I.H.187.Warren Buffett.A Word About Par and Feedback Mechanism
人的认知与决策，其实是一个“方向→记忆→泛化→再回到方向”的闭环飞轮：你把什么当作“好/坏”的方向信号，会决定你一路收集并强化什么记忆；这些记忆又会沉淀成你对世界的泛化结构（框架、习惯、偏见），反过来影响你下一轮的方向选择。方向一旦偏了，错误样本会被反复写入记忆，泛化结构也会一起偏；更麻烦的是，人很容易进入“自我保护闭环”——反证被解释掉、被忽略掉、被同温层稀释掉，于是纠错成本快速上升。
这时，一个足够简单、公开透明、事先约定的衡量标准（Par）未必能保证你不犯错，但它能显著提高你及时纠错的概率。巴菲特当年用 Dow 作为 Par；如果换成今天更常用、更容易执行的广泛市场基准，S&P 500对大多数人来说是最干净也最公平的选择。你不需要每天辩论自己是否“理解更深”，只需要在足够长的窗口里（至少三年，更理想是五年），用可复现的数据口径回答一个问题：主动决策是否创造了净价值？如果长期没有，就应该把结论从“我还要更努力押对”改成“我应该减少主动、回到能力圈、把大部分资产指数化”。这不是否定自己，恰恰是最深的自知之明：承认无知，承认没有优势，用正确的游戏规则依然可以跑赢大多数参与者。
承认自己“一无所知”，等于知道了一件对自己最重要的事：你不可能了解所有事，但你必须了解自己——知道自己的能力圈边界、知道自己会自我解释、也知道自己会在痛苦时刻本能地为过去辩护。这不是消极，而是一种很罕见的智慧。对投资而言，它意味着：与其追求“永远做对”，不如建立一套能让你尽早发现做错、并且不得不修正的机制。
对于少数真正知道自己在做什么的人——按照“能力圈”的定义，他们对自己做的事没有根本性疑问，或者至少有相当程度的确信——Par 的作用就不止是“警报器”，也是“激励器”。因为 Par 代表平均水平：战胜平均并非终点，而是起步的要求；它迫使你把“我觉得我很懂”转换成“我确实做得更好”，并长期保持诚实与纪律。
1、《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
A Word About Par
关于衡量标准
The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.
我在最初选择合伙人，以及随后处理与合伙人的关系时，最看重的就是我们要达成一致，使用同样的衡量标准。如果我的业绩差，合伙人就该撤资，我自己也不会继续再股市投资了。如果业绩好，我明确知道自己表现出色，我可以很坦然。
The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
问题在于，什么是好，什么是差，我们一定要达成一致。衡量标准应该事先定好。事后再找参照标准，无论业绩如何，总能找到更差的。
I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
我一直把道指作为我们的衡量标准。我的个人观点是要检验投资表现，至少要看三年时间，最能检验出真实水平的是期末道指点位与期初很接近，看在此期间投资表现如何。
While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
什么衡量标准都不十全十美，道指也如此，但是参照道指的好处是，它众所周知、历史悠久，可以相当准确地反映一般投资者的表现。我不反对使用其他标准来衡量股市表现，例如，可以用其他的指数、大型基金、银行共同信托基金等。
You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
你可能认为，道指不就是无人管理的 30 只蓝筹股吗，跑赢道指应该很容易，我选的参照标准是不是太低了。道指其实是很难战胜的。亚瑟·威辛保 (Arthur Wiesenberger) 写过一本很有名的书，是关于基金公司的，其中列出了所有大型基金从 1946 到 1960 这 15 年里的业绩。目前，美国基金掌管的资产规模是 200 亿美元，基金的整体表现可以反映几千万投资者的收益率。我没有相关数据，但我认为大多数投资咨询机构和银行信托的收益率和这些基金不相上下。
基本上是个逻辑题，0.1%的人忙着求生，99.9%的忙着求死，整体又是稳步求生的，把某个人单独拿出来是0.1%的可能性很小，并且0.1%群体本身是不断变化的，能持续繁荣超过30年的伟大企业或人都非常少，0.1%的人可能有一份天赋带来的快乐，但普通人可以通过指数获得财务上的成功，并用其他方面的天赋获得快乐。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.
在《Charts & Statistics》中，威辛保统计了 1946 年以来有持续业绩记录的 70 只基金。我把其中 32 只基金剔除了，它们有些是平衡型基金（因此没充分参与股市上涨），有些是专门投资某个行业的基金。我觉得用这 32 只基金进行比较不合适。这 32 只基金里，有 31 只跑输道指，排除它们不会影响我们得出的结论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.
剩下的 38 只基金与道指更有可比性，其中 32 只跑输道指，6 只跑赢。1960 年末，跑赢道指的 6 只基金资产规模约为 10 亿美元，跑输的 32 只基金资产规模约为 65 亿美元。跑赢的这 6 只基金，每年领先幅度也不到几个百分点。
Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don't have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:
以下是我们这几年的业绩与最大的两只开放式股票基金与最大的两只封闭基金的对比情况（没有 1961 年的对比，因为我没有这年的准确数据，粗略估算应该和 1957-60 差不多）：
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)
（来源：Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961）
COMPOUNDED 复合收益率
Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.
Massachusetts Investors Trust 的净资产有 18 亿美元左右；Investors Stock Fund 约有 10 亿美元；Tri -Continental Corporation 约 5 亿美元；Lehman Corporation 约 3.5 亿美元。它们的净资产总和是 35 亿美元以上。
I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.
我整理上述表格和信息，目的不是批评基金公司。让我管这么多钱，受到种种限制，不能像管理我们的合伙基金这样投资，我的业绩也不会比它们强多少。我是想用上述数据说明战胜道指没那么容易，别说跑赢，美国大多数基金连跟上道指都很难。
Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.
我们的投资组合和道指的成分股完全不同。我们的投资方法和基金的投资方法差别很大。
However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.
我们的大多数合伙人，如果不把资金投到我们的合伙账户中，可供选择的投资方式可能就是买基金，获得与道指类似的收益率，因此，我认为把道指作为我们的业绩衡量标准很合理。
2、《1964-07-08 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self- management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
道指不是衡量股票投资业绩的唯一标准，但所有投资管理活动（包括管理自己的资金在内）都要经受客观的检验，检验标准应该事先确定，不能事后自己随便选。
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
资管行业规模庞大。基金经理非常重视评估汽车、钢铁、化工等各行各业的公司的管理层。为了分析公司管理层优劣，他们会严肃认真地投入大量时间和精力。基金经理不辞辛苦地评估投资组合中公司的管理层，他们自己却不会受到同样的评估，这实属不该。我们认为，投资者和基金经理必须确立业绩评估标准，并且像研究自己的投资标的一样，经常客观地审视自己的业绩。
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
我们就这么做，不管评估结果如何。不用我说，大家也知道，我们有确定的业绩衡量标准，只能保证我们能做到客观评估，绝对不等于我们就能取得良好的业绩。提到衡量业绩，我们再回顾一下“基本原则”(Ground Rules) 是怎么说的。基本原则中说，鉴于我们的投资方式，衡量我们的表现，至少要看三年，而且投机气氛浓厚时，我们很可能落后。有一点，我可以向各位保证。既然我们已经把标准定在了 90 厘米，标准就始终是 90 厘米。我们不会因为达不到标准而修改标准。依我之见，在规模高达几千亿的资管行业中，如果人人都确立合理的标准来衡量能力，并有意识地付诸实践，这个行业会更健康地发展。在日常商业活动中，无论是评估市场、人员、机器，还是流程，人们普遍遵循既定标准，资管可是世界上规模最大的商业行业。
检验自己是不是一无所知。
3、《1993-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.” We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”
我们的股票投资策略与十五年前几乎无异。正如我们在1977年的年报中所说：“我们选择可交易普通股的方式，基本就像评估一整家公司是否值得整体收购。我们希望该企业：(a) 我们能够理解；(b) 具备良好的长期前景；(c) 由诚实且能干的人经营；(d) 可在一个非常有吸引力的价格买到。”只有一处我们认为需要调整：鉴于市场环境与我们的体量，我们如今将“非常有吸引力的价格”改为“有吸引力的价格”。
4、《2002-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
30. Staying rational and avoiding confirmation bias
保持理性并避免确认偏误
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6. We have a break in about five minutes. In fact, we’ll do this question and then we’ll break.
WARREN BUFFETT：6 区。我们大概五分钟后休息。事实上，我们先回答这个问题，然后再休息。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. My name’s Paul Tomasik from Illinois. I’d like to talk about your thinking, if you don’t mind. In the “Fortune” magazine article that you sent to all the shareholders, you referenced a practice by Darwin that when he found something that was contrary to his established conclusions, he quickly wrote it down because the mind would’ve pushed it out. And if you read “The Origin of Species,” Darwin’s very careful to avoid fooling himself. He very carefully asks and answers the hard questions. It’s a feedback mechanism, and you’ve picked up on one of his feedback mechanisms to avoid fooling yourself. So the two questions are this: If you look — model — how you think, Charlie thinks, how physicists think, how mathematicians think, you see the same pattern. You want to use logic. You’re dedicated to logic. But logic’s not enough. You have to avoid fooling yourself, so you build feedback mechanisms. So the first question is, do you see it that way?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的。我叫 Paul Tomasik，来自伊利诺伊州。如果你不介意的话，我想谈谈你们“怎么思考”的问题。在你寄给全体股东的那篇《Fortune》杂志文章里，你提到 Darwin 的一个做法：一旦他发现某个事实与自己既有结论相反，他会立刻把它记下来，因为大脑本能上会把这些东西“排斥掉”。如果你去读《The Origin of Species（物种起源）》，会发现 Darwin 极其小心，避免自欺，他会非常仔细地提出并回答那些最难的问题。这是一种“反馈机制”，而你显然是采纳了他这种避免自欺的反馈机制之一。所以我有两个问题：如果你把你自己的思维方式、Charlie 的思维方式、物理学家的思维方式、数学家的思维方式拿来做一个“模型”，你会看到同样的模式：你们都想使用逻辑、都致力于按逻辑来思考，但光有逻辑还不够，还得避免自欺，所以你们会刻意搭建各种反馈机制。第一个问题是：你是否也是这样看待自己的？
That you’re thinking just like mathematicians, physicists, and some of the other exceptional businessmen, by being logical and being careful to have feedback mechanisms? And the second question is about other feedback mechanisms. Your partnership — sitting next to you is a great feedback mechanism. Hard to fool yourself when you partner with Charlie Munger.
也就是说，你是不是认为：自己和数学家、物理学家以及一些杰出的商人一样，都是靠讲逻辑、再加上小心翼翼地建立反馈机制来思考？第二个问题是关于其他的反馈机制。你们的合伙关系——你身边这位就是一个极好的“反馈机制”。当你的合伙人是 Charlie Munger 时，你要想自欺其实挺难的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
WARREN BUFFETT：没错。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This meeting’s a feedback —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：这场股东大会本身也是一种反馈——
WARREN BUFFETT: Hard to fool him, too. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：也很难糊弄得了他。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But that’s not an accident. The meeting is one level of feedback mechanism, the way you attack the annual report letter is a feedback mechanism. So you could comment, both of you, on other feedback mechanisms you developed? Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：但这当然不是偶然的。这个大会本身就是一层反馈机制；你们处理年度股东信的方式，也是一个反馈机制。所以能不能请你们两位谈谈：你们还为自己设计了哪些其他的反馈机制？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ve come up with two very good ones. I mean, there’s no question that Charlie will not accept anything I say because I say it, whereas a lot of other people will. You know, I mean, it’s just the way the world works. And it’s terrific to have a partner who will say, you know, you’re not thinking straight.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你刚才提到的这两个，确实都是非常好的例子。毫无疑问，Charlie 不会因为“话是我说的”就接受它，而很多其他人会——这是这个世界的“正常状态”。能有一个合伙人，会直接跟你说“你这个地方想得不对劲”，这是件极其幸运的事。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It doesn’t happen very often.
CHARLIE MUNGER：这种事儿倒也不经常发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s no question, the human mind — what the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact. I mean, that is a talent everyone seems to have mastered. And how do we guard ourselves against it? Well, we don’t achieve it perfectly. I mean, Charlie and I have made big mistakes because, in effect, we have been unwilling to look afresh at something. You know, that happens. But we do have — I think the annual report is a good feedback mechanism. I think that reporting on yourself, and giving the report honestly, whether you do it through an annual report or do it through some other mechanism, is very useful. But there — I would say a partner, who is not subservient, and who himself is extremely logical, you know, is probably the best mechanism you can have. I would say that on the contrary, to get back to looking things you have to be sure you don’t fall into, I would say the typical corporate organization is designed so that the CEO opinions and biases and previous beliefs are reinforced in every possible way.
WARREN BUFFETT：毫无疑问，人类大脑——人类最擅长的一件事，就是把所有新的信息都“解释”为不改变自己原来的结论。也就是说，任何新东西一进来，我们都会本能地把它加工成“支持我原来想法的证据”。这几乎是所有人都已经练得炉火纯青的本事。那么我们怎么防止自己落进这个陷阱呢？说实话，我们做不到完美。Charlie 和我也犯过大错误，归根到底，就是我们当时不愿意“重新再看一遍”某件事——这种情况是会发生的。不过，我们确实有一些防护措施——我认为年度报告就是一个很好的反馈机制。不管是通过年报，还是通过别的方式，“对自己做诚实的汇报”这件事本身就非常有用。但是，我还想补充一点：如果你能有一个不是唯唯诺诺、而是本身极其讲逻辑的合伙人，我觉得那可能是你能拥有的“最佳反馈机制”。反过来说，要回到你刚才说“必须避免的那些东西”：我认为典型的大公司组织结构，基本上就是“按一切可能的方式”来强化 CEO 的观点、偏见和既有信念的。
大脑默认的方式是沿着原来的轨迹思考问题，巴菲特列了两条防范的措施。
（1）股东信，文字记录的好处是给心理活动留下空间，文字本身又是高度压缩的智慧，可以比较方便的反复调整注意力的方向，任何其他的方法都很难现实相同的效果；
（2）团队内部有一些独立思考的人，能提供纠正偏见的机会。
I mean, having staff surround you that know what you want to do, you are not going to get a lot of — you’re not going to get a lot of contrary thinking. I mean, most staffs, if they know you want to buy a company, you’re going to get a recommendation. Whatever your hurdle rate, if it’s 15 percent internal rate of return, which very few deals ever work out at, you know, or 12 or — they’re going to come back, and they’re going to come back with whatever they feel that you want. And if you arrange your organization so that you basically have a bunch of, you know, sycophants who are cloaked in other, you know, titles, you’re not going to get — you are going to leave your prior conclusions intact, and you’re going to get whatever you go in with your biases wanting. And the board is not going to be much of a check on that.
我的意思是，如果你身边围着一圈下属，他们很清楚“你想干什么”，那你是基本别指望会听到多少“相反意见”的。大多数幕僚，一旦知道你想买一家公司，不管你的 hurdle rate（内部收益率门槛）是 15%——而事实上几乎没有哪笔交易能做到这个数字——还是 12%，他们最后都会端出一份“符合你期待”的方案回来。他们会端回来他们“认为你想要的东西”。如果你把组织结构设计成：周围基本上是一群“马屁精”，只是披着各种不同的头衔，那结果就很清楚了——你的原有结论会完好无损地被保留下来，而你也一定会“得到”你原本带着偏见一头冲进去想要的那个结果。董事会在这方面通常起不了什么真正的制衡作用。
I’ve seen very, very few boards that can stand up to the CEO on something that’s important to the CEO and just say, you know, “You’re not going to get it.” You’ve hit on a terribly important point. All of us in this room want to read new information and have it confirm our cherished beliefs. I mean, it is just built into the human system. And that can be very expensive in the investment and business world. And, like I say, I think we’ve got a pretty good system. And I think that most of the systems aren’t very good, that exist in corporate America, to avoid falling into the trap you’re talking about. Charlie?
我见过的董事会里，能在一件对 CEO 本人非常重要的事情上，站出来对他说一句“这件事你就是办不成”的，实在是少之又少。你刚才点到了一个极其重要的问题：在座我们所有人，看到新信息的时候，内心深处都希望它来“印证我们原先最珍视的那些看法”。这是写在“人类操作系统”里的默认设置。而在投资和商业世界里，这种倾向的代价会非常大。就像我说的，我觉得我们自己这套机制还算不错；但在整个美国企业界，大部分现有机制在防止你说的这种陷阱方面，其实都做得并不好。Charlie？
Steve Forbes: Now, in terms of that, many times, a foundation gets set up. And...
Steve Forbes：不过在实际操作中，很多时候，基金会设立之后，会……
Warren Buffet: Goes off in a different direction.
Warren Buffet：跑偏，朝着不同的方向去了。
Steve Forbes: And there's this thing called Parkinson's Law, that an organization becomes self-centered, in for itself, and forgets its purpose that it was created for.
Steve Forbes：还有所谓的 Parkinson's Law：组织会变得以自我为中心，为自身而存在，忘了最初的使命。
Warren Buffet: I see it all the time.
Warren Buffet：我经常见到这种情况。
Steve Forbes: You see it in business--that's why they go broke oftentimes. But in foundations, you see it. So you made a provision that that was not going to happen with your funds, and they had to be... those monies had to be deployed what, within 10 years?
Steve Forbes：商业里也是如此——这往往就是他们破产的原因之一。基金会也不例外。所以你设了条款，避免你的资金出现这种情况，要求这些钱必须在——多久之内花完？十年？
Warren Buffet: 10 years after my estate's completed. Yeah, and the money has to all be spent--it can't go to institutions which in turn put it in there endowment or anything like that. I want people that I know, and I know are in sync with me, and I know will be true to certain ideals. I want them to dispense it because who the hell knows, 50 years from now, when the place becomes some large institution, what will happen. People will rationalize then that what's good for the institution is exactly what old Warren thought 40 years ago on his deathbed. So I've seen that happen too often. And I... foundations are not tested by a market system. If you've got a business idea, and he's got music, it's being tested by a market system. People will make a decision was whether that next album is good, and they'll make a decision whether Coca Cola still keeps them happy, and all that sort of thing. A foundation has no market tests. So it's very easy, if there's not a market test, as people will find out in government and other places, it's very easy to start rationalizing things that are a long way from what you originally--people thought you were setting out to do.
Warren Buffet：在我的遗产清算完成后的10年内。对，而且这些钱必须全部花掉——不能给那些再把钱放进自己捐赠的机构。我希望把钱交给我认识、与我理念一致、忠于特定理想的人去使用。因为谁也不知道50年后，当某个机构变成庞然大物时会变成什么样。到那时人们会自圆其说，把“对机构有利”的事，解释成“老 Warren 在四十年前临终时的本意”。这种事我见得太多了。再者……基金会没有“市场检验”。你有商业点子，他有音乐作品——都会被市场检验。人们会用脚投票：下一张专辑好不好、Coca Cola 是否还能令他们满足，等等。而基金会没有市场检验。没有市场检验，就很容易——政府和其他领域的人也会发现——很容易开始把事情合理化，离最初的使命越来越远。
没有有效反馈机制的事都会慢慢进入自我解释、自我强化的状态。
6、《2011-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.
Charlie 和我认为，凡是受托管理他人资金的人，都应该在一开始就设定清晰的业绩目标。如果缺乏这样的标准，管理层就很容易先随便射出一箭，然后再在箭落之处画上靶心，把结果说成是原本的目标。
1962年的股东信里有一段专门内容：“A Word About Par”。
In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.
就 Berkshire 而言，我们早就告诉过你们，我们的工作就是让每股内在价值的增长率，长期跑赢标普 500 指数（包括股息） 的增幅。有的年份我们做到了，有的年份我们做不到。但如果从长期来看，我们无法实现这一目标，那就说明我们根本没有为投资人做成什么事——因为他们自己去买一只指数基金，就可以获得相同甚至更好的结果。
The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.
当然，难点在于如何计算内在价值。如果把这个任务分别交给 Charlie 和我去算，你会得到两个不同的数字。精确到小数点后的那种精度，在这件事上根本不可能。
To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.
为了减少主观性，我们在衡量自己业绩时，就用一个偏保守的内在价值替代指标——账面价值。可以肯定的是，我们有些业务的实际价值远远高于它们在账面上的记录值（在本报告后面，我们会举一个具体例子）。但由于这种“溢价”一般不会在年与年之间剧烈波动，账面价值就可以作为一个合理的工具，用来跟踪我们到底做得怎么样。
The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.
本报告第 2 页的表格展示了我们与标普指数对比的 46 年业绩记录：早期表现相当出色，而现在则只能算是尚可。我们要强调的是，那些“丰收的年代”不会再来了。我们目前管理的资本规模过于庞大，这几乎排除了再取得异常亮丽业绩的可能性。不过，我们仍会努力争取取得“好于平均”的结果，也认为你们用这个标准来要求我们，是完全合理的。
Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.
需要说明的是，年度数据既不能被忽视，也不应被视为一切的全部。地球绕太阳公转的节奏，并不必然与投资构想或经营决策结出果实所需的时间同步。以 GEICO 为例，我们去年非常积极地投入了 9 亿美元用于广告，只是为了争取那些短期内并不能带给我们任何利润的保单持有人。如果我们能把两倍的金额同样高效地花出去，尽管这会让我们的短期业绩受到进一步拖累，我们也会心甘情愿地去做。我们在铁路和公用事业业务上的许多大额投资，同样是着眼于很久以后的回报。
To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.
为了让你从更长期的角度看待业绩，我们在相邻页面把第 2 页上的年度数据重新整理成了一系列连续的五年期区间。总体来看，一共有 42 个这样的时期，而它们共同讲述了一个颇有意思的故事。从相对表现来看，我们最好的年份在上世纪 80 年代初就已经结束了；而市场的黄金时期则出现在随后那 17 年，在这段时间里，即便我们的相对优势有所收窄，Berkshire 在绝对回报上仍然有着非常耀眼的表现。
After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.
1999 年之后，市场基本停滞不前（或者说，这一点你早就注意到了？）。因此，自那以后，尽管 Berkshire 相对于标普指数的表现依然令人满意，但在绝对回报上却只能说是中规中矩。
Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.
展望未来，我们希望平均每年能够比标普指数高出几个百分点——当然，这样的结果绝谈不上有任何保证。如果我们真的能达成这一目标，那么在股市表现不佳的年份，我们几乎可以肯定会取得更好的相对业绩；而在市场非常强劲的年份，我们的表现则很可能会相对逊色一些。
7、《2013-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
2. Buffett: I haven’t lost any intensity
巴菲特：我的“强度”一点没减
WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll go to Doug.
WARREN BUFFETT：下面我们请 Doug 提问。
DOUG KASS: Thank you, Warren. Mae West once said, “The score never interested me, only the game.” Are you at the point now where the game interests you more than the score? But before you answer the question, let me explain to you why I asked it. In the past, your research has been all-encompassing, whether measured in time devoted to selecting investments and acquisitions, or the intensity of analysis, your interest in the old days of knowing the slightest minutia about a company. You once said, in characterizing Ben Rosner, quote, “Intensity is the price of excellence,” closed quotes. Your research style has seemed to morph over time from a sleuth-like analysis — American Express comes into mind when you hired Jonathan’s dad, Henry Brandt. You and he conducted weeks of analysis and sight visits and channel checks. Not so much in the later investments. As an example, you famously thought of making the Bank of America investment in your bathtub. There is an investment message of this transformation from being intense to less intense. Would you please explain the degree it has to do with the market, Berkshire’s size, or some other factors?
DOUG KASS：谢谢你，Warren。Mae West 曾经说过一句话：“我从来不在乎比分，我只在乎比赛本身。”现在对你来说，是不是“比赛本身”比“比分”更重要了？在你回答之前，我先解释一下我为什么这么问。过去，你的研究是“面面俱到”的——无论从你为选择投资和收购所投入的时间，还是从分析的强度来看，你早年对一家公司最细枝末节都充满兴趣。你曾经用一句话来形容 Ben Rosner，引用一下：“Intensity is the price of excellence.”（卓越的代价是全情投入）。随着时间推移，你的研究风格似乎从一种“侦探式”的深挖发生了变化——比如 American Express 那次，你当时请了 Jonathan 的父亲 Henry Brandt，一起做了好几周的分析、实地考察和渠道访谈。后来的很多投资，就没那么“紧绷”了。举个例子，你著名的 Bank of America（美国银行）投资想法，是在浴缸里想到的。这种从“高度紧绷”到“没那么紧绷”的变化背后，是有投资含义的。你能不能解释一下，这种变化有多大程度是因为市场、Berkshire 的体量，或者是其他什么原因？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think, actually, you have to love something to do well at it. There may be exceptions on that, but it is an enormous, enormous advantage if you absolutely love what you’re doing, every minute of it. And the nature of it is that that intensity adds to your productivity. And I have every bit of the intensity — not manifested exactly the same way — but it’s there every minute. I mean, I love thinking about Berkshire. I love thinking about its investments. I love thinking about its businesses. I love thinking about its managers. It’s part of me. And it is true, you can’t separate the game from the scorecard. I mean, you — so your score card is part of playing the game and loving the game. The proceeds are — you know, to me — are unimportant, but the proceeds are part of the score card, so they come with a score card.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我认为，想在某件事上做得好，你必须真心热爱它。或许会有例外，但如果你发自内心地热爱自己在做的事，而且是每一分钟都热爱，那是巨大的、巨大的优势。而这种热爱天然就会转化为“强度”，而强度会提升你的产出。我今天依然保持着当年的那种强度——虽然表现形式不完全一样——但那种强度每一分钟都在。我热爱思考 Berkshire。我热爱思考它的投资。我热爱思考它的业务。我热爱思考它的经理人。这些已经成了我自身的一部分。而确实，你没办法把“比赛”和“记分牌”完全分开。你的“记分牌”是你参加这场比赛、并且热爱比赛的一部分。收益——对我个人而言——并不重要，但收益是“记分牌”的一部分，所以自然会跟着记分牌一起出现。
在射击运动中没有记分牌如何知道自己打的准不准？该不该调整射击的姿势？
But it’s much more important — I mean, I would — no question about it, I wouldn’t be — feel — the same way about Berkshire at this point if I didn’t own a share of it, if I didn’t get paid. I mean, it’s what I like doing in life, and that’s why I do it. So, I don’t think you’ll — I don’t think it’s actually a correct observation — and Charlie can comment on this — to say that because we’re doing things in a somewhat different way, that any of the intensity or the passion has been lost. There’s nothing more fun for me than finding something new to add to Berkshire, and that was true 40 years ago. It’s true now. And it’ll be true 10 years from now, I hope. Charlie, how would you answer that?
但有件事更重要——我的意思是，毫无疑问，如果我今天不持有 Berkshire 的股份、也拿不到报酬，我对 Berkshire 的感觉绝不可能是现在这个样子。因为这就是我一生中最喜欢做的事，这也是我为什么一直在做它。所以，我不觉得——我真的不认为你刚才的观察是准确的——当然 Charlie 可以补充——就是说，仅仅因为我们今天做事的方式跟以前不完全一样，就可以推断我们失去了当年的“强度”或“激情”。对我来说，世界上没什么比“为 Berkshire 找到一个新的可以纳入的好东西”更有趣的事了，这在 40 年前就是这样。现在还是这样。我希望 10 年后也依然如此。Charlie，你会怎么回答这个问题？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think when you bought American Express for the first time, you didn’t know that much about it, so, naturally, you were digging in rather deeply. The second time you bought it, I remember you got on the golf course with Olson —
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我觉得你第一次买 American Express 的时候，对它其实并不了解多少，所以很自然地，你就会挖得非常深。你第二次买它的时候，我记得你是在球场上跟 Olson 一起——
WARREN BUFFETT: Frank Olson, yep.
WARREN BUFFETT：Frank Olson，对。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — and you just saw how he couldn’t get rid of American Express if he wanted to, and then you bought it the second time. The research is still — the first one was hard, and the second was easy.
CHARLIE MUNGER：——你当时只是看清了一点：就算他想摆脱 American Express，他也根本摆脱不了，然后你就有了第二次买入。研究还是在，只不过第一次是难的，第二次就容易了。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s all cumulative.
WARREN BUFFETT：一切都是“累积”的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s cumulative, eventually.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对，最终都是累积。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And, you know, what I learned sitting with Lorimer Davidson on a Saturday at GEICO in January of 1951 is still — is useful to me, and I don’t have to learn it a second time. I can build on it. But that’s one of the great things about investing. I mean, the universe, there’s enough in it so that you can finds lots of opportunities, but there — it’s not like it’s changing dramatically all the time. There’s some things that may change, and we just don’t play in that part of the game if we don’t understand them. But what Charlie says is true. I didn’t know a thing about American Express when the Salad Oil Scandal hit in November of 1963. But I thought I saw an opportunity, so I learned a lot about it. I went around to restaurants and talked to people about travel and entertainment cards, as they were called then. I learned about traveler’s checks. I talked to banks. And I was absorbing some knowledge.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。而且，你知道，1951 年 1 月的一个星期六，我坐在 GEICO，跟 Lorimer Davidson 谈话时学到的东西，到今天对我依然有用，而且我不需要“再学一遍”，我可以在这些知识之上继续往上搭。这正是投资最美妙的地方之一。整个世界足够大，你总能找到很多机会，但它又不是时时刻刻都在发生剧烈变化。有些东西会变，那些我们搞不懂的领域，我们就干脆不去玩那部分游戏。但 Charlie 说的是对的。1963 年 11 月“沙拉油丑闻”爆发时，我对 American Express 一无所知。但我觉得看到了一个机会，于是就去好好研究。我跑去餐馆，和人们聊当时所谓的 travel and entertainment cards（差旅和娱乐卡）；我去了解 traveler’s checks（旅行支票）；我去跟银行谈。我就在不断地吸收知识。
And then, as Charlie said, when we were up at Prouts Neck playing golf with Frank Olson, and he was running the Hertz Corp., and he was telling me that there was no way in the world that he could get rid of American Express, or even get them to cut their fees. That was my kind of business. And I knew enough to proceed to buy a fair amount of stock, and now we own whatever it is, probably 13 percent of the company or thereabouts. And they keep buying in their stock. We can’t buy anymore stock ourselves. I got asked that question in March of 2009 by Joe Kernen, “Why aren’t you buying the stock of American Express?” Well, it was a bank holding company, and we couldn’t add a share. But they are doing it for us, and I love it. At Coca-Cola, at Wells Fargo, to a lesser degree, at IBM, at most of our companies, our interest in the company goes up every year because the companies are repurchasing shares and they probably earn more money so we got a double play going for us. But the passion is not gone, I promise you.
然后，就像 Charlie 说的，我们后来在 Prouts Neck 和 Frank Olson 打高尔夫，他那时候在经营 Hertz Corp.，他跟我说，世界上根本没有什么办法能让他“摆脱” American Express，甚至连让他们稍微降一点收费都做不到。这种就是我喜欢的那类生意。那时我知道得已经足够多，可以继续出手买入相当数量的股票。如今我们持有这家公司大概 13% 左右的股份。他们自己还在持续回购股票，而我们自己已经不能再多买一股了。2009 年 3 月 Joe Kernen 还问过我：“你为什么不买 American Express 的股票？”答案是：它已经是一个 bank holding company（银行控股公司），我们没法再加仓了。但他们在替我们回购，我非常喜欢这一点。在 Coca-Cola、在 Wells Fargo、在较小程度上的 IBM，还有我们大多数持股公司里，我们在公司的持股比例每年都在上升，因为公司在回购股票，而且通常赚的钱也更多，对我们来说就像是“打了一个双响”。但我向你保证，激情一点都没消失。
PM hiring
PM 招聘
If you are a hedge fund looking to hire a portfolio manager from a competitor, how can you tell if she has investing skill? There are two main sources of information:
如果你是一家对冲基金，想要从竞争对手那里雇佣一名投资组合经理，你如何判断她是否具备投资技能？有两个主要信息来源：
1.You can look at her results. If she was up a lot last year, that could just be luck, but if she was up a little bit every day for the last five years, that probably isn’t.
你可以看看她的成绩。如果她去年涨了很多，那可能只是运气，但如果在过去五年里她每天都涨一点，那可能就不是了。
2.You can interview her, look at her resume and ask about her process. If she worked at increasingly fancy hedge funds with increasingly fancy titles, those are good signs. If you interview her and she thoughtfully describes a surprising but intuitively plausible investment process that seems like it ought to work, that’s a good sign. If she’s like “I keep flipping coins to pick stocks and it works great,” that’s a bad sign.
你可以采访她，查看她的简历，并询问她的投资流程。如果她曾在越来越高端的对冲基金工作，并拥有越来越高级的头衔，那是一个好迹象。如果你采访她时，她能深思熟虑地描述一个令人惊讶但直觉上合理的投资流程，并且看起来确实可行，那是一个好迹象。如果她说“我一直抛硬币来选股票，而且效果很好”，那就是一个坏迹象。
These sources are complementary. Good results backed up by a good process are encouraging. Good results with a bad process could be luck. Bad results with a good process could be bad luck — her luck has to change, and you can get a good portfolio manager at a discount! — though they could also indicate that you’re wrong about the process being good. “She went to Harvard and worked at Point72, so she must be good” is perhaps a useful heuristic, but it can be refuted by performance data.
这些来源是互补的。良好的结果加上良好的流程是令人鼓舞的。良好的结果伴随糟糕的流程可能只是运气。糟糕的结果伴随良好的流程可能是坏运气——她的运气总会改变，而你可以以折扣价获得一位优秀的投资组合经理！——不过，这也可能表明你对流程良好的判断是错误的。“她毕业于哈佛，并曾在 Point72 工作，所以她一定很优秀”或许是一个有用的启发法，但可以通过业绩数据加以反驳。
“业绩+取得业绩的逻辑”缺一不可。
There is a problem, though. You can look at her resume, and interview her about her process, to your heart’s content; she’ll probably be happy to talk to you. (Perhaps she cannot disclose proprietary information about her process but, you know.) And you can ask her about her results, and she’ll probably be happy to tell you, but you can’t check. Your competitor fund is not going to send over a spreadsheet listing the returns attributable to her investment calls. That’s definitely proprietary information, and they don’t want to help you out.
不过，有一个问题。你可以查看她的简历，并尽情采访她的投资流程；她可能会很乐意与你交流。（也许她不能透露流程中的专有信息，但你明白的。）你可以询问她的投资结果，她可能也会乐意告诉你，但你无法核实。你的竞争对手基金不会送来一份电子表格，列出归因于她投资决策的回报率。这绝对是专有信息，他们也不想帮你的忙。
At Business Insider, Alex Morrell and Bradley Saacks have a fun story about this problem:
在 Business Insider，Alex Morrell 和 Bradley Saacks 写了一篇有趣的报道，探讨了这个问题：
Multimanager funds now regularly fork over eight-figure deals to PMs, with some coveted stars receiving packages north of $50 million. But firms often must take it on faith that PMs claiming tens or hundreds of millions in profits at their former employers are being forthright.
多经理基金现在经常向投资组合经理提供八位数的交易，一些备受追捧的明星甚至获得超过 5000 万美元的薪酬。但公司往往只能凭信任相信，那些声称在前雇主那里赚取数千万或数亿美元利润的投资组合经理是坦诚的。
The dirty secret, according to conversations with nearly two dozen portfolio managers, recruiters, hedge fund execs, and business-development professionals, is that many of them aren't. When it comes to performance, traders regularly prevaricate and exaggerate; it's just a matter of degree and audacity.
根据与近二十位投资组合经理、招聘人员、对冲基金高管和业务发展专业人士的对话，隐藏的秘密是，其中许多人并非如此。谈到业绩，交易员经常含糊其辞并夸大其词；只是程度和胆量的问题。
And possible — but also problematic — solutions:
可能的解决方案——但也存在问题：
Last summer, a senior headhunter who places PMs at multimanagers saw a change emerging on the hiring front lines. Before finalizing multimillion-dollar deals to hire candidates, funds were making a bold request: direct, proprietary evidence of the PM's trading performance. Some, for example, asked PMs to jump on FaceTime or Zoom while at home and pan the camera over to their computer screen to show their P&L in their company's internal system. Others were meeting candidates at coffee shops or going to their homes. ...
去年夏天，一位为多经理制基金招聘投资组合经理的高级猎头在招聘前线发现了变化。在最终确定数百万美元的招聘交易之前，基金公司提出了一个大胆的要求：提供直接的、专有的投资组合经理交易业绩证据。例如，一些基金要求投资组合经理在家中通过 FaceTime 或 Zoom 通话，并将摄像头对准电脑屏幕，以展示其公司内部系统中的损益情况。还有一些基金选择在咖啡店与候选人会面，或直接前往他们的住所。
Another senior headhunter said he also observed a change starting around the summer, with multiple funds asking candidates to bring their laptop to a café, log onto their internal system, and show their P&L to finalize a hire. …
另一位高级猎头表示，他也注意到从夏季左右开始出现变化，多家基金要求候选人带上笔记本电脑到咖啡馆，登录其内部系统，并展示其损益情况以最终确定聘用。…
"It violates all the confidentiality agreements," another PM who's worked at multiple funds said. "I don't think reputable firms would ask you to do that."
“这违反了所有的保密协议，”另一位曾在多家基金工作过的 PM 说。“我认为有信誉的公司不会要求你这么做。”
I wonder if there are any cases of a hedge fund asking a PM “hey please show us your firm’s P&L records,” and the PM saying “sure here you go,” and the hedge fund saying “no that was a trick, we expected you to say no, we only hire ethical people here and you have proven that you can’t be trusted.” I bet the answer is no.
我想知道是否有对冲基金要求一位投资组合经理“嘿，请给我们看你公司的损益记录”，然后投资组合经理回答“当然，给你”，接着对冲基金说“不，这是个陷阱，我们本以为你会拒绝，我们只雇佣有道德的人，而你已经证明了自己不值得信任。”我敢打赌答案是否定的。
There is a simpler solution:
有一个更简单的解决方案：
Perhaps the most popular and ubiquitous way of corroborating a trader's performance is by obtaining the candidate's pay history through W-2 tax records and deferred-compensation statements.
也许验证交易员业绩最常见且普遍的方法是通过 W-2 税务记录和递延薪酬报表获取该候选人的薪酬历史。
Because hedge fund payouts are formulaic — most multimanagers pay a standard percentage of a trader's profits that's typically upward of 20% — a PM's compensation is a direct indicator of their past performance.
由于对冲基金的支付方式是公式化的——大多数多经理基金会支付交易员利润的标准百分比，通常超过 20%——因此，投资组合经理的薪酬直接反映了他们的过往业绩。
One multimanager exec said he asked for W-2s and screenshots of P&L, describing these requests as "the same thing everyone else asks for." But many states, including the hedge fund hot spots New York, California, and Connecticut, have barred employers from asking about salary history.
一位多经理制公司的高管表示，他要求提供 W-2 表格和 P&L 截图，并称这些要求是“和其他人要求的一样。”但包括对冲基金热点地区纽约、加利福尼亚和康涅狄格在内的许多州已禁止雇主询问薪资历史。
If you tell a potential employer that you are making $100 million of profits at your current firm, and your pay stubs say you are getting paid $200,000, then either you are on a very bad deal or you’re lying.
如果你告诉潜在雇主你在当前公司赚取了 1 亿美元的利润，而你的工资单显示你只拿到 20 万美元，那么要么你的协议非常糟糕，要么你在撒谎。
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