I.C.S.104.我们的工作方法
我们的工作不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息，需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力，参考：《1976-11 Warren Buffett’s Forward to The Intelligent Investor》。
To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a strato-spheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What’s needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework. This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline.
一生中成功的投资并不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息。你需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力。本书精准清晰地阐述了正确的框架。你必须具备情绪自律的能力。
合适的性格（独立思考）、合适的智力框架（正确思考），加在一起是真正意义上的理性，参考：《1993-10-18 Warren Buffett's Idea Of Heaven: "I Don't Have To Work With People I Don't Like"》。
He credits Graham with giving him “an intellectual framework for investing and a temperamental model, the ability to stand back and not be influenced by a crowd, not be fearful if stocks go down.” He sums up Graham’s teaching: “When proper temperament joins with proper intellectual framework, then you get rational behavior.”
他把本·格雷厄姆的贡献归结为“为投资提供了一个智力框架和一种性格模型——能够超然旁观、不受大众影响，股价下跌也不恐惧。”他用一句话概括格雷厄姆的教诲：“当合适的性格与合适的智力框架结合时，你就会表现得理性。”
（1）独立思考
独立思考是一种性格，其重要性要占到90%，性格也不是模糊不清的问题，一个人的性格是不是向内收敛？有没有自己的想法？遇到问题时往哪个方向思考？实际上是可以证实或者证伪的问题，参考：《2025-09-27 段永平.你需要先确认你确实有脑袋》。
MarDiscover：段师兄好，想请教您一个问题，互联网上经常充斥着各种各样的信息，鱼目混珠，特别是在判断力方面有欠缺的。请问我们应该怎样思考和判断真伪，以免被别人牵着脑袋走@大道无形我有型
大道无形我有型：你需要先确认你确实有脑袋。
（2）正确思考
巴菲特已经把投资工作的智力框架总结成一句话，参考：《1978-03-14 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
(1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.
(1) 我们能够理解的生意， (2) 具有良好的长期前景， (3) 由才德兼具的人士所经营， (4) 非常吸引人的价格。
前面三点（Right Business+Right People）是假设（Intelligent hypotheses）；假设需要有事实（Correct facts）；最后“吸引人的价格”（Right Price）需要合理的推理（Sound reasoning），参考：《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、逻辑正确，你就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
1、Intelligent hypotheses（聪明的假设）
好的假设从一开始就抓住特定企业的关键变量，参考：《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
But I would, you know, if I were teaching a course on investments, there would be simply one valuation study after another with the students, trying to identify the key variables in that particular business, and evaluating how predictable they were first, because that is the first step. If something is not very predictable, forget it. You know, you don’t have to be right about every company. You have to make a few good decisions in your lifetime. But then when you find — the important thing is to know when you find one where you really do know the key variables — which ones are important — and you do think you’ve got a fix on them. Where we’ve been — where we’ve done well, Charlie and I made a dozen or so very big decisions relative to net worth, but not as big as they should have been. And we’ve known we were right on those going in. I mean they just weren’t that complicated. And we knew we were focusing on the right variables and they were dominant. And we knew that even though we couldn’t take it out to five decimal places or anything like that, we knew that in a general way we were right about them.
不过我要说的是，如果我来教一门投资课，我会带着学生做一例又一例的“估值实战”。目标是识别该企业的关键变量，并首先评估这些变量的可预测性——因为这一步是第一要务。如果某件事不可预测，就把它放下。你不需要对每家公司都判断准确；一生中只需做出少数几次好的决策。关键在于：当你遇到一个标的，确实知道它的关键变量“是什么”、哪些是重要的，而且你觉得自己抓住了它们——这时要认得出来。我们的成功正源于此：我和 Charlie 做过十来次相对于净资产而言非常大的决定（但其实本可以下得更大）。在这些决策上，我们从一开始就知道自己是对的——并不复杂。我们知道自己在关注正确且“占主导”的变量。即使不能精确到小数点后五位，我们也知道“大方向没错”。
关于这一点的说法有很多，参考：《1995-03-07 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).
我们的投资仍然很集中，理念也很简单：最佳投资点子三言两语就能说清。我们偏爱具有持久竞争优势并且由德才兼备、股东利益优先的经理人所经营的优质企业。只要目标企业确实拥有这些特质，而且我们能够以合理的价格买进，投资就很难出错（这正是我们一直不断要克服的挑战）。
Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.
投资者应该记住，评估投资成绩并不会像奥林匹克跳水比赛那样考虑难度系数。有的企业，其价值很大程度上取决于某个单一的关键因素，而且这个因素容易理解又经久不衰；但有的企业，其价值受很多不断变化、复杂的因素影响。只要你对企业价值的分析和评估是正确的，你的投资收益并不会因为企业价值的评估难度提高而变得更高。
再比如七英尺高的篮球运动员，参考：《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
Now, the general premise of why you’re interested in something should be 80 percent of it or thereabouts. I mean, you don’t want to be chasing down every idea that way, so you should have a strong presumption.
不过，你之所以对某项投资感兴趣的基本前提应当占到大约80%。我的意思是，你不想用这种方法追踪每一个想法，所以你需要有一个强有力的假设前提。
You should be like a basketball coach who runs into a seven-footer on the street. I mean, you’re interested to start with; now you have to find out if you can keep him in school, if he’s coordinated, and all that sort of thing. That’s the scuttlebutt aspect of it.
你应该像一个篮球教练在街上遇到一个七英尺高的球员一样。我的意思是，你一开始就应该感兴趣；然后你需要了解他是否能留在学校，是否协调，诸如此类的事情。这就是“走访调查法”的一个方面。
But I believe that as you’re acquiring knowledge about industries in general, companies specifically, that there really isn’t anything like first doing some reading about them, and then getting out and talking to competitors, and customers, and suppliers, and ex-employees, and current employees, and whatever it may be.
但我相信，在你获取行业一般知识和具体公司信息时，确实没有什么比先阅读资料，然后与竞争对手、客户、供应商、前雇员、现雇员以及其他相关人士交流更有效的方法了。
And you will learn a lot. But it should be the last 20 percent or 10 percent. I mean, you don’t want to get too impressed by that, because you really want to start with a business where you think the economics are good, where they look like seven-footers, and then you want to go out with a scuttlebutt approach to possibly reject your original hypothesis.
你会从中学到很多。但这应该是最后的20%或10%的工作。我的意思是，你不想对这些印象过深，因为你确实应该从一家你认为经济状况良好的企业开始，就像那些七英尺高的篮球运动员一样，然后用“走访调查法”来验证或否定你的原始假设。
不能让10-20%的部分过度干扰80%的部分。
就像一张纸的正面和反面，正面是能找到关键变量反面是找不到，正面有多重要等于反面有多麻烦，我们在自己的实践中发现绝大数的错误不是中途停下来：“这个好像说不通”，绝大数的错误是起头就是错了，并且是方向性的错误，更严重的是在错误的方向上已经自我强化了很长的时间，很难再有修正的机会，这样的例子比比皆是。
回到假设本身，特定企业的关键变量始终围绕“Right Business”和“Right People”，要么业务的质量很好，要么管理的质量很好，或者两者兼备。
（1）Right Business
Right Business的判断标准：1、业务易于理解；2、具备优异的经济属性。巴菲特有一份用了几十年的收购标准可以作为参考：《1993-03-01 Warren Buffett.Acquisition Criteria》。
1.Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
规模较大的收购（税后利润至少 1,000 万美元），
2.Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
具备经验证的稳定盈利能力（我们对未来预测或“扭亏为盈”的情形不感兴趣），
3.Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
在很少或几乎无负债的情况下实现良好股本回报的企业，
4.Management in place (we can’t supply it),
管理团队已就位（我们无法提供管理层），
5.Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
业务简单（如果技术含量很多，我们就无法理解），
6.An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
明确的要约价格（在价格未知的情况下，即便是初步交流，我们也不想浪费自己或卖方的时间）。
第2点的潜台词是高利润（没有足够厚的利润空间哪来的稳定？），第3点的潜台词是轻资产（轻资产才能轻负债，重资产和重负债往往是伴生的），人都是野生动物，对风险极其敏感，低利润、重资产+重负债的业务在日子好的时候不是事，日子不好的时候自然有不理性的行为，是埋在内部的不安全的因素。
重资产有一个例外是公共事业，有稳定的需求（相当于有一个安全的防护罩），否则负重前行等于抱着一个炸弹前行，最终就像巴菲特说的，行业是最重要的因素，有些行业的经济属性天生就更有风险，参考：《2007-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
But in stocks, because the prices jiggle around every minute, and because it lets the people who teach finance use the mathematics they’ve learned, they have — in effect, they would explain this a way a little more technically — but they have, in effect, translated volatility into all kinds of — past volatility — in terms of all kinds of measures of risk.
但在股票市场中，因为价格每分钟都在波动，而这让教授金融的人能够运用他们学到的数学，实际上，他们用一种稍微技术性的方式解释，但实际上，他们将波动性转化为各种风险的度量。
And it’s nonsense. Risk comes from the nature of certain kinds of businesses. It can be risky to be in some businesses just by the simple economics of the type of business you’re in, and it comes from not knowing what you’re doing.
这纯属无稽之谈。风险来自某些业务本身的性质。仅仅因为你所处行业类型的基本经济特性，有些生意天生就更有风险；风险也来自你不知道自己在做什么。
And, you know, if you understand the economics of the business in which you are engaged, and you know the people with whom you’re doing business, and you know the price you pay is sensible, you don’t run any real risk.
而且，你知道，如果你了解所从事业务的经济状况，并且了解与你做生意的人，并且知道你支付的价格是合理的，你就不会承担任何真正的风险。
And I don’t think Charlie and I — certainly Berkshire — I don’t think we’ve ever had a permanent loss in marketable securities that was, what, 1 percent, maybe, half a percent of net worth.
我认为查理和我——当然还有伯克希尔——我不认为我们在可交易证券上曾经有过永久性损失，可能是净资产的 1%，也许是 0.5%。
（2）Right People
人都是野生动物，对风险极其敏感，靠近风险的距离决定了每个人的心理状态和思维方式，有些人不容易受到外界的影响，能沉下心来做好事情，有些人天生紧张，很容易受外界的影响做出不理性的行为，参考：《2007-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
Beware when someone says “it’s so easy”
当有人说“这很简单”时要小心。
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 7 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thanks for hosting this wonderful meeting. My name is Chander Chavla (PH), and I’m visiting from Seattle, Washington.
观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢你们举办这次精彩的会议。我的名字是钱德·查夫拉（音），我来自华盛顿州的西雅图。
And I think Berkshire Hathaway can contribute to the reduction of global warming if, for next year shareholder’s meeting, Mr. Gates and I fly on the same plane. (Laughter)
我认为，如果明年股东大会时盖茨先生和我乘坐同一架飞机，伯克希尔·哈撒韦可以为减少全球变暖做出贡献。（笑声）
My question is, I have made a few mistakes in business by trusting the wrong people. So in — and I don’t know where to learn how to trust the right people.
我的问题是，我在生意中因为信错了人而犯了一些错误。所以在——我不知道该去哪里学习如何信任正确的人。
They don’t teach you that in business school, and the people who are supposed to teach you in the corporate world sometimes betray you.
他们在商学院里不教你这些，而那些在企业界应该教你的人有时会背叛你。
So how can I learn who to trust and who not to trust?
那么我该如何学会信任谁和不信任谁呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Boy, that’s a great question. But you probably have about as good a chance of getting a good answer from me on that as you have on getting on Bill Gates’ plane next year. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：哇，这是个好问题。但是你可能从我这里得到一个好的答案的机会和你明年跟比尔·盖茨同一班飞机的机会差不多。（笑声）
I get letters all the time, and I hear from people who have been taken advantage of in financial transactions. And, you know, it really is — it’s sad. And a lot of it isn’t even — it’s not fraud or anything.
我经常收到信件，听到一些人在金融交易中受到欺骗的故事。你知道，这真的很令人伤心。而且很多时候——这并不是欺诈或其他的东西。
For one thing, I mean, just the charges involved, the frictional costs and the baloney that is presented is tough.
首先，我的意思是，仅仅是涉及的费用、摩擦成本和所呈现的胡扯就很难处理。
Charlie and I have had very good luck in terms of buying businesses and putting our trust in people. It’s been just overwhelmingly good.
查理和我在购买企业和信任他人方面一直非常幸运。这一直是非常好的。
But we filter out a lot of people. And then you say, “Well, how do you filter them out?”
但是我们筛选掉了很多人。然后你会问：“那么你是如何筛选他们的？”
I would say — I think Charlie will agree with this — people give themselves away fairly often. And maybe it does help to have been around as long as we have in seeing the various ways they give themselves away.
我会说——我认为查理会同意这一点——人们经常会暴露出自己的本性。而且，可能在我们这么多年里，看到的各种方式让我们更能识别这些。
They — when somebody comes to me with a business — and I probably shouldn’t tell this publicly because they’ll probably tailor their approach subsequently — but when they come, just the very things they talk about, what they regard as important and not important, there are a lot of clues that come as to subsequent behavior.
当有人带着一个生意来找我时——我可能不应该公开说这个，因为他们可能会因此调整他们的方式——但当他们来时，仅仅是他们谈论的事情，他们认为重要和不重要的东西，就有很多线索可以预示后续的行为。
And, like I say, we’ve really had a batting average I wouldn’t have thought we would have had in the people that we’ve joined with.
就像我说的，我们在与我们合作的人中取得了我原本没想到的击球率。
But it hasn’t been a hundred percent. It’s been well above 90. And I get asked that, you know, I mean, “How do you make those judgments?” And I don’t know.
但这并不是百分之百。一直在 90%以上。有人问我，“你是如何做出这些判断的？”我也不知道。
Charlie, can you articulate the way we do it?
查理，你能阐述一下我们是怎么做的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, partly we’re deeply suspicious when the proposition is too good to be true.
查理·芒格：嗯，部分原因是当提议好得令人难以置信时，我们会深感怀疑。
Warren once introduced me to a gentleman promoter who wanted to inveigle us into an insurance program. And he said, “We only write fire insurance on concrete bridges that are covered by water.” He says, “It’s like taking candy from babies.” We are able to filter out propositions like that.
沃伦曾经向我介绍一个想要引诱我们参与保险计划的推销员。他说，“我们只对被水覆盖的混凝土桥梁进行火灾保险。”他说，“这就像从婴儿手中拿糖果。”我们能够过滤掉这样的提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Anybody that, implicit in their comments or what they kind of laugh about or — all kinds of things in terms of the fact — you know, it’s so easy and — it ain’t that easy, you know, and we get suspicious very quickly.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。任何人，无论是在他们的评论中隐含的，还是他们有点嘲笑的，或者是各种各样的事情——你知道，这么容易——其实没那么容易，你知道，我们会很快产生怀疑。
And the truth is, we rule out 90 percent of the times. And we may be wrong about a fair number that we’re ruling out. The important thing is whether the ones we’re ruling in we’re right about.
事实上，我们会排除90%的情况。我们可能会对不少被排除的人做出错误判断。重要的是，我们对那些留下的人是否正确。
And so we don’t mind — we’re looking for the obvious cases of people you can trust.
所以我们不介意——我们在寻找那些显而易见的值得信任的人。
I mean, go back to 1969 again. When I was thinking about who to turn my partners over to, all kinds of people with great records. That was a hedge fund — that was the first hay-day of hedge funds. And there were books written about it, “New Breed on Wall Street” and some of those. You can look them up.
我的意思是，再回到 1969 年。当我在考虑把我的合伙人交给谁时，各种有着优秀记录的人。那是一个对冲基金——那是对冲基金的第一个辉煌时期。还有一些书是关于它的，比如《华尔街的新生代》等。你可以查一下。
And dozens and dozens and dozens of people with good records. And when I sat down and thought about, I’m going to write my partners and tell them who to turn over all their money to — because most of them had a hundred percent or close to it with me — you know, Charlie, Sandy, Bill Ruane.
有数十个人都有很好的记录。当我坐下来思考要给我的合作伙伴写信，告诉他们该把他们的钱交给谁——因为他们大部分人几乎都把钱交给我——我想到了查理、桑迪和比尔·鲁安。
I couldn’t have told you which of the three was going to do the best. And, you know, I couldn’t even tell you those three would done better than five others that somebody else might pick.
我无法告诉你这三个人中谁会表现得最好。而且，你知道，我甚至不能告诉你这三个人会比其他可能选出的五个人表现得更好。
But the one thing I was sure of is that they were going to be sensational stewards of money.
但我确信的一件事是，他们将成为出色的资金管理者。
They were going to care more about those people — the people that were turned over to them — in getting the best result possible than they were going to care about, you know, whether they made X or 2X this year in terms of commissions or fees or any of that sort of thing.
他们会更加关心那些被转交给他们的人，想尽一切办法获得最佳的结果，而不是关心自己能否在这个年度获得多少佣金或费用。
Anytime I find somebody with a — what I regard as an unfair fee structure, and saying, “Well, I can get it,” well, you know, I rule them out.
每当我发现有人有——我认为不公平的收费结构，并且说：“好吧，我能接受，”你知道，我就把他们排除在外。
And I may rule out some of the wrong people. But the ones that are left in, I feel very good about. And I wish I could give you better advice than that, but that’s all I can do.
我可能会排除一些不合适的人。但留下来的人，我感到非常满意。我希望能给你更好的建议，但这就是我所能做的。
什么样的人具有明显错误的性格特征？参考：《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call “the institutional imperative.” In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative’s existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn’t so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
我最意外的发现：商业中有一种看不见的力量至关重要，我们可以称之为“制度性必然（the institutional imperative）”。在商学院时，没人暗示过它的存在；刚踏入商业世界时，我也并未直觉地理解它。我曾以为体面、聪明且经验丰富的经理人会自然而然地做出理性决策。但随着时间推移，我发现并非如此：一旦制度性必然发挥作用，理性常常会枯萎。
For example: (1) As if governed by Newton’s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
比如：（1）仿佛受牛顿第一定律支配，机构会抗拒改变其当前方向；（2）正如工作会膨胀以填满可用时间，公司项目或并购会自发出现以消耗可用资金；（3）领导者的任何业务“渴望”，哪怕愚蠢，其下属都会迅速拿出详尽的收益率与战略研究予以背书；（4）同业公司的行为——不论是扩张、并购、制定高管薪酬等——都会被盲目模仿。
第一：不可逆转；第二：卡住的正好是脖子的位置；第三、第四：自发的寻找一切作死的方式。
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
让企业走上这些道路的，是制度动力学，而非贪婪或愚蠢——尽管这些道路往往被事实证明是误导。在因忽视这种力量而付出昂贵代价之后，我努力以尽量降低其影响的方式来组织和管理 Berkshire。此外，Charlie 和我也尝试将投资集中在那些对这一问题保持警觉的公司。
如果最初的假设错了就全坏了，后面都是自己骗自己的幻觉，参考：《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The first filter we probably put it through is whether we think — and we know instantly — whether it’s a business we’re going to understand, and whether it’s a business that — if it passes through that, it’s whether a company can have a sustainable edge, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们可能首先筛选的是，看看这是不是一个我们能够理解的业务——我们通常能够瞬间判断出这一点——以及这家公司是否能够具有持续的竞争优势。如果通过这一点，就继续评估。
And that gets rid of a very significant percentage of the things people have —
这一筛选就会淘汰掉人们推荐给我们的很大一部分东西。
They always want to tell you some story or anything. And I’m sure they regard me and Charlie as very arbitrary, in terms of, you know, in the middle of the first sentence saying, “Well, you know, we appreciate the call, but we’re not interested.”
他们总是想给你讲一些故事之类的东西。我确信，他们会认为我和查理非常武断，比如在第一句话说到一半时，我们就说：“嗯，我们很感谢您的来电，但我们没兴趣。”
I mean, you know, they just think if they explain something — and I get letters on this all the time.
我的意思是，他们可能认为，只要他们能解释清楚——而我经常收到这类信件。
But we really can tell, in the middle of the first sentence, usually, whether those two factors exist. And if we can’t understand it, obviously, it’s not going to have — we can’t make a decision as to whether it has a sustainable edge.
但我们通常能在第一句话中途判断出是否具备这两个条件。如果我们无法理解它，那显然无法判断它是否有持续的竞争优势。
And if we can’t understand it, we, very often, can come to the conclusion that it’s not the kind of the business where it will have a sustainable edge.
而且如果我们无法理解它，我们很容易得出结论，这不是那种能够拥有持续竞争优势的业务。
So 98 percent of the conversations we can end, you know, in the middle of somebody’s first sentence, which, of course, goes over very big with the caller, but — (Laughter)
所以，我们可以在98%的对话中，在对方第一句话的中途就结束交谈。当然，这对打电话的人来说可能很令人沮丧——（笑声）
最初的假设错了就全坏了，后面都是自己骗自己的幻觉。
And then, sometimes if you’re talking about an entire business, we can tell by who we’re dealing with whether a deal’s ever going to work out or not.
然后，有时候当我们讨论一个完整的企业时，我们可以通过和谁打交道来判断这笔交易是否可能成功。
I mean, it — if there’s an auction going on, we don’t want to — we have no interest in talking about it. And it just isn’t going, you know, it isn’t going to work.
我的意思是，如果有拍卖正在进行，我们不会感兴趣——我们根本不会谈论它。这是行不通的。
If someone is interested in, essentially, doing that with their business, you know, they’re going to sit down and want to renegotiate everything with us all over again after the deal is done. And we’re going to have to buy the business two or three times before we get through.
如果有人基本上是想通过拍卖来处理他们的企业，您知道，他们可能会在交易完成后与我们重新坐下来，想要再谈一遍所有的条款。而我们可能需要“购买”这家公司两三次才能完成。
You just see all these things coming.
您会预见到所有这些问题的到来。
And on the other hand, we’ve had, you know, terrific experience, basically, with the people we have associated with.
另一方面，我们与合作过的人基本上有着非常好的合作经历。
So it works. It’s efficient. You know, we don’t want to listen to stories all day. And we don’t read brokerage reports of anything of the sort. It’s just — there’s other things to do with your time.
所以这种方式有效率。您知道，我们不想整天听故事。我们也不看任何类似经纪报告的东西。时间还有其他更值得花费的事情。
最终该如何评价管理团队的能力？巴菲特讲到了两点，一是看他们把企业经营得如何？特别是接手时拿到的“底牌”是什么？经过一段时间的经营有没有变得更好？二是看他们如何对待所有者？能力差的人，往往也恰恰是不怎么把股东放在心上的人，这两点经常是相伴相生的，参考：《1994-04-25 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
18. “Two yardsticks” for judging management
“两把尺子”评估管理层
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Secondly, you talk about good management with corporations and that you try and buy companies with good management. I feel that I have about as much chance of meeting good managers, other than yourself, as I do bringing Richard Nixon back to life. How do I, as an average investor, find out what good management is?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：其次，您常谈到优秀的企业管理层，并且尽量收购拥有优秀管理层的公司。除了您本人之外，我觉得自己遇到一个好管理者的概率，差不多等于把 Richard Nixon 复活的概率。作为一个普通投资者，我如何判断什么是好的管理层？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you judge management by two yardsticks. One is how well they run the business and I think you can learn a lot about that by reading about both what they’ve accomplished and what their competitors have accomplished, and seeing how they have allocated capital over time. You have to have some understanding of the hand they were dealt when they themselves got a chance to play the hand. But, if you understand something about the business they’re in — and you can’t understand it in every business, but you can find industries or companies where you can understand it — then you simply want to look at how well they have been doing in playing the hand, essentially, that’s been dealt with them. And then the second thing you want to figure out is how well that they treat their owners. And I think you can get a handle on that, oftentimes. A lot of times you can’t. I mean it — they’re many companies that obviously fall in — somewhere — in that 20th to 80th percentile and it’s a little hard to pick out where they do fall.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为评估管理层有两把尺子。第一，看他们把企业经营得如何。我觉得你可以通过阅读他们取得了什么、他们的竞争对手取得了什么，以及他们这些年如何进行资本配置，来学到很多东西。你必须理解他们接手时拿到的“底牌”是什么。当你对他们所处的业务有所了解——你不可能了解所有行业，但总能找到一些你能看懂的行业或公司——那么你就要看他们如何打好手中的“牌”。第二，看他们如何对待所有者。我认为很多时候你能抓住这一点，当然也有不少时候很难。我是说，有许多公司显然落在第20到第80百分位之间的某个位置，而要精确分辨它们处在其中的哪一段，确实不太容易。
But, I think you can usually figure out — I mean, it’s not hard to figure out that, say, Bill Gates, or Tom Murphy, or Don Keough, or people like that, are really outstanding managers. And it’s not hard to figure out who they’re working for. And I can give you some cases on the other end of the spectrum, too. It’s interesting how often the ones that, in my view, are the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don’t think that much about the shareholders, too. The two often go hand in hand. But, I think reading of reports — reading of competitors’ reports — I think you’ll get a fix on that in some cases. You don’t have to — you know, you don’t have to make a hundred correct judgments in this business or 50 correct judgments. You only have to make a few. And that’s all we try to do. And, generally speaking, the conclusions I’ve come to about managers have really come about the same way you can make yours.
但是，我认为你通常还是能分辨出来——比如说，Bill Gates、Tom Murphy、Don Keough 这些人，确实是杰出的管理者；而他们究竟在为谁服务，也不难判断。相反一端也有不少例子。有意思的是，在我看来那些管理能力差的人，往往也恰恰是不怎么把股东放在心上的人。这两点经常是相伴相生的。不过，我认为通过阅读年报——以及竞争对手的年报——在某些情况下你能把握住要点。在这个行业里，你不需要——你懂的——做对一百次判断，甚至不需要做对五十次判断。你只需要做对少数几次。我们所做的，也只是如此。总体而言，我对管理层的判断，基本上就是通过你也可以使用的同样方法得出的。
I mean they come about by reading reports rather than any intimate personal knowledge or — and knowing them personally at all. So it — you know, read the proxy statements, see what they think of — see how they treat themselves versus how they treat the shareholders, look at what they have accomplished, considering what the hand was that they were dealt when they took over compared to what is going on in the industry. And I think you can figure it out sometimes. You don’t have to figure out very often. Charlie?
我的意思是，这些判断主要来自阅读报告，而不是源于什么私人接触，或者对他们的私下了解。所以——去读代理声明（proxy statements），看看他们在意什么——看看他们如何对待自己与如何对待股东；结合他们接手时拿到的“底牌”，与行业同时期的情况对比，去看他们到底做出了什么成绩。我想，有时候你能看明白。你也不必次次都看明白。Charlie？
2、Correct facts（正确的事实）
要尽量确保掌握的事实是正确的，然后一旦掌握了事实，必须弄清这些事实意味着什么？不需要关注不重要的事实；有些事实重要但不可知，也不需要关注；真正需要关注的是重要并且可知（important and knowable）的事实。
这个过程还可以用到Fisher的走访调查法（scuttlebutt），用来验证或否定最初的假设。
（1）区分观点和事实
WARREN BUFFETT: A fat pitch coming up. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 一个好机会来了。（笑声）
But I don’t mind it at all, because the truth is that we get — I don’t even know what we pay for Value Line. Charlie and I both get it in our respective offices, but we get incredible value out of it because it gives us the quickest way to see a huge number of the key factors that tell us whether we’re basically interested in the company.
但我一点也不介意，因为事实是我们得到——我甚至不知道我们为《价值线》支付了多少钱。查理和我都在各自的办公室收到它，但我们从中获得了难以置信的价值，因为它以最快的方式展示了大量关键因素，让我们知道我们是否对一家公司基本感兴趣。
And it also gives us a great way — good way — of sort of periodically keeping up-to-date. Value Line has 1,700 or so stocks they cover, and they do it every 13 weeks. So it’s a good way to make sure that you haven’t overlooked something if you just quickly review that.
它还为我们提供了一种很好的方式来定期保持更新。《价值线》覆盖了大约1700只股票，并且每13周更新一次。所以快速浏览一下是确保你没有遗漏什么的好方法。
But the snapshot it presents is an enormously efficient way for us to garner information about various businesses.
它提供的快照是我们获取各种企业信息的一种极为高效的方式。
We don’t care about the ratings. I mean that doesn’t make any difference to us. We’re not looking for opinions. We’re looking for facts.
我们不关心评级。我是说，这对我们来说没有任何影响。我们不是在寻找观点，而是在寻找事实。
But I have yet to see a better way, including fooling around on the internet or anything, that gives me the information as quickly. I can absorb the information on — about a company — most of the key information you can get — and probably doesn’t take more than 30 seconds in glancing through Value Line, and I don’t have any other system that’s as good. Charlie?
但我还没有见过比这更好的方式，包括在网上搜索信息或者其他任何方式，能够让我如此快速地获取信息。我能从《价值线》中吸收关于一家公司——几乎是所有关键信息——可能只需要不到30秒的时间，我没有其他任何系统能做到这么好。查理？
（2）重要并且可知的事实
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Ben Graham said long ago that you’re neither right nor wrong because people agree with you or disagree with you.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。早在很久以前，本·格雷厄姆就说过，你的对错并不取决于别人是否同意或反对你。
In other words, being contrarian has no special virtue over being a trend follower.
换句话说，逆向思维并不比追随潮流有特别的优点。
Right for the Right reasons，这句话是另一句话的衍生：You’re neither right nor wrong because people agree with you or disagree with you（你的对错并不取决于别人是否同意或反对你），格雷厄姆和巴菲特各自给出的回答基本意思一样但也有差别。
格雷厄姆认为一个好的决策必须满足两个条件：1、有内在合理性（必须正确思考）；2、有别于多数人的想法（必须独立思考）。巴菲特的回答是：Intelligent hypotheses（聪明的假设）；Correct facts（正确的事实）；Sound reasoning（合理的推理），巴菲特没有强调“有别于多数人的想法”，他强调的是重要并且可知的（important and knowable）事实。
巴菲特对人性的认识更加清晰：人的注意力是会自我实现的，一心想着“与众不同”可能会“为了不同而不同”。
You’re right because your facts and reasoning are right. So all you do is you try to make sure that the facts you have are correct. And that’s usually pretty easy to do in this country. I mean, information is available on all kinds of things. Internet makes it even easier.
你之所以正确，是因为你的事实与推理正确。所以你要做的就是确保你掌握的事实是正确的。在这个国家，这通常是很容易做到的。我的意思是，各种信息都可以获取。互联网让这一切变得更加容易。
And then once you have the facts, you’ve got to think through what they mean. And you don’t take a public opinion survey. You don’t pay attention to things that are unimportant. I mean, what you’re looking for is something — things that are important and knowable.
然后，一旦你掌握了事实，你就必须思考它们的意义。你不进行民意调查，你不关注不重要的事情。我的意思是，你要寻找的是重要且可知的事情。
If something’s important but unknowable, forget it. I mean, it may be important, you know, whether somebody’s going to drop a nuclear weapon tomorrow but it’s unknowable. It may be all kinds of things. So you — and there are all kinds of things are that knowable but are unimportant.
如果某件事情很重要但无法知道，那就忘了它。我的意思是，它可能很重要，比如明天是否有人会投放核武器，但这是无法知道的。可能有各种各样的事情。所以你——而且有各种各样的事情是可以知道的，但却不重要。
In focusing on business and investment decisions, you try to think — you narrow it down to the things that are knowable and important, and then you decide whether you have information of sufficient value that — you know, compared to price and all that — that will cause you to act.
在专注于商业和投资决策时，你会尝试思考——你将其缩小到那些可知且重要的事情，然后你决定是否拥有足够有价值的信息——你知道，相对于价格等等——这会促使你采取行动。
3、Sound reasoning（合理的推理）
巴菲特的团队在实际挑选股票时有一个简单的计算方法，参考：《2022-10-28 Todd Combs.32nd Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast》。
Combs goes to Buffett’s house on many Saturdays to talk, and here’s a litmus test they frequently use. Warren asks “How many names in the S&P are going to be 15x earnings in the next 12 months? How many are going to earn more in five years (using a 90% confidence interval), and how many will compound at 7% (using a 50% confidence interval)?” In this exercise, you are solving for cyclicality, compounding, and initial price. Combs said that this rubric was used to find Apple, since at the time the same 3-5 names kept coming up.
Combs经常在周六去Buffett家里交流，他们常用一个“试金石”。Warren会问：“在未来12个月里，S&P中有多少家公司会是15倍市盈率？有多少家公司在五年后能赚得更多（以90%的置信区间衡量）？有多少家公司会以7%的复合增长率增长（以50%的置信区间衡量）？” 在这个练习中，你要解答的是周期性、复利和初始价格问题。Combs说，他们正是用这个标准找到了Apple，因为当时反复出现的就是那三到五个名字。
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
当Charlie和我买股票时——我们把它们看作企业的一小部分——我们的分析与收购整家公司时非常相似。我们首先要决定能否对五年甚至更久之后的盈利区间作出合理估计。若答案为是，只要价格相对于我们估计区间的下沿合理，我们就会买入该股票（或企业）。反之，若我们缺乏估计未来盈利的能力——这通常是事实——我们就干脆转向别的机会。在我们合作的54年里，从未因为宏观或政治环境，或他人的观点而放弃有吸引力的买入。事实上，这些话题在我们决策时根本不会出现。
计算由两个部分组成：
- 确信的部分，90%的概率获得7%（对应15倍的PE）的收益率；
- 不太确信的部分，50%以上的概率额外增添超过7-8%的收益率。
这种算账的方式不仅仅是股票，“优先股+认股权”的做法更加直接，参考：《1990-03-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.
债券出售所得连同年初的多余现金以及随后通过盈利产生的现金，用于购买三只可转换优先股。首笔交易在7月完成：我们购入 The Gillette Co. 优先股6亿美元，股息8 3/4%，10年强制赎回，并可按每股50美元转换为普通股。随后我们购入 USAir Group, Inc. 优先股3.58亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股60美元转换为普通股。最后在年末我们购入 Champion International Corp. 优先股3亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股38美元转换为普通股。
And what about the other recent deals? Aren’t they just an indirect way of buying the stocks of Salomon Brothers, Champion, USAir and Gillette? Yes and no. “I wouldn’t have bought any of them on an equity basis,” Buffett tells FORBES. “This \[buying convertible preferred issues] is lending money, plus an equity kicker.” But you can look at what he is doing the other way around. Buffett was buying Gillette stock with a yield kicker. What, then, does he mean by saying he wouldn’t buy Gillette stock on an equity basis? Merely that the straight common stock is too risky. The convertible is much safer than the stock because it carries the option to put it back to the company as a fixed-income investment. It can be a stock or a bond—at Buffett’s option. If Gillette’s earnings fall apart, Buffett doesn’t convert the preferred into stock, and it retains value as a fixed-income investment.
那么最近的其他交易呢？它们难道不只是变相买入所罗门兄弟、Champion、USAir 和吉列股票的方式吗？答案是也对也不对。巴菲特告诉《福布斯》：“若单纯当股权投资，我一个都不会买。这（购买可转换优先股）本质上是放贷，再加上一点股权增值的甜头。”反过来看，巴菲特其实是在用收益附加条款买吉列股票。那他说不会买吉列普通股又是什么意思？仅仅因为单买普通股风险太大。可转优先股更安全，因为可选择将其作为固定收益投资回售给公司。它既可以是股票，也可以是债券——取决于巴菲特的选择。如果吉列盈利崩塌，巴菲特不会把优先股转为普通股，而它依然作为固定收益投资保持价值。
（1）PE（FWD）是不是低于15倍？
巴菲特的目标收益率是15%，r=c/DCF+g，PE即DCF/c，15倍约等于7%，其余的8%需要由增长（g）来实现，PE值过高=完全寄希望于增长（g），未来很难预测，更危险的是“脚不着地”的思维方式，最终的影响是无孔不入，侵蚀和影响脑子里的每一个想法，参考：《1974-11-01 Warren Buffett.THE MONEY MEN》。
"A water company is pretty simple," he says, adding that Blue Chip Stamps has a 5% interest in the San Jose Water Works. "So is a newspaper. Or a major retailer." He'll even buy a Street favorite if he isn't paying a big premium for things that haven't happened yet. He mentions Polaroid. "At some price, you don't pay anything for the future, and you even discount the present. Then, if Dr. Land has some surprises up his sleeve, you get them for nothing."
“自来水公司相当简单，”他说，并补充 Blue Chip Stamps 持有圣何塞水务公司 5% 的股份。“报纸也是。大型零售商也是。”如果他不用为尚未发生的事支付高额溢价，他甚至会买华尔街热门股。他提到宝丽来：“在某个价格上，你不会为未来支付任何费用，甚至会对现状打折。那么，如果兰德博士还有什么惊喜，你就能免费得到。”
（2）未来五年有90%的信心成为更赚钱的公司（EPS是增长的）？
用于巩固上一步的成果，不要买入一家既没有增长空间又没有增长能力、处于衰退中的企业，参考：《2022-10-28 Todd Combs.32nd Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast》。
Combs recalled the first question Charlie Munger ever asked him was what percentage of S&P 500 businesses would be a “better business” in five years. Combs believed that it was less than 5% of S&P businesses, whereas Munger stated that it was less than 2%. You can have a great business, but it doesn’t mean it will be better in five years. The rate of change in the world is significant, which makes this exercise difficult, but this is something that Charlie, Warren and Todd think about. When Combs started at Berkshire, they had a 7/10 confidence on the businesses outlook for the next five years. The nature of the world is that things are constantly changing, and Todd says they are right on maybe 1/10 predictions.
Combs回忆道，Charlie Munger问他的第一个问题是：在五年内，S&P 500中有多少比例的企业会成为“更好的企业”。Combs认为少于5%，而Munger则表示少于2%。你可以拥有一家很好的企业，但这并不意味着它在五年后会变得更好。世界变化的速度非常快，使得这一判断非常困难，但这是Charlie、Warren和Todd一直在思考的问题。当Combs刚加入Berkshire时，他们对未来五年企业前景的信心大约是7/10。但世界的本质在于不断变化，Todd表示他们可能只有1/10的预测是正确的。
（3）至少50%信心实现每年7%的增长？
可以期盼但不能强求的结果，5个选择中有4个成绩平平（比如能跟S&P500持平），其中1个“一飞冲天”，中间有运气的成分但也跟严谨细致的工作有很大的关系，参考：《1994-06-16 Steve Jobs.The Rolling Stone Interview》。
I don’t think of the world that way. I’m a tool builder. That’s how I think of myself. I want to build really good tools that I know in my gut and my heart will be valuable. And then whatever happens is… you can’t really predict exactly what will happen, but you can feel the direction that we’re going. And that’s about as close as you can get. Then you just stand back and get out of the way, and these things take on a life of their own.
我并不以那种方式看待世界。我是一个工具制造者。这就是我对自己的看法。我想制造出真正好的工具，我在内心深处知道它们会有价值。然后，无论发生什么……你无法准确预测会发生什么，但你可以感受到我们前进的方向。这就是你能接近的程度。然后你只需退后，放手让这些事情自行发展。
就像小时候打水漂，飞出去的碎瓦片能在水面上跳多少次是无法预测的，乔布斯在斯坦福的演讲中也讲了这个道理，参考：《2005-06-12 Steve Jobs.Stanford University Commencement Speech》。
Again, you can’t connect the dots looking forward; you can only connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will somehow connect in your future. You have to trust in something - your gut, destiny, life, karma, whatever. Because believing in the dots will connect down the road will give you the confidence to follow your heart even when they leave you off the well-worn path. And it has made all the difference.
同样的，你们也无法预知未来，只有回头看时才会发现它们的关系，所以你必须相信你现在获得的点滴会在未来连结起来。你必须相信一些东西：直觉、命运、人生、因果，什么都没关系，因为如果你相信这些点滴会连接起你未来的道路，你就会拥有跟随自己内心的自信，即使你的选择不被主流认同，这将使一切都变得不一样。
*****
I used to tell the stock exchange people that before a person bought 100 shares of General Motors they should have to write out on a [piece of paper:] “I’m buying 100 shares of General Motors at X” and multiply that by the number of shares “and therefore General Motors is worth more than $32 billion” or whatever it multiplies out to, “because ... [fill in the reasons]” And if they couldn’t answer that question, their order wouldn’t be accepted.
我过去常对交易所的人说，在某人买入100股通用汽车之前，他应该在一张纸上写下：“我以X价格买入100股通用汽车”，再乘以股数，“因此通用汽车的价值超过320亿美元”，或者算出多少就是多少，“因为……【写明理由】”。如果他回答不了，就不该接受订单。
That test should be applied. I should never buy anything unless I can fill out that piece of paper. I may be wrong, but I would know the answer to that. “I’m buying Coca Cola right now, 660 million shares of stock, a little under $50. The whole company costs me about $32 billion dollars.” Before you buy 100 shares of stock at $48 you ought to be able to answer “I’m paying $32 billion today for the Coca Cola Company because...” [Banging the podium for emphasis.] If you can’t answer that question, you shouldn’t buy it. If you can answer that question, and you do it a few times, you’ll make a lot of money.
必须采用这种测试。除非我能填好那张纸，否则绝不买。我可能会出错，但我会知道答案。“我现在买可口可乐，6.6亿股，每股不到50美元，整家公司成本约320亿美元。”在你以48美元买入100股之前，你应能回答：“我今天花320亿美元买下可口可乐，因为……”【敲讲台强调】若答不上，就不该买。若能回答并重复几次，你会赚大钱。
[From the audience: “Well, you bought it, how did you answer it?”]
【观众问：“那您买了，您怎么回答？”】
Well, it was only $14 billion. I would say this: “If you added a penny to price of every Coca Cola sold in the world this year, that would add $2 billion to pretax earnings.” Now you tell me whether you think there’s a penny, worldwide, of price flexibility per serving of Coke. Well, the answer is “you know there is.”
当时才140亿美元。我会这么答：“如果今年全球每杯可乐涨价一分钱，就能增加20亿美元税前利润。”那么，你觉得每杯可乐在全球范围里有没有涨价一分钱的灵活空间？答案显然是“有”。
*****
4、Appendix
Appendix.1.《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致，你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致，你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时，正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、逻辑正确，你就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
Appendix.2.《1976 An Hour with Mr. Graham / A Conversation with Benjamin Graham》
There are two requirements for success in Wall Street. One, you have to think correctly; and secondly, you have to think independently.
在华尔街取得成功有两个条件：第一，你必须正确思考；第二，你必须独立思考。
Appendix.3.《1976-11 Warren Buffett’s Forward to The Intelligent Investor》
But over forty years after publication of the book that brought structure and logic to a disorderly and confused activity, it is difficult to think of possible candidates for even the runner-up position in the field of security analysis.
然而，在他为混乱无序的学术活动注入结构和逻辑的著作出版四十多年后，我们却很难想象在证券分析领域，哪怕是屈居亚军的候选人也寥寥无几。
Appendix.4.《1991 Warren Buffett.Three Lectures to Notre Dame Faculty》
... Incidentally, I would say that almost everybody I know in Wall Street has had as many good ideas as I have, they just had a lot of \[bad] ideas too. And I’m serious about that. I mean when I bought Western Insurance Security selling at \$16 and earning \$20 per share, I put half my net worth into it. I checked it out first – I went down to the insurance commission and got out the convention statements, I read Best’s, and I did a lot of things first. But, I mean, my dad wasn’t in it, I’d only had one insurance class at Columbia – but it was not beyond my capabilities to do that, and it isn’t beyond your capabilities.
……顺便说一句，我想说的是，在华尔街我认识的几乎所有人都有和我一样多的好主意，他们只不过也有很多[糟糕的]主意。我是认真的。比如当我以每股16美元买入、而每股赚20美元的Western Insurance Security时，我把自己一半的净资产都投了进去。我事先做过调查——我去了保险监管机构，调出了年会报告，我查阅了《贝斯特年鉴》，还做了很多其他功课。但我的父亲并没有参与，我在哥伦比亚大学也只上过一门保险课——然而做这件事并未超出我的能力范围，也不会超出你们的能力范围。
可靠性不足，运气是不确定的，没有自己的脑子是确定的，不确定的运气+确定性的没有脑子。
Now if I had some rare insight about software, or something like that – I would say that, maybe, other people couldn’t do that – or biotechnology, or something. And I’m not saying that every insight that I have is an insight that somebody else could have, but there were all kinds of people that could have understood American Express Company as well as I understood it in ‘62. They may have been...they may have had a different temperament than I did, so that they were paralyzed by fear, or that they wanted the crowd to be with them, or something like that, but I didn’t know anything about credit cards that they didn’t know, or about travelers checks. Those are not hard products to understand. But what I did have was an intense interest and I was willing, when I saw something I wanted to do, to do it. And if I couldn’t see something to do, to not do anything. By far, the most important quality is not how much IQ you’ve got. IQ is not the scarce factor. You need a reasonable amount of intelligence, but the temperament is 90% of it.
如果我对软件之类的领域有某种罕见的洞见——那我会说，也许别人就做不到——比如生物技术。但我并不是说我拥有的每一个洞见别人都可以拥有，不过在1962年，有很多人本可以像我一样理解美国运通公司。他们也许……他们也许与我有着不同的性情，以至于被恐惧麻痹，或者想要随大流，诸如此类；但关于信用卡或旅行支票，我并不比他们了解更多。这些产品并不难理解。但我拥有的是强烈的兴趣，并且当我发现想做的事情时，我愿意去做；而当我找不到可做之事时，就什么也不做。最重要的品质绝不是你的智商有多高。智商并不是稀缺因素。你需要适量的智力，但性格（气质）占了90%。
That’s why Graham is so important. Graham’s book \[The Intelligent Investor] talks about the qualities of temperament you have to bring to the game, and that is the game.
这就是格雷厄姆如此重要的原因。格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》讨论了你在投资游戏中必须具备的性格特质，而那正是游戏本身。
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.” We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”
我们的股票投资策略与十五年前几乎无异。正如我们在1977年的年报中所说：“我们选择可交易普通股的方式，基本就像评估一整家公司是否值得整体收购。我们希望该企业：(a) 我们能够理解；(b) 具备良好的长期前景；(c) 由诚实且能干的人经营；(d) 可在一个非常有吸引力的价格买到。”只有一处我们认为需要调整：鉴于市场环境与我们的体量，我们如今将“非常有吸引力的价格”改为“有吸引力的价格”。
Appendix.6.《1994 Warren Buffett.UNC Business School》
WB: If you understand an idea, you can express it so that other people understand it. It’s interesting, I find that every year when I write the [annual] report, I hit these blocks. And the block isn’t because I had run out of words in the dictionary, the block is because I haven’t got it straight in my own mind yet. There’s nothing like writing to force you to think and get your thoughts straight.
WB：如果你理解一个想法，你就能把它表达清楚，让别人也能理解。有趣的是，我发现每年写年报时，我都会遇到一些障碍。而这些障碍不是因为字典里的词用完了，而是因为我自己心里还没理清楚。没有什么比写作更能迫使你思考、让你的思想变得清晰。
If you want to communicate something to other investors or co-owners or whatever it may be, it’s quite possible to do it. And, based on what Chairman Levitt said, I think you’re going to probably see a lot of improvement in that area.
如果你想把一些东西传达给其他投资者或合伙人，这是完全可能做到的。而根据 Levitt 主席所说，我认为你们很可能会看到这个领域有很多改进。
The same thing goes for accounting footnotes. I get accounting footnotes that I have trouble understanding. The reason I have trouble understanding is [because] the person who wrote it didn’t want me to understand it. It’s not impossible to write a footnote explaining deferred acquisition costs in life insurance or whatever you want to do — you can write it so people can understand it.
会计附注也是一样。我收到过一些会计附注，读起来让我很费解。之所以难以理解，是因为写那东西的人根本不想让我理解。解释人寿保险递延取得成本或别的什么内容，并不是写不明白——你完全可以写得让人明白。
If it’s written so you can’t understand it, I am very suspicious. I probably won’t invest — well, I won’t invest in a company where I can’t understand a footnote because I know they don’t want me to understand it.
如果它写得让你看不懂，我会非常怀疑。我大概不会投资——确切地说，我不会投资一家让我连附注都看不懂的公司，因为我知道他们是不想让我懂。
Appendix.7.《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
44. “You need a large margin of safety”
“你需要一个很大的安全边际”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is (inaudible). I’m from New Mexico. And I’m a shareholder. I have two questions.
听众： 是的，我叫（听不清），来自新墨西哥州。我是伯克希尔的股东。我有两个问题。
First, in your ’91 letter, you wrote about investors eventually repeat their mistakes. So what do you do to keep you from making the same mistake twice?
第一个问题，在您1991年的信中，您写到投资者最终会重复他们的错误。那么，您如何避免自己两次犯同样的错误？
And the second question is, in your ’92 letter, you wrote that you tend to deal with a problem of future earning in two ways. The first way is the business you understand. And the second is the margin of safety. And you say they are equally important. But if you — (loud noise) — but if you cannot find the happy combination of faster growth at a low key, which one do you think is more important, faster growth or low key? That’s my two questions.
第二个问题，在您1992年的信中，您提到您倾向于通过两种方式处理未来收益问题。第一是理解的业务，第二是安全边际。您说它们同样重要。但是如果——（噪音）——如果您找不到高增长和低风险的完美结合，您认为更重要的是高增长还是低风险？这是我的两个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we were told by — (loud noise) — we were told by some higher authority which one was more important there for a second. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想我们刚刚听到了——（噪音）——某个更高的权威在告诉我们哪个更重要。（笑声）
Well, they’re bound together. Obviously, if you understood a business perfectly — the future of a business — you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety.
实际上，它们是紧密相连的。显然，如果你完全理解一家企业及其未来，你需要的安全边际就会很少。
So the more volatile the business is — or possibility is — but assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger the margin of safety.
因此，业务或前景越不确定——假设你仍然想投资——你需要的安全边际就越大。
I think in that first edition of [Benjamin] Graham — I doubt if I’m right — was it (inaudible) and said, you know, maybe it was worth somewhere between 30 or 110, or some number. He said, “Well, that sounds — how much good does that do you to know that it’s worth between 30 and 110?” Well, it does you some good if it’s selling below 30 or above 110.”
我记得在本杰明·格雷厄姆的第一版著作中——我不确定是否记得准确——他说，也许某个东西的价值在30到110之间。他说，“好吧，知道它的价值在30到110之间有什么用？”嗯，如果它的价格低于30或高于110，这就对你有帮助。
That’s — you need a large margin of safety.
这就是——你需要一个大的安全边际。
Well, if you’re driving a truck across a bridge that holds — it says it holds 10,000 pounds — and you’ve got a 9,800 pound vehicle, you know, if the bridge is about six inches above the crevice that it covers, you may feel OK.
比如，如果你开着一辆9800磅重的卡车通过一座标称承重为10,000磅的桥梁，如果桥下只有6英寸深的裂缝，你可能会觉得没问题。
But if it’s, you know, over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety, in terms of only driving a 4,000 pound truck, or something, across. So it depends on the nature of the underlying risk.
但如果它横跨大峡谷，你可能会希望有更大的安全边际，比如只开一辆4000磅的卡车过去。因此，这取决于潜在风险的性质。
We don’t get the margin of safety now that we got in a 1973-4 period, for example.
比如说，我们现在的安全边际不像1973-74年那样高了。
The biggest thing to do is understand the business. If you understand the business, and get into the kind of the businesses where surprises — by their nature — surprises are few. And we think we’re largely in that type of business.
最重要的是理解企业。如果你理解企业，并选择进入那些本质上意外较少的企业，我们认为我们基本上就在这种类型的业务中。
And they asked me what — sometimes they asked me what I’d do if I was running a business school, teaching investments.
他们问我，如果我在经营一所商学院，教授投资，我会怎么做。
And I’d tell them I’d only have two courses. One would be how to value a business, and the second would be how to think about markets.
我会告诉他们我只会有两门课程。一门是如何评估一个企业，第二门是如何思考市场。
Appendix.9.《2011-04-01 Warren Buffett.Meeting with Business students》
Q4：请您从定性层面谈谈您是如何计算估值？你如何得出估值的数字的，是用 excel 表做定量的估值计算吗？
巴菲特：我从来不用 excel 表进行计算，但不代表我脑袋里面没有类似 excel 计算的框架。比如说我不动笔做笔记，不代表我头脑中不记忆，这些是读书的时候就形成的学习习惯。我从来就没有开始用过 excel，而且我过去的 60 年也没有学什么新的工具，除非我开始学，否则我不会用 excel 来计算，但我也能算出你通过 excel 进行的计算结果。我不喜欢任何可能传达虚假假设的计算。通过在 excel 表中列出详细的数据表格，人们会获得一种虚假的安全感，让人们认为未来会更加的有规律，但是事实并不是这样。
我曾经在所罗门投行待过一段时间，根据一个客户的股票研究要求，研究部门的人花了几周时间，打出来了一个很长的报告，预测了一个制造业公司未来 20 年的利润情况，另一方面，当我问所罗门公司未来一周能够产生多少利润的时候，他们说这怎么可能算的出来。真正的原因是做 20 年后的预测，这些人都不一定在这里了，而要做出下一周的预测，我们下一周马上知道预测是对的还是错的，所以我从来不看这些预测。在路博润公司 Lubrizol（注：2011 年 3 月 14 日伯克希尔完成的收购）交易中，公司 CEO 要给我看他们对于生意未来业绩的预测，我说我不用看了，每一个公司都会预测说明年要赚的更多，如果我对于未来的生意没有形成自己的判断，我也不想别人告诉我。如果我不知道该怎么做，别人没有放自己钱的人，又怎会告诉你该如何做呢。我不关注他们做的预测，但是我头脑中自有对于公司的经济前景有预测，然后基于这个预测进行估值。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在寻找新的独立业务时，我们寻求的关键品质是：持久的竞争优势；能干且高标准的管理层；运营所需净有形资产能带来良好回报；具有吸引人回报的内生性增长机会；以及最后，一个合理的收购价格。
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