I.C.S.103.我们的商业模式
一些好的企业是一个聪明的假设（Intelligent Hyposes）套接一个简单的想法（Simple Ideas，一个完整的想法包括假设、事实和推理，参考：《I.C.S.104.我们的工作方法》），假设错了后面很难理顺，假设对了杂事和噪音自然烟消云散，一切都会顺利。
这里的假设就是企业的使命和愿景，我们目前的版本：1、使命，把钱种在地里，种下的每一块钱都能创造超过一块钱的价值；2、愿景，成为长期储蓄、终身储蓄的载体。
1、Intelligent Hyposes（聪明的假设）
先理解巴菲特的投资思想和方法再形成自己的策略。
（1）巴菲特的投资策略
在巴菲特的投资生涯中至少有两处明确表述了他的投资策略。
在巴菲特的投资生涯中至少有两处明确表述了他的投资策略。
- 1962年
I、低估值，II、套利“work out”，III、控制类，从低估值的股票入手，后续有两种脱离路径的可能，一是找不到目标，这时候就做点套利；二是砸在手上了，考虑发展成控制类、进入董事会，想办法控制公司、变卖资产、变换管理层，等等，这是前后联系、逻辑上闭环的策略，参考：《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》。
- 2015年
BRK的策略是“保险+投资”，巴菲特在计算内在价值时表述的很清楚：《Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value》，同时他在2015年（管理BRK的第50年）写了BRK100年以后的经济假设，参考：《2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.这些构件建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一个世纪之后，BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy仍将在人类经济中发挥关键作用。住宅和汽车仍将是大多数家庭生活的核心。保险对企业和个人依然不可或缺。展望未来，Charlie和我看到一个为Berkshire量身定制的世界。我们很幸运被托付去管理它。
（2）我们的投资策略
我们的策略还处于探索的阶段，大致思路如下：
- 重点行业
保险、金融、消费品、科技是我们的重点。
- 基础策略
基础策略的重点是保险、金融、消费品，消费品的长期繁荣可以参考：《1787-12-05 Federalist No. 17 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union》。
- 基础策略和科技的结合
苹果是一个非常好的例子，乔布斯说苹果是人文艺术和科技的综合，从投资的角度可以看成基础策略（iPhone的消费品属性）和科技的结合，至少30%的资金配置在这个领域。
2、Correct facts（正确的事实）
重要且可知（important and Knowable）的事实。
（1）操作系统
（2）给企业估值
3、Sound Reasoning（合理的推理）
如果有一笔远离生存线的钱，这笔钱的收益率大概是9-10%（根据巴菲特的方法按现在的税率重新换算的结果），参考：《1977-05 Warren Buffett.How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor》。
So let’s also assume, in line with recent experience, that corporations earning 12 percent on equity pay out 5 percent in cash dividends (2.5% after tax). And retain 7 percent, with those retained earnings producing a corresponding market-value growth (4.9 percent after the 30 percent tax). The after-tax return, then, would be 7.4 percent. Probably this should be rounded down to about 7 percent to allow for frictional costs. To push our stocks- as-disguised-bonds thesis one notch further, then, stocks might be regarded as the equivalent, for individuals, of 7 percent tax-exempt perpetual bonds.
因此，让我们结合近期经验来假设：企业在股本上赚取 12%，其中 5% 以现金股息形式支付（税后 2.5%），另有 7% 留存，且这些留存收益带来相应的市值增长（税后 4.9%）。那么税后回报为 7.4%。考虑到摩擦性成本，可能应将其四舍五入至 7%。进一步推动我们“股票即伪装债券”的论点，股票可以被视为相当于个人持有的 **7% 免税的永续债券**。
现在税率更低但PB更高，股息：联邦15%，高的不超过30%；长期资本利得：联邦顶格23.8%，高的可到35-37%，套回巴菲特的计算逻辑，5%的现金股息扣税后（税率15%）得4.25%，留存的7%扣税后（税率25%）得5.25%，合计9.5%。
（1）基础目标
能通过策略的合理性检测：《ICS104.我们的工作方法》，就能实现基础的目标（I.C.S三道推理的目标是15%，略高于S&P500的平均收益率）。
（2）超额收益
超额收益来自日常性的工作：给企业估值，看的越多机会越多，可能实现超额收益的概率越高。
*****
4、Appendix
Appendix.1.《1949 The Intelligent Investor-Chapter 7 “Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: The Positive Side》
To obtain better than average investment results over a long pull requires a policy of selection or operation possessing a twofold merit: (1) It must meet objective or rational tests of underlying soundness; and (2) it must be different from the policy followed by most investors or speculators.
要在长期内获得高于平均水平的投资回报，必须采用一种具有双重优点的选择或操作策略： (1) 它必须通过对基本面稳健性的客观或理性检验；(2) 它必须有别于大多数投资者或投机者所遵循的策略。
Appendix.2.《1979-08-06 Warren Buffett.You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus》
A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn't it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: "Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved," etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.
第二种观点认为，近期前景存在太多问号；不如等形势明朗一些再行动。你知道那些套话：“保留购买能力，直至当前不确定性消除”等等。在依赖这根拐杖之前，先直面两件令人不快的事实：未来从来不清晰；在股市里，你会为愉快的一致预期付出极高的代价。不确定性实际上是长期价值买家的朋友。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we do define risk as the possibility of harm or injury. And in that respect we think it’s inextricably wound up in your time horizon for holding an asset. I mean, if your risk is that you’re going — if you intend to buy XYZ Corporation at 11:30 this morning and sell it out before the close today, I mean, that is, in our view, that is a very risky transaction. Because we think 50 percent of the time you’re going to suffer some harm or injury. If you have a time horizon on a business, we think the risk of buying something like Coca-Cola at the price we bought it at a few years ago is essentially, is so close to nil, in terms of our perspective holding period. But if you asked me the risk of buying Coca-Cola this morning and you’re going to sell it tomorrow morning, I say that is a very risky transaction. Now, as I pointed out in the annual report, it became very fashionable in the academic world, and then that spilled over into the financial markets, to define risk in terms of volatility, of which beta became a measure.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们把风险定义为“受到伤害或损失的可能性”。在这个意义上，我们认为风险与资产的持有期限“密不可分”。也就是说，如果你的“风险场景”是——今天上午 11:30 买入 XYZ Corporation 并在今天收盘前卖出——在我们看来，这是一次非常高风险的交易，因为我们认为你有 50% 的概率会遭受某种损害或损失。若你的持有期限是“企业视角”，那么以我们几年前买入 Coca-Cola 的价格来看，在我们的持有期框架内，其风险本质上“接近于零”。但如果你问我“今天早上买 Coca-Cola、明早卖出”的风险，我会说那是非常高风险的交易。正如我在年报中指出的，学术界曾风行（并外溢至金融市场）把“波动性”当作风险的定义，而 beta 成为了其度量。
But that is no measure of risk to us. The risk, in terms of our super-cat business, is not that we lose money in any given year. We know we’re going to lose money in some given day, that is for certain. And we’re extremely likely to lose money in a given year. Our time horizon of writing that business, you know, would be at least a decade. And we think the probability of losing money over a decade is low. So we feel that, in terms of our horizon of investment, that that is not a risky business. And it’s a whole lot less risky than writing something that’s much more predictable. Interesting thing is that using conventional measures of risk, something whose return varies from year to year between plus-20 percent and plus-80 percent is riskier, as defined, than something whose return is 5 percent a year every year. We just think the financial world has gone haywire in terms of measures of risk. We look at what we do — we are perfectly willing to lose money on a given transaction, arbitrage being an example, any given insurance policy being another example. We are perfectly willing to lose money on any given transaction.
但对我们来说，那并不是风险的度量。以我们的“超额巨灾（super-cat）”业务为例，风险不在于“某一年会不会亏钱”——我们知道“某一天一定会亏钱”，而且“某一年极有可能亏钱”。但我们经营该业务的时间视角至少是十年，我们认为“十年整体亏损”的概率很低。因此在我们的投资视角下，那并不是高风险业务，甚至比一些“看上去更可预测”的业务风险还低。有趣的是，用传统的风险衡量方法，年回报在 +20% 与 +80% 之间波动的标的，被定义为比“每年固定 5% 回报”的标的更“高风险”。我们只是认为金融世界在风险度量上“有些走偏了”。就我们自己的操作而言——我们完全接受“单笔交易可能亏损”，比如套利、或者某张保险保单——我们完全可以接受“单笔亏损”。
We are not willing to enter into transactions in which we think the probability of doing a number of mutually independent events, but of a similar type, has an expectancy of loss. And we hope that we are entering into our transactions where our calculations of those probabilities have validity. And to do so, we try to narrow it down. There are a whole bunch of things we just won’t do because we don’t think we can write the equation on them. But we, basically, Charlie and I by nature are pretty risk-averse. But we are very willing to enter into transactions — We, if we knew it was an honest coin, and someone wanted to give us seven-to-five or something of the sort on one flip, how much of Berkshire’s net worth would we put on that flip? Well we would — it would sound like a big number to you. It would not be a huge percentage of the net worth, but it would be a significant number. We will do things when probabilities favor us. Charlie?
我们不愿参与那种“由若干相互独立但同类的事件组成、其总体期望值为亏损”的交易。我们希望在进入交易时，我们对相关概率的计算是“有效”的。为此，我们会尽量“收窄范围”——一大堆“我们写不出概率方程”的事，我们干脆不碰。总体上，我和 Charlie 的天性都相当“厌恶风险”。但只要概率对我们有利，我们非常愿意参与交易——如果我们知道抛的是“公平的硬币”，有人愿意按“7 比 5 的赔率（seven-to-five）”让我们押一次，那我们会拿出多少 Berkshire 的净资产去押？答案会让你觉得数额不小；占净资产的比例不会巨大，但绝对值会相当可观。只要胜率在我们这边，我们就会出手。Charlie？
MELINDA GATES:
梅琳达·盖茨：
And I think one of the important things that he told us about the foundation very early on was that to pick what we wanted to focus on and once we picked the bull’s-eye of our target, the other places— pieces would drop away and it would be ok. Because we were, initially before we chose our focus, we were getting lots and lots of letters from lots of worthy causes, things that really tugged at your heart and your head. And I think once he helped us see that, it was really beneficial to us and we really had—did pick an early focus and have stuck to it. And the other thing I’ll say that he was just incredibly kind to me about in the early years after we started—we got married and started to have children was, he could see I was struggling between work which I love, the foundation and the kids, and he said “don’t worry Melinda, you know, you’re doing the right thing as a parent and you’ve got enough time to do what you’re doing at the foundation too.” And he was just—he’s just very kind in that way.
我认为，他很早就跟我们谈到基金会的重要一点，就是要选择我们想要专注的方向，一旦选定了目标的中心，其它杂事自然会烟消云散，一切都会顺利。因为在我们选择专注方向之前，我们收到过很多来自各种值得支持的事业的来信，那些事既触动了你的心也启发了你的头脑。当他帮助我们认识到这一点后，对我们来说真是大有裨益，我们早早便确定了方向并始终坚持下去。还有一点我要说的是，在我们开始后不久——当我们结婚、生了孩子的早年时期——他对我非常好，他看得出我在工作（我热爱的工作）、基金会事务和孩子之间挣扎，他说“别担心，梅琳达，你作为家长做得对，而且你还有足够的时间去处理基金会的事务。”他就是这样，总是那么体贴。
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