I.H.100.Warren Buffett.Think Correctly
有些人有不错的运气，但运气是不确定的而没有自己的脑子是确定的，并且没有脑子的人不知道自己没有脑子，任何运气都挡不住一个如此确定、具有制度性强制力的风险。
巴菲特不仅解释了什么是脑子（正确的思维框架），还进一步解释了如何形成正确的思维框架：好坏对错是在大量阅读和体验中对比出来的，“你需要用各种相互竞争的想法来充实你的头脑，并随着时间的推移整理出真正有意义的东西”。
1、《1946 On Being Right in Security Analysis》
If this is a sound recommendation, not only must it work out well in the market, but it must be based on sound reasoning also.
如果这是一个合理的建议，它不仅必须在市场上取得良好的效果，而且还必须基于合理的推理。
2、《1949 The Intelligent Investor-Chapter 7 “Portfolio Policy for the Enterprising Investor: The Positive Side》
To obtain better than average investment results over a long pull requires a policy of selection or operation possessing a twofold merit: (1) It must meet objective or rational tests of underlying soundness; and (2) it must be different from the policy followed by most investors or speculators.
要在长期内获得高于平均水平的投资回报，必须采用一种具有双重优点的选择或操作策略： (1) 它必须通过对基本面稳健性的客观或理性检验；(2) 它必须有别于大多数投资者或投机者所遵循的策略。
Our Method of Operation
我们的投资方法
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资可以分为三个类型：这三个类型的投资各有各的特性，我们的资金在这几类投资中的分配情况，会对我们每年相对道指的业绩产生重要影响。每类投资的占比是按计划来的，但实际分配要见机行事，主要视投资机会情况而定。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called "generals") where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类是低估的股票。在此类投资中，我们对公司决策没话语权，也掌控不了估值修复所需时间。这些年来，在我们的投资中，低估的股票是占比最大的一类，这类投资赚的钱比其他两类都多。我们一般以较大仓位（每只占我们总资产的 5% 到 10%）持有 5、6 只低估的股票，以较小的仓位持有其他 10 或 15 只低估的股票。
没有重点=没有脑子。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
此类投资有时候很快就能获利，很多时候要用几年时间。在买入时，基本不知道这些低估的股票怎么能涨，但是正因为黯淡无光，正因为短期内看不到任何利好因素带来上涨，才能有这么便宜的价格。付出的价格低，得到的价值高。在低估类中，我们买入的每只股票价值都远远高于价格，都存在相当大的安全边际。每只都有安全边际，分散买入多只，就形成了一个既有足够安全保障，又有上涨潜力的投资组合。这些年来，在时机掌控方面，我们总是在买的时候比卖的时候做的好很多。对于低估类，我们本来就没打算赚到最后一分钱，能在买入价与产业资本评估的合理价值中间的位置附近卖出，我们就很满意了。
三种类型的投资策略在《1963-01-18 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》又写了遍，少许改动，增加一些新的感受，比如，对“generals”的描述。
Many times generals represent a form of "coattail riding" where we feel the dominating stockholder group has plans for the conversion of unprofitable or under-utilized assets to a better use. We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but everything else equal we would rather let others do the work. Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are holding.
很多时候，我们买低估的股票是跟着大股东吃肉喝汤，我们觉得大股东有计划优化资源，转化没盈利能力或利用率低的资产，我们就跟着买。在桑伯恩和登普斯特这两笔投资中，我们亲自动手优化资源，但是在其他条件一样的情况下，我们更愿意让别人做这个工作。做这样的投资，不但价值要足够高，而且跟谁也要选好。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
低估类的涨跌受大盘影响很大，就算便宜，也一样会下跌。当市场暴跌时，低估类的跌幅可能不亚于道指。长期来看，我相信低估类会跑赢道指，在像 1961 年这样大涨的行情中，我们的投资组合里的低估类表现最佳。在市场下跌时，这类投资也最脆弱。
Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
我们的第二类投资是“套利”(work-outs)。在套利类投资中，投资结果取决于公司行为，而不是股票买卖双方之间的供给和需求关系。换言之，此类股票有具体的时间表，我们可以在很小的误差范围内，事先知道在多长时间内可以获得多少回报，可能出现什么意外，打乱原有计划。套利机会出现在并购、清算、重组、分拆等公司活动中。近些年，套利机会主要来自大型综合石油公司收购石油生产商。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.
在很大程度上，无论道指涨跌如何，套利投资每年都能带来相当稳定的收益。在某一年，如果我们把投资组合中大部分资金用于套利，这年大市下跌，我们的相对业绩会很好；这年大市上涨，我们的相对业绩会很差。多年以来，套利是我们第二大投资类别。我们总是同时进行 10 到 15 个套利操作，有的处于初期阶段，有的处于末期阶段。无论是从最终结果，还是过程中的市场表现来讲，套利类投资具有高度安全性，我相信完全可以借钱作为套利类投资组合的部分资金来源。不考虑借钱对收益的放大作用，套利类的收益率一般在 10% 到 20% 之间。我自己规定了一个限制条件，借来的钱不能超过合伙基金净值的 25%。我们一般不借钱，借钱的话，都是用于套利。
The final category is "control" situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.
最后一类是“控制类”。在此类投资中，我们或是拥有控股权或者是大股东，对公司决策有话语权。衡量此类投资肯定要看几年时间。当我们看好一只股票，在收集筹码时，它的股价最好长期呆滞不动，所以在一年中，控制类投资可能不会贡献任何收益。此类投资同样受大盘影响相对较小。有时候，一只股票，我们是当做低估类买入的，但是考虑可能把它发展成控制类。如果股价长期低迷，很可能出现这种情况。如果我们还没买到足够的货，这只股票就涨起来了，我们就在涨起来的价格卖掉，成功完成一笔低估类投资。我们现在正在买入的一些股票，再过几年可能发展成控制类。
三个策略加在一起是一个闭环。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致，你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致，你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时，正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、逻辑正确，你就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety.W e want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, fi their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.
我们投资股票的选择方式与买进整家企业的模式很相近，我们想要的企业必须是： (1) 我们能够理解的生意。 (2) 具有良好的长期前景。 (3) 由才德兼具的人士所经营。 (4) 吸引人的价格。我们从来不会去买那些短期股价预期有所表现的股票，事实上，如果其企业的表现符合我们的预期，我们反而希望他们的股价不要太高，这样我们才有机会以更理想的价格买进更多的股份。
5、《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The first filter we probably put it through is whether we think — and we know instantly — whether it’s a business we’re going to understand, and whether it’s a business that — if it passes through that, it’s whether a company can have a sustainable edge, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们可能首先筛选的是，看看这是不是一个我们能够理解的业务——我们通常能够瞬间判断出这一点——以及这家公司是否能够具有持续的竞争优势。如果通过这一点，就继续评估。
And that gets rid of a very significant percentage of the things people have —
这一筛选就会淘汰掉人们推荐给我们的很大一部分东西。
They always want to tell you some story or anything. And I’m sure they regard me and Charlie as very arbitrary, in terms of, you know, in the middle of the first sentence saying, “Well, you know, we appreciate the call, but we’re not interested.”
他们总是想给你讲一些故事之类的东西。我确信，他们会认为我和查理非常武断，比如在第一句话说到一半时，我们就说：“嗯，我们很感谢您的来电，但我们没兴趣。”
I mean, you know, they just think if they explain something — and I get letters on this all the time.
我的意思是，他们可能认为，只要他们能解释清楚——而我经常收到这类信件。
But we really can tell, in the middle of the first sentence, usually, whether those two factors exist. And if we can’t understand it, obviously, it’s not going to have — we can’t make a decision as to whether it has a sustainable edge.
但我们通常能在第一句话中途判断出是否具备这两个条件。如果我们无法理解它，那显然无法判断它是否有持续的竞争优势。
And if we can’t understand it, we, very often, can come to the conclusion that it’s not the kind of the business where it will have a sustainable edge.
而且如果我们无法理解它，我们很容易得出结论，这不是那种能够拥有持续竞争优势的业务。
So 98 percent of the conversations we can end, you know, in the middle of somebody’s first sentence, which, of course, goes over very big with the caller, but — (Laughter)
所以，我们可以在98%的对话中，在对方第一句话的中途就结束交谈。当然，这对打电话的人来说可能很令人沮丧——（笑声）
最初的假设错了就全坏了，后面都是自己骗自己的幻觉，常见的现象是一句话前后矛盾，因为和所以之间没有任何联系。
And then, sometimes if you’re talking about an entire business, we can tell by who we’re dealing with whether a deal’s ever going to work out or not.
然后，有时候当我们讨论一个完整的企业时，我们可以通过和谁打交道来判断这笔交易是否可能成功。
I mean, it — if there’s an auction going on, we don’t want to — we have no interest in talking about it. And it just isn’t going, you know, it isn’t going to work.
我的意思是，如果有拍卖正在进行，我们不会感兴趣——我们根本不会谈论它。这是行不通的。
If someone is interested in, essentially, doing that with their business, you know, they’re going to sit down and want to renegotiate everything with us all over again after the deal is done. And we’re going to have to buy the business two or three times before we get through.
如果有人基本上是想通过拍卖来处理他们的企业，您知道，他们可能会在交易完成后与我们重新坐下来，想要再谈一遍所有的条款。而我们可能需要“购买”这家公司两三次才能完成。
You just see all these things coming.
您会预见到所有这些问题的到来。
And on the other hand, we’ve had, you know, terrific experience, basically, with the people we have associated with.
另一方面，我们与合作过的人基本上有着非常好的合作经历。
So it works. It’s efficient. You know, we don’t want to listen to stories all day. And we don’t read brokerage reports of anything of the sort. It’s just — there’s other things to do with your time.
所以这种方式有效率。您知道，我们不想整天听故事。我们也不看任何类似经纪报告的东西。时间还有其他更值得花费的事情。
74. “Advantage of accumulation of useful information”
“积累有用信息的优势”
WARREN BUFFETT: What was the first question? Oh, the part about organizing —
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一个问题是什么？哦，关于组织信息的部分——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, I’m just wondering, for those of us on the other side of the table, we get barraged with information. And I’m wondering how do you both — do you just read annuals, 10-Ks, and talk to people, and ignore everything else? And how do you keep track of everything, intellectually —?
观众： 哦，我只是想知道，对于我们这些坐在桌子另一侧的人来说，总是被信息淹没。我想知道你们是如何处理的——是只看年报、10-K报告，与人交谈，而忽略其他一切吗？你们如何在智力上掌控一切——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t keep track of everything. But the beauty of — to some extent — of evaluating businesses — large businesses — is that it is all cumulative. I mean, if you started doing it 40 or so years ago, you really have got a working knowledge of an awful lot of businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们并不掌控一切。但评估企业——尤其是大型企业——在某种程度上的妙处在于，这一切都是累积的。我的意思是，如果你从40年前开始做这件事，你实际上已经对许多企业积累了实用的知识。
But there aren’t that many, to start with, that are, you know —
但一开始也没有那么多，您知道——
And you can get a fix. You know, how many — what are there? Seventy-five, maybe, or so important industries. And you’ll get to understand how they operate.
而且您可以掌握这些。您知道，有多少个——大约有多少个？也许有75个左右的重要行业。而您会逐渐理解它们是如何运作的。
And you don’t have to start over again every day. And you don’t have to consult a computer for it or anything like that, it —
而且您不需要每天从头开始，也不需要借助电脑或其他类似的工具。
So it has the advantage of accumulation of useful information over time. And, you know, you just add the incremental bit at some point.
因此，它具有随着时间积累有用信息的优势。而且，您知道，您只需要在某个时间点添加一些增量信息。
You know, why did we decide to buy Coca-Cola in 1988? Well, it may have been, you know, just a couple small incremental bits of information. But that came into a mass that had been accumulated over decades.
您知道，我们为什么在1988年决定买入可口可乐？嗯，也许只是因为几条小的增量信息。但这些信息融入了几十年来积累的大量知识中。
And it’s a very — it’s a great business that way. It’s why we like businesses that don’t change too much, because the past is useful to us.
这是一个非常——这种方式很棒。这也是我们喜欢变化不大的企业的原因，因为过去对我们有用。
Now, the general premise of why you’re interested in something should be 80 percent of it or thereabouts. I mean, you don’t want to be chasing down every idea that way, so you should have a strong presumption.
不过，你之所以对某项投资感兴趣的基本前提应当占到大约80%。我的意思是，你不想用这种方法追踪每一个想法，所以你需要有一个强有力的假设前提。
You should be like a basketball coach who runs into a seven-footer on the street. I mean, you’re interested to start with; now you have to find out if you can keep him in school, if he’s coordinated, and all that sort of thing. That’s the scuttlebutt aspect of it.
你应该像一个篮球教练在街上遇到一个七英尺高的球员一样。我的意思是，你一开始就应该感兴趣；然后你需要了解他是否能留在学校，是否协调，诸如此类的事情。这就是“走访调查法”的一个方面。
But I believe that as you’re acquiring knowledge about industries in general, companies specifically, that there really isn’t anything like first doing some reading about them, and then getting out and talking to competitors, and customers, and suppliers, and ex-employees, and current employees, and whatever it may be.
但我相信，在你获取行业一般知识和具体公司信息时，确实没有什么比先阅读资料，然后与竞争对手、客户、供应商、前雇员、现雇员以及其他相关人士交流更有效的方法了。
And you will learn a lot. But it should be the last 20 percent or 10 percent. I mean, you don’t want to get too impressed by that, because you really want to start with a business where you think the economics are good, where they look like seven-footers, and then you want to go out with a scuttlebutt approach to possibly reject your original hypothesis.
你会从中学到很多。但这应该是最后的20%或10%的工作。我的意思是，你不想对这些印象过深，因为你确实应该从一家你认为经济状况良好的企业开始，就像那些七英尺高的篮球运动员一样，然后用“走访调查法”来验证或否定你的原始假设。
不能让10-20%的部分过度干扰80%的部分。
7、《2001-04-28 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
65. Having “your head screwed on right in the first place”
首先要“思路正确”
WARREN BUFFETT: Second question — (laughs) — I gather is, sort of, how much does our actual business experience versus book experience help us?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二个问题——（笑声）——我猜是关于实际商业经验与书本经验对我们的帮助有多大？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, it’s, you know, if you look at a person who has just made two years of being in the business of investing, versus a person who has been for 10 years in the business of investing.
观众提问： 嗯，如果你看一个刚进入投资行业两年的人，与一个已经在投资行业工作十年的人。
And say the person who has been for two years, you know, has read a lot about, you know, Ben Graham’s techniques, and your techniques, and, say, Peter Lynch’s techniques. So would you say that the person who has only two years of experience may do much better than the second person?
假设这个两年的人读过很多关于本·格雷厄姆的技术、您的技术，以及比如彼得·林奇的技术。您是否认为这个仅有两年经验的人可能比那个十年经验的人做得更好？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if everything else is equal, I mean, everything else is equal, except the amount of experience you have, I think the experience is probably useful. But it isn’t going to be equal. And I don’t think that — I don’t think that the —
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，如果其他条件都相等，我是说，除了经验年限之外，其他都相等的话，我认为经验可能是有用的。但实际上不会相等。我不认为——我不认为——
I think it’s way more important what you’ve thought about for two years than what you’ve practiced for 10 years. If you’re — if the direction — if there’s a divergence in techniques applied, I would rather be with the one that I’m philosophically in sync with.
我认为你在两年里思考的内容，比你在十年中实践的内容更重要。如果应用的技术方向不同，我更愿意选择与我哲学一致的人。
If I’m philosophically in sync with both and one’s had 10 years of experience, the chances are they will know a little bit more about more businesses if they’ve been around for 10 years, looking at them, than if they’ve been around for two years.
如果两个人都与我的理念一致，但其中一个有十年经验，那他可能会因为观察过十年的企业而比观察两年的人多了解一些业务。
But the biggest thing is that, you know, basically they’ve got their head screwed on right in the first place, in terms of how they value businesses and how they look at stocks.
但最重要的是，他们首先在看待业务和股票的方式上是否“思路正确”。
Whether they look at them as pieces of businesses or whether they look at them as little things that move around, and that you can tell a lot by looking at charts or listening to strategists on or something of the sort.
他们是否将股票视为企业的一部分，或者只是看作会波动的小东西，通过看图表或听策略师的意见就能了解很多。
We have — Charlie and I have learned a lot about a lot of businesses over 40 or 50 years. But I would say that, in terms of the new things that would come to us, at the end of the second year, we were probably about as good judges of them as we would be today.
查理和我在过去的40或50年里学到了很多关于企业的知识。但我会说，就新的事物而言，在我们进入行业的第二年，我们对它们的判断可能和今天差不多好。
But I think there’s a little plus to having seen — more in terms of human behavior and that sort of thing — than knowing about the specifics of a given business model.
但我认为，观察过更多人类行为之类的内容，比了解某个特定商业模式的细节更有帮助。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that — I’ve watched Warren for a long time now, and I would say he’s actually getting better as he gets older. Not at golf or — (Buffett laughs) — many other activities, but —
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为——我已经观察沃伦很久了，我会说他确实随着年龄增长变得更好了。虽然不是在打高尔夫或——（巴菲特笑）——其他许多活动上，但——
WARREN BUFFETT: Stay with generalities.
沃伦·巴菲特： 保持在总体范围内。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — as an investor, he’s better — (laughter) — which I think’s remarkable. It shows that scale of experience matters.
查理·芒格： ——作为投资者，他更优秀了——（笑声）——我认为这很了不起。这说明经验规模很重要。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it helps somewhat to have seen a lot of business situation — I mean, Charlie talks about models and you construct your models as you go along based on observation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，见过很多商业情境是有帮助的——我的意思是，查理谈到模型，而你是在观察的基础上逐步构建自己的模型。
And your models will — if you’re paying attention, your models will be somewhat better the more years you’ve spent really observing and not just trying to make everything fit into what you saw the first few years.
而你的模型——如果你认真观察的话，你的模型会随着观察时间的增加而有所改进，而不仅仅是试图把所有东西都套进你最初几年看到的框架中。
8、《2003-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
30. From “cigar butts” to high-quality companies
从“烟蒂”到高质量公司
WARREN BUFFETT: The — Charlie explained, I had learned investment, and got enormous benefit out of that learning, from a fellow who concentrated on the quantitative aspects, Ben Graham.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理解释过，我学会了投资，并从中获得了巨大的收益，这得益于一位专注于定量分析的人，本·格雷厄姆。
And who didn’t dismiss the qualitative aspects, but he said you could make enough money focusing on quantitative aspects, which were a more sure way of going at things and would enable you to identify the cigar butts.
他并没有忽视定性方面，但他说你可以通过专注于定量方面赚到足够的钱，这是一种更可靠的方法，可以让你识别出烟蒂。
He would say that the qualitative is harder to teach, it’s harder to write about, it may require more insight than the quantitative. And besides, the quantitative works fine, so why try harder?
他说，定性方面更难教授，更难写作，可能比定量方面需要更多的洞察力。而且，定量方面运作良好，所以为什么要更努力呢？
And on a small scale, you know, there was a very good point to that.
而且在小范围内，你知道，这确实是一个很好的观点。
But Charlie really did — it wasn’t just Ira Marshall — but Charlie emphasized the qualitative much more than I did when I started.
但查理确实如此——不仅仅是艾拉·马歇尔——查理比我刚开始时更强调定性方面。
He had a different background to some extent than did, and I was enormously impressed by a terrific teacher, and for good reason.
他在某种程度上有着不同的背景，而我对一位了不起的老师印象深刻，这是有充分理由的。
But it makes more sense, as we pointed out, to buy a wonderful business at a fair price, than a fair business at a wonderful price.
但正如我们所指出的，以合理的价格购买一家出色的公司，比以出色的价格购买一家普通的公司更有意义。
And we’ve changed our — or I’ve changed my focus anyway, and Charlie already had it — over the years in that direction. And then of course, we have learned by what we’ve seen.
我们已经改变了我们的——或者说我改变了我的重点，查理早就有了——多年来朝着那个方向发展。当然，我们也从所见中学到了东西。
I mean, we — it’s not hard when you watch businesses for 50 years, you know, to learn a few things about them, as to where the big money can be made.
我的意思是，我们——当你观察企业 50 年时，了解一些关于它们的事情并不难，比如在哪里可以赚大钱。
Now, you say when did it happen? It’s very interesting on that. Because what happens, even when you’re getting a new, important idea, is that the old ideas are still there. So there’s this flickering in and out of things. I mean, there was not a strong, bright red line of demarcation where we went from cigar butts to wonderful companies.
现在，你说它是什么时候发生的？这很有趣。因为即使当你获得一个新的、重要的想法时，旧的想法仍然存在。所以事情会时隐时现。我的意思是，我们并没有从烟蒂到优秀公司的一个鲜明的分界线。
And it — but we moved in that direction, occasionally moved back, because there is money made in cigar butts.
而且——但我们朝那个方向前进，偶尔会退回去，因为在烟蒂上可以赚钱。
But overall, we’ve kept moving in the direction of better and better companies, and now we’ve got a collection of wonderful companies.
但总的来说，我们一直在朝着越来越好的公司方向前进，现在我们拥有了一批优秀的公司。
9、《2007-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you should read everything you can.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为你应该尽可能多地阅读。
I can tell you in my own case, I think by the time I was — well, I know by the time I was ten — I’d read every book in the Omaha Public Library that had anything to do with investing, and many of them I’d read twice.
就我个人而言，我可以告诉你，我想在我十岁的时候——我知道在我十岁的时候——我已经读完了奥马哈公共图书馆里所有与投资有关的书籍，其中许多我都读了两遍。
So I don’t think there’s anything like reading, and not just as limited to investing at all. But you’ve just got to fill up your mind with various competing thoughts and sort them out as to what really makes sense over time.
所以我认为没有什么能比得上阅读，这不仅仅局限于投资。你需要用各种相互竞争的想法来充实你的头脑，并随着时间的推移整理出真正有意义的东西。
人工智能的推理是个很有前途的技术方向。
And then once you’ve done a lot of that, I think you have to jump in the water, because investing on paper and doing — you know, and investing with real money, you know, is like the difference between reading a romance novel and doing something else. (Laughter)
然后，当你做了很多这样的事情后，我认为你必须跳入水中，因为在纸上投资和用真钱投资，就像读浪漫小说和做其他事情之间的区别。（笑声）
There is nothing like actually having a little experience in investing. And you soon find out whether you like it. If you like it, if it turns you on, you know, you’re probably going to do well on it.
没有什么能比真正拥有一点投资经验更好了。你很快就会发现自己是否喜欢它。如果你喜欢它，如果它让你感到兴奋，你知道，你可能会在这方面做得很好。
And the earlier you start, the better, in terms of reading. But, you know, I read a book at age 19 that formed my framework for thinking about investments ever since.
而且在阅读方面，越早开始越好。不过，你知道，我在 19 岁时读了一本书，从那时起就形成了我对投资的思维框架。
I mean, what I’m doing today at 76 is running things through the same thought pattern that I got from a book I read when I was 19.
我的意思是，我今天在 76 岁时所做的事情，是通过我 19 岁时读的一本书中获得的相同思维模式来进行的。
And I read all the other books, too, but if you — and you have to read a lot of them to know which ones really do jump out at you and which ideas jump out at you over time.
我也读了所有其他的书，但如果你——你必须读很多书才能知道哪些书真正吸引你，哪些想法随着时间的推移会吸引你。
So I would say that read and then, on a small scale in a way that can’t hurt you financially, do some of it yourself.
所以我会说，先阅读，然后在不会对你造成经济损失的小范围内，自己尝试做一些。
Q4：请您从定性层面谈谈您是如何计算估值？你如何得出估值的数字的，是用 excel 表做定量的估值计算吗？
巴菲特：我从来不用 excel 表进行计算，但不代表我脑袋里面没有类似 excel 计算的框架。比如说我不动笔做笔记，不代表我头脑中不记忆，这些是读书的时候就形成的学习习惯。我从来就没有开始用过 excel，而且我过去的 60 年也没有学什么新的工具，除非我开始学，否则我不会用 excel 来计算，但我也能算出你通过 excel 进行的计算结果。我不喜欢任何可能传达虚假假设的计算。通过在 excel 表中列出详细的数据表格，人们会获得一种虚假的安全感，让人们认为未来会更加的有规律，但是事实并不是这样。
我曾经在所罗门投行待过一段时间，根据一个客户的股票研究要求，研究部门的人花了几周时间，打出来了一个很长的报告，预测了一个制造业公司未来 20 年的利润情况，另一方面，当我问所罗门公司未来一周能够产生多少利润的时候，他们说这怎么可能算的出来。真正的原因是做 20 年后的预测，这些人都不一定在这里了，而要做出下一周的预测，我们下一周马上知道预测是对的还是错的，所以我从来不看这些预测。在路博润公司 Lubrizol（注：2011 年 3 月 14 日伯克希尔完成的收购）交易中，公司 CEO 要给我看他们对于生意未来业绩的预测，我说我不用看了，每一个公司都会预测说明年要赚的更多，如果我对于未来的生意没有形成自己的判断，我也不想别人告诉我。如果我不知道该怎么做，别人没有放自己钱的人，又怎会告诉你该如何做呢。我不关注他们做的预测，但是我头脑中自有对于公司的经济前景有预测，然后基于这个预测进行估值。
11、《2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve always been more concerned about how our record is achieved than the precise record itself. And with both Todd and Ted, Charlie and I were struck by, not only a good record, but intellectual integrity and qualities of character, a real commitment to Berkshire, a lifelong-type commitment.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们一直更关心的是我们的业绩是如何取得的，而不是具体的业绩本身。对于托德和泰德，查理和我不仅被良好的业绩所打动，更被他们的知识诚信和品格品质所吸引，对伯克希尔的真正承诺，这是一种终身的承诺。
And we’ve seen hundreds and hundreds of good records in our lifetimes; we haven’t seen very many people we want to have join Berkshire.
我们在一生中见过成百上千的好记录；但我们没有见过很多我们想要让他们加入伯克希尔的人。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在寻找新的独立业务时，我们寻求的关键品质是：持久的竞争优势；能干且高标准的管理层；运营所需净有形资产能带来良好回报；具有吸引人回报的内生性增长机会；以及最后，一个合理的收购价格。
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