I.H.RB.07.Controlled Company

I.H.RB.07.Controlled Company

多元化的企业集团必须有收敛的方向,巴菲特的总结是为“每1美元的投入至少产生1美元的价值”提供最有效率的平台。
1、重新配置资本的效率;
2、税收的效率。

1、《1787-12-05 Federalist No. 17 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union》

To the People of the State of New York:

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.
这类不同于我在上一次论述中已提出并回答过的反对意见,人们或许也会针对对美国个体公民行使立法的原则提出异议。有人会说,这样做会使联邦政府过于强大,并使其能够吞并那些本应为地方目的而保留给各州的剩余权力。即便把合理之人所能要求的对权力之爱的最大限度都予以承认,我仍承认,我难以想见掌管国家政府的人会出于何种诱因而愿意剥夺各州此等性质的权力。仅仅是一州内部之治安与行政的规制,在我看来,对雄心并无多大诱惑。商业、财政、外交与战争,似乎囊括了所有能吸引受此激情支配之心灵的对象;而为达成这些对象所必需的一切权力,理当首先存放于国家层面的总汇之处。至于同一州公民之间的私法裁判、对农业以及性质相近的其他事务的监督——简言之,一切适宜由地方立法加以规定之事——绝不可能成为一般层级管辖所乐于承担的关切。因此,联邦当局间存在篡取与之相连之权力的倾向,实属不大可能;因为试图行使这些权力,将同样麻烦且徒劳无益;正因如此,占有这些权力也不会给国家政府的尊严、重要性或辉煌增添分毫。

But let it be admitted, for argument’s sake, that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
但且为论辩起见,纵使仅凭恣意与支配之欲就足以滋生那种倾向;仍可坦然断言,国家代表之选民团体——换言之,各州人民——的意志,会抑制如此过分的嗜好。州政府侵犯国家权力,永远要比国家政府侵犯州权来得容易得多。此命题之根据,在于:若州政府以正直与审慎治理其务,便通常会对人民拥有更大的影响力;而这一情形也同时教导我们:一切联邦宪制中,皆潜藏着一种与生俱来的内在弱点;因此在其组织设计上,必须不遗余力,使之具备与自由原则相容的最大力度。

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
各州政府在影响力上的优势,部分源于国家政府结构的分散与广布,更主要则源于州级行政所要关注之事物的性质。

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.
众所周知,人性之情感,往往随对象之距离或分散程度的增加而减弱。基于同一原理,一个人对家庭的依恋强于对邻里的依恋,对邻里的依恋又强于对整个共同体的依恋;因此,各州人民极易对其地方政府抱有较之对联邦政府更为强烈的偏向;除非联邦政府的施政远为优越,以至于抵消此一原理之作用。

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
人心这种强烈的倾向,在州政府所规制的诸多事务中,还会找到有力的助缘。

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.
种种更为细微的利益,必然落入地方行政的督察之下,并化作无数影响力的细流,流经社会的每一处;若要一一细述,势必陷入冗长而乏味的铺陈,所获教益不足以抵偿其枯燥。

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,–I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not un-frequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
州政府职权范围内,有一项卓绝的优势,足以单独将问题阐释得明白而令人满意——我指的是刑事与民事司法的日常实施。在所有来源之中,此事最为强大、最为普遍、亦最具吸引力,足以激发民众的服从与依附。它作为生命与财产的直接且可见的守护者,其利益与威惧不时显现于公众眼前,规制着一切与个人切身相关、与日常相熟之事;因而较诸任何其他因素,更能在人民心中烙下对政府的亲爱、敬重与崇敬。这个社会之大粘合剂,几乎将完全经由各州政府的渠道而弥散开来;即便撇开其他一切影响因素不论,也足以使各州政府对其各自公民拥有如此明确的支配力,以至于在任何时候都能构成对联邦权力的完全抗衡,并且不止一次地成为其危险的对手。

The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
反之,国家政府的运作较少直接处于广大公民的目光之下;由此获得的利益,多半只会为思辨之士所感知并加以留意。此类运作关涉较为宏泛的一般性利益,因此不太容易切近人们的情感;相应地,也就不大可能激发一种习惯性的义务感与一种积极的依附情绪。

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
关于此点的推理,凡我们所熟悉的一切联邦宪制,以及一切与其稍有类比之政体的经验,已提供了充分的例证。

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
虽则古代封建制度严格说来并非邦联,但它们带有此类联合的性质。全国之上有一共同之首,即酋长或君主,其权威扩及全境;其下有若干从属的封臣或采邑领主,他们分得广袤土地,并各自拥有众多更下级的封臣或扈从,这些人以向所依附者宣誓忠诚或服从为土地占有之条件,占据并耕种土地。每一位主要封臣在其特定领地之内,皆是一种意义上的君主。此等格局的后果,是不断与君主权威相对抗,以及大贵族或主要封建领主之间频繁的战争。国家元首的权力通常太弱,无足以维持公共安宁,亦不足以保护人民免受其直属领主的压迫。史家强调地将欧洲事务的这一时期称为封建无政府时代。
Idea
商业模式中有非常相似的地方。
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
当君主恰好具备勇悍好战之性情并兼有卓越才能时,他会获得一份个人分量与影响,暂时可起到较为正规权威的作用。但一般而言,伯爵等贵族之力常常胜过君主之力;在许多情形里,君主的统治被完全摆脱,广大封地被树立为独立的侯国或邦国。在那些君主最终战胜其封臣的案例中,其成功主要得益于封臣对其部属的暴虐。那些贵族既是君主之敌,又是平民之压迫者,因此同时为双方所畏惧并憎恶;终于,在共同危险与共同利益的驱使下,二者结成联盟,从而致使贵族权势覆亡。若贵族以仁恕与正义行事,得以维系其侍从与追随者的忠诚与奉献,则他们与君主之间的争斗几乎总会以贵族取胜而告终,并导致王权的缩减或颠覆。

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
此并非仅凭臆测或揣度而下的断言。诸多可资佐证的例子之中,苏格兰便提供了一个有力的样本。该王国早期引入的氏族精神,将贵族与其部属以近乎血亲的纽带联结起来,使得贵族阶层长期压倒君主之力;直至与英格兰的合并,方才制服其凶悍而难驯之气,并将之纳入后者王国先前所确立的更为理性且更具活力的市民政体之服从规则内。

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
邦联中的各个分立政府,颇可与封建采邑相类比;就其有利之处而言,基于前述缘由,它们通常能获得人民的信任与善意;凭借如此重要的支撑,它们足以有效抗拒国家政府的一切蚕食。若它们尚不足以抵消国家政府正当且必要的权威,那已属幸事。二者相似之处,在于彼此皆存在权力之争,以及把社会相当大一部分力量集中于特定“蓄积”之中——前者由个人所支配,后者则由政治团体所支配。

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
对历来伴随邦联政体而生的事件作一番简要回顾,将进一步阐明这一重要原理;忽视此点,正是我们政治错误的根源所在,并使我们的猜忌指向了错误的一边。此一回顾,将成为后续若干篇文章的主题。

PUBLIUS.
In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory: Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply couldn’t be in better hands.
无论是做控股收购还是买入股票,我们都力求不仅买好企业,还要买那些由高素质、有才华、而且可亲的管理者经营的企业。如果我们在“与谁结盟”这件事上看走了眼,控股公司有一个表面上的优势:我们有权力推动变革。但在实践中,这个优势多少有点“虚幻”:更换管理层就像更换婚姻一样——痛苦、耗时、而且充满不确定性。无论如何,在我们那三项“可交易但永久持有”的投资上,这一点根本不构成问题:Cap Cities 有 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke,GEICO 有 Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson,The Washington Post 有 Kay Graham 和 Dick Simmons——我们不可能处在更好的托付之下。
Idea
控股公司在资本配置和税收上有优势,但是在人事变革和管理上的优势是“虚幻”的。
I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.
我会说,控股公司有两项主要优势。第一,当我们控股一家企业时,我们可以进行资本配置;而在可交易持股中,我们很可能对资本配置几乎没有发言权。这一点很重要,因为很多公司的负责人并不擅长资本配置。他们的不擅长并不奇怪:多数老板之所以爬到顶端,是因为他们在某个领域表现出色,比如市场营销、生产、工程、行政管理——有时甚至是机构政治。
Idea
局部泛化的缺陷,或者说不能产生更简洁、更统一的知识结构终归是有麻烦的,不能有效保存已经到手的胜利果实。
Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it’s as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
一旦他们成为 CEO,就要面对新的责任:他们必须做资本配置决策——这是一项关键工作,可能是他们从未真正处理过、而且也不容易掌握的工作。把话说得夸张一点:就好像一个极有天赋的音乐家,职业生涯的最后一步不是在 Carnegie Hall 演出,而是被任命为美联储主席。

The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.
许多 CEO 在资本配置上的欠缺,绝不是小事:在任十年后,如果一家公司每年留存的利润相当于净资产的10%,那么这位 CEO 其实已经对公司运用的全部资本中超过60%的那部分资本的“去向”负过责任了。

CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such “help.” On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.
那些意识到自己不擅长资本配置的 CEO(并不是人人都意识到)往往会试图用“求助”来弥补:转向内部幕僚、管理咨询公司或投资银行。Charlie 和我经常观察到这种“帮助”带来的后果。总体上,我们觉得:它更可能放大资本配置的问题,而不是解决问题。

In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That’s why you hear so much about “restructuring.”) Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.
归根结底,美国企业界发生了大量不聪明的资本配置。(这就是为什么你总听到那么多“重组”。)不过,Berkshire 很幸运。在我们那些重要的非控股持股公司里,资本总体上被配置得很好,有些情况下甚至堪称精彩。

The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.
控股公司相对于可交易证券的第二个优势,与税收有关。作为公司股东,Berkshire 持有非控股(即持股低于80%)的股权时,会承担一些显著的税负成本;而当我们的持股达到或超过80%时,就不会承受这些成本(或会大幅减轻)。这种税收劣势早就存在,但税法的变化使它在过去一年显著加重。因此,同样的经营成果,如果来自持股80%或以上的控股企业,而不是来自较小持股的企业,如今可能给 Berkshire 带来高出多达50%的财务结果。
Idea
80%以上的控股没有股息税但还是有资本利得税;如果是外国公司持股,股息有预扣税但没有资本利得税。
It is also true that you can take the capital out, the earnings out of the business that you control 100%. You can decide the distribution policy and put [the capital] over someplace else — and that’s an advantage to us.
同样,你 100% 控股时,也可以把资本、把收益从企业里拿出来。你可以决定分配政策,把资金投到别处——这对我们是个优势。

If the XYZ company that we owned 5% of wants to go out and buy movie studios or whatever they might want to do, they get to allocate the capital. And, all things being equal (and even unequal), I would rather allocate the capital. I can do that if we own 100%, so that’s an advantage to owning 100%.
如果我们只持有 5% 的 XYZ 公司想买电影制片厂,或者想干别的,他们有权分配资本。而在其他条件相同(甚至不相同)时,我更愿意由我来分配资本。若我们 100% 持有,就能做到这一点,所以 100% 持有确实有优势。

2、《1994-06-16 Steve Jobs.The Rolling Stone Interview》

Would you explain, in simple terms, exactly what object-oriented software is?
您能否用简单的语言解释一下什么是面向对象软件?

Objects are like people. They’re living, breathing things that have knowledge inside them about how to do things and have memory inside them so they can remember things. And rather than interacting with them at a very low level, you interact with them at a very high level of abstraction, like we’re doing right here.
对象就像人。它们是有生命、会呼吸的存在,内部拥有执行任务的知识,也拥有记忆以便记住事情。而且,与其在非常底层的层面与它们交互,不如像我们现在这样,在非常高的抽象层次与它们交互。

Here’s an example: If I’m your laundry object, you can give me your dirty clothes and send me a message that says, “Can you get my clothes laundered, please.” I happen to know where the best laundry place in San Francisco is. And I speak English, and I have dollars in my pockets. So I go out and hail a taxicab and tell the driver to take me to this place in San Francisco. I go get your clothes laundered, I jump back in the cab, I get back here. I give you your clean clothes and say, “Here are your clean clothes.”
举个例子:如果我是你的洗衣对象,你可以把脏衣服交给我,并给我发条信息说:“请帮我把衣服洗干净。”我恰好知道旧金山最好的洗衣店在哪里。我会说英语,口袋里有美元。于是我出门招一辆出租车,告诉司机把我送到旧金山的那家店。我去把你的衣服洗好,再跳上出租车回到这里。我把干净衣服交给你,说:“这是洗好的衣服。”

You have no idea how I did that. You have no knowledge of the laundry place. Maybe you speak French, and you can’t even hail a taxi. You can’t pay for one, you don’t have dollars in your pocket. Yet I knew how to do all of that. And you didn’t have to know any of it. All that complexity was hidden inside of me, and we were able to interact at a very high level of abstraction. That’s what objects are. They encapsulate complexity, and the interfaces to that complexity are high level.
你完全不知道我是怎么做到的,也不知道那家洗衣店在哪里。也许你只会说法语,甚至不会招出租车,也付不起车费,口袋里没有美元。然而我知道如何完成这一切,而你无需了解任何细节。所有复杂性都被封装在我体内,我们得以在很高的抽象层次上交互。这就是对象。它们封装复杂性,而与这种复杂性交互的接口则是高级的。

3、《1997-08-17 Warren Buffett and Jeff Raikes discuss Microsoft investment》

There is a tremendous strategic synergy between the “finished goods business and the OEM operating system business. E.g. we have about 90% share of office productivity software with Microsoft Office, and that is a great business (about \$5B, also 85%+ operating margin). But also important is the fact that this software is heavily valued by the actual users (operating systems are a bit more invisible to the user), and they resist shifting brands. If we own the key “franchises built on top or the operating system, we dramatically widen the “moat that protects the operating system business. I.e. if J owned the most successful daily newspaper in Buffalo, I wouldn’t want to leave it to my competitor to  own the Sunday edition.
“盒装产品”业务与 OEM 操作系统业务之间存在巨大的战略协同。例如,Microsoft Office 在办公软件市场占约 90% 份额,这是一门极佳的生意(约 50 亿美元,运营利润率亦超过 85%)。更重要的是,实际用户非常重视这些软件(操作系统对用户而言相对隐形),因此他们不愿轻易换品牌。如果我们拥有构建在操作系统之上的关键“特许经营”,就能大大加宽保护操作系统业务的“护城河”。就好比若我拥有布法罗最成功的日报,可不想把星期日版留给竞争对手。

Idea
Windows 的教训:基础层“涨价即税”,社会容忍度低→最终走向碎片化;Office/Excel/Word 处于工具层,可被感知的增量价值。
*****

Your analysis of Microsoft, why I should invest in it, and why I don’t could be more on the money. In effect the company has a royalty on a communication stream that can do nothing but grow. It’s as if you were getting paid for every gallon of water starting in a small stream but with added amounts received as tributaries turned the stream into an Amazon. The toughest question is how hard to push prices and I wrote a note to Bill on that after our December meeting last year. Bell should have anticipated Bill and let someone else put in the phone infrastructure while he collected by the minute and distance (and even importance of 1-hr call he could have figured a way to monitor it) in perpetuity.
你对微软的分析——我为何该投资、又为何没有投资——再贴切不过。实际上,微软对一条只会壮大的信息流收取版税。就像从一条小溪的每加仑水开始收费,而支流汇入后,那条小溪最终变成亚马逊。最棘手的问题是价格能推到多高;去年十二月会议后我还就此给比尔写过一张便条。贝尔当初若能料到比尔的做法,就该让别人铺设电话基础设施,自己按通话时长、距离(甚至一小时电话的重要性——他肯定能想出监测办法)永续收费。

Coke is now getting a royalty on swallows; probably 7.2 billion a day. If this average gulp is one ounce. I feel 100 % sure (perhaps mistakenly) that I know the odds of this continuing—again 100 % as long as cola doesn’t cause cancer. Bill has an even better royalty—one which I would never bet against but I don’t feel I am capable of assessing probabilities about, except to the extent that with a gun to my head and forced to make a guess, I would go with it rather than against. But to calibrate whether my certainty is 80 % or 55 %, say, for a 20-year run would be folly. If I had to make such decisions, I would do my best but I prefer to structure investing as a no-called-strikes game and just wait for the fat one.
可口可乐现在对“吞咽”收取版税——大约每天72亿次。如果平均每口一盎司,我百分之百确定(也许是错觉)这种局面会持续下去——只要可乐不会致癌,概率依旧是百分之百。比尔的版税更胜一筹——我永远不会押注它会失败,但若要我评估其中概率,我自觉做不到;如果被架着枪逼着猜,我宁愿押正面而非反面。但要精确校准我究竟有80%还是55%的把握,并据此下注20年,那就是愚蠢。若真得做这种决定,我会尽力而为,但我更愿把投资当作“没有被三振”的比赛,耐心等那颗大好的球。
Idea
个性化、专业化是价值创造的关键,越基础、越往下沉的服务或者产品的提价能力越弱,而Windows很符合这样的特征,过去几十年的数据可以证明这一点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the main thing is that practically nobody else does it. And yet to me it’s obvious it’s the way to go.
查理·芒格:嗯,主要是几乎没有其他人这样做。然而对我来说,很明显这是正确的做法。

There’s a lot in Berkshire that is like that. It’s just a little different from the way other people do it, partly the luxury of having a controlling shareholder of strong opinions.
在伯克希尔有很多这样的情况。它只是与其他人做事的方式有些不同,部分原因是拥有一个有强烈意见的控股股东的奢侈。

That accounts for this. It would be hard for a committee, including a lot of employees, to come up with these decisions.
这就是这一切的原因。对于一个委员会,包括许多员工来说,很难做出这样的决定。

4、《2008-08-07 Steve Jobs.App Store’s Launch》

MR. WINGFIELD: Can you tell me what percentage of them were free versus paid?
温菲尔德先生:你能告诉我他们中有多少百分比是免费的,多少是付费的吗?

MR. JOBS: I don’t know off the top of my head, but the majority, clearly, which is great. Our purpose in the App Store is to add value to the iPhone. Free apps do that just as well as paid apps sometimes. We love free apps.
乔布斯先生:我不太清楚,但显然大多数是,这很好。我们在 App Store 的目的是为 iPhone 增加价值。免费应用有时和付费应用一样好。我们喜欢免费应用。

MR. WINGFIELD: You, as you said the last time we talked, don’t expect to make...
温菲尔德先生:正如你上次谈到的,你们并不期望...

MR. JOBS: By the way, some free apps have back-end service components that they charge for. A perfect example is like Epocrates. The Epocrates app is a free app. They’ll give you a free database when you go to their website and register, but then they have all of these other products that they will sell you the services for.
乔布斯先生: 顺便提一下,一些免费的应用有后端服务组件是收费的。比如 Epocrates 应用就是一个很好的例子。Epocrates 应用是免费的。你去他们的网站注册后,他们会给你一个免费的数据库,但他们还有很多其他产品会向你销售服务。

MR. WINGFIELD: Upsell.
温菲尔德先生: 追加销售。

MS. COTTON: [inaudible 9:25] talking about it, because his wife’s a doctor.
MS. COTTON: [听不清 9:25] 在谈论这件事,因为他的妻子是一名医生。

MR. JOBS: On Epocrates, you should go visit them.
乔布斯先生: 在 Epocrates 上,你应该去拜访他们。

MR. WINGFIELD: Yeah, I’ve talked to the...
温菲尔德先生: 是的,我和...谈过。

MR. JOBS: You should talk to Kurt. They exceeded their whole year forecast for iPhone downloads in the first two weeks. He could probably give you some pretty interesting...
乔布斯先生: 你应该和 Kurt 谈谈。他们在头两周内就超过了整年的 iPhone 下载预期。他可以给你一些相当有趣的数据...

[crosstalk] [相声]

MR. WINGFIELD: Do you know how it compares to their other platforms that they’re on? They’re a pretty mature product.
温菲尔德先生:你知道这和他们其他平台的比较如何吗?他们是个相当成熟的产品。

MR. JOBS: You should ask Kurt. He’s told me some things. I don’t know how much I’m free to say. They’re very happy.
乔布斯先生: 你应该问库尔特。他告诉我一些事情。我不知道我可以说多少。他们非常开心。

MR. WINGFIELD: The service fees, the advertising that appears, you guy don’t participate in that.
温菲尔德先生:服务费和出现的广告,你们没有参与其中。

MR. JOBS: No, we don’t.
乔布斯先生:不,我们没有。

MR. WINGFIELD: OK. The 70-30 split, are the economics of this working out the way that you had said when we last spoke, which is that you might make some money, but you don’t expect it to be a big source of profits?
温菲尔德先生:好的。那么 70-30 的分成,经济模式的运作情况是否如你上次所说的那样,就是你们可能会赚一些钱,但不期望这是一个大的利润来源?

MR. JOBS: Yeah. It’s just like iTunes.
乔布斯先生: 是的。这就像 iTunes。

MR. WINGFIELD: Even with the huge popularity of this, you don’t...
温菲尔德先生:即使这个非常受欢迎,你也不...

MR. JOBS: No. It costs money to run it. Those free apps cost money to store and to deliver wirelessly. The paid apps cost money, too. They have to pay for some of the free apps. We don’t expect this to be a big profit generator. We expect it to add value to the iPhone. We’ll sell more iPhones because of it.
乔布斯先生:不。这需要成本来运营。那些免费的应用在存储和无线传输上都要花钱。付费的应用也需要花钱,他们必须为一些免费的应用付费。我们不期望这会成为一个大的利润生成器。我们期望它为 iPhone 增值。我们会因此卖出更多的 iPhone。
CARL: I was just wondering, Warren, earlier you talked about searching— hunting for elephants or even any business, and occasionally some businesses do not want to sell to you for a variety of reasons. Does that ever take you by surprise? Do you ever say, `Excuse me, I’m Warren Buffett. I’m kind of a big deal, and the opportunity to be owned by Berkshire doesn’t— is kind of a golden ring that may not come around too much’?
CARL:我在想,Warren,之前你谈到寻找——猎取“大象”级别的企业,或者任何企业,有时候一些企业出于各种原因并不愿意卖给你。这会让你感到意外吗?你有没有想过说,“不好意思,我是 Warren Buffett,我算是个挺重要的人物,被 Berkshire 收购的机会可是难得的‘金环机会’”?

BUFFETT: That isn’t exactly the way I present it to people. No, it’s very— a really good business, like I say, if it’s owned privately, they shouldn’t sell. I mean, I— I’ve been called in by lots of families, and I— and they’re usually good businesses. And I— the first thing I tell them is that you should keep this business unless there’s some compelling reason other than the dollars you’ll get from it. Because you’ll get a lot of dollars from me, but those dollars are not going to buy a better business than the one you’ve got already. I mean, I— you know, that’s why I’m buying it. So I don’t think— the question usually— the question is now is finding big businesses. I mean, there aren’t that many big businesses in the world, and then I want big good businesses, and that narrows it down further. And then you have to have people who for some reason or another want to sell on the other side. And that happens from time to time in America.
BUFFETT:我并不是那样向别人表达的。不,一个真正优秀的企业,就像我说的,如果它是私人拥有的,就不应该卖。我——我见过很多家族企业,他们通常都是好公司。我首先会告诉他们,除非有某种比金钱更重要的理由,否则你们应该保留这个企业。因为你会从我这里得到很多钱,但这些钱并不能买到一个比你现在拥有的更好的企业。我的意思是,这正是我想买它的原因。所以我不认为——问题通常是——现在的问题在于找到大型企业。世界上并没有那么多大型企业,而我还想要大型且优质的企业,这就进一步缩小了范围。然后你还需要对方出于某种原因愿意出售。这种情况在美国偶尔会发生。

BUFFETT: I’ve— I had a fellow come to see me a few years ago, and he loves his business, it’s a wonderful business, and he said, `Warren, I want to sell you this business.′ And he said, `I want to sell you this business because I’m 61 years old and I’m in good health and I love running it, but I don’t know, you know, what would happen if something happened to me tonight.′ He said, `I’ve seen’— he’d bought another business where the family had fallen apart when the— when the owner had died, and he said, `I don’t want to leave my wife with that kind of a problem, and my children, and they wouldn’t know what to do with it. So as long as I get to keep running the business, I’ve got all the money in the world, and so I want to have the joy of running the business and I do not want to have the worry of what happens if I’m not around tomorrow.′ And he said, `You’re the only guy that can solve that.′ So that’s the only way I win beauty contests is when I’m the only guy in them.
BUFFETT:我——几年前有一个人来找我,他非常热爱自己的企业,那是一家很棒的公司。他说:“Warren,我想把这家公司卖给你。”他说:“我想卖给你,是因为我今年 61 岁,身体很好,也很喜欢经营这家公司,但我不知道,如果今晚我出了什么事会怎样。”他说:“我见过——”他曾收购过另一家公司,那家公司在原老板去世后,家族内部分崩离析。他说:“我不想把那样的问题留给我的妻子和孩子,他们也不知道该如何处理。所以只要我还能继续经营这家公司,我已经拥有足够的钱,我想要继续享受经营企业的乐趣,而不想担心如果明天我不在了会发生什么。”他说:“你是唯一能解决这个问题的人。”所以我赢得这种“选美比赛”的唯一方式,就是我是唯一参赛者的时候。
Idea
用一段小文字解释了独特性,这是一个并不为人所知,并且有经济价值的独特想法。

4、《2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think it’s almost impossible. Besides, I mean, it’s taken a long, long time to get here. It’s taken a great amount of consistency, and that consistency has been allowed because, basically, we’ve had a controlling shareholder during that time.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,我认为这几乎是不可能的。此外,我的意思是,来到这里花了很长很长的时间。这需要极大的持续性,而这种持续性之所以能够实现,基本上是因为在这段时间里我们有一个控股股东。

So we’ve not had to bow to any of the urgings of Wall Street or, you know, whatever may be the fad of the day. But we have had a culture that — where we could write out 13 or 14 principles more than 30 years ago, and we’ve been able to stick with them.
所以我们不必屈从于华尔街的任何压力,或者说,任何当下的潮流。但我们有一种文化——在 30 多年前,我们能够写出 13 或 14 条原则,并且我们一直能够坚持这些原则。

And that’s very hard to do for most American corporations, and I think it’s very hard to do when managers come and go and they have small shareholdings. I think it takes a very unusual structure to be able to do it.
这对大多数美国公司来说是非常困难的,我认为当管理者频繁更换并且他们的持股比例很小的时候,这更难做到。我认为需要一种非常特殊的结构才能做到这一点。

And, you know, it took a long time to get to the point where people with large private businesses in this country really cared about where those businesses were lodged after they gave up their stewardship. Took a long time to have it get so that a great many of those people would think of Berkshire first.
而且,花了很长时间才能达到一个阶段,即很多大型私营企业在放弃管理后,真正关心这些企业的去向。很多人现在首先想到伯克希尔。

And the nice thing about it is, if they think of Berkshire first they don’t think of anybody second, so we get the call.
而这件事的好处在于,如果他们首先想到伯克希尔,他们就不会想到其他任何人,所以我们会接到电话。

We don’t do well buying businesses at auction. I mean, if somebody’s only interest is to get the top price for their business, you know, seldom we’ll get one.
我们在拍卖中购买企业的表现并不理想。也就是说,如果某人的唯一兴趣是获得他们企业的最高价格,我们通常很难拿下。

We did buy one at auction, I mean, but it was an add-on. The Dutch company we bought yesterday, we bought at auction. But that sometimes happens with our smaller acquisitions.
我们确实有在拍卖中买过一家企业,但那只是一个附加收购。我们昨天收购的荷兰公司就是通过拍卖获得的。但这在我们的小型收购中偶尔会发生。

But the big private acquisitions are going to come to Berkshire because they want to come to Berkshire. And that’s a significant competitive edge, and I don’t see how anybody really challenges us on that.
但大型私人收购将会来到伯克希尔,因为他们想要来到伯克希尔。这是一个显著的竞争优势,我看不出还有谁能在这方面真正挑战我们。

4、《2015-02-27 Berkshire - Past Present and Future》

At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed -- among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.
在股东的层面,当个人投资者试图在企业和行业之间重新分配资本时,税收和摩擦成本会给他们带来沉重的负担。即使免税的机构投资者在转换资本时也面临比较大的成本,因为他们通常需要中介机构去完成这个工作。此时,无数张昂贵的嘴需要被养活——其中包括投资银行家,会计师,咨询师,律师以及资本配置运营商比如杠杆收购者。资本的重新洗牌可一点也不便宜。

In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
相比之下,像伯克希尔这样的企业集团完全有能力以最低的成本,合理地配置资本。当然,企业形式本身并不能保证会成功:我们犯了无数错误,并且还会犯更多。然而,我们的结构性优势是非常强大的。

At Berkshire, we can -- without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs -- move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.
在伯克希尔,我们能够在不产生税负或者其他成本的情况下,将巨额资本,从增量投资机会有限的业务中,转移到其他有更大前景的业务中。另外,我们不会因与特定行业的终身联系而产生历史偏见,也不会遭受维护现状符合其既得利益的同伴的压力。这一点很重要:如果马儿控制了投资决策,那么就不会有汽车行业了。

Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses -- a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day -- in small pieces, to be sure -- are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.
我们拥有的另一个主要优势是,购买好生意的一部分(普通股)的能力。这不是大多数管理层可以采取的活动。在我们的历史中,这种策略选择已被证明是非常有益的;广泛的选择总是使得决策更加明智。股票市场每天给予我们的企业报价(当然只是一小部分),往往比我们整体收购的报价更具吸引力。此外,我们从股市上实现的收益,帮助我们进行了许多大型收购,否则这些收购将会超出我们的财务能力。

In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster -- a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
实际上世界是属于伯克希尔的——这个世界提供给我们范围广泛的机会,远远超出大多数企业实际面临的机会。当然,我们仅限于那些我们能够评估其经济前景的企业。这是一个重要的限制:很多企业查理和我都不知道十年后将会如何。但是这种限制远远小于,一位经验仅限于单一领域的高管所承受的限制。除此之外,我们可以有利可图的持续扩大规模,远远超过许多企业,这些企业普遍受到其所在单一行业潜力有限的制约。

I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.
我前面提到,相比于它适度的资本需求,喜诗糖果产出了大量现金收益。当然,我们很乐意明智地使用那些资本,去扩大我们的糖果业务。但是我们多次扩张的尝试基本上都是徒劳的。所以,在不产生无效税负或摩擦成本的情况下,我们将喜诗糖果产出的多余资金用于收购其他业务。如果喜诗糖果仍然是一家独立的公司,它的巨额收益将不得不分配给投资者以重新配置,有时在巨额税收以后,几乎总是被巨大的摩擦和代理人成本耗尽。
Idea
在美国100%控股的企业有股息扣除的政策(Dividends Received Deduction,简称DRD),不需要缴税联邦相关的所得税。
David: Xiaomi becomes super important later. But it's completely free. Anybody can take the Android software and do whatever they want with it.
David:小米后来变得非常重要。但 Android 完全是免费的。任何人都可以拿这套软件去做他们想做的事。

The other part of “open” that Google really focuses on is developers can develop for the platform, so this was before the iPhone iOS was not yet open to develop.
Google 所强调的“开放”的另一个层面是,开发者可以为这个平台开发应用。而这发生在 iPhone 的 iOS 还没有开放给开发者的时期。

Ben: That’s right. WWDC in July or in June of 2008 is when Apple walked back there, you can make web apps and announced the App Store.
Ben:没错。Apple 是在 2008 年 6 月或 7 月的 WWDC 上才转变态度,说你可以做 Web App,然后宣布了 App Store。

David: Steve Jobs initially was, you know, his posturing was “We don’t want developers. We want to control everything with the software stack.” And hard to imagine what the iPhone would be like today if there were not third party developers.
David:最初 Steve Jobs 的立场是,“我们不想要开发者。我们要控制整个软件堆栈。” 很难想象如果没有第三方开发者,今天的 iPhone 会变成什么样子。
生理性的向内收敛。

5、《2021-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll — you know, we’ve got some wonderful deals, and some terrible deals.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们有一些很棒的交易,也有一些糟糕的交易。

And the nice thing about it is — as I pointed out, this doesn’t really apply in the case of Precision, precisely — but when we’re disappointed in a business, it usually becomes a smaller and smaller percentage of our business, just by the nature of things, because it isn’t going anyplace.
而这件事的好处在于——正如我所指出的,这在精确度的情况下并不适用——但当我们对一项业务感到失望时,它通常会逐渐成为我们业务中越来越小的百分比,这就是事物的本质,因为它没有任何进展。

And when we get a successful business, like a GEICO or something of the sort — GEICO’s doing — they’re doing 15 times as much business as when we bought control in 19 — they become a proportionally much more important part of our mix.
当我们获得一个成功的业务,比如 GEICO 或类似的公司——GEICO 的业务——他们的业务量是我们在 19 年收购控制权时的 15 倍——他们在我们的组合中变得相对更重要。

So, you really get, through just natural forces, you get more of your money in the things that have developed more favorably than you thought. You actually end up getting a greater concentration in the ones that work out.
所以,通过自然力量,你实际上会在那些发展得比你想象中更有利的事物上获得更多的收益。你最终会在那些成功的项目上获得更大的集中度。
Idea
注意力的锚点,water the flowers and skip over the weeds。
It’s not like — as Charlie would say, it’s not like having children. I mean — (Laughs)
这并不像——正如查理所说,这并不像有孩子。我是说——(笑)

The one that — the bad ones cause you more problems. (Laughs)
坏的那些会给你带来更多问题。(笑)

But the — in this — in the children of businesses, the small ones kind of — by the way, we started with three businesses, Charlie and I. And Berkshire was textiles, Diversified Retailing was a department store, and trading stamps were Blue Chip’s business. And those were the three companies we put together. And all three of the original businesses failed.
但是在这方面,孩子们的企业,小企业有点——顺便说一下,我们是从三家企业开始的,查理和我。伯克希尔是纺织业,多元化零售是百货商店,交易邮票是蓝筹公司的业务。这三家公司是我们组合在一起的。而且这三家原始企业都失败了。

Which sort of gets me, in terms of the people that are worried about, don’t we know that coal is going to be phased out over time? (Laughs)
这让我有点困惑,关于那些担心的人,我们难道不知道煤炭会逐渐被淘汰吗?(笑)

Of course, we know coal’s going to be — you know, but that doesn’t mean we’re going to be phased out over time. I mean that —
当然,我们知道煤炭会被淘汰——你知道的,但这并不意味着我们会随着时间的推移而被取代。我的意思是——

Every business has some things to think about, about that way.
每个企业都有一些事情需要考虑,关于那种方式。

6、《2024-04-11 Andy Jassy’s Letters to Amazon Shareholders》

We spend enormous energy thinking about how to empower builders, inside and outside of our company. We characterize builders as people who like to invent. They like to dissect a customer experience, assess what’s wrong with it, and reinvent it. Builders tend not to be satisfied until the customer experience is perfect. This doesn’t hinder them from delivering improvements along the way, but it drives them to keep tinkering and iterating continually. While unafraid to invent from scratch, they have no hesitation about using high-quality, scalable, cost-effective components from others. What matters to builders is having the right tools to keep rapidly improving customer experiences.
我们投入大量精力思考如何赋能公司内外的建设者。我们将建设者定义为喜欢创新的人。他们喜欢剖析客户体验,评估其中的问题,并重新设计。建设者往往在客户体验达到完美之前不会满足。这并不会妨碍他们在过程中持续提供改进,但会驱使他们不断地调整和迭代。虽然他们不惧怕从零开始创新,但也毫不犹豫地使用来自他人的高质量、可扩展且经济高效的组件。对建设者而言,重要的是拥有合适的工具,以持续快速地改善客户体验。

The best way we know how to do this is by building primitive services. Think of them as discrete, foundational building blocks that builders can weave together in whatever combination they desire. Here’s how we described primitives in our 2003 AWS Vision document:
我们所知的最佳方法是构建原始服务。可以将它们视为独立的、基础的构建模块,开发人员可以根据自己的需求任意组合。这是我们在 2003 年 AWS 愿景文档中对原始服务的描述:

“Primitives are the raw parts or the most foundational-level building blocks for software developers. They’re indivisible (if they can be functionally split into two they must) and they do one thing really well. They’re meant to be used together rather than as solutions in and of themselves. And, we’ll build them for maximum developer flexibility. We won’t put a bunch of constraints on primitives to guard against developers hurting themselves. Rather, we’ll optimize for developer freedom and innovation.”
Primitives是软件开发人员使用的原始组件或最基础级别的构建模块。它们是不可分割的(如果能在功能上拆分成两个,就必须拆分),并且专注于做好一件事。它们旨在相互配合使用,而不是单独作为解决方案。此外,我们将构建它们以实现开发人员的最大灵活性。我们不会对Primitives施加大量限制来防止开发人员犯错,而是会优化开发人员的自由度和创新空间。

Of course, this concept of primitives can be applied to more than software development, but they’re especially relevant in technology. And, over the last 20 years, primitives have been at the heart of how we’ve innovated quickly.
当然,这种Primitives的概念不仅适用于软件开发领域,但在技术领域尤为重要。在过去的 20 年里,Primitives一直是我们快速创新的核心。

One of the many advantages to thinking in primitives is speed. Let me give you two counter examples that illustrate this point. First, we built a successful owned-inventory retail business in the early years at Amazon where we bought all our products from publishers, manufacturers, and distributors, stored them in our warehouses, and shipped them ourselves. Over time, we realized we could add broader selection and lower prices by allowing third-party sellers to list their offerings next to our own on our highly trafficked search and product detail pages. We’d built several core retail services (e.g. payments, search, ordering, browse, item management) that made trying different marketplace concepts simpler than if we didn’t have those components. A good set of primitives? Not really.
以基础元素的方式思考的众多优势之一是速度。我举两个反例来说明这一点。首先,在亚马逊的早期阶段,我们建立了一个成功的自营库存零售业务,我们从出版商、制造商和分销商那里购买所有产品,将其存储在自己的仓库中,并自行发货。随着时间推移,我们意识到,通过允许第三方卖家在我们流量巨大的搜索和产品详情页面上与我们自己的商品并列展示,我们可以提供更广泛的选择和更低的价格。我们已经构建了几个核心零售服务(例如支付、搜索、订购、浏览、商品管理),这些服务使我们尝试不同的市场模式变得比没有这些组件时更简单。但这算是一套好的基础元素吗?并不是。

It turns out that these core components were too jumbled together and not partitioned right. We learned this the hard way when we partnered with companies like Target in our Merchant.com business in the early 2000s. The concept was that target.com would use Amazon’s ecommerce components as the backbone of its website, and then customize however they wished. To enable this arrangement, we had to deliver those components as separable capabilities through application programming interfaces (“APIs”). This decoupling was far more difficult than anticipated because we’d built so many dependencies between these services as Amazon grew so quickly the first few years.
事实证明,这些核心组件过于混杂,没有正确地进行分割。我们是在 2000 年代初与 Target 等公司合作开展 Merchant.com 业务时,才艰难地意识到这一点。当时的设想是,target.com 将使用亚马逊的电子商务组件作为其网站的基础架构,然后根据自身需求进行定制。为了实现这一安排,我们必须通过应用程序接口(API)将这些组件作为可分离的功能提供出去。然而,这种解耦的难度远超预期,因为在亚马逊最初几年快速增长过程中,我们在这些服务之间建立了太多的依赖关系。

This coupling was further highlighted by a heavyweight mechanism we used to operate called “NPI.” Any new initiative requiring work from multiple internal teams had to be reviewed by this NPI cabal where each team would communicate how many people-weeks their work would take. This bottleneck constrained what we accomplished, frustrated the heck out of us, and inspired us to eradicate it by refactoring these ecommerce components into true primitive services with well-documented, stable APIs that enabled our builders to use each other’s services without any coordination tax.
这种耦合关系在我们过去使用的一种名为“NPI”的繁重机制中尤为突出。任何需要多个内部团队协作的新项目,都必须经过这个 NPI 小组的审查,每个团队都要说明他们的工作需要多少人周。这种瓶颈限制了我们的成就,让我们极为沮丧,并促使我们通过将这些电子商务组件重构为真正的基础服务,配备文档完善、稳定的 API,使开发人员能够在无需额外协调成本的情况下使用彼此的服务,从而彻底消除这种瓶颈。

In the middle of the Target and NPI challenges, we were contemplating building a new set of infrastructure technology services that would allow both Amazon to move more quickly and external developers to build anything they imagined. This set of services became known as AWS, and the above experiences convinced us that we should build a set of primitive services that could be composed together how anybody saw fit. At that time, most technology offerings were very feature-rich, and tried to solve multiple jobs simultaneously. As a result, they often didn’t do any one job that well.
在应对 Target 和 NPI 挑战的过程中,我们曾考虑构建一套新的基础设施技术服务,以便亚马逊能够更快地行动,同时也让外部开发者能够构建他们所设想的任何东西。这套服务后来被称为 AWS,上述经验使我们确信,我们应该构建一系列基础服务,让任何人都可以根据自己的需求自由组合。当时,大多数技术产品都功能繁多,试图同时解决多个问题,因此往往无法很好地完成任何单一任务。

Our AWS primitive services were designed from the start to be different. They offered important, highly flexible, but focused functionality. For instance, our first major primitive was Amazon Simple Storage Service (“S3”) in March 2006 that aimed to provide highly secure object storage, at very high durability and availability, at Internet scale, and very low cost. In other words, be stellar at object storage. When we launched S3, developers were excited, and a bit mystified. It was a very useful primitive service, but they wondered, why just object storage? When we launched Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (“EC2”) in August 2006 and Amazon SimpleDB in 2007, people realized we were building a set of primitive infrastructure services that would allow them to build anything they could imagine, much faster, more cost-effectively, and without having to manage or lay out capital upfront for the datacenter or hardware. As AWS unveiled these building blocks over time (we now have over 240 at builders’ disposal—meaningfully more than any other provider), whole companies sprang up quickly on top of AWS (e.g. Airbnb, Dropbox, Instagram, Pinterest, Stripe, etc.), industries reinvented themselves on AWS (e.g. streaming with Netflix, Disney+, Hulu, Max, Fox, Paramount), and even critical government agencies switched to AWS (e.g. CIA, along with several other U.S. Intelligence agencies). But, one of the lesser-recognized beneficiaries was Amazon’s own consumer businesses, which innovated at dramatic speed across retail, advertising, devices (e.g. Alexa and Fire TV), Prime Video and Music, Amazon Go, Drones, and many other endeavors by leveraging the speed with which AWS let them build. Primitives, done well, rapidly accelerate builders’ ability to innovate.
我们的 AWS 基础服务从一开始就被设计成与众不同。它们提供了重要、高度灵活但专注的功能。例如,我们的第一个主要基础服务是 2006 年 3 月推出的亚马逊简单存储服务(“S3”),旨在以互联网规模、极低的成本提供高度安全的对象存储,具有极高的耐用性和可用性。换句话说,就是在对象存储方面做到卓越。当我们推出 S3 时,开发人员感到兴奋,也有些困惑。这是一个非常有用的基础服务,但他们疑惑,为什么只提供对象存储?当我们在 2006 年 8 月推出亚马逊弹性计算云(“EC2”)以及 2007 年推出亚马逊 SimpleDB 时,人们意识到我们正在构建一系列基础设施服务,使他们能够更快、更经济地构建任何他们能想象的东西,而无需提前管理或投入资金建设数据中心或硬件。 随着 AWS 逐步推出这些构建模块(目前我们已为开发者提供超过 240 个模块,远超其他任何供应商),许多公司迅速在 AWS 之上建立起来(例如 Airbnb、Dropbox、Instagram、Pinterest、Stripe 等),一些行业在 AWS 上实现了自我重塑(例如 Netflix、Disney+、Hulu、Max、Fox、Paramount 等流媒体服务),甚至一些关键的政府机构也转向了 AWS(例如 CIA 以及其他几个美国情报机构)。但较少被注意到的受益者之一是亚马逊自身的消费者业务,它们通过利用 AWS 提供的快速构建能力,在零售、广告、设备(例如 Alexa 和 Fire TV)、Prime 视频和音乐、Amazon Go、无人机以及许多其他领域实现了高速创新。基础模块若设计得当,将极大地加速开发者的创新能力。

So, how do you build the right set of primitives?
那么,你该如何构建合适的primitives集合呢?

Pursuing primitives is not a guarantee of success. There are many you could build, and even more ways to combine them. But, a good compass is to pick real customer problems you’re trying to solve.
追求基础元素并不能保证成功。你可以构建许多基础元素,也有更多方式将它们组合起来。但一个好的指南针是选择你试图解决的真实客户问题。

Our logistics primitives are an instructive example. In Amazon’s early years, we built core capabilities around warehousing items, and then picking, packing, and shipping them quickly and reliably to customers. As we added third-party sellers to our marketplace, they frequently requested being able to use these same logistics capabilities. Because we’d built this initial set of logistics primitives, we were able to introduce Fulfillment by Amazon (“FBA”) in 2006, allowing sellers to use Amazon’s Fulfillment Network to store items, and then have us pick, pack, and ship them to customers, with the bonus of these products being available for fast, Prime delivery. This service has saved sellers substantial time and money (typically about 70% less expensive than doing themselves), and remains one of our most popular services. As more merchants began to operate their own direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) websites, many yearned to still use our fulfillment capabilities, while also accessing our payments and identity primitives to drive higher order conversion on their own websites (as Prime members have already shared this payment and identity information with Amazon). A couple years ago, we launched Buy with Prime to address this customer need. Prime members can check out quickly on DTC websites like they do on Amazon, and receive fast Prime shipping speeds on Buy with Prime items—increasing order conversion for merchants by ~25% vs. their default experience.
我们的物流基础模块就是一个很有启发性的例子。在亚马逊成立初期,我们围绕商品仓储建立了核心能力,然后快速可靠地完成拣货、包装和配送给客户。当我们向市场引入第三方卖家时,他们经常要求使用这些相同的物流能力。正因为我们已经建立了这一套初始的物流基础模块,我们才能在 2006 年推出“亚马逊物流(FBA)”,允许卖家使用亚马逊的物流网络存储商品,然后由我们负责拣货、包装并配送给客户,同时这些商品还能享受快速的 Prime 配送服务。这项服务为卖家节省了大量的时间和成本(通常比他们自己操作便宜约 70%),并且至今仍是我们最受欢迎的服务之一。随着越来越多的商家开始运营自己的直面消费者(DTC)网站,许多商家仍然希望使用我们的物流能力,同时也希望利用我们的支付和身份基础模块,以提高他们自己网站上的订单转化率(因为 Prime 会员已经与亚马逊共享了这些支付和身份信息)。 几年前,我们推出了 Buy with Prime,以满足客户的这一需求。Prime 会员可以像在亚马逊上一样,在 DTC 网站上快速结账,并在购买 Buy with Prime 商品时享受 Prime 的快速配送服务,这使商家的订单转化率比默认体验提高了约 25%。

As our Stores business has grown substantially, and our supply chain become more complex, we’ve had to develop a slew of capabilities in order to offer customers unmatched selection, at low prices, and with very fast delivery times. We’ve become adept at getting products from other countries to the U.S., clearing customs, and then shipping to storage facilities. Because we don’t have enough space in our shipping fulfillment centers to store all the inventory needed to maintain our desired in-stock levels, we’ve built a set of lower-cost, upstream warehouses solely optimized for storage (without sophisticated end-user, pick, pack, and ship functions). Having these two pools of inventory has prompted us to build algorithms predicting when we’ll run out of inventory in our shipping fulfillment centers and automatically replenishing from these upstream warehouses. And, in the last few years, our scale and available alternatives have forced us to build our own last mile delivery capability (roughly the size of UPS) to affordably serve the number of consumers and sellers wanting to use Amazon.
随着我们的门店业务大幅增长,供应链也变得更加复杂,我们不得不开发大量能力,以便为客户提供无与伦比的选择、低廉的价格和极快的配送速度。我们已熟练掌握了将产品从其他国家运往美国、清关并运送至仓储设施的流程。由于我们的配送履约中心没有足够空间存放所有库存以维持理想的库存水平,我们建立了一系列成本较低的上游仓库,专门用于存储(不具备复杂的终端用户拣货、包装和配送功能)。拥有这两类库存促使我们开发算法,预测配送履约中心何时会缺货,并自动从这些上游仓库补货。此外,过去几年中,我们的规模和可用的替代方案迫使我们建立了自己的最后一公里配送能力(规模大致相当于 UPS),以经济高效地服务于希望使用亚马逊的众多消费者和卖家。

We’ve solved these customer needs by building additional fulfillment primitives that both serve Amazon consumers better and address external sellers’ increasingly complex ecommerce activities. For instance, for sellers needing help importing products, we offer a Global Mile service that leverages our expertise here. To ship inventory from the border (or anywhere domestically) to our storage facilities, we enable sellers to use either our first-party Amazon Freight service or third-party freight partners via our Partnered Carrier Program. To store more inventory at lower cost to ensure higher in-stock rates and shorter delivery times, we’ve opened our upstream Amazon Warehousing and Distribution facilities to sellers (along with automated replenishment to our shipping fulfillment centers when needed). For those wanting to manage their own shipping, we’ve started allowing customers to use our last mile delivery network to deliver packages to their end-customers in a service called Amazon Shipping. And, for sellers who wish to use our fulfillment network as a central place to store inventory and ship items to customers regardless of where they ordered, we have a Multi-Channel Fulfillment service. These are all primitives that we’ve exposed to sellers.
我们通过构建额外的履约基础设施,既更好地服务亚马逊消费者,也满足外部卖家日益复杂的电子商务活动,从而解决了这些客户需求。例如,对于需要帮助进口产品的卖家,我们提供了利用我们专业知识的 Global Mile 服务。为了将库存从边境(或国内任何地方)运送到我们的仓储设施,我们允许卖家通过我们的合作承运商计划,使用亚马逊自营货运服务或第三方货运合作伙伴。为了以更低成本存储更多库存,确保更高的库存率和更短的交货时间,我们向卖家开放了上游的亚马逊仓储和配送设施(并在需要时自动补货到我们的配送中心)。对于希望自行管理运输的客户,我们开始允许他们使用我们的末端配送网络,将包裹送达终端客户,这项服务称为 Amazon Shipping。 此外,对于希望使用我们的配送网络作为集中存储库存并向客户发货(无论客户从何处下单)的卖家,我们提供了多渠道配送服务。这些都是我们向卖家开放的基础服务。

Building in primitives meaningfully expands your degrees of freedom. You can keep your primitives to yourself and build compelling features and capabilities on top of them to allow your customers and business to reap the benefits of rapid innovation. You can offer primitives to external customers as paid services (as we have with AWS and our more recent logistics offerings). Or, you can compose these primitives into external, paid applications as we have with FBA, Buy with Prime, or Supply Chain by Amazon (a recently released logistics service that integrates several of our logistics primitives). But, you’ve got options. You’re only constrained by the primitives you’ve built and your imagination.
有意义地构建基础组件能够极大地拓展你的自由度。你可以将这些基础组件保留在内部,并在其基础上开发出引人注目的功能和能力,让你的客户和业务从快速创新中获益。你也可以将基础组件作为付费服务提供给外部客户(例如我们推出的 AWS 和近期的物流服务)。或者,你可以将这些基础组件组合成面向外部的付费应用程序,就像我们推出的 FBA、“Buy with Prime”或亚马逊供应链(最近发布的一项物流服务,整合了我们多个物流基础组件)。总之,你拥有多种选择,唯一的限制是你所构建的基础组件和你的想象力。

Take the new, same-day fulfillment facilities in our Stores business. They’re located in the largest metro areas around the U.S. (we currently have 58), house our top-moving 100,000 SKUs (but also cover millions of other SKUs that can be injected from nearby fulfillment centers into these same-day facilities), and streamline the time required to go from picking a customer’s order to being ready to ship to as little as 11 minutes. These facilities also constitute our lowest cost to serve in the network. The experience has been so positive for customers that we’re planning to double the number of these facilities.
以我们门店业务中新建的当日配送设施为例,它们位于美国各大都市区(目前共有 58 个),存放着我们销量最高的 10 万个库存单位(SKU),同时还能从附近的配送中心调入数百万个其他 SKU 到这些当日配送设施中。这些设施将从拣选客户订单到准备发货的时间缩短至最快仅需 11 分钟。此外,这些设施也是我们网络中服务成本最低的部分。由于客户体验非常积极,我们计划将这些设施的数量增加一倍。

But, how else might we use this capability if we think of it as a core building block? We have a very large and growing grocery business in organic grocery (with Whole Foods Market) and non-perishable goods (e.g. consumables, canned goods, health and beauty products, etc.). We’ve been working hard on building a mass, physical store offering (Amazon Fresh) that offers a great perishable experience; however, what if we used our same-day facilities to enable customers to easily add milk, eggs, or other perishable items to any Amazon order and get same day? It might change how people think of splitting up their weekly grocery shopping, and make perishable shopping as convenient as non-perishable shopping already is.
但是,如果我们将这种能力视为一个核心基础模块,我们还能如何利用它呢?我们在有机食品杂货(通过 Whole Foods Market)和非易腐商品(例如日用品、罐头食品、健康和美容产品等)领域拥有规模庞大且不断增长的业务。我们一直在努力打造大规模的实体店(Amazon Fresh),提供出色的生鲜购物体验;然而,如果我们利用当天配送设施,让顾客能够轻松地在任何亚马逊订单中添加牛奶、鸡蛋或其他易腐商品,并实现当天送达,会怎样呢?这可能会改变人们对每周杂货购物分配方式的看法,使购买易腐商品变得像购买非易腐商品一样方便。

Or, take a service that some people have questioned, but that’s making substantial progress and we think of as a very valuable future primitive capability—our delivery drones (called Prime Air). Drones will eventually allow us to deliver packages to customers in less than an hour. It won’t start off being available for all sizes of packages and in all locations, but we believe it’ll be pervasive over time. Think about how the experience of ordering perishable items changes with sub-one-hour delivery?
或者,以一项曾被一些人质疑但正取得重大进展、并被我们视为极具价值的未来基础能力的服务为例——我们的无人机送货服务(称为 Prime Air)。无人机最终将使我们能够在不到一小时内将包裹送达客户手中。虽然最初并非所有尺寸的包裹和所有地点都能享受此服务,但我们相信随着时间推移,它将变得普及。试想一下,不到一小时的送货速度将如何改变订购易腐商品的体验?

The same is true for Amazon Pharmacy. Need throat lozenges, Advil, an antibiotic, or some other medication? Same-day facilities already deliver many of these items within hours, and that will only get shorter as we launch Prime Air more expansively. Highly flexible building blocks can be composed across businesses and in new combinations that change what’s possible for customers.
亚马逊药房也是如此。需要喉糖、布洛芬、抗生素或其他药物吗?当天送达服务已经能在数小时内配送许多此类商品,随着我们更广泛地推出 Prime Air,这一时间还会进一步缩短。高度灵活的基础模块可以跨业务组合,并以新的方式组合,改变客户的可能性。

Being intentional about building primitives requires patience. Releasing the first couple primitive services can sometimes feel random to customers (or the public at large) before we’ve unveiled how these building blocks come together. I’ve mentioned AWS and S3 as an example, but our Health offering is another. In the last 10 years, we’ve tried several Health experiments across various teams—but they were not driven by our primitives approach. This changed in 2022 when we applied our primitives thinking to the enormous global healthcare problem and opportunity. We’ve now created several important building blocks to help transform the customer health experience: Acute Care (via Amazon Clinic), Primary Care (via One Medical), and a Pharmacy service to buy whatever medication a patient may need. Because of our growing success, Amazon customers are now asking us to help them with all kinds of wellness and nutrition opportunities—which can be partially unlocked with some of our existing grocery building blocks, including Whole Foods Market or Amazon Fresh.
有意识地构建基础模块需要耐心。在我们尚未展示这些基础模块如何组合之前,向客户(或广大公众)发布最初几个基础服务,有时可能会显得随意。我之前提到过 AWS 和 S3 作为例子,但我们的健康服务也是如此。在过去 10 年里,我们在不同团队中尝试了几次健康领域的实验,但这些尝试并未遵循我们的基础模块方法。这种情况在 2022 年发生了改变,我们将基础模块思维应用于全球医疗保健领域的巨大问题和机遇。现在,我们已经创建了几个重要的基础模块,以帮助改善客户的健康体验:急性护理(通过 Amazon Clinic)、初级护理(通过 One Medical)以及药房服务,以便患者购买所需的任何药物。由于我们日益增长的成功,亚马逊的客户现在要求我们帮助他们探索各种健康和营养方面的机会,而这些机会可以部分通过我们现有的一些食品杂货基础模块来实现,包括 Whole Foods Market 或 Amazon Fresh。
就是最早的面向对象技术。

7、《2025-07-11 The Pants Cost $20. They Explain $86 Billion of Costco Sales.》

Those pants were part of the Kirkland Signature private label, which is based on a simple but powerful idea: sell products of a high quality at a low price. With that philosophy, Kirkland has become essential to Costco’s success. No less a Costco authority than co-founder Jim Sinegal describes the creation of Kirkland three decades ago as one of the crucial developments in the history of the company.
这条裤子属于 Kirkland Signature 自有品牌,其核心理念简单却强大:以低价销售高品质产品。凭借这一理念,Kirkland 成为 Costco 成功的关键。Costco 联合创始人吉姆·西尼加尔甚至称,三十年前 Kirkland 的诞生是公司历史上的关键事件之一。

The store brand now accounts for roughly a third of Costco’s revenue—and it’s growing faster than the company as a whole. Costco’s total sales have almost doubled since 2017. Kirkland’s have almost tripled.
如今,该自有品牌约占 Costco 收入的三分之一——增速快于公司整体。自 2017 年以来,Costco 总销售额几乎翻倍,而 Kirkland 的销售额几乎增长了三倍。

At this point, it’s bigger than many of the world’s biggest companies. . Kirkland alone brought in \$86 billion last year—more than all of Procter & Gamble. In fact, this brand known for no-frills affordability generated roughly the same annual revenue as luxury giant LVMH.
如今,它的规模已超过世界上许多最大公司。。仅 Kirkland 一项去年就创造了 860 亿美元收入——高于整个宝洁公司。事实上,这个以“实惠无噱头”著称的品牌的年收入与奢侈品巨头 LVMH 相当。

It doesn’t just drive sales. It also breeds loyalty. It gives people a reason to become members—and members a reason to keep coming back. If the cult of Costco had a Kool-Aid, it would definitely be Kirkland Signature.
它不仅推动销售,还培养忠诚度。它给人们一个成为会员的理由,也给会员一个持续回访的理由。如果 Costco 的“狂热粉丝”有自己的“神秘饮料”,那一定是 Kirkland Signature。

Perhaps the most important thing that Kirkland does is bring down the price of other brands.
也许 Kirkland 最重要的作用就是压低其他品牌的价格。

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