Last year MidAmerican wrote off a major investment in a zinc recovery project that was initiated in 1998 and became operational in 2002. Large quantities of zinc are present in the brine produced by our California geothermal operations, and we believed we could profitably extract the metal. For many months, it appeared that commercially-viable recoveries were imminent. But in mining, just as in oil exploration, prospects have a way of “teasing” their developers, and every time one problem was solved, another popped up. In September, we threw in the towel.

去年，MidAmerican 对一项重大的投资计提了损失（write off）：这是一个锌回收项目，1998 年启动、2002 年投产。我们在加州地热业务中产出的卤水（brine）含有大量锌，我们原以为可以以盈利方式把金属提取出来。曾有好几个月，看上去商业上可行的回收（commercially-viable recoveries）已近在眼前。但在采矿业，就像在石油勘探中一样，项目往往会“吊着”开发者：每解决一个问题，就会冒出另一个问题。最终在 9 月，我们选择放弃。

Our failure here illustrates the importance of a guideline — stay with simple propositions — that we usually apply in investments as well as operations. If only one variable is key to a decision, and the variable has a 90% chance of going your way, the chance for a successful outcome is obviously 90%. But if ten independent variables need to break favorably for a successful result, and each has a 90% probability of success, the likelihood of having a winner is only 35%. In our zinc venture, we solved most of the problems. But one proved intractable, and that was one too many. Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it makes sense to look for — if you’ll excuse an oxymoron — mono-linked chains.

这次失败说明了一条原则的重要性——坚持简单命题（stay with simple propositions）——我们通常在投资与运营中都遵循它。若一个决策只取决于一个关键变量，而该变量有 90% 的概率朝有利方向发展，那么成功的概率显然就是 90%。但如果成功需要 10 个相互独立的变量都朝有利方向变化，并且每个变量成功概率都是 90%，那么最终“赢”的概率只有 35%。在我们的锌项目中，我们解决了大多数问题，但有一个问题始终无法攻克——而这一个就已经“多一个都不行”。因为一条链条的强度取决于最薄弱的一环，所以更合理的做法是去寻找——请原谅这个自相矛盾的说法——“单环链条”（mono-linked chains）。

WARREN BUFFETT:

What do you think if you’re a banker? Your job is to assess the credit of whatever you’re committing to. And the interesting thing about those CDOs and a lot of them consisted of hybrid bank securities. I mean, so they were actually benefiting and there were a lot of hybrid bank securities put in the CDOs and they were benefiting from raising money from that forum. And that turned out to be a way poorer asset than they thought. They created the liability to some degree as they grew. But I would get back to the fact that if you run a bank, you know, I think your job is to assess the credit of when you lay out money whether you’re buying U.S. treasuries, whether you’re bonds of Greece, whether you’re buying or lending money to, for construction and, I think I would not want to cop out really, I was relying on a rating agency. And the rating agencies they have models and we all have models in our mind, you know, when we’re investing but they’ve got them all worked out, you know, with a lot of checklists and all of that sort of thing. I don’t believe in those myself, only to say I’ve got a model in my mind, everybody has a model in their mind when they’re making investments. But reliance on models, you know, work 98% of the time but it’s, they never work 100% of the time. And everybody ought to realize that that’s using them.

Warren Buffett：

如果你是一家银行的银行家，你觉得你的工作是什么？你的工作就是评估你要投入资金的东西的信用（credit）。而这些 CDO 里有个很有意思的点：很多 CDO 的资产其实由“银行混合型证券”（hybrid bank securities）构成。也就是说，这些银行一方面把大量混合型银行证券装进 CDO 里，另一方面又从这个渠道融资——它们实际上也从中受益。但事实证明，那类资产比他们想象的要差得多。随着它们规模扩张，它们在某种程度上也“自己创造了这种负债/风险”。但我还是要回到一点：如果你在经营一家银行，我认为你的职责就是在你掏钱的时候评估信用风险——无论你买的是美国国债（U.S. treasuries）、希腊债券（bonds of Greece），还是你在做建设项目的贷款或投资。我不愿意接受那种“推脱式”的说法：我只是依赖了评级机构。评级机构有他们的模型（models）。我们每个人在做投资时，脑子里也都有自己的模型；只不过他们把模型“形式化”了：有很多清单（checklists）之类。我个人不太信那一套——当然我也承认，我脑子里也有模型，人人在做投资决策时脑子里都有模型。但依赖模型这种事，可能 98% 的时间都管用，但永远不可能 100% 管用。任何使用模型的人都应该清楚这一点。

62. Munger: GEICO synergies are “dumb idea”

芒格：GEICO 的协同效应是“愚蠢的想法”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞。

GARY RANSOM: With the Van Tuyl acquisition — or now Berkshire Hathaway Automotive — there may be some natural synergies with GEICO, if it’s nothing more than just putting a gecko on the salesman’s desk.

加里·兰索姆：随着Van Tuyl收购——现在是伯克希尔哈撒韦汽车——与 GEICO 之间可能会有一些自然的协同效应，即使这仅仅是把一只壁虎放在销售员的桌子上。

Would you expect to do anything in that regard to encourage getting more customers through that relationship?

你会期待在这方面做些什么来鼓励通过这种关系吸引更多客户吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think so.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不这样认为。

You always have these things that the investment banker will tell you will produce synergy and all that. Most times that doesn’t work.

你总是会听到投资银行家告诉你这些事情会产生协同效应等等。但大多数时候这并不奏效。

And historically, selling auto insurance through dealerships hasn’t been particularly effective. And if we were to do that, we would probably have to compensate people who did the insurance work — or made the insurance sales — out of Van Tuyl. That would add to costs.

历史上，通过经销商销售汽车保险并不是特别有效。如果我们这样做，我们可能需要对在 Van Tuyl 进行保险工作或进行保险销售的人进行补偿。这将增加成本。

I mean, GEICO is a low-cost model, and it’s a wonderful low-cost model. And [CEO] Tony Nicely has done an incredible job of keeping those costs down and our — and you can see it in our expense ratios.

我意思是，GEICO 是一个低成本模型，而且这是一个很棒的低成本模型。[首席执行官]托尼·尼克利做得非常出色，成功地控制了这些成本，你可以在我们的费用比率中看到这一点。

We spend a lot of money on advertising. But its success depends on delivering first-class insurance at a better price than other people can get, and the more people we put in distribution system or anything —

我们在广告上花了很多钱。但它的成功依赖于提供一流的保险，价格优于其他公司，并且我们越多地把人们放在分销系统中或者其他任何地方——

So, I would doubt very much that we do anything along that line. I think that those two companies will do better if run as two independent businesses than if we try to push through something.

所以，我非常怀疑我们会在这方面做任何事情。我认为，如果这两家公司作为两个独立的业务运营，它们会做得更好，而不是我们试图推进什么。

We — Charlie and I have seen a lot of things on paper that involve that sort of a proposition and very, very few succeed.

我们——查理和我在纸上看到过很多涉及这种提议的事情，但成功的非常非常少。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. It’s a very dumb idea, and we’re not going to do it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我同意。这是个非常愚蠢的主意，我们不会这样做。（笑声）