I.H.RP.109.Operating and Investment
“Operating”是局部泛化，而“Investment”显然需要更广泛适用的知识结构，两者很难兼容，在BRK顶层的人事架构中这两个部分一直是分开设置的，巴菲特最终还是更偏向于实际运营企业的人，他认为如果真的懂经营必定懂投资，因为钱就是那里，而投资不一定能把注意力绑定在正确的方向上，比如，更关注管理的规模而不是实际的企业，这个问题为什么很难？
人工智能的研究可以做一点补充，如果知识局限于一个比较窄的领域，泛化的不够简洁，在面对新情况、新问题时给不出非常好的答案，如果一个企业很赚钱要给钱寻找新的出路就会遇到问题；大部分人都是普通 人，局限在一个比较窄的领域也是最好的策略，这在巴菲特对Right Business的定义中有很明显的体现，最好的生意往往是一些专注于单一品类的企业。
这些企业有非常好的财务表现，比如，“少变化、少杠杆、长期高ROE”，但业务本身很难配置新的资本，这时候如果CEO缺少资本配置的能力就不能有效保存已经到手的胜利果实。
What do you look for in a core stock?
在核心股票上你看重什么？
They are all low-cost producers; they are all either world leaders in their fields or can fully measure up to another of my yardsticks, the Japanese competition. They all now have promising new products, and they all have managements of above-average capabilities by a wide margin.
它们都是低成本生产者；要么是各自领域的全球领导者，要么能够完全符合我另一个衡量标准——经得起与日本竞争对手的比拼。它们现在都有很有前景的新产品，并且管理层的能力远高于平均水平。
跟巴菲特的想法一模一样，或者巴菲特就是从Phil Fisher得到的启发。
2、《1988-02-29 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory: Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply couldn’t be in better hands.
无论是做控股收购还是买入股票，我们都力求不仅买好企业，还要买那些由高素质、有才华、而且可亲的管理者经营的企业。如果我们在“与谁结盟”这件事上看走了眼，控股公司有一个表面上的优势：我们有权力推动变革。但在实践中，这个优势多少有点“虚幻”：更换管理层就像更换婚姻一样——痛苦、耗时、而且充满不确定性。无论如何，在我们那三项“可交易但永久持有”的投资上，这一点根本不构成问题：Cap Cities 有 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke，GEICO 有 Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson，The Washington Post 有 Kay Graham 和 Dick Simmons——我们不可能处在更好的托付之下。
控股公司在资本配置和税收上有优势，但是在人事变革和管理上的优势是“虚幻”的。
I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.
我会说，控股公司有两项主要优势。第一，当我们控股一家企业时，我们可以进行资本配置；而在可交易持股中，我们很可能对资本配置几乎没有发言权。这一点很重要，因为很多公司的负责人并不擅长资本配置。他们的不擅长并不奇怪：多数老板之所以爬到顶端，是因为他们在某个领域表现出色，比如市场营销、生产、工程、行政管理——有时甚至是机构政治。
局部泛化的缺陷，或者说不能产生更简洁、更统一的知识结构终归是有麻烦的，不能有效保存已经到手的胜利果实。
Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it’s as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
一旦他们成为 CEO，就要面对新的责任：他们必须做资本配置决策——这是一项关键工作，可能是他们从未真正处理过、而且也不容易掌握的工作。把话说得夸张一点：就好像一个极有天赋的音乐家，职业生涯的最后一步不是在 Carnegie Hall 演出，而是被任命为美联储主席。
The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.
许多 CEO 在资本配置上的欠缺，绝不是小事：在任十年后，如果一家公司每年留存的利润相当于净资产的10%，那么这位 CEO 其实已经对公司运用的全部资本中超过60%的那部分资本的“去向”负过责任了。
CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such “help.” On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.
那些意识到自己不擅长资本配置的 CEO（并不是人人都意识到）往往会试图用“求助”来弥补：转向内部幕僚、管理咨询公司或投资银行。Charlie 和我经常观察到这种“帮助”带来的后果。总体上，我们觉得：它更可能放大资本配置的问题，而不是解决问题。
In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That’s why you hear so much about “restructuring.”) Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.
归根结底，美国企业界发生了大量不聪明的资本配置。（这就是为什么你总听到那么多“重组”。）不过，Berkshire 很幸运。在我们那些重要的非控股持股公司里，资本总体上被配置得很好，有些情况下甚至堪称精彩。
The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.
控股公司相对于可交易证券的第二个优势，与税收有关。作为公司股东，Berkshire 持有非控股（即持股低于80%）的股权时，会承担一些显著的税负成本；而当我们的持股达到或超过80%时，就不会承受这些成本（或会大幅减轻）。这种税收劣势早就存在，但税法的变化使它在过去一年显著加重。因此，同样的经营成果，如果来自持股80%或以上的控股企业，而不是来自较小持股的企业，如今可能给 Berkshire 带来高出多达50%的财务结果。
80%以上的控股没有股息税但还是有资本利得税；如果是外国公司持股，股息有预扣税但没有资本利得税。
The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are sometimes offset by a huge advantage: Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non-controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices—dramatically below those commanded in negotiated transactions that transfer control. For example, we purchased our Washington Post stock in 1973 at $5.63 per share, and per-share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were $10.30. Similarly, Our GEICO stock was purchased in 1976, 1979 and 1980 at an average of $6.67 per share, and after-tax operating earnings per share last year were $9.01. In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a mighty good friend.
持有可流通证券的劣势，有时会被一个巨大的优势抵消：股市偶尔会给我们机会，让我们以荒谬的价格买到非控股的、极其卓越企业的一部分——价格大幅低于通过谈判交易获得控制权时所需要支付的价格。比如，我们在1973年以每股5.63美元买入 Washington Post；而该公司1987年每股税后经营利润是10.30美元。同样，我们的 GEICO 股票在1976、1979和1980年买入，平均成本为每股6.67美元；而该公司去年每股税后经营利润是9.01美元。在这样的案例里，Mr. Market 的确证明了自己是个非常好的朋友。
3、《1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
And when I’m not around, the logical, at some point — it depends on exactly when it happens, again. But Charlie’s a little older than I am. And it’s likely that it will be broken into a two-person function again, but not exactly the way Charlie and I function.
当我不在时，按照逻辑，在某个时点——这还要取决于事情发生的具体时间。由于 Charlie 比我年长一些，很可能会再次分成两个人的职能，但不完全是我和 Charlie 现在这种分工方式。
And that is that there will be someone in charge of investments and capital allocation. I mentioned Lou Simpson’s position, because he is younger than I am, in the annual report, and then someone in charge of operations. And we have that person in the organization now.
也就是说，会有人负责投资与资本配置——我在年报里提到过 Lou Simpson 的角色，因为他比我年轻——同时还会有人负责运营。而我们现在组织内已经有这样的人选。
Now, I don’t know what the situation will be when I die, because it could be in 20 minutes or it could be in 20 years. And when that — so, I can’t specifically name the individuals.
不过我不知道自己去世时的具体情况，因为那可能是 20 分钟后，也可能是 20 年后。既然如此——我就无法具体点名这些人。
We have the individuals now for both those functions. We’ll have the individuals for the same functions 20 years from now. I don’t know whether they’ll be the same people.
现在我们在这两个职能上都有人；20 年后我们在同样的职能上也会有人。我不知道是否还是同一批人。
But it’s quite a logical way to run the business. GEICO was run that way and still is run that way and has been for some years.
但这是一种相当合理的经营方式。GEICO 就是这样运作的，现在仍是如此，而且已经这样很多年了。
It’s always struck me as terribly illogical, the way property-casualty insurance companies are run, because they’ve been dominated by the underwriting side of the business. And here they have this important investment side, but it’s always been — virtually every company’s been subservient to the underwriting.
我一直觉得财产意外险公司的管理方式非常不合逻辑，因为它们长期由承保端主导。而明明还有极其重要的投资端，但几乎每家公司都让投资端从属于承保端。
And GEICO, very logically, set up a co-CEO arrangement some years back where — originally Bill Snyder before that — but Tony Nicely ran the underwriting end of the business and Lou Simpson ran the investment side.
而 GEICO 很合理地在若干年前设立了联席 CEO 架构——在那之前是 Bill Snyder——Tony Nicely 负责承保端业务，Lou Simpson 负责投资端。
And those are two very different functions. Same person, logically, doesn’t fit both functions in most cases. I mean, it’s a rarity when the same person happens to hit for both functions.
这两项是截然不同的职能。从逻辑上说，同一个人多数情况下并不适合同时胜任二者。同一人能在两端都打出好成绩是非常罕见的。
So GEICO worked very well that way. Still works that way. Lou runs investments. Tony runs underwriting.
因此 GEICO 以这种方式运作得非常好。现在还是这样。Lou 负责投资，Tony 负责承保。
And Berkshire — slightly different — it’s a variant on it. But, essentially, at Berkshire headquarters, you need someone overseeing and not meddling in them too much, but making sure you’ve got the right manager and you’re treating him fairly.
而 Berkshire——略有不同——是这种模式的一个变体。基本上，在 Berkshire 总部，你需要有人进行监督，但不过度干预；要确保你找对了经理人，并公平对待他。
You need someone on the operating side. You need someone on the investment/capital allocation side. We’ve got those people now. And we’ll have them, you know, whenever it happens, too.
你需要一个负责运营的人；你也需要一个负责投资/资本配置的人。我们现在就有这些人。不管事情何时发生，我们届时也会有这些人。
That’s the — that is the structure. And we’ve got some very good businesses.
这——这就是结构。而且我们拥有一些非常优秀的业务。
And, you know, nobody’s buying See’s Candy because they think I’m sitting in some office in Omaha. And no one’s buying a GEICO insurance policy because, you know, my name is there as chairman or CEO. The businesses are marvelous businesses. They’ll continue very well.
而且你知道，没有人是因为以为我坐在奥马哈某个办公室里才去买 See’s Candy。也没有人是因为我的名字挂着董事长或 CEO 才去买 GEICO 的保单。这些业务本身就很出色，它们会继续发展得很好。
And there will be a capital allocation problem then just like there is now. And there will be the problem of keeping good managers in place and treating them fairly. And that’s a solvable problem.
届时仍会像现在一样面临资本配置问题，也会面临如何留住优秀经理人并公平对待他们的问题。而这些都是可解的问题。
So, that’s the future as seen from Kiewit Plaza.
所以，这就是从 Kiewit Plaza 望去所看到的未来。
WARREN BUFFETT: There was a great article, and this applies — (applause) — to an earlier question.
WARREN BUFFETT：有一篇很棒的文章，这也——（掌声）——呼应了先前的问题。
There was a very good article in Forbes about one issue ago that showed the occupational profile of the U.S. at a couple of different intervals, going back to 1900.
在《Forbes》不久前的一期里，有篇文章对比了自 1900 年以来美国在若干时点的职业结构。
And one problem you can see, just by looking at that profile, is that, if you assume 20 percent of the — the bottom 20 percent — however you measure it, in terms of employability — whether it’s measured by IQ, or interest in working, or energy level, or whatever you want to do — they fit, very well, most of the jobs that were available a hundred years ago.
仅凭这张“结构图”，你就能看到一个问题：如果我们假设最末端的 20%（无论你用“就业能力”、IQ、工作兴趣、精力水平等指标衡量），在一百年前，他们与当时大量可供选择的工作高度匹配。
In other words, you could do most of the jobs, of which there were many, with relatively unimpressive mental abilities. And as jobs have changed, the profile of people hasn’t changed. So there are more people that end up on the short end.
换言之，当时有许多岗位并不需要突出的心智能力；而如今工作性质已改变，但人群“能力画像”并未同速改变，于是落在不利端的人更多了。
Now, the good part of that is the society produces so much more that it can take care of those people, one way or another. Now, the trick is to take care of them and make them not only feel, but be productive and be part of the act, and —
好的一面是，社会总产出大幅提升，有能力以某种方式照顾这些人。难点在于：既要照顾他们，也要让他们不仅有“被参与的感觉”，而且能真正产生产出、成为行动的一部分，并且——
We’ve got enough product to do that. But the country turns out way more output than 50 or a hundred years ago.
我们的“蛋糕”足够大；国家的产出比 50 年、100 年前高出许多。
We don’t have — we’re not perfect at figuring out how to make the bottom 20 or 30 percent, in terms of abilities, fit a new, changing job profile.
但我们并不擅长——也还远未完善——如何让“能力处于底部 20%—30% 的人”去适配这套不断变化的职位结构。
I really recommend you look at that Forbes magazine. Because if you think through the implications of those charts, I think you’ll see what social problems have to be attacked.
我强烈建议你看看那期《Forbes》。当你把那些图表的含义想透，我想你会更清楚：我们究竟该攻克哪些社会问题。
可以想象但巴菲特还需要实实在在的证据。
3、《1994-04-25 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t have any staff to help us on it. I mean, basically we tell them to mail all the money to Omaha — (laughter) — and then when we get there, we put our arms around it. (Laughs) And we allocate all the capital ourselves. I mean, that is our job. And we don’t feel we should delegate, I mean, we wouldn’t do it anyway. Our personalities aren’t such that we would delegate our — allocating our own money to someone — letting somebody else allocate our own money. But we feel that’s our job. And it’s interesting, and we’ve — I’ve written about this in the past — that that’s an important job for most managements. There’s some companies where it’s not, but it’s a — it usually is a very important job for most managements.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，我们没有任何团队来帮这件事。基本上，我们只需要告诉大家把钱都寄到 Omaha——（笑）——等钱到了，我们就把它们“紧紧抱住”。（笑）然后所有资本都由我们亲自配置。那是我们的工作。我们不认为应该把这事授权出去，事实上我们也不会那么做。我们的性格也不是那种会把“分配自己资金”的权力交给别人的人。我们认为这是我们的职责。有意思的是——我以前也写过——对大多数管理层而言，这是一项极其重要的工作。虽然对某些公司不一定如此，但对大多数公司，这通常都是非常重要的工作。
And if you take a CEO that’s in a job for 10 years, and he has a business that earns, say, 12 percent on equity, and he’s — and he pays out a third, that means he’s got 8 percent per year of equity. I mean, when you think of his tenure in office, how much capital he’s allocated, it’s an enormous factor over time. And yet, probably relatively few chief executives are either trained for, or are selected on, the basis of their ability to allocate capital. I mean, they get there through other routes. So, I’ve said it’s like somebody playing the piano all their life, and then getting to Carnegie Hall and they hand him a violin. I mean, it is a different function than most — than the route — than the functions that exist along the routes to the CEO’s job at most companies. And so many CEOs, when they get there, think they can solve it by either having a staff that does it, or by hiring consultants, or whatever it may be.
再想想一个任期 10 年的 CEO，如果他的企业股东权益回报率是 12%，每年分红三分之一，也就意味着每年有 8% 的权益留存。把任期拉长来看，他需要配置的资本量非常可观。然而，真正接受过“资本配置”训练、或以“资本配置能力”为选拔标准而走上 CEO 岗位的人，恐怕并不多——大多是通过其他路径上位。因此我说，这好比一个人一辈子练的是钢琴，结果到了 Carnegie Hall 却被递上一把小提琴。资本配置与多数人成为 CEO 的成长路径上那些职能，是完全不同的。而很多 CEO 上任后以为可以靠一个幕僚团队、或请咨询公司，就能把这事解决掉。
And in our view, that is — and that’s a terrible mistake, because it’s — it is, if not the key function of the CEO, it’s one of two or three key functions at say 80 or 90 percent of all companies. And if you can’t do it yourself, you’re going to make a lot of mistakes. You may make a lot of mistakes even if you do it yourself. But if you — You know, you wouldn’t want anybody in any other position of that importance in the company essentially saying, “I don’t know how to do this, so I’m going to have somebody else do it,” when it’s their key responsibility. But that’s the way it works in business. And Charlie and I take responsibility for all capital allocation decisions, other than just, sort of, routine expenditures at the operating businesses. And we don’t get into those at all. I mean, if our managers are spending three or four million dollars a year on machinery — or if one of them is, I mean — on machinery, equipment, plants, new leases — we have no review process on that.
在我们看来，这是——而且是个严重错误。因为在 80%—90% 的公司里，资本配置要么就是 CEO 的核心职能，要么至少是两三项核心职能之一。如果你自己不会做，就会犯很多错；即便你亲自做，也可能犯错。但你懂的，你不会希望公司里任何同等重要岗位的人说：“我不会做这件事，所以交给别人干吧”，而这恰恰是他的关键职责。可现实中的企业常常如此。除了各经营单位的日常性开支外，所有资本配置决策都由我和 Charlie 负责；那些日常开支我们完全不插手。比如我们的经理人每年花三四百万美元买机器、设备、厂房、签新租约——我们没有任何“总部审批流程”。
We don’t have a staff at headquarters. We don’t waste the time to do that. We think those people know how to allocate the money that relates to the actual operations of their business. We think, in terms of the capital that is generated above that, that that’s our job. Charlie, anything —?
我们总部没有“人员编制”。我们不会把时间浪费在那上面。我们认为一线经理最懂如何配置与其实际运营相关的资金。至于超出运营所需之外生成的资本，那就是我们的工作。Charlie，你要补充点——？
4、《2008-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
真正伟大的企业必须拥有可持续的“护城河”，以守护其出色的投入资本回报。资本主义的动力机制决定了：凡是能获得高回报的商业“城堡”，竞争者都会一再攻城。因此，像成为行业低成本生产者（GEICO、Costco）或拥有强大的全球品牌（Coca-Cola、Gillette、American Express）这样的坚固壁垒，是长期成功的关键。商业史充斥着“Roman Candles”式的公司——它们的护城河被证明是虚幻的，很快就被跨越。
前者代表执行力，后者代表独立思考。
5、《2015-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
39. Unlikely that one person will run both investments and operations
不太可能由同一个人同时负责投资和运营
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Then we’ll move on to Jonathan. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。那我们继续请Jonathan。（笑）
JONATHAN BRANDT: Warren, you have up to this point said that Berkshire in the future will have a chief executive officer and one or more chief investment officers.
JONATHAN BRANDT：Warren，到目前为止你提到过，未来Berkshire会有一位首席执行官，以及一位或多位首席投资官。
You haven’t explicitly said that a chief investment officer cannot be the CEO, but that has, for me at least, been implied.
你并没有明确说首席投资官不能担任CEO，但对我而言，至少是有这种暗示的。
Berkshire has been successfully managed for 50 years by a chairman and vice chairman whose principal experience was in allocating capital amongst a number of businesses and industries with which they were familiar and whose attributes they could compare.
过去50年里，Berkshire一直由一位主席和一位副主席成功管理，他们的主要经验在于在多个他们熟悉、且能够相互比较特性的业务与行业之间进行资本分配。
Since capital allocation is the key skill needed for a company structured the way Berkshire is, why couldn’t the company’s principal decision maker in the future also be someone who is experienced in choosing among different reinvestment options, with perhaps a second outstanding person expert in operations acting as chief operating officer, albeit a route of the hands-off one, given Berkshire’s extreme decentralization?
既然资本分配是像Berkshire这种结构所需的关键技能，为什么未来公司的主要决策者不能同样是一位擅长在不同再投资选项中做选择的人，再配上一位在运营方面出类拔萃的人担任首席运营官——考虑到Berkshire的高度分权，这位COO也许更像是“放手型”的角色呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a very good question.
WARREN BUFFETT：这是个非常好的问题。
It’s not inconceivable. It’s very unlikely, Jonny, that — but as you say, the — a chief investment officer has a — will have — or should have — a significant array of skills that would be useful, also, for a chief executive officer.
这并非不可想象，只是不太可能。Jonny——但是正如你所说，首席投资官确实拥有——或者应该拥有——一系列对首席执行官也非常有用的重要技能。
认为同一个人同时负责投资和运营并非不可想象，只是不太可能。
But I would say, also, that I would not want to move — if I were voting on it — I would not want to vote to put somebody whose sole experience had been investments in charge of an operation like Berkshire, who had not had any, also, significant operating experience.
但我还要说，如果要我投票，我不会赞成让一个只有投资经验、而没有任何重要运营经验的人来领导像Berkshire这样的公司。
I’ve said that I’m a better investment manager because I’ve been an operating manager, and I’m a better operating manager because I’ve been the investment manager.
我说过，我之所以能成为更好的投资经理，是因为我做过运营管理；而我之所以能成为更好的运营管理者，是因为我做过投资管理。
But the — you — operations — I’ve learned a lot through operations that I wouldn’t have learned if I’d stayed in investments all my life. I would not have been equipped to run it.
但是，运营——我通过运营学到了很多东西，如果我一辈子只做投资，是学不到的。我也不会具备运营一家公司的能力。
I learned a lot of things about operations by being in operations. So if you had somebody that had the dual experience and was very good at investments, but had a lot of experience in operations, that would be conceivable. Otherwise, I wouldn’t vote that way.
我是在亲自做运营时学到了很多关于运营的东西。所以，如果有一个人既有双重经验、在投资方面很出色，同时也有丰富的运营经验，这是可以想象的。否则，我不会那样投票。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, every year at Berkshire, as now constituted, the owned and controlled businesses get more and more important, and the measurable securities are relatively less important.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，在如今的Berkshire，每年我们自有并控制的业务都愈发重要，而可度量的证券相对变得没那么重要。
So, I think it would be crazy not to go with the tide to some extent.
因此，我认为不在一定程度上顺势而为是疯狂的。
And we need more — we need expertise beyond that of a typical portfolio analyst.
而且我们需要更多——需要超出典型投资组合分析师范畴的专业能力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But the CEO should have some real understanding of investments and investment alternatives and all that.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。不过CEO应该对投资、投资备选方案等等有真正的理解。
I’ve seen a lot of businesses run by people that really don’t understand the math of investing or capital allocation very well. So having a dual background is useful, but actually our operating managers know — some of them know — a lot about investing.
我见过很多企业由那些并不真正理解投资或资本分配“数学”的人来管理。所以具有双重背景是有用的，但事实上我们的运营经理中——有些人——对投资也非常了解。
6、《2024-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
Warren Buffett: Yeah, I would say that decision actually will be made when I’m not around, and I may try and come back and haunt them if they do it differently. But I’m not sure the Ouija board will get that job done. So that job, I’ll never know the answer on whether it get covered, but I feel very comfortable about the fact that it will be made by a board, that they’ve got loads of brainpower, they’ve got a dedication to an unusual institution, and they will figure things out. But I would say that if I were on that board and were making the decision, I would probably, knowing Greg, I would just leave. I would leave the capital allocation to Greg. And he understands businesses extremely well. And if you understand businesses, you understand common stocks. I mean, if you really know how business works, you are an investment manager. How much you manage, maybe just your own funds or maybe other people. And if you really are primarily interested in getting assets under management, which is where the money is, you know, you don’t really have to understand that sort of thing. But that’s not the case with Ted or Todd, obviously. But I think the responsibility ought to be entirely with Greg.The responsibility has been with me, and I farmed out some of it. And I used to think differently about how that would be handled, but I think the responsibility should be that of the CEO. And whatever that CEO decides may be helpful in effectuating that responsibility. That’s up to him or her to decide at the time they’re running
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会说那个决定实际上会在我不在的时候做出，如果他们做得不一样，我也许会尝试“回来”缠着他们。但我不确定占卜板能不能完成这项工作。所以这件事，我永远不会知道最后是否被覆盖（如何决定），但我对它将由董事会来做这个决定感到非常放心——他们有大量的脑力资源、对这个不寻常的机构的奉献，他们会想出办法。不过我想说，如果我在那个董事会并参与决策，考虑到我对 Greg 的了解，我可能会选择把权力留给他。我会把资本配置交给 Greg。并且他对业务理解得非常透彻。而如果你理解企业，你就理解普通股。我的意思是，如果你真正知道企业如何运作，你就是一名投资经理。你管理多少，可能只是你自己的资金，也可能是别人的。而如果你真正主要关心的是“管理资产规模”（那里才是赚钱的地方），你其实并不需要理解这类事情。但显然 Ted 或 Todd 不是这种情况。不过我认为责任应当完全由 Greg 承担。过去这个责任在我这里，我也外包（分配）了一部分。我过去对如何处理这件事有过不同的看法，但我现在认为责任应该属于 CEO。而无论那位 CEO 认为为了履行这项责任需要做什么、怎样更有帮助——在他们执掌资金的时候，这该由他或她来决定。
改变了多年以来的看法。
Warren Buffett: It’s working way better with Greg than with me because I just didn’t want to work as hard as he worked and I could get away with it because we’ve got a basically good business, very good business and I wasn’t in danger of you firing me by virtue of both ownership and the fact that we would do pretty well.
Warren Buffett：在 Greg 手里运转得比在我手里好得多，因为我并不想像他那样努力工作，而我之所以还能蒙混过关，是因为我们本来就是一家好公司，非常好的公司；再加上我既是股东又能交出不错的成绩，所以你们也不可能把我开掉。
But the fact that you can do pretty well doesn’t mean you couldn’t do better. And Greg can do better at many things. Many people want to be managed, need help in being managed. Some don’t. Some you just leave alone.
但“做得还不错”并不意味着“不能做得更好”。而在许多方面，Greg 能做得更好。很多人希望被管理、也需要在管理中得到帮助；也有一些人不需要，对他们你只要放手不管就好。
We’ve had managers it would have been crazy to start giving instructions to because they just quit. And I wouldn’t blame them because I’d be the same type myself. But a lot of people really do welcome direction and help, particularly when they’re getting it from somebody like Greg that really lives the life himself and doesn’t just come down from on high and say “here’s what you do” while I do something else. A manager that behaves differently than what he’s asking the people beneath them to behave – it just doesn’t work over time.
我们也有一些经理人，你一旦开始指手画脚那就太疯狂了——他们会直接辞职。我不会责怪他们，因为我自己也属于那一类人。但也有很多人确实欢迎方向与帮助，尤其当这帮助来自像 Greg 这样“身体力行”的人——不是高高在上地说“你就这么干”，而自己却去做别的事。一个管理者如果要求下属那样做、自己却那样做，长久看是行不通的。
And people want a manager that they admire and they’re not going to admire them if those people profess to behave in one manner and behave in another manner. It’s easier – this is a sad thing, but it’s easier for an organization to see its quality move downward than it is upward.
人们希望有一个值得敬佩的管理者；如果一个人言行不一，就不会赢得敬佩。有件令人遗憾的事是：一个组织的素质往下滑比往上升要容易得多。
I mean, if the boss behaves badly, it causes everybody to behave badly. That is really catching. It’s not as catching on the way up in upper management. But if the manager is doing a lot of little things to grease his own situation, pretty soon, let’s say you’re running a retail establishment, pretty soon all the employees or a lot of the employees are telling their friends that they get a discount with the retail operation and if they want something they’ll put it on their account and then get the discount.
我的意思是，如果老板行为不端，大家都会学坏——这传染性极强。向上感染没那么快，但如果管理者为了自己方便在很多小事上“抹油走账”，很快——比如你经营一家零售店——员工们就会告诉朋友可以拿员工折扣，想买什么先挂自己账户然后再打折。
Once you start deviating downward, it is really contagious and it is hard to rebuild. So, you really need someone that behaves well on top and is not playing games for their own benefit. And we get a lot of managers that bend over backwards not to do that sort of thing. And then we get a few that bend over forwards. And if you get enough companies, you’re going to get a lot of different forms of behavior, and Greg does something about it and I’ve generally been lax in doing something about it, but he’s done a way better job at that than I have.
一旦开始向下偏离，就会迅速蔓延，而且很难重建。所以你必须在顶层放一个行为端正、不玩小算盘的人。我们有很多经理人为此竭尽全力，也有少数人“向前弯腰”。当公司多了，各种行为都会出现；Greg 会着手处理，而我通常不够严格——在这方面他做得比我好得多。
不能再要求BRK出现巴菲特这样的人才，Greg不是巴菲特，做不了巴菲特能做的事，但是BRK已经在商业模式上取得的优势可以弥补管理团队能力上的不足。
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