，他们的服务非常出色。
Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher, though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It’s even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s.
尽管我们对通胀持悲观看法，我们对负债的“胃口”仍然相当有限。可以肯定的是：如果把债务/企业价值（debt-to-business-value）的比率提高到更高、但仍属常规的水平，Berkshire 很可能会提升股东权益回报率（ROE）。更可能的是：即便在比1930年代初以来任何时期都更糟糕的经济环境下，我们也大概率能在不出问题的情况下承受那样的杠杆水平。
But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to policies—both in regard to debt and all other matters—that will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions.
但我们不希望“很可能”能履约；我们希望那是“确定无疑”。因此，我们在债务以及所有其他事项上都坚持一种政策：宁可在正常条件下放弃一些“最优结果”，也要确保在极端不利条件下仍能取得可接受的长期结果。
Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees) for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant. This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have remained constant.
好的经营或投资决策，最终会带来相当令人满意的经济结果，而不需要杠杆助力。因此，在我们看来，为了那些相对不重要的额外回报，而去冒险危及真正重要的东西（其中必然包括无辜旁观者——如保单持有人与员工——的福祉），既愚蠢也不正当。这个观点并非源自我们年纪渐长或更加富有：我们对债务的看法始终如一。
However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We’re far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe—on a worst-case basis—will pose no threat to Berkshire’s well-being. Analyzing what that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy: Berkshire’s earnings come from many diverse and well-entrenched businesses; these businesses seldom require much capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we now have.
不过，我们并不“恐惧借债”。（我们远未到那种认为“世上没有比负债更糟的命运”的地步。）我们愿意借入一个金额——按最坏情形评估——也不会对 Berkshire 的安危构成威胁。分析这个安全额度时，我们可以依靠一些关键优势：Berkshire 的盈利来自许多多元且根基深厚的业务；这些业务很少需要大量资本开支；我们现有债务的结构安排得很好；并且我们持有大量流动性资产。显然，我们完全可以承受一个比当前更高的“债务/企业价值”比率，同时仍然感到踏实。
One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment: Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.
我们债务政策还有一个方面值得补充：与商界许多人不同，我们更愿意“提前融资以备不时之需”，而不是“等需要来了再被动融资”。一家企业要取得尽可能好的财务结果，必须把资产负债表的两端都管理好：资产端要拿到尽可能高的回报，负债端要拿到尽可能低的资金成本。若能在两端都出现聪明行动机会时刚好重合，那当然很方便。但理性告诉我们，更可能发生的恰恰相反：紧缩的资金环境（意味着负债端成本高）往往会创造最好的收购机会；而宽松的资金（便宜钱）则会把资产价格推到天上。因此我们的结论是：负债端的行动，有时应当独立于资产端的行动而进行。
Alas, what is “tight” and “cheap” money is far from clear at any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest rates and—maintaining our usual open-minded spirit—believe that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which—as we have said—are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.
可惜，“紧钱”与“便宜钱”在任何特定时点都很难界定。我们没有能力预测利率——并且本着一贯的开放心态，我们也相信别人同样做不到。因此，我们只是在条件看起来“不压迫”时借钱，然后希望之后能找到明智的扩张或收购机会；而正如我们所说，这类机会最可能出现在债务市场条件明显“压迫”的时候。我们的基本原则是：如果你想射中那些稀有、快速移动的大象，你就应该始终带着一把上膛的枪。
Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning about 6½% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week. This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.
这种“先筹资、后收购/扩张”的政策，几乎总会惩罚短期盈利。比如，我们最近以10%的成本融资了2.5亿美元，而现在这笔资金大约只能赚到6.5%的收益；这种利差目前每周大约让我们付出16万美元的代价。我们并不在乎这种负利差，也不会因此去勉强追逐收购，或去追求更高收益的短期工具。如果在未来五年左右我们找到合适的“商业大象”，那么这段等待就会是值得的。
We wouldn’t have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.
我们不喜欢99:1这样的赔率——将来也不会。我们认为，小概率的困境或羞辱，不能被高概率的额外回报所抵消。只要你的行动是理性的，结果自然会不错；在大多数这种情形中，杠杆只是加速器。Charlie 和我从不着急：我们更享受过程，胜过收益——尽管我们也学会了与后者愉快相处。
WARREN BUFFETT:
I think it’s very tough to do and I will tell you that whenever I hear the terms modernization or innovation in financial markets, I reach for my wallet (laughs). It’s, usually what they mean is revenue producing and I think it’s very tough. I mean that’s what I got into in my letter of 1982, I mean, you are opening Pandora’s box when you give people the right to either invest, speculate or gamble on very long term contracts, you know, with minimal margin requirements and all. I mean, it can pose dangers to the system but it gets down to leverage overall. I mean, if you don’t have leverage, you don’t get into trouble. That’s the only way a smart person can go broke (laughs). And I’ve always said if you’re smart
you don’t need it and if you’re dumb you shouldn’t be using it. So I’m not a big fan of leverage. But leverage and incentives are in my view things that, try to focus on. And recognizing that there’s a lot of limitations on what you can do. But if, I mean, we’ve always felt that way with banks. The bank has the right to use government guaranteed money in effect. You’ve got to have some limitations on leverage so then they come up with SIVs and derivatives and all kinds of ways to increase leverage without breaking the rules. And then, it’s a tough question but I would be fairly tough about how I would go at that. And I don’t like to keep going back to it but I, it doesn’t seem to be anything talked about much, but the CEO is the guy making the decisions, I’m making the decisions at Berkshire. When I make the decisions at Berkshire, I’m thinking about the fact that a) I’ve got 99% of my net worth in it and it’s all going to charities so I mean, if I cause this place to go broke, there’s a lot of downside to me. And there’s a lot of downside to the Keywood Company if they do silly things in their construction business. And I think that downside has an effect on people.
Warren Buffett：
我认为这非常难做。我跟你说，只要我听到金融市场里的 “modernization（现代化）” 或 “innovation（创新）” 这些词，我就会去摸我的钱包（笑）。通常它们真正想表达的意思是“能产生收入的东西”，而这类东西往往很棘手。我在 1982 年那封信里就谈过：当你允许人们在期限非常长的合约上——而且保证金要求极低——去投资、投机或赌博时，你就是在打开潘多拉魔盒。这当然可能对系统构成危险，但归根结底还是“总体杠杆”的问题。如果你没有杠杆，你就不会陷入麻烦。一个聪明人会破产，唯一的方式就是用了杠杆（笑）。我一直都说：你要是聪明，你不需要杠杆；你要是不聪明，你更不该用杠杆。所以我不是杠杆的拥趸。但在我看来，杠杆与激励机制是你应该努力盯住的重点——同时也要承认，你能做的事情有很多限制。我们对银行一直就是这种看法：银行本质上有权使用“带政府担保的钱”。因此你必须对杠杆设一些限制。于是他们就会发明 SIVs、衍生品以及各种办法，在不“触犯规则表面文字”的前提下提高杠杆。这是个很难的问题，但如果让我来做，我会采取相当强硬的方式。我不太想老是回到这个点上，但似乎也没人怎么谈：做决策的人是 CEO——在 Berkshire 做决策的人是我。当我在 Berkshire 做决策时，我会想到：a）我把自己 99% 的净资产都放在这里，而且这些钱最终都会捐给慈善机构——也就是说，如果我把这里搞破产了，我自己承担的下行后果很大。Keywood Company 在建筑业务上如果做蠢事，也会承担很大的下行后果。我认为这种“下行”会真实地影响人的行为。
Life and Debt
人生和负债
The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.
赛车比赛的基本原则是：想要第一个冲线，你必须先保证自己能完赛。这条原则同样适用于商业，也始终指导着我们在 Berkshire 的一切行动。
Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade – and some relearned in 2008 – any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.
毫无疑问，有些人确实通过举债变得非常富有。但同样明显的是，用借来的钱也可以把人变得一无所有。当杠杆顺风时，它会放大你的收益，你的配偶会觉得你很聪明，你的邻居会开始羡慕你。但杠杆具有成瘾性，一旦尝到它的“甜头”，很少有人愿意退回到更保守的做法。而且，正如我们在三年级算术课上学到的——也是在 2008 年重新补上的一课——任何一串再漂亮的正数，只要乘上一个零，就会化为乌有。历史告诉我们，杠杆“制造零”的频率实在太高，即便操盘的人是非常聪明的人也不例外。
Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.
当然，杠杆对企业同样可能是致命的。负债沉重的公司，往往习惯性地假设：等债务到期时，总能顺利再融资。这个假设在大多数时候是成立的。但偶尔会有例外：要么因为公司自身出了问题，要么因为全球性信用紧缩，结果就是债务到期时真的需要“掏现金”还本付息，而那一刻，只有真金白银才能解决问题。
Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.
到那时，借款人就会明白：信用就像氧气。只要两者供给充足，人们甚至察觉不到它们的存在；一旦任何一项缺失，所有人的注意力就只剩下这一件事。即便只是短暂的信用中断，也足以让一家公司立刻跪下。事实上，在 2008 年 9 月，信贷几乎一夜之间在许多经济领域消失，这种局面已经非常接近于让整个美国经济跪倒在地。
Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s wellbeing. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.
Charlie 和我对任何哪怕可能给 Berkshire 的长期健康带来一点点威胁的行为都毫无兴趣。（以我们加起来 167 岁的年纪来说，“从头再来”显然不在我们的心愿清单上。）我们始终清楚：你们这些合伙人，在很多情况下把自己相当大一部分积蓄托付给了我们；同时，还有重要的慈善承诺依赖于我们的稳健行事；最后，许多因我们承保客户而蒙受事故、致残的受害者，也指望我们在未来几十年按时支付赔款。如果为了多赚几个百分点的回报而拿这些群体的利益冒险，那对我们来说就是极其不负责任的行为。
A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.
一点个人历史，或许可以部分解释我们为什么对金融上的“冒险主义”有如此强烈的厌恶。我直到 Charlie 35 岁才第一次见到他，尽管他从小在离我现在住了 52 年的地方不到 100 码的地方长大，而且也就读于 Omaha 市中心那所公立中学——我的父亲、妻子、孩子和两个孙辈都从那里毕业。不过，小时候我们都曾在我外祖父的杂货店打过工，只是两人的打工时间相隔大约五年。我的外祖父叫 Ernest，可以说“earnest”（认真、诚挚）这个名字配得上他本人。没有人能在他店里干活——哪怕只是当个理货小工——而不被那段经历深刻地塑造性格。
On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found – along with $1,000 of cash – when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.
在本页对面，你可以看到一封 1939 年 Ernest 写给他小儿子（也就是我舅舅 Fred）的信。类似的信，他也分别写给了另外四个孩子。我至今仍保存着寄给我姑妈 Alice 的那一封——1970 年，我以遗产执行人身份打开她的保险箱时，在里面同时发现了那封信和 1,000 美元现金。
Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.
Ernest 从没上过商学院——事实上，他连高中都没念完——但他非常明白一件事：充足的流动性，是企业能否活下来的基本前提。在 Berkshire，我们把他那“1,000 美元方案”又向前推进了一大步，并郑重承诺：在不计入受监管的公用事业和铁路业务持有现金的前提下，我们自己始终至少持有 100 亿美元的现金。正因为有这一承诺，我们在实际操作中通常会将手头现金维持在至少 200 亿美元的水平，这样我们既能扛住史无前例的巨额保险赔付（迄今为止最大的一次是来自 Katrina 的约 30 亿美元——那也是整个保险业史上代价最高的一场灾难），又能在金融动荡时期迅速抓住合适的收购或投资机会。
We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.
我们主要把现金放在美国国债（U.S. Treasury bills）上，而避免去买那些虽然多给几个基点收益、但本质上是短期信用工具的其他证券。早在 2008 年 9 月商业票据和货币市场基金的脆弱性暴露之前很久，我们就一直坚持这一政策。我们认同投资作家 Ray DeVoe 的那句名言：“因为追逐收益而亏掉的钱，比在枪口下亏掉的还多。”在 Berkshire，我们不依赖银行授信，也不会签订那种需要我们不断追加抵押品的合约，除非所需抵押金额与我们的流动资产相比微不足道。
Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.
另外，在过去 40 年里，Berkshire 一分钱现金都没有因为派发股息或回购股票而流出公司。相反，我们把全部盈利都留存在公司，用来加强业务实力，而这一“强化过程”现在大约以每月 10 亿美元的速度在进行。正因为这样，在过去这四十年中，我们的账面净资产从 4,800 万美元增长到了 1,570 亿美元，而内在价值的增幅远远超过这个数字。没有任何一家美国公司，能以这样“从不松懈”的方式，把自己的财务实力堆积到类似的高度。
By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.
在杠杆问题上保持如此谨慎，确实在一定程度上让我们的投资回报少了那么一小块“上浮空间”。但换来的，是我们拥有一大堆流动性，可以安稳睡觉。更重要的是，当经济中不时爆发金融动荡时，我们在财务上和心理上都能保持“进攻姿态”，而不是像别人那样忙于“保命逃生”。正是这种状态，让我们在 2008 年 Lehman 破产后的 25 天恐慌期里，能够投入 156 亿美元大举买入。
55. No magic formula for calculating risk
计算风险没有魔法公式
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Scott Bondurant who is from Chicago, Illinois, and he’s a shareholder.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自于来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的斯科特·邦杜兰特，他是一名股东。
And he asks, “Can you please elaborate your views on risk? You clearly aren’t a fan of relying on statistical probabilities, and you highlight the need for $20 billion in cash to feel comfortable. Why is that the magic number, and has it changed over time?”
他问：“你能详细阐述一下你对风险的看法吗？显然你不喜欢依赖统计概率，并且你强调需要 200 亿美元的现金才能感到安心。为什么这个数字是魔法数字，它是否随着时间而变化？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it isn’t the magic number, and there is no magic number.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。其实这不是一个魔法数字，也没有魔法数字。
I would get very worried about somebody that walked in every morning and told us precisely how many dollars of cash we needed to be, you know, secured at three sigma or something like that.
我会非常担心那些每天早上进来告诉我们需要多少现金才能在三倍标准差的情况下保持安全的人。
Charlie and I have had a lot of — we saw a lot of problems develop in an organization that expressed their risks in sigma, and we even argued sometimes with the appropriateness of how they calculated their risk.
查理和我经历了很多——我们看到一个组织在以西格玛表达他们的风险时出现了很多问题，有时我们甚至争论过他们计算风险的合理性。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It was truly horrible.
查理·芒格：这真是太可怕了。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they were a lot smarter than we were. (Laughs) That’s what’s depressing.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们比我们聪明得多。（笑）这让人感到沮丧。
But we both have the same bend of mind whereby we think about worst cases all the time, and then we add on a big margin of safety, and we don’t want to go back to go.
但我们俩都有相同的思维方式，总是考虑最坏的情况，然后再加上一个很大的安全边际，我们不想回到起点。
I mean, I enjoy tossing those papers in the other room, but I don’t want to do it for a living again.
我是说，我喜欢把那些纸扔到另一个房间，但我不想再以此为生。
So we undoubtedly build in layers of safety that others might regard as foolish, but we’ve got 600,000 shareholders and we’ve got members of my family that have 80 or 90 percent of their net worth in the company.
所以我们无疑建立了其他人可能认为愚蠢的安全层，但我们有 60 万股东，还有我的家族成员将 80%或 90%的净资产投入到公司中。
And I’m just not interested in explaining to them that we went broke because there was a one-hundredth of 1 percent chance that we would go broke and there was a — the remaining probability was filled by the chance of doubling our money, and I decided that that was just a good gamble to take.
我对此没有兴趣向他们解释，我们破产是因为有0.01%的机会破产，而剩余的概率是我们翻倍的机会，我决定这是一个值得冒的好险。
We’re not going to do that. It doesn’t mean that much. We are never going to risk what we have and need for what we don’t have and don’t need. We’ll still find things to do where we can make money, but we don’t have to stretch to do it.
我们不会那样做。这并没有那么重要。我们永远不会冒险去牺牲我们拥有和需要的东西，去追求我们没有和不需要的东西。我们仍然会找到可以赚钱的事情，但我们不必勉强去做。
And it’s my job — and Charlie thinks the same way. We don’t have to talk about it much.
这就是我的工作——查理也是这么认为的。我们不需要多谈这个。
But it’s our job to figure out what can really go wrong with this place and, you know, we’ve seen September 11th, and we’ve seen September of 2008, and we’ll see other things of a different nature but similar impact in the future.
但我们的工作是弄清楚这个地方可能出现的真正问题。你知道，我们见过 911 事件，也见过 2008 年 9 月的情况，未来我们还会看到其他性质不同但影响相似的事件。
And we not only want to sleep well all those nights, we want to be thinking about things to do with some excess money we might have around.
我们不仅希望在那些夜晚睡得很好，还希望考虑如何利用我们可能有的多余资金。
So it is — if you’re calibrating it in some mathematical way, I would say it’s really dangerous. I could give you a couple examples on that, but unfortunately I’ve learned about them on a confidential basis.
所以，如果你以某种数学方式进行校准，我会说这真的很危险。我可以给你几个例子，但不幸的是，我是以保密的方式了解到这些的。
But some really great organizations have had dozens of people with advanced mathematical training and make — and thinking about it daily, making computations, and they don’t really — they don’t really get at the problem.
但一些非常优秀的组织拥有数十名受过高级数学训练的人，他们每天都在思考这个问题，进行计算，但他们实际上并没有真正解决这个问题。
So it’s at the top of the mind, always, around Berkshire, and your returns in 99 years out of 100 will probably be penalized by us being excessively conservative, and one year out of a hundred, we’ll survive when some other people won’t.
所以这始终是伯克希尔最重要的事情，99%的年份里，你的回报可能会因为我们过于保守而受到惩罚，而在 100 年中，有一年我们会生存下来，而其他一些人则不会。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, how do these super-smart people with all these degrees in higher mathematics end up doing these dumb things?
查理·芒格：是啊，这些拥有高等数学学位的超级聪明的人怎么会做出这些愚蠢的事情呢？
I think it’s explainable by the old proverb that, “To a man with a hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail.” They’ve learned these techniques and they just twist the problem so they fit the solution, which is not the way to do it.
我认为这可以用一句古老的谚语来解释：“对一个手握锤子的人来说，所有问题看起来都像钉子。”他们学会了这些技巧，只是把问题扭曲成适合解决方案的样子，这并不是正确的方法。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they have a lack of understanding of history, I would say.
沃伦·巴菲特：我会说他们对历史缺乏理解。
One of the things — in 1962, when I set up our office in Kiewit Plaza, where we still are, it’s a different floor, I put seven items on the wall. Our art budget was $7, and I went down to the library, and for a dollar each I made photo copies of the pages from financial history.
1962年，我在我们仍然在的基维特广场设立了办公室，虽然在不同的楼层，我把七项内容贴在墙上。我们的艺术预算是7美元，我去图书馆，每页花一美元复印了金融历史的页面。
And one of those cases, for example, was in May of 1901 when the Northern Pacific Corner occurred, and it’s kind of interesting in terms of being in Omaha because Harriman was trying to get control of the Northern Pacific, and James J. Hill was trying to control the Northern Pacific.
其中一个例子是1901年5月北太平洋铁路角事件，这在奥马哈特别有趣，因为哈里曼试图控制北太平洋铁路，詹姆斯·J·希尔也在试图控制北太平洋铁路。
And unbeknownst to each other, they both bought more than 50 percent of the stock. Now, when two people buy more than 50 percent of the stock each, and they both really want it, they’re not just going to resell it. You know, interesting things happen.
而他们互不知情地都买了超过50%的股票。当两个人都购买超过50%的股票，并且他们都非常想要时，他们不会简单地转售。你知道，会发生有趣的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: To the shorts.
查理·芒格：这对空头来说。
WARREN BUFFETT: And in that paper of May 1901, the whole rest of the market was totally collapsing because Northern Pacific went from $170 a share to $1000 a share in one day, trading for cash, because the shorts needed it.
沃伦·巴菲特：在1901年5月的那篇报道中，整个市场完全崩溃，因为北太平洋的股价在一天内从170美元飙升至1000美元，现金交易，因为空头需要它。
And there was a little item at the top of that paper, which we still have at the office, where a brewer in Troy, New York, committed suicide by diving into a vat of hot beer because he’d gotten a margin call.
而在那篇报道的顶部有一个小消息，我们现在仍然在办公室里有记载，纽约特洛伊的一位酿酒师因收到保证金催缴通知而跳入热啤酒桶自杀。
And to me, the lesson — that fellow probably understood sigmas and everything and knew how impossible it was that in one day a stock could go from 170 to 1,000 to cause margin calls on everything else.
对我来说，这个教训——那家伙可能理解了西格玛和一切，并知道在一天之内，一只股票从 170 涨到 1,000 是不可能的，这会导致其他所有股票的保证金追缴。
And he ended up in a vat of hot beer, and I’ve never wanted to end up in a vat of hot beer. (Laughter)
他最后掉进了一个热啤酒的桶里，我从来不想掉进热啤酒的桶里。（笑声）
So those seven days that I put up on the wall — life in financial markets has got no relation to sigmas.
所以我在墙上贴的那七个例子——金融市场的生活与西格玛没有任何关系。
I mean, if everybody that operated in financial markets had never had any concept of standard errors and so on, they would be a lot better off.
我的意思是，如果所有在金融市场运作的人都没有任何标准误差等概念，他们会过得好得多。
Don’t you think so, Charlie?
你不这么认为吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sure. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当然可以。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Here, have some fudge. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：来，吃点软糖。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s created a lot of false confidence and — now, it has gone away.
查理·芒格：这造成了很多虚假的信心——现在，这一切都消失了。
Again, as I said earlier, the business schools have improved. So has risk control on Wall Street. They now have taken the Gaussian curve and they’ve just changed its shape.
再说一次，正如我之前所说，商学院已经有所改善。华尔街的风险控制也是如此。他们现在已经采用了高斯曲线，并且只是改变了它的形状。
WARREN BUFFETT: Threw it away.
沃伦·巴菲特：把它扔掉了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: They threw it away. Well, they just made a different shape than Gauss did, and it’s a better curve now, even though it’s less precise.
查理·芒格：他们把它扔掉了。好吧，他们只是做了一个与高斯不同的形状，现在它是一个更好的曲线，尽管它的精确度较低。
WARREN BUFFETT: They talk about fat tails, but they still don’t know how fat to make them. They have no idea.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们谈论肥尾，但他们仍然不知道该多肥。他们没有头绪。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but they knew — they’ve learned through painful experience they weren’t fat enough.
查理·芒格：嗯，但他们知道——通过痛苦的经验，他们意识到之前的设计不够“肥”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They learned the other was wrong, but they don’t know what’s right.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们知道之前的方法是错的，但不知道什么才是正确的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We always knew there were fat tails. Warren and I, in the Salomon meetings, would look over at one another and roll our eyes when the risk control people were talking.
查理·芒格：我们一直知道存在肥尾现象。沃伦和我在所罗门会议上，会互相看一眼，翻个白眼，当风险控制人员在讲话时。
67. Learning from the follies of others
向他人的愚蠢行为学习
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Jeff Chen (PH). I’m from San Francisco. I’m 26, and I run a software start-up out there.
观众成员：嗨，我叫杰夫·陈（音）。我来自旧金山。我 26 岁，正在那里经营一家软件初创公司。
My question is about mistake minimization. I found that I’ve made a lot of mistakes in my business, looking back, and I want to know besides thinking harder and learning from your own mistakes, what are the most effective techniques you’ve used to minimize the mistakes?
我的问题是关于错误最小化的。我发现回顾过去，我在生意中犯了很多错误，我想知道除了更加努力思考和从自己的错误中学习之外，你使用过的最有效的技术是什么，以最小化错误？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I — we made mistakes; we’ll make more mistakes.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我——我们犯了错误；我们还会犯更多错误。
We do — we think not so much — we think in terms of not exposing ourselves to any mistakes that could really hurt our ability to play tomorrow.
我们考虑的不仅仅是思考错误，而是要避免让自己暴露于可能严重影响我们明天能力的错误中。
And so we are always thinking about, you know, worst-case situations and there are — on the other hand, we have a natural instinct to do things big, both of us.
因此，我们总是在考虑最坏的情况，另一方面，我们俩都有一种天然的倾向去做大事情。
So we have to think about whether we’re doing anything really big that could have really terrible consequences.
所以我们必须考虑我们是否在做一些可能会产生非常严重后果的重大事情。
And, I would say this, that A) I don’t worry much about mistakes, I mean, the idea of learning from mistakes. The next mistake is something different. So I do not sit around and think about my mistakes and things I’m going to do differently in the future or anything of the sort.
我想说的是，A) 我不太担心错误，我的意思是学习错误的想法。下一个错误是不同的事情。所以我不会坐在那里想我的错误和未来我将要做的不同的事情或类似的事。
I would say that the — you may get some advantage — I think I’ve learned something over the years. I haven’t learned more about a basic investment philosophy. I got that when I was 19 and I still —
我想说的是，您可能会获得一些优势——我认为多年来我学到了很多。我并没有在基本投资理念上学到更多。我19岁时就得到了这些，现在仍然是这样。
I think I’ve learned more about people over the years. And I’ll make mistakes with people. You know, that’s inevitable. But, I think I’ll make more good judgments about people. I’ll recognize the extraordinary ones better than I would have 40 or 50 years ago.
我觉得这些年来我对人们的了解更多了。我会在与人交往中犯错误。你知道，这是不可避免的。但是，我认为我会对人做出更好的判断。我会比 40 或 50 年前更好地识别出那些非凡的人。
So I think that improves, but I don’t think it improves by certainly any conscious sitting around and focusing on what mistake did I make with that person or this person. I just don’t operate that way.
所以我认为这方面是有所改善的，但我不认为这是通过坐下来专注于我在那个人或这个人身上犯了什么错误而改善的。我就是不以这种方式运作。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I would argue that what you’ve done, and what I’ve done to a lesser extent, is to learn a lot from other people’s mistakes. That is really a much more pleasant way to learn hard lessons. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：沃伦，我认为你所做的，以及我在较小程度上所做的，就是从其他人的错误中学到了很多。这确实是一种更愉快的学习艰难教训的方式。（笑声）
And we have really worked at that over the years, partly because we find it so interesting, the great variety of human mistakes and their causes. And I think this constant study of other people’s disasters and other people’s errors has helped us enormously, don’t you, Warren?
而且我们多年来一直在努力，部分原因是我们发现人类错误及其原因的多样性非常有趣。我认为这种对他人灾难和错误的持续研究对我们帮助巨大，你不觉得吗，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah, well that’s true. In terms of reading of financial history and all that sort of thing, I’ve always been absolutely absorbed with reading about disasters. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的，这是真的。在阅读金融历史和所有这些事情方面，我一直对阅读灾难充满了兴趣。（笑）
And there’s no question. I mean, when you look at the folly of humans — you know, I’ve focused on the folly in the financial area — there’s all kinds of folly elsewhere — but just the financial area will give you plenty of material if you like to be a follower of folly.
毫无疑问。我是说，当你看到人类的愚蠢时——你知道，我专注于金融领域的愚蠢——其他地方也有各种愚蠢——但仅仅金融领域就会给你提供大量的素材，如果你喜欢追随愚蠢的话。
And I do think that understanding — and that’s what gave us some advantage over these people that have IQs of 180, you know, and can do things with math that we couldn’t do.
我确实认为理解力——这就是我们相对于那些智商 180 的人所拥有的一些优势，他们能够做我们做不到的数学题。
They just — they really just didn’t have an understanding of how human beings behave and what happens. 2008 was a good example of that, too.
他们确实——他们根本没有理解人类的行为和发生的事情。2008年就是一个很好的例子。
So we’ve — we have been a student of other people’s folly, and its served us well.
所以我们一直在研究他人的愚蠢，这对我们很有帮助。