想法上的对齐对于每个人来说都很困难，人类的整个历史也表明这个事很困难。AI关于对齐（alignment）的思路是："同一套压缩出来的原则，对"结构相同但表述不同"的两个句子，能不能给出同样的答案？"以下是巴菲特经常举的例子：

为什么"结构相同但表述不同"的两个句子会给出不一样的答案？愚蠢的不对齐的行为很像巴甫洛夫的条件反射（respondent conditioning），一种不受理性控制的行为，巴菲特给这种现象有过一个专门的定义：“institutional imperative”。

“institutional imperative”是巴菲特自创的说法，其他的说法还包括institutional stupidity、institutional constraints，也包括“unforced errors”，间接的提示还有一种错误是“forced errors”，参考：《1990-03-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at "ten points better than the DOW". I was younger, poorer and probably more competitive. Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance. I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill. I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English countryside. He received assenting nods and continued stealing.

最后，也是最重要的一个考量，关乎个人动机。刚成立合伙企业时，我把那台调节跑步机速度的马达设在“比 DOW 高十个百分点”这一档。那时我更年轻，更穷，大概也更有竞争心。即使没有前面提到的那三个会压低业绩的外部因素，我仍然会认为，个人处境的变化已经使得把这台跑步机的速度调低一些，成为明智之举。我见过太多这样的例子：生活中各种领域，尤其是商业领域里的行为习惯，在它们早已失去合理性之后，仍会继续存在，甚至随着岁月流逝而变本加厉。Bertrand Russell 讲过一个故事：第一次世界大战之后，有两个 Lithuanian 女孩住在他的庄园里。每天晚上，天一黑，她们就会偷偷溜出去，从邻居那里偷些蔬菜，囤在自己房间里；尽管 Russell 家的餐桌上食物十分充裕。Lord Russell 向她们解释说，这种行为在战时的 Lithuania 也许非常说得通，但在英国乡间就多少有些不合时宜了。她们点头表示同意，然后继续去偷。

He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.

最后，他只能安慰自己说：她们的行为，虽然在邻居看来很奇怪，其实和老 Rockefeller 的做派也并没有太大不同。

Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?

事实上，许多企业管理者在对待股票的问题上表现出某种精神分裂。他们认为自家股票便宜得吓人，但与此同时又批准养老金政策，普遍拒绝买入普通股。同一位老板，戴上并购帽时，愿意为美国典型企业支付账面价值150%到200%的价格；可戴上养老金帽时，却鄙视以账面价值买入类似公司。难道他的才能如此独特，以至于当他能亲自掌控企业时，支付“两美元买一美元”就合理，而如果必须让商业圆桌会议的同行来经营，就断言“一美元买一美元”是不明智的养老金投资？

... Incidentally, I would say that almost everybody I know in Wall Street has had as many good ideas as I have, they just had a lot of \[bad] ideas too. And I’m serious about that. I mean when I bought Western Insurance Security selling at \$16 and earning \$20 per share, I put half my net worth into it. I checked it out first – I went down to the insurance commission and got out the convention statements, I read Best’s, and I did a lot of things first. But, I mean, my dad wasn’t in it, I’d only had one insurance class at Columbia – but it was not beyond my capabilities to do that, and it isn’t beyond your capabilities.

……顺便说一句，我想说的是，在华尔街我认识的几乎所有人都有和我一样多的好主意，他们只不过也有很多[糟糕的]主意。我是认真的。比如当我以每股16美元买入、而每股赚20美元的Western Insurance Security时，我把自己一半的净资产都投了进去。我事先做过调查——我去了保险监管机构，调出了年会报告，我查阅了《贝斯特年鉴》，还做了很多其他功课。但我的父亲并没有参与，我在哥伦比亚大学也只上过一门保险课——然而做这件事并未超出我的能力范围，也不会超出你们的能力范围。

Now if I had some rare insight about software, or something like that – I would say that, maybe, other people couldn’t do that – or biotechnology, or something. And I’m not saying that every insight that I have is an insight that somebody else could have, but there were all kinds of people that could have understood American Express Company as well as I understood it in ‘62. They may have been...they may have had a different temperament than I did, so that they were paralyzed by fear, or that they wanted the crowd to be with them, or something like that, but I didn’t know anything about credit cards that they didn’t know, or about travelers checks. Those are not hard products to understand. But what I did have was an intense interest and I was willing, when I saw something I wanted to do, to do it. And if I couldn’t see something to do, to not do anything. By far, the most important quality is not how much IQ you’ve got. IQ is not the scarce factor. You need a reasonable amount of intelligence, but the temperament is 90% of it.

如果我对软件之类的领域有某种罕见的洞见——那我会说，也许别人就做不到——比如生物技术。但我并不是说我拥有的每一个洞见别人都可以拥有，不过在1962年，有很多人本可以像我一样理解美国运通公司。他们也许……他们也许与我有着不同的性情，以至于被恐惧麻痹，或者想要随大流，诸如此类；但关于信用卡或旅行支票，我并不比他们了解更多。这些产品并不难理解。但我拥有的是强烈的兴趣，并且当我发现想做的事情时，我愿意去做；而当我找不到可做之事时，就什么也不做。最重要的品质绝不是你的智商有多高。智商并不是稀缺因素。你需要适量的智力，但性格（气质）占了90%。

That’s why Graham is so important. Graham’s book \[The Intelligent Investor] talks about the qualities of temperament you have to bring to the game, and that is the game.

这就是格雷厄姆如此重要的原因。格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》讨论了你在投资游戏中必须具备的性格特质，而那正是游戏本身。

But that — I don’t want to bet on anybody else. I mean, in the end, we want to understand, ourselves, where we think a business is going. And if somebody tells us the business is going to change a lot, in Wall Street, they love to tell you that, you know, that’s great opportunity.

但问题在于——我不想押注任何其他人。归根结底，我们希望亲自理解一家企业将走向何处。如果有人告诉我们这门生意将发生巨变，华尔街最爱说“那是巨大机会”。

They don’t think it’s a great opportunity when Wall Street itself is going to change a lot, incidentally. (Laughter)

顺便说一句，当华尔街自身要发生巨变时，他们却并不认为那是巨大机会。（笑声）

But they — you know, it’s a great opportunity. We don’t think it’s an opportunity at all. I mean, we — it scares the hell out of us. Because we don’t know how things are going to change.

The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.

逻辑很简单：如果你未来将成为股票的净买入者——无论是直接用你自己的钱，还是间接地（通过你所持有、正在回购股份的公司）——当股价上涨时你会受损，当股价下跌时你会受益。然而情绪常常使问题复杂化：大多数人——包括那些未来会成为净买入者的人——看到股价上涨会感到欣慰。这类股东很像一位通勤者，仅仅因为自己的油箱还存着一天的油，就在油价上涨后感到高兴。

Trying to change things in government is an interesting proposition in the country because you get self-selection in terms of the people that go into government and continue in it. And to some extent they keep having to make decisions that they don’t like as they go along and they learn to accept them or rationalize them or whatever it may be.

在这个国家，试图通过政府去改变，是一个“有趣”的命题，因为走进并留在政府的人群本身就具有自我筛选的特征。在某种程度上，他们一路上会做出自己并不喜欢的决定，并逐渐学会接受、或为之寻找理由，诸如此类。

But it’s still – this country’s worked out better than any country in the world. So you can’t argue it was a failure, but you can’t argue that there are certain problems that are terribly tough to figure out ways to solve. And of course, one of them gets back to the fiscal problem I mentioned before because it’s easy to spend money and it’s hard to cut people’s receipts.

但即便如此——这个国家的运转仍优于世界上任何国家。所以你不能称之为失败；但你也不能否认，有些问题极难找到解决路径。当然，其中之一又回到我之前提到的财政问题：花钱容易、削减他人收入很难。

And if you get elected, you’re going to say to yourself, well, I can do more good if I stay, and then if I really vote my conscience on this sort of thing. So, you give away a little bit here and a little bit there and a little bit there and finally you don’t recognize yourself in the mirror anymore. And that’s – I grew up in a political family, but I watched how people behaved and they behave like human beings which is what you have to expect and I behave like human beings.

而当你当选，你会告诉自己：如果我留在这里，我就能做更多好事；然后在这种事情上你若按良知投票……于是这里让一点，那里让一点，久而久之镜子里已认不出自己。我出身政治家庭，见过人们的行为模式，他们的表现与“人性”一致，这是你必须预期到的——而我也同样具有人的弱点。