I.H.102.Warren Buffett.Right People
巴菲特把投资的世界压缩成三件事：Right Business、Right People、Right Price。其中最基础、必须最先搞明白的，是中间这件——Right People。他给出的定义只有两个单词：able and trustworthy。我们要做的事很简单：把这两个单词拆开，弄清楚「Right People 到底是谁」，以及为什么在现实世界里，这几乎等于是把一生交出去的选择——因为你把长期复利的方向盘交给谁，结果往往比你买贵一点、买便宜一点重要得多。
要把这两个单词讲明白，绕不开一个问题：人脑是怎么「看世界」的。心理学里有一组概念，叫 Basic trust / Basic mistrust，可以粗略理解为：在人生最初的几年里，世界在你心里被写成了「大体可相信」还是「大体靠不住」。这个“出厂设置”会给注意力一个默认偏置：遇到事情时，你是先看问题本身，还是先看“我会不会受伤”。
人工智能领域那篇《Attention Is All You Need》讲的是模型的注意力权重；人也是一样：注意力往哪边偏，后面的学习、记忆与选择就会往哪边长。巴菲特喜欢用另一个词来形容这种现象：Focus（专注）。你可以把 Focus 理解成“加强版的 Attention”——不仅看得到，而且能长时间盯住，把问题吃干榨净。
（1）如果一个人有 Basic trust，他遇到事情时更容易先看到问题，也更容易专注于具体问题：
——先问「怎么把事做好」，而不是「我会不会吃亏」；
——时间久了，和现实世界的交互越来越顺；
——总是愿意把功劳多归于他人、不走捷径、兑现所有承诺——还额外多给一点。
（2）如果一个人更偏 Basic mistrust，他的注意力恰好反过来，更难专注于具体问题：
——第一反应是「我要怎么自保、怎么不被伤害」；
——时间久了，和现实世界的距离越来越远：在很多组织里都能看到，有人工作很多年却从来没有真正搞懂过一次业务——不是智商问题，而是注意力被自保占满，问题本身从未进入视野；
——于是会习惯性回避难题、推卸责任，甚至在关键时刻牺牲别人来保护自己。
两者能不能转换？可以，但成本很高。
第一，Basic trust / mistrust 更像一种“出厂设置”，可以类比成“左撇子 / 右撇子”：左撇子被要求用右手写字，并不是写不了，而是要额外调动注意力，脑回路要多绕几圈；紧张或者高压情境下更容易露出原先的偏向。
第二，巴菲特在给大学生讲这类问题时，用的是 habit 这个词。习惯会自我强化：方向一旦定了，不断重复就会越走越远；反向校正不是没有机会，但一定要尽可能早。
在这个底层之上，我们再回到巴菲特的那句定义。Right People 的实质，是看一个人脑子是怎么运转的。巴菲特把它拆成 able and trustworthy；如果借用人工智能的语言来写一张“对应表”，我更愿意把主轴压缩成两行：
- able ≈ Think correctly ≈ Memorization+Generalization（Compression）：根据接收到的各种信息转化为结构化的知识，并进一步提炼、压缩成更简单、更广泛适用的逻辑。
- trustworthy ≈ Think independently ≈ Value Functions：从最开始的专注于问题本身，到后面从什么样的角度看问题，再往后是在什么样的边界内使用自己的能力。
接下来，我们就沿着这张表往下走：先说 able，再说 trustworthy，最后看这两股力量在同一个人身上叠加，会发生什么。
（1）able
接手是什么样的牌，现在打得怎么样？和竞争对手放在一起比较的经营业绩？如何进行资本配置？现实中有些人更能干、有些人不怎么行，确实存在天赋差异（比如“经济头脑”）。但在大多数真实场景里，able 更像“门槛条件”：达标就行；真正决定长期结果的，往往是后面那件事——trustworthy。
（2）trustworthy
trustworthy 本质上是 Value Functions：一个人的注意力指向哪里、长期优化什么，太关键了。巴菲特关注的是“他如何对待所有者”：honest、integrity、以及股东信里那句“we like, admire, and trust”。更重要的是：一个长期没办法把注意力放在真实问题上的人，通常会用自我解释来填补空白；垃圾信息先输入自己的大脑，再输出到组织与所有者身上——这种人往往既不可信，也不自洽。
（3）able+trustworthy
"able"=Memorization+Generalization（Compression），“trustworthy”=Value Functions，这是两股循环递进的力量。
- 注意力方向对（更偏 Basic trust），且运转得比较好：Compression + Value Functions 会自我强化，在目标事业上形成越来越强的吸附力；
- 注意力方向不对（更偏 Basic mistrust），反向校正的努力也不够：破坏性同样会循环递进，管理能力差的人往往也不怎么把股东放在心上。
1、《三国演义第二十一回》
玄德曰：“河北袁绍，四世三公，门多故吏，今虎踞冀州之地，部下能事者极多，可为英雄？”
操笑曰：“袁绍色厉胆薄，好谋无断，干大事而惜身，见小利而忘命，非英雄也。”
长期看不到问题、看不到现实导致的结果。
2、《1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.
在很大程度上，公司获得了他们所寻求和应得的股东群体。如果他们将思维和沟通集中在短期业绩或短期股市后果上，他们在很大程度上会吸引关注相同因素的股东，而若公司对其股东采取轻蔑的态度，最后投资大众亦会以相同的态度回报之。
Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele - patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc. - and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.
菲尔·费舍尔，一位受人尊敬的投资者和作家，曾将公司吸引股东的政策比作餐厅吸引潜在顾客的方式。餐厅可以寻求特定的顾客群体——快餐、优雅正餐、东方美食等的顾客——并最终获得一群合适的忠实顾客。如果工作做得很出色，这些顾客会因为提供的服务、菜单和价格水平而持续光顾。但餐厅不能不断改变其特色，否则就无法拥有快乐和稳定的顾客群。如果生意在法式料理和外卖炸鸡之间摇摆不定，结果将是顾客不断进出，感到困惑和不满。
好的坏的都会自我选择，自我强化必然伴随着自我选择。
So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.
同样的，公司和它们所寻求的股东群体也是如此。你不能同时迎合所有人的需求，寻求不同的所有者，他们的主要利益从短期收益到长期资本增长，再到股市的烟火表演等各不相同。
The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones - because you can’t add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners.
管理层寻求其股票大量交易活动的理由让我们感到困惑。实际上，这些管理层是在说，他们希望现有的许多客户不断抛弃他们，转而选择新的客户——因为你无法在不失去许多原有股东的情况下增加大量新股东（带着新的期望）。
We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder “seats” than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations. And we hope to deliver on those expectations.
我们更喜欢那些喜欢我们的服务和菜单，并且年复一年回来的股东。很难找到比现在已经占据伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东“席位”的人更好的群体。因此，我们希望在我们的股东中继续保持非常低的流动率，反映出一个理解我们运营、认可我们政策并分享我们期望的群体。我们希望能够兑现这些期望。
Why is the computer field dominated by people so young? The average age of Apple employees is 29.
为什么计算机领域由如此年轻的人主导？苹果员工的平均年龄是 29 岁。
It’s often the same with any new, revolutionary thing. People get stuck as they get older. Our minds are sort of electrochemical computers. Your thoughts construct patterns like scaffolding in your mind. You are really etching chemical patterns. In most cases, people get stuck in those patterns, just like grooves in a record, and they never get out of them. It’s a rare person who etches grooves that are other than a specific way of looking at things, a specific way of questioning things. It’s rare that you see an artist in his 30s or 40s able to really contribute something amazing. Of course, there are some people who are innately curious, forever little kids in their awe of life, but they’re rare.
对于任何新的、革命性的事物来说，情况往往都是如此。随着年龄的增长，人们会陷入固定的思维模式。我们的思维就像是电化学计算机。你的思想构建了像脚手架一样的模式在你的大脑中。你实际上是化学蚀刻的模式。在大多数情况下，人们会陷入这些模式中，就像唱片上的凹槽一样，他们永远无法摆脱。很少有人能够刻蚀出不同于特定看待事物方式、特定质疑事物方式的凹槽。在30岁或40岁的艺术家中，能够真正贡献出令人惊叹的东西的人是罕见的。当然，也有一些人天生好奇，永远对生活充满敬畏，像永远的小孩子一样，但他们是罕见的。
非常准确的描述，在基本信任（Basic trust）的方向上，Compression才能正常发挥，将能力泛化到其他的领域；如果Basic mistrust，自我强化的结果只是越来越深的偏见。
4、《1991 Warren Buffett.Three Lectures to Notre Dame Faculty》
... Incidentally, I would say that almost everybody I know in Wall Street has had as many good ideas as I have, they just had a lot of \[bad] ideas too. And I’m serious about that. I mean when I bought Western Insurance Security selling at \$16 and earning \$20 per share, I put half my net worth into it. I checked it out first – I went down to the insurance commission and got out the convention statements, I read Best’s, and I did a lot of things first. But, I mean, my dad wasn’t in it, I’d only had one insurance class at Columbia – but it was not beyond my capabilities to do that, and it isn’t beyond your capabilities.
……顺便说一句，我想说的是，在华尔街我认识的几乎所有人都有和我一样多的好主意，他们只不过也有很多[糟糕的]主意。我是认真的。比如当我以每股16美元买入、而每股赚20美元的Western Insurance Security时，我把自己一半的净资产都投了进去。我事先做过调查——我去了保险监管机构，调出了年会报告，我查阅了《贝斯特年鉴》，还做了很多其他功课。但我的父亲并没有参与，我在哥伦比亚大学也只上过一门保险课——然而做这件事并未超出我的能力范围，也不会超出你们的能力范围。
可靠性不足，运气是不确定的，没有自己的脑子是确定的，不确定的运气+确定性的没有脑子。
Now if I had some rare insight about software, or something like that – I would say that, maybe, other people couldn’t do that – or biotechnology, or something. And I’m not saying that every insight that I have is an insight that somebody else could have, but there were all kinds of people that could have understood American Express Company as well as I understood it in ‘62. They may have been...they may have had a different temperament than I did, so that they were paralyzed by fear, or that they wanted the crowd to be with them, or something like that, but I didn’t know anything about credit cards that they didn’t know, or about travelers checks. Those are not hard products to understand. But what I did have was an intense interest and I was willing, when I saw something I wanted to do, to do it. And if I couldn’t see something to do, to not do anything. By far, the most important quality is not how much IQ you’ve got. IQ is not the scarce factor. You need a reasonable amount of intelligence, but the temperament is 90% of it.
如果我对软件之类的领域有某种罕见的洞见——那我会说，也许别人就做不到——比如生物技术。但我并不是说我拥有的每一个洞见别人都可以拥有，不过在1962年，有很多人本可以像我一样理解美国运通公司。他们也许……他们也许与我有着不同的性情，以至于被恐惧麻痹，或者想要随大流，诸如此类；但关于信用卡或旅行支票，我并不比他们了解更多。这些产品并不难理解。但我拥有的是强烈的兴趣，并且当我发现想做的事情时，我愿意去做；而当我找不到可做之事时，就什么也不做。最重要的品质绝不是你的智商有多高。智商并不是稀缺因素。你需要适量的智力，但性格（气质）占了90%。
That’s why Graham is so important. Graham’s book \[The Intelligent Investor] talks about the qualities of temperament you have to bring to the game, and that is the game.
这就是格雷厄姆如此重要的原因。格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》讨论了你在投资游戏中必须具备的性格特质，而那正是游戏本身。
*****
(Garbled) and some of you will be stars, and some of you will be less than stars. But it won’t correlate with your IQ at all. But you have it already. And everybody in the room has it. I’ll give you a little question. Let’s think about this. Let’s say that everyone here got a bonus when they left Notre Dame. Let’s say for \$25,000 you could buy a 10% interest in the income of any one of your classmates that you wanted to. Now, what are you thinking about? You can take anybody in this room, and for \$25,000 buy a 10% interest in their income for life. If they make \$25,000 the first year, you make \$2,500. If they’re unemployed, you don’t get anything. If they get stock options, you get 10% of the stock options. What are you thinking about as you look around? Are you thinking about which ones are the smartest? It’s interesting what ingredients you think now are what’s going to produce that in the classroom. I would suggest that you start thinking about, assuming you have a 10% interest, what qualities you want to have. I know I would take Tom Murphy. Why? Well, he’s got an IQ, there’s no question about that. But, that’s something one or two others might have as well.
（录音模糊）将来你们有人会成为明星，有人不那么出色，但这与智商毫无关系，而是你们已经具备的东西，房间里每个人都有。我给大家出个小问题：假设各位毕业时拿到一笔奖金，用 2.5 万美元就能买下任何一位同学未来收入 10% 的权益。你会怎么想？你可以挑这里任何人，花 2.5 万美元买下其终身收入一成。他第一年赚 2.5 万美元，你拿 2500；若他失业，你得零；若他拿期权，你得其中 10%。环顾四周你在想什么？你在挑最聪明的同学吗？有趣的是，现在你认为课堂上哪些因素能产生未来回报。我建议你思考：既然有 10% 股权，你希望那人具备哪些品质？我知道我会选汤姆·墨菲。为什么？他当然有智商，但那点其他人也有。
关于性格的假设，目前找到的最早的版本，这个假设在后面反反复复讲了很多遍，2013年以后成为股东大会后的一个5公里的跑步项目，名称就叫“Invest in Yourself”。
Think about why you picked him or her, and how much of that is transferable to you. And it usually won’t be anything you can’t attain yourself. But if it’s qualities of character, or qualities of enthusiasm, or whatever it may be, most of those things you can pick up.
想想你为何选中某人，以及这些品质有多少能转移到你身上。通常它们都不是你自己无法获得的。如果是品格、热情等特质，大多数你都能培养。
In the past, I’ve observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads. (“Fanaticism,” said Santyana, “consists of redoubling your effort when you’ve forgotten your aim.”) Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous “restructuring” charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.
过去，我注意到许多渴望并购的经理人似乎受到了童年读过的“公主亲青蛙”故事的蛊惑。记住了公主的成功，他们愿意付出高价去“亲吻”企业癞蛤蟆，指望出现奇迹般的蜕变。起初，令人失望的结果只会加深他们继续围捕新癞蛤蟆的欲望。（正如 Santyana 所言：“狂热就是在忘记目标后加倍努力。”）最终，即便最乐观的经理人也不得不直面现实。站在齐膝深的“无动于衷”的癞蛤蟆堆中，他随即宣布一笔巨额的“重组”费用。在这种企业版的“Head Start”项目里，CEO 得到教育，股东则支付学费。
In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads. They were cheap dates - I’ve never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads. I kissed and they croaked.
我作为经理人的早年，也“约会”过几只癞蛤蟆。它们算是“便宜的约会”——我从来不是个大手大脚的人——但我的结果与那些追求高价癞蛤蟆的并购者并无二致。我亲了，它们就“呱呱”了。
After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous). Said the pro: “Practice doesn’t make perfect; practice makes permanent.” And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.
在经历了数次这类失败之后，我终于想起一位高尔夫职业球手曾给过我的一条有用建议（和所有见过我球技的职业球手一样，他希望保持匿名）。这位球手说：“练习并不会让你完美；练习只会让你的动作定型。”此后我调整了策略，努力以合理价格买入好企业，而不是以好价格买入一般的企业。
Right Business、Right People、Right Price的排序可能来自Benjamin Graham，1976年的股东信里就有非常明确的定义。
6、《1994-04-25 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
18. “Two yardsticks” for judging management
“两把尺子”评估管理层
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Secondly, you talk about good management with corporations and that you try and buy companies with good management. I feel that I have about as much chance of meeting good managers, other than yourself, as I do bringing Richard Nixon back to life. How do I, as an average investor, find out what good management is?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：其次，您常谈到优秀的企业管理层，并且尽量收购拥有优秀管理层的公司。除了您本人之外，我觉得自己遇到一个好管理者的概率，差不多等于把 Richard Nixon 复活的概率。作为一个普通投资者，我如何判断什么是好的管理层？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you judge management by two yardsticks. One is how well they run the business and I think you can learn a lot about that by reading about both what they’ve accomplished and what their competitors have accomplished, and seeing how they have allocated capital over time. You have to have some understanding of the hand they were dealt when they themselves got a chance to play the hand. But, if you understand something about the business they’re in — and you can’t understand it in every business, but you can find industries or companies where you can understand it — then you simply want to look at how well they have been doing in playing the hand, essentially, that’s been dealt with them. And then the second thing you want to figure out is how well that they treat their owners. And I think you can get a handle on that, oftentimes. A lot of times you can’t. I mean it — they’re many companies that obviously fall in — somewhere — in that 20th to 80th percentile and it’s a little hard to pick out where they do fall.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为评估管理层有两把尺子。第一，看他们把企业经营得如何。我觉得你可以通过阅读他们取得了什么、他们的竞争对手取得了什么，以及他们这些年如何进行资本配置，来学到很多东西。你必须理解他们接手时拿到的“底牌”是什么。当你对他们所处的业务有所了解——你不可能了解所有行业，但总能找到一些你能看懂的行业或公司——那么你就要看他们如何打好手中的“牌”。第二，看他们如何对待所有者。我认为很多时候你能抓住这一点，当然也有不少时候很难。我是说，有许多公司显然落在第20到第80百分位之间的某个位置，而要精确分辨它们处在其中的哪一段，确实不太容易。
But, I think you can usually figure out — I mean, it’s not hard to figure out that, say, Bill Gates, or Tom Murphy, or Don Keough, or people like that, are really outstanding managers. And it’s not hard to figure out who they’re working for. And I can give you some cases on the other end of the spectrum, too. It’s interesting how often the ones that, in my view, are the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don’t think that much about the shareholders, too. The two often go hand in hand. But, I think reading of reports — reading of competitors’ reports — I think you’ll get a fix on that in some cases. You don’t have to — you know, you don’t have to make a hundred correct judgments in this business or 50 correct judgments. You only have to make a few. And that’s all we try to do. And, generally speaking, the conclusions I’ve come to about managers have really come about the same way you can make yours.
但是，我认为你通常还是能分辨出来——比如说，Bill Gates、Tom Murphy、Don Keough 这些人，确实是杰出的管理者；而他们究竟在为谁服务，也不难判断。相反一端也有不少例子。有意思的是，在我看来那些管理能力差的人，往往也恰恰是不怎么把股东放在心上的人。这两点经常是相伴相生的。不过，我认为通过阅读年报——以及竞争对手的年报——在某些情况下你能把握住要点。在这个行业里，你不需要——你懂的——做对一百次判断，甚至不需要做对五十次判断。你只需要做对少数几次。我们所做的，也只是如此。总体而言，我对管理层的判断，基本上就是通过你也可以使用的同样方法得出的。
I mean they come about by reading reports rather than any intimate personal knowledge or — and knowing them personally at all. So it — you know, read the proxy statements, see what they think of — see how they treat themselves versus how they treat the shareholders, look at what they have accomplished, considering what the hand was that they were dealt when they took over compared to what is going on in the industry. And I think you can figure it out sometimes. You don’t have to figure out very often. Charlie?
我的意思是，这些判断主要来自阅读报告，而不是源于什么私人接触，或者对他们的私下了解。所以——去读代理声明（proxy statements），看看他们在意什么——看看他们如何对待自己与如何对待股东；结合他们接手时拿到的“底牌”，与行业同时期的情况对比，去看他们到底做出了什么成绩。我想，有时候你能看明白。你也不必次次都看明白。Charlie？
Right People更细化的解释，这个解释最后是写成股东信里的一名话：able and trustworthy management，“ able”=经营得如何；“ trustworthy”=如何对待所有者。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
7、《1994 Warren Buffett.UNC Business School》
I met twelve people — roughly twelve — that evening. A dozen or so. I probably knew four or five of them by sight and there were probably six or seven that I didn’t know, though I probably knew their names. As I interviewed these people, making what to me was the most important hire — by far — that I would ever have to make…
那天晚上我见了十二个人——大约十二个。一打左右。我可能只见过其中四五个人的面孔，另外六七个我没见过，但我大概知道他们的名字。在面试这些人时，我做的可以说是我一生中最重要的一次雇佣决定……
It may be of interest to you, [though] it may not be quite as dramatic when you get hired, but maybe some of the same things will be going through the mind of the person that’s looking at you [during your job interview process]. The good news is that I did not ask them their grades in business school. (Laughs) And the bad news, of course, is that I didn’t ask them if they had been to business school at all.
这或许对你们有意思，虽然你们被录用时场景没那么戏剧化，但面试你们的人脑子里可能也会闪过类似的念头。好消息是，我没有问他们商学院的成绩（笑）。而坏消息是，我甚至没问他们是否读过商学院。
I never looked at a resume. It wouldn’t have made any difference. I knew that all twelve had the IQ to handle the job. No one had gotten to that position in the firm without being smart enough to know all the instruments and know how markets work and all of that sort of thing. It wasn’t a question of IQ at all.
我从没看过简历。那也没什么区别。我知道这十二个人都有足够的智商胜任工作。在那家公司，没有人能爬到那个位置，而不聪明到能了解各种工具、理解市场如何运作等等。这完全不是智商的问题。
It’s just sort of hearing how their [mental] machinery works. You can tell the people who are very full of themselves. It’s very easy to do. You find a few of those in investment banking, believe it or not. (Laughs) You can probably detect, perhaps, the ones who won’t have the courage in a situation like that.
关键是听一听他们头脑的“运转方式”。你能看出哪些人满脑子都是自己。这很容易。信不信由你，在投行里你能发现一些这样的人（笑）。你或许也能分辨出，在那种情况下哪些人不会有勇气。
I wanted the qualities, the same thing Ben Franklin wrote about a couple of hundred years ago, the people who are always willing to give the other person more credit than themselves and who don’t cut corners and who deliver all they promise — and a little extra. Essentially, I was very lucky because I found that individual: a fellow named Deryck Maughan.
我想要的品质，正是 Ben Franklin 几百年前写到的：那些总是愿意把功劳多归于他人、不走捷径、兑现所有承诺——还额外多给一点的人。总之，我很幸运找到了这样的人：一个叫 Deryck Maughan 的人。
Erik Erikson的Basic Trust，基本信任和基本不信任，两者注意力关注的重点是不一样的。
*****
I often use this illustration [when speaking to] a class. I say to them, “If you looked under your seat today and one of you had this lucky ticket and the one who got that ticket got to pick one of their classmates — you’ve been together for a couple of years and you could pick any one you want — if you had an hour to make the decision and you would get 10% of the earnings of that individual for the rest of their life, [who would you pick]?”
我经常在课堂上用这个例子。我会对学生说：“如果今天你们座位底下有一张幸运票，谁拿到票就可以挑选一个同学——你们已经相处了几年，可以选任何一个人——你有一小时做决定，并且从此以后能获得这个人一生收入的 10%，你会选谁？”
You don’t pick the guy with the richest father. We’ll assume that everybody’s starting from scratch. But what would you think about, in that hour, in terms of who you’d pick? Would you think about who had the highest grades in the class? Probably not. Would you think about who had the highest IQ? Probably not. The best looking? Probably not. A whole bunch of things would go through your mind — and I think you’d be amazed at how most of you would settle on a relatively few individuals.
你不会选那个父亲最有钱的人。我们假设大家都是从零开始。但在那一小时里，你会思考什么来决定挑谁？会考虑谁成绩最高吗？大概不会。会考虑谁智商最高吗？大概不会。长得最好看？也大概不会。你脑子里会闪过许多因素——我想你会惊讶，大多数人最后都会集中挑选相对少数的几个人。
反向校正的基础，大脑的理解能力（Understanding is Compression）很有韧性，出现问题的是情绪（Value Functions），巴菲特的想法是通过Understand反向校正Value Functions。
But the interesting thing is that, when you think about what is going through your mind, you’re not thinking about things that are impossible for you to achieve yourself. You’re not thinking about who can jump seven feet, who can throw a football 65 yards, who can recite pi to 300 digits, or whatever it may be. You’re thinking about a whole bunch of qualities of character — and the truth is that every one of those qualities is obtainable. They are largely a matter of habit.
但有趣的是，当你思考这些因素时，你想的并不是那些自己不可能做到的事。你不会考虑谁能跳过七英尺，谁能把橄榄球扔 65 码，谁能背出圆周率 300 位等等。你想的是一堆品格上的品质——而事实是，这些品质每个人都可以获得。它们在很大程度上是习惯问题。
Ben Franklin — and, actually, my old boss Ben Graham… Ben Graham, when he was twelve years old, wrote down all the qualities that he admired in other people — and he wrote down the qualities that he found objectionable. He looked at that list and there wasn’t anything there about being able to run the 100-yard dash in 9.6 [seconds] or high jumping seven feet.
Ben Franklin——实际上，还有我以前的老板 Ben Graham……Ben Graham 在 12 岁时就写下了他欣赏的所有品质——以及他厌恶的品质。他看着那张清单，里面没有任何一条是关于 9.6 秒跑完 100 码，或跳过七英尺。
They were all things that were simply a matter of deciding whether you were going to be that kind of person or not. When you’re young, you really have that opportunity. As you get older, it’s tougher. Somebody said that the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they’re too heavy to be broken. And, in terms of behavior, I see that all the time. The time to form the right habits is very early. The right habits, the habits that you would admire in someone else and [that make you] want to buy 10% of whatever individual that is, they’re absolutely obtainable.
它们全都是只需决定你是否要成为那种人的事。当你年轻时，真有这个机会。随着年纪增长，就更难了。有人说过，习惯的枷锁轻到无法察觉时，等你能感觉到时，它们已经重到无法打破。而在行为方面，我经常看到这一点。培养正确习惯的时间就在早期。那些你会在别人身上欣赏、会让你愿意买下其 10% 的好习惯，完全可以自己获得。
If you had to sell short one other member of your class and you had to pay 10% of their earnings, again, you wouldn’t pick the person with the lowest grades. You’d think about the person who always cut corners or claimed credit for things that they didn’t do and never showed up on time. All these little things that seem like nothing, but they determine whether if you have a 300 horsepower motor, whether you get 300 horsepower output out of it or whether you get a whole lot less. The people I see that function well are not necessarily the people with the biggest motors, but they’re the people with the most efficient motors. And it’s those qualities of character that really make an enormous difference.
如果你必须做空班上某个同学，并且得支付他收入的 10%，你依然不会选成绩最低的那个人。你会想到那个总是偷工减料、抢占他人功劳、从不准时出现的人。这些看似微不足道的小事，决定了如果你有一台 300 马力的引擎，是能输出 300 马力，还是远远不及。我看到那些表现出色的人，不一定是引擎马力最大的人，而是效率最高的人。而真正产生巨大差异的，就是这些品格上的品质。
基本不信任的先看到自己、满脑子都是自己（时间久了离现实世界越来越远），第一反应是如何自保、回避难题；有基本信任的先看到问题（时间久了跟现实世界交互的越来越好），总是愿意把功劳多归于他人、不走捷径、兑现所有承诺——还额外多给一点。
What I would suggest to you is to think about that person who you would buy 10% of and the one you’d short 10% of — and think about why you would do it. Then ask yourself, “What on this lefthand side of the list can’t I achieve myself?” and “What on the righthand side of the list can’t I get rid of by myself if I possess it?” In the end, decide you’re going to be the [kind of] person that you’d buy the 10% of.
我建议你们思考：你会买谁的 10%，会做空谁的 10%，再想想为什么。然后问自己：“这张清单左边的优点，有哪一条是我自己做不到的？”“这张清单右边的缺点，如果我有，又有什么是我改不掉的？”最终，决定成为那个你愿意买下 10% 的人。
这是改进后的版本，补充一个俞敏洪的例子，参考：《罗永浩讲自己的前老板，前老板之前在大学宿舍的有趣事》。
以前我的前老板也讲过，他们当年在北大读书，8个人在一个屋，就我那个前老板，铁老师，但我今天要说的不是铁老师的坏话，就说铁老师当年讲过一些有意思的事，就我的前老板，他是这样的，他就是村里来的嘛，当年一傻小子，跑到那以后呢，没睡过上铺，他来的晚了，他是8个人宿舍里到第8个，扛着扁担就来了，进来一看，只剩一个上铺了，这时候他就很慌，他没有睡过上铺，他就说能不能跟谁换一下，那谁跟你换呢？这不就像是上了飞机，跟人靠窗的说咱俩换一下，人家说哎呀，不好意思，心里想的是滚，对不对？
所以他要跟上铺的换一下，那个人想法也是滚啊，但是他就很苦，愁眉苦脸，在那就哎哎，你知道吗，他就蹲在地上了，扛着个扁担就蹲在地上，愁眉苦脸，这个时候上铺有一个见过世面的，不是下铺有一个见过世面的，他觉得哎，这小伙怎么这么慌，要不我就上铺。
哪是见过世面，是安全感，是从小对世界有基本的信任，如果真要讲见过世面也是对的，从1岁以来比其他同学跟现实世界有过更多的交互。
这个人就是我那个前老板的公司，就我当年服务的那个教育机构，新东方的联合创始人包凡一老师，他一看这个江阴县来的村里小伙，慌成这样，他说那行吧，要不我把下铺让给你吧，他就上上铺了，后来这下铺这小伙子就成了亿万富翁，然后那个从下铺去了上铺的那位包老师跟着做了联合创始人，也成了亿万富翁，所以你人生的命运很多时候真的不知道是什么样的，知道这个意思吗？不知道，这是我讲我前老板的第一个事，他同学的。
他还举了第二个例子，他们宿舍里另一个，他没点名，这是做的比较厚道的，他没点名，我也没点名，我一直说前老板，铁老师，我也没点名，他也不是真姓铁，他只是真的很铁，然后他同宿舍另一个是北京本地一小伙，每周末回去看完爹妈回来，那个时候整个中国还很穷，水果是比较金贵的东西，他每次回来，从爸妈家回来的时候，带一兜子水果来，放到自己的那个，每个人不有个小桌吗，下边有个柜子，也不锁抽屉，然后就把那个每次带过来的水果放那，每天晚饭后特别养生，就是吃那么一个两个，然后他也不出去吃，当着这个宿舍里7个吃不起水果的穷同学的面吃，最后那个人就可以想象他的人生啊，不展开说了，就到这。
注意力放在哪里的问题，人的大脑是单线程的任务处理，注意力放在A面，B面就看不到了，但只要注意力的方向调在同一个方向，大家看到的都是差不多的，问题是有些人出厂的默认设置是A面，有些是B面，如果要改变出厂的默认设置要尽可能的早。
That’s enough of the sermon — I’d like to answer questions now. And, really, the nastier they are, the better I like it. It’s much more fun and makes it more interesting.
布道就说到这里——现在我想回答问题。老实说，问题越尖锐，我越喜欢。这会更有趣，也更吸引人。
8、《1995-03-07 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.
就长期而言，公司经营者配置资本的能力将会对企业的价值产生很大的影响。我们认为，一家好公司所能产出的现金，比其本身内部所需投入的，要多的多（至少是在早期成长期以后）。当然，公司可以通过分配股利或回购股份的方式将资本返还给股东。但是，通常企业的CEO们会咨询公司战略规划部门、顾问或是投资银行家们，搞那么一两次并购是否有利可图。这样的做法就好象是问你的室内设计师，你是否需要一张价值五万美元的地毯。
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.
并购问题又因为隐藏其后的生物本能而变本加厉：许多CEO之所以能终临高位，部分的原因正是在于他们极富动物精神与野望。如果一位经理人颇具这类特质——当然我们必须承认，有时这也是种优势——然而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失。而这样的CEO被其顾问们鼓励去进行并购交易时，他的反应就会像一位十几岁的孩子被父亲鼓励去过成人的性生活一样。这样的做法是强人所难。【7】
资本配置可以观察一个人有没有边界感。
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
几年前，我的一位CEO朋友半开玩笑地在无意间透露出许多大型交易的病态过程。这位CEO当时管理着一家意外和财产险公司，在董事会上，他向董事会成员解释为何公司必须要收购一家人寿保险公司。在对此次收购的经济和战略上的理由喋喋不休之后，他突然停止了演说，带着顽皮的表情说道：“好吧！伙计们，谁叫其它财产险公司也都有一家寿险公司呢。”
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.
在伯克希尔，我们的经理人们不断地通过看似平凡普通的业务，赚取惊人的回报。这些经理人们会首先在自身业务中寻找可以有效配置其利润的去处，之后再把多余的资本交回给查理跟我，然后我们会努力为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出更多的内在价值。我们的目标，是收购我们熟悉了解的、有持续竞争力且由我们喜爱的、由受人尊敬和值得信任的经理人所经营的公司的一部分或全部所有权。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are always — we’re more interested in bad news, always, than good news. We figure good news takes care of itself. And one — we only give a couple of instructions to people when they go to work for us. And one of them is to think like an owner. And the second one is to just tell us the bad news immediately, because good news takes care of itself. And we can take bad news, but we don’t like bad news late. So, I would say, in connection with Salomon, that there is, and has been, some culture clash. And there probably almost always would be a culture clash in a business where there is that amount of tension. Whether it be the entertainment business, or the investment banking business, or the sports business, there’s going to be a certain amount of tension when — between compensation to the people that work there and compensation to the owners. And I think there’s been some — that strain has existed at Salomon from the day I was first there and far before that. I mean, I — that was no surprise. It’s understandable.
WARREN BUFFETT：我和 Charlie 一向——总是对坏消息比好消息更感兴趣。我们的看法是，好消息会自己照顾好自己。我们只给为我们工作的人两条指示：其一，要像所有者那样思考；其二，立刻把坏消息告诉我们，因为好消息会自己照顾好自己。我们能承受坏消息，但我们不喜欢“迟到的坏消息”。关于 Salomon，我会说，确实存在、也一直存在一些文化冲突。而在高度紧张的行业里几乎总会有文化冲突。无论是娱乐业、投行业还是体育业，当“员工的报酬”和“所有者的回报”之间存在张力时，就会有一定的紧张关系。我认为这种张力在我刚到 Salomon 之时、甚至更早就存在了。这并不意外，也可以理解。
紧张病。
You’re seeing a tension, actually, in the airline business between the people that work there and capital. And it’s produced terrible results in the airline business. And the people that work there have been able to — and I’m not talking about USAir specifically, although that’s a case. But it goes beyond that. They have had contracts, which were, as I pointed out in the report, were executed in an earlier age, which, essentially, will not allow — in many cases — capital to receive any compensation. And that produces a lot of tension. You don’t have contracts like that in the investment banking business or Wall Street, generally. But you have that same sort of tension. And changing a culture around, A, takes time and, B, probably takes some change in people. I mean, I don’t think that’s a great surprise if you expect to do it. I have — I don’t think you can find two better people than Bob Denham and Deryck Maughan. They’re smart, they’re high-grade, they’re willing to work very hard.
事实上，在航空业你也能看到员工与资本之间的张力，这给航空业带来了可怕的结果。员工们签过的合同——不单指 USAir，尽管它也是个例子——正如我在报告中指出的，很多是在更早年代签订的，实质上在许多情况下“不允许资本获得任何回报”。这会产生大量紧张关系。投行或华尔街总体上没有那样的合同，但也有同样的张力。要改变一种文化，第一，要花时间；第二，很可能要更换一些人。这并不意外。如果要做这件事，我认为你找不到比 Bob Denham 和 Deryck Maughan 更好的人选了。他们聪明、素质高、也愿意非常努力地工作。
And there will be people that buy into the arrangements they want to have. And there are people that won’t. Not all of the people that have left, by a long shot, are leaving of their own volition, but most of them are. But some aren’t. I mean, there — Salomon lost a lot of money last year. And many of the people that have left were not responsible for some of those losses, but some of the people were. So, that is not something where you announce names in the paper. But some people are leaving because they can make more money elsewhere. And some people are, maybe, leaving because we think we can make more money without them. (Laughter) Charlie?
当然，会有人接受他们所制定的新安排，也会有人不接受。离开的人并非全都是主动离开的，但大多数是，有些不是。Salomon 去年亏了很多钱。许多已经离开的人并不对那些亏损负责，但也确实有人需要负责。这不适合在报纸上点名。但有些人离开是因为他们在别处能赚更多钱；也可能有些人离开，是因为我们认为“没有他们我们会赚更多”。（笑声）Charlie？
WARREN BUFFETT: My children, in many ways, are a lot smarter than I am. So, I’ve had different experience, Charlie. (Laughs) No, I think you can — you know, I’ve mainly learned by reading myself, so I don’t think I have any original ideas that — I’ve certainly got a lot — I mean, I’ve talked about reading Graham, I read Phil Fisher, and I’ve gotten a lot of ideas myself from reading. And in my own case, I mean, talk about your parents having influences, you know, my parents had an enormous influence. So, I think you can learn a lot from other people. In fact, I think, if you learn reasonably well from other people, you don’t have to get any new ideas or do much on your own. You can just apply the best of what you see.
WARREN BUFFETT：在很多方面，我的孩子们比我聪明。所以我的经历与你不同，Charlie。（笑）我主要靠自学阅读，所以我不觉得自己有什么“原创思想”。我确实收获很多——比如我读 Graham、读 Phil Fisher，很多想法都来自阅读。就我个人而言，父母的影响也极其深远。因此你完全可以从他人身上学到很多。事实上，如果你足够善于向他人学习，你无需发明新点子，也无需做太多原创；把你所见的最好实践运用起来就行。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Generally speaking, I think we always get a group of wise people after sifting millions. But I don’t think anybody’s invented a way to teach so that everybody is wise. It’s extraordinary how resistant some people are to learning anything. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：总体上说，我们总能在“筛过百万”之后得到“一撮聪明人”。但我不认为有人发明过一种教学法，能让“人人皆明智”。有些人对学习的抗拒简直“离谱”。（笑声与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Really, what is astounding is how resistant they are when it’s in their selfinterest to learn. I mean, I was always astounded by how much attention was paid to Graham — I mean, he was regarded 40 years ago as the dean of security analysts —but how little attention was paid, in terms of the principles he taught. And it wasn’t because people were refuting them, and it wasn’t because people didn’t have a self-interest in learning sound investment principles. It’s just this incredible resistance to thinking or change. I mean, I quoted Bertrand Russell one time as saying — who said that, “Most men would rather die than think. Many have.” (Laughter) In the financial sense, that’s very true. It’s not complicated. I mean, human relations, you know, usually aren’t that complicated, but — and certainly it’s in people’s self-interest to develop habits that work well in human relations, but an amazing number of people seem to mess it up one way or another.
WARREN BUFFETT：真正让我震惊的是：即便“学习对他们自身有利”，他们仍会抗拒。比如 Graham——四十年前他就被称为证券分析界的“宗师”，可他所讲的原则却鲜有人认真对待。并不是人们在反驳这些原则，也不是他们不希望学习健全的投资原则，而是对“思考或改变”的抗拒。我曾引用 Bertrand Russell 的话：“大多数人宁愿去死也不愿思考；许多人已经用行动证明了这一点。”（笑声）这在金融世界尤其真实。其实并不复杂——比如人际关系，培养良好的习惯显然符合自身利益，但仍然令人惊讶地有很多人把事情搞砸。
CHARLIE MUNGER: How much has Berkshire Hathaway been copied, either in investing America or corporate America? I’m not saying we deserve to be, necessarily. But people don’t want to do it differently than they’re presently doing it.
CHARLIE MUNGER：在美国的投资界或企业界，有多少人复制了 Berkshire 的做法？我并不是说我们一定值得被学习。但人们就是不愿意改变他们正在做的事。
WARREN BUFFETT: You might argue that Mrs. B. [Nebraska Furniture Mart founder Rose Blumkin], having started what you may have seen out there this weekend, with $500 in 1937, you know, without a day in school in her life, and building that into a great enterprise, you might say, “Well, that is something to study.” I mean, is it because she couldn’t speak English when we got — you know, she got over? Maybe we can explain to people — I mean, what is there to learn from seeing somebody create an incredible success like that in a competitive business? She didn’t invent something that the world had never seen before. She didn’t have a lock on some piece of real estate that protected her from competition. You know, all of these — and yet, she accomplished something that virtually no one has accomplished. Now, why aren’t business schools studying her? You know, why are they talking about EVA, you know, economic value added, as we talked about earlier? I mean, here is a success. Something has made her a success.
WARREN BUFFETT：你可以看看 Mrs. B（Nebraska Furniture Mart 创始人 Rose Blumkin）的故事：她 1937 年拿着 500 美元起步，一辈子没上过一天学，却把事业做到你们这个周末在店里看到的规模。难道这不值得研究？是因为她初到美国时不会说英语吗？我们完全可以从这样的“在充分竞争行业里，硬是做出了几乎无人能及的成功”的案例中汲取营养。她没有发明前所未见的新东西，也没有靠某块“风水宝地”独享竞争保护。尽管如此，她还是做到了。为什么商学院不研究她？为什么还在讨论 EVA（经济增加值）之类的模型？这里摆着一个现实的成功，必然有某些关键因素造就了她的成功。
You know, is it something — is it a 200 — and she’s very smart — but is it a 220 IQ? No, it isn’t. It’s a very smart woman, but it’s not something that’s incapable of being replicated in the habits and the way of thinking. But who is studying her? I mean, they present her as a curiosity. But if you go to any of the top 20 business schools, you know, there’s not one page that’s being given to anybody to study what is an incredible success. And I just — I find that very interesting that — and to some extent, you know, I’ve seen it in the investment world. There’s this — for one thing, the high — you know, it’s probably a little discouraging to a professor of management at some major business school that has gone on to get his doctorate and everything, to think he has to come and hang around the Furniture Mart — (laughter) — study a woman in a golf cart, I mean — (Laughter) But you could — they’d be better off if they did.
你可能会说——她确实很聪明——但是不是因为“220 的智商”？当然不是。她很聪明，但更关键的是一整套“可被复制的习惯与思维方式”。可是谁在研究她？她常被当成“奇闻轶事”。去任何一所前 20 的商学院，你几乎找不到一页纸是让学生系统研究这种“惊人的成功”的。我对此感到很有意思；在投资世界里也多少能看到类似现象。某种程度上，让一位拿到博士学位的名校管理学教授想到要“去家具城蹲点”、研究坐着高尔夫球车办公的老太太——（笑声）——这可能有点“打击人”。但如果他们真这么做了，收获会更大。
Compression+Value Function是两股循环递进的力量，做好了能把注意力牢牢吸附住，“吸附力”就会越来越强，人自然就不太想“乱搞别的”。
（1）Compression → 胜任感（Competence）；
（2）Value Function → 梯度流（Gradient Flow） + 意义/联结（Relatedness）：我能感觉到“往这个方向更新是对的”，而且这个“对”不只是赚钱，还包括对他人/群体有意义。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. But generally, we like people who are candid. We can usually tell when somebody’s dancing around something, or where their — when the reports are essentially a little dishonest, or biased, or something. And it’s just a lot easier to operate with people that are candid. And we like people who are smart, you know. I don’t mean geniuses. But that — and we like people who are focused on the business. It’s not real complicated, but we generally — you know, there may be a whole bunch of people in the middle that we don’t really have any feeling on one way or the other, and then we see some that we know we don’t want to be associated with, and some that we know we very much enjoy being associated with.
WARREN BUFFETT：没错。总体上，我们喜欢“坦诚的人”。有人在回避、报告里稍显“不诚实或带偏见”，我们通常看得出来。与坦诚的人合作更轻松。我们也喜欢“聪明的人”（不是天才），以及“专注于业务的人”。这不复杂：大量的人处在“中间地带”，我们无感；有些人，我们知道“不想与之共事”；另一些人，我们知道“非常享受与之共事”。
坦诚是最容易理解的，面对问题才能解决问题，才有机会跟现实交互，能力是第二位的，事实上大部分人在第一个环节就已经输了，所以在第二个环节即使普通的能力也能做的很好。
10、《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
56. Looking for owners who love their business more than money
寻找那些热爱业务胜过金钱的企业主
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been asked to take one more question from zone 10. I’m not sure why, but maybe because they see that I still have candy up here. (Laughter) So zone 10, please, and then we’ll break.
WARREN BUFFETT：有人让我再回答第 10 区的一个问题。我也不太清楚为什么，也许是因为他们看到我桌上还放着糖。（笑声）所以请第 10 区提问，然后我们就休息。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Sanjiv Mirchandani, shareholder from Boston. First of all, thank you to both of you for everything. I have two questions. For you, Mr. Buffett, you obviously have filters that you apply on selecting people as you do on stocks. Can you tell us a little bit about what those filters are?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生、Munger 先生，你们好。我叫 Sanjiv Mirchandani，是来自 Boston 的股东。首先感谢两位所做的一切。我有两个问题。第一个问题是问 Buffett 先生的。显然，你在“选人”时也有一套过滤标准，就像你选股票那样。能不能跟我们谈一谈，这些过滤标准大致是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Filters on people?
WARREN BUFFETT：选人的过滤标准？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, in selecting — you have an ability to motivate people who have a lot of money to keep working. What do you look for to figure out who those people are?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：对，就是在选人的时候——你似乎有一种能力，可以让已经很有钱的人依然愿意继续工作。你是通过什么来判断哪些人会是这样的人？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a key, key question, because when we buy businesses we don’t have managers to put in them. I mean we are not buying them that way. We don’t have a lot of MBAs around the office that we’re —
WARREN BUFFETT：这是一个非常、非常关键的问题。因为当我们收购企业时，我们手头并没有一支可以“塞进去”的职业经理人队伍。换句话说，我们买企业时并不是打算自己去派人管理。我们的办公室里并没有一大堆 MBA 等着上岗——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank God.
CHARLIE MUNGER：谢天谢地。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) And, you know, I have not promised that they’re going to have all kinds of opportunities or anything. So as a practical matter, we need management with the businesses that we buy. And three times out of four, thereabouts, the manager is the owner and is receiving tens of millions, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars. So they don’t have to work. And we have to decide in that time when we meet them whether they love the business or love money. And we’re not making a moral judgment. Charlie may, but I’m not making a moral judgment about whether it’s better to love the business or love money, but it’s very important for me to know which of the two is the primary motivator with them. And we have had extremely good luck in identifying people who love their business. And so all we have to do is avoid anything that, on our part, that diminishes that love of the business or makes other conditions so intolerable that they overcome that love of the business. And we have a number of people working for us, they have no financial need to work at all.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。（笑声）而且你要知道，我不会向他们承诺什么“无限机会”之类的东西。所以在现实操作中，我们必须依赖原有的管理团队来管理我们收购的企业。大概有四分之三的情况，管理者本身就是企业的所有者，而他们会收到几千万，甚至上亿美元的对价——也就是说，他们完全不需要再为钱而工作。我们在和他们第一次见面时，就得判断清楚：他们爱的是这门生意，还是爱钱。这里我们并不是在做道德评判——Charlie 也许会，我本人不会就“爱事业好还是爱钱好”做道德判断——但对我而言，搞清楚这两者之中哪一个是他们的“第一驱动力”极其重要。我们在这方面的运气非常好，经常能找到那些真正热爱自己事业的人。之后我们要做的，就是避免自己做出任何会削弱他们对事业的热爱，或者让其他条件变得如此难以忍受，以至于压倒他们对事业热爱的事情。现在有不少为我们工作的人，从财务上讲，完全没有再工作的必要。
And they probably outwork, you know, 95 percent or more of the people in the world, and they do it because they just love smacking the ball. And we almost — we virtually had no mistakes in that respect. And we have identified a number of people, Charlie and I have, in terms of proposals to us, where we’ve felt that they did really — they liked the money better than the business. They were kind of tired of the business. You know? And they might promise us that they would continue on and they would do it in good faith, but something would happen six months later or a year later and they’d say to themselves, “Why am I doing this, you know, for Berkshire Hathaway when I could be doing,” whatever else they want to do? I can’t tell you exactly how we — what filter it is that we put them through mentally, but I can tell you that if you’ve been around a while, you can — I think you can have a pretty high batting average in coming to those conclusions. As you can about other aspects of human behavior.
而且他们的工作投入，可能比全世界 95% 以上的人都要多，而之所以这样干，仅仅是因为他们真心喜欢“挥棒打球”这件事。在这方面，我们几乎——可以说完全没有犯过错误。多年以来，在别人向我们提出的各种出售方案中，我和 Charlie 也识别出不少这样的人：我们能感觉到，他们其实是更喜欢钱而不是这门生意——对生意本身已经有点厌倦了。你知道吧？他们也许会向我们承诺继续干下去，而且是出于善意地这么承诺，但六个月、一年以后，总会发生点什么，让他们心里冒出一句话：“我为什么还要为 Berkshire Hathaway 干这些呢？明明可以去做”——然后就是他们真正想做的其他事情。我没法精确告诉你，我们在脑子里到底给他们套了什么样的过滤器，但我可以说，只要你在这个世上“混”的时间够久，你在这类判断上的“击球率”会相当高。就像你对人类行为的其他方面所做的判断一样。
I’m not saying you can take a hundred people and take a look at them and analyze their personalities or anything of the sort. But I think when you see the extreme cases, the ones that are going to cause you nothing but trouble, or the ones that are going to bring you nothing but joy, I think you can identify those pretty well. Charlie?
我不是说，你能把一百个人排成一排，看一眼就把每个人的性格剖析得清清楚楚。我的意思是，当你遇到那些“极端案例”时——要么将来只会给你惹麻烦的人，要么会给你带来无穷乐趣的人——我认为你是有能力把他们区分出来的。Charlie？
是不是真心喜欢正在做的事？在一些“极端案例”中是非常容易判断的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, I think it’s pretty simple. You’ve got integrity, intelligence, and experience, and dedication. And that’s what human enterprises need to run well, and we’ve been very lucky in getting this marvelous group of associates to work with all these years. It would be hard to do better, I think, than we’ve done on that respect. Look around this place. I mean, and really, you young people look around this place. And look at how much gratification can come into these lives which have been mostly spent in deferring gratification. It’s a very funny group of people, you shareholders. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，是的，我觉得这事其实挺简单的。你要找的就是：integrity（正直）、intelligence（聪明）、experience（经验）和 dedication（投入/敬业）。这些就是一个人类组织要运转良好所需要的东西。多年来能和这样一群出色的合作者一起工作，我们实在是太幸运了。在这方面，要比我们现在的结果做得更好，我觉得是很难的。你看看这个会场——尤其是你们这些年轻人，好好看看四周。看看这些人的一生，是如何在长期“延迟满足”的前提下，最终获得如此巨大的满足感的。你们这些股东，是一群非常有趣的人。（笑声）
11、《2001-04-28 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
60. The value of Berkshire’s “loyalty effect”
伯克希尔“忠诚效应”的价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, hi. I’m James Halperin from Dallas, Texas. And I’ve been a shareholder since 1995. And I feel great about it, so thank you. This question has to do with Berkshire’s so-called permanent holdings and whether, when making investment decisions, you somehow mathematically calculate a value to Berkshire’s reputation for loyalty to its public investees. Let’s say you are confident enough that Pepsi or Procter and Gamble would grow cash flow faster than Coke or Gillette would. And that the replacement value of the stock was less expensive enough to more than make up for the taxes. Would you then sell Coke, for example, to buy Pepsi? And if not, why not? And how do you value this reputation for loyalty aspect in those decisions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是来自德州达拉斯的 James Halperin。从 1995 年起我就是股东了，对此感觉非常好，所以先谢谢你们。我的问题跟 Berkshire 所谓的“永久持股”有关：在做投资决策的时候，你们会不会在某种程度上，用一个“数学上的方式”去给 Berkshire 对所投上市公司那种“忠诚声誉”赋值？比如说，假设你们足够有把握认为，Pepsi 或 Procter and Gamble 的现金流增长会快于 Coke 或 Gillette，而且这些新标的的“替代成本”（股价）足够便宜，足以弥补卖出原有持股所要缴的税。那在这种情况下，你们会不会卖掉比如说 Coke 去买 Pepsi？如果不会，原因是什么？在你们的决策里，怎么给这种“忠诚声誉”的因素估值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that’s a very good question. I don’t think we would ever — I think it’s very unlikely we would come to the conclusion that we were that certain that — you mentioned P&G and Pepsi versus the ones — but that some major consumer products company would do better than the ones we’re in. We might very well decide that some other one is going to do quite well and buy that additionally. As a practical matter, if I’m on the board of a company, or Charlie were to be, representing Berkshire, it’s very difficult — I would say it’s almost impossible for us to trade in their securities. It just — it creates too many problems. People would think we knew something we didn’t. Or, you know, particularly if we were selling it, you know, we would have people questioning very much whether we had detected something within the company that was not available to the rest of the world. So we really give up an enormous amount of investment mobility when we go on a board.
WARREN BUFFETT：我觉得这是个非常好的问题。我不认为我们会——我觉得我们极不可能得出那种程度的结论：也就是像你刚才提到的，用 P&G 和 Pepsi 去对比我们已经持有的那些公司，然后说某家大型消费品公司一定会明显优于我们现在持有的这些。我们完全可能会认为，另外某家公司未来会表现得很好，然后在现有持股之外再去买一些。但在实际操作层面，如果我在某家公司董事会里，或者 Charlie 在董事会里代表 Berkshire，那我们要在它的股票上交易就会变得非常困难，我甚至会说几乎是不可能。这会带来太多问题：别人会认为我们掌握了一些他们不知道的内部信息。尤其是如果我们在卖出的时候，人们就会非常质疑，我们是不是在公司内部发现了什么“外界还不知道的东西”。所以，一旦我们进入一家公司的董事会，我们实际上放弃了非常大一块投资上的机动性。
And so I don’t even think about doing what you’re suggesting, although I might very well if I were just a money manager running the business. We certainly, and we’ve laid it out in the ground rules in the back of the — in our Owner’s Manual back in the annual report — we’ve certainly said, in terms of businesses we buy control of, that they just aren’t for sale. And a fancy price will not tempt us. And that we lay out that exception relating to businesses where we think there’s a permanent loss of cash for as far as the eye can see, or businesses where we have labor troubles, which we — I described earlier in the day, we might’ve had at The Buffalo News at that one period. But otherwise, simply because we can use the money better someplace else, we’re not interested in it.
所以，我压根儿不会去考虑你刚才说的那种做法，尽管如果我只是一个“代客理财”的职业资金经理、只是在经营一只基金，我很可能会那么干。我们当然——而且我们已经在年报后面的《Owner’s Manual》里的“基本规则”部分写得很清楚——我们明确说过，对那些我们买到控股权的企业来说，它们就是“不挂牌出售”的，即使对方给出一个花哨的高价也不会打动我们。我们只保留极少数例外：比如，我们认为这家企业在可预见的未来会“永久性地亏现金”，或者像我今天上午提到的那种，在劳动关系上遇到严重问题的企业——像当年 The Buffalo News 在某个时期那样。除了这种情况，仅仅因为我们把钱挪到别处可能赚得更多，我们对“卖掉这家企业”这件事就不感兴趣。
You know, I can’t really dig into my psyche and tell you how much of that is because I think that will help us buy businesses in the future if we behave that way, or how much is just my natural inclination that when I make a deal with somebody and I’m happy with how they behave with me, that I want to stick with them. It’s probably both, you know? And I wouldn’t want to try and weight the two. I’m happy, you know, with the results of the first and I’m happy with the way I feel, essentially, about the second. I just think it’s crazy — I know if I owned all of Berkshire myself, I wouldn’t dream of trading around businesses with people that have trusted in me and that I like and have been more than fair with me. I wouldn’t dream of trading around businesses so that my estate was 105 percent of some very large number instead of 100 percent of some large number. I just would regard that as a crazy way to live.
说实话，我也很难把自己的内心剖得特别细，告诉你这里面有多少成分是“我相信这种行为方式会帮助我们将来收购更多企业”，又有多少成分只是我个人的天性：一旦我和某个人达成了交易，而且我对他对待我的方式很满意，那我就倾向于一直和他合作。很可能两方面都有，对吧？而且我也不想去硬给这两者分别称个重量。对于第一点，我对它带来的结果很满意；对第二点，我也很喜欢它给我带来的那种“做人方式上的感受”。我只是觉得，把生活过成另外那样是很疯狂的——我很清楚，如果我个人拥有 Berkshire 的全部股权，我绝不会去“倒手买卖那些企业”，明明那些人信任我、而且我也喜欢他们，并且他们对我一向非常公平。我绝不会为了把自己的遗产从“某个巨大数字的 100%”变成“某个巨大数字的 105%”，去折腾买卖企业。我会觉得那是一种非常荒唐的生活方式。
And I don’t want the fact I run a public company to cause me to behave in a way that I would be uncomfortable behaving if we were a private company. But I also feel that you, as shareholders, are entitled to know that that’s an idiosyncrasy of mine. And therefore, I lay it out, and have laid it out for 20 years, as something that you should understand, as an investor or before you become an investor. I’m sure it helps us in acquisitions over time. But whether that in any way compensations the opportunity costs that Charlie talks about of making an occasional advantageous disposal, I don’t know and it’s something I’ll never calculate. Charlie?
而且，我不希望“我经营的是一家上市公司”这个事实，逼着我去采取一种如果我们是私人公司我自己都觉得别扭的行为方式。但与此同时，我也认为，作为股东，你们有权知道这是我个人的一个“特立独行之处”。因此，我把这点写出来——而且已经写了二十年了——当成一件你们作为投资者，或在成为投资者之前就应该明白的事情。我确信，从长期看，这种做法在收购业务上是帮到我们的。但这种“忠诚效应”在多大程度上弥补了 Charlie 所说的那种“偶尔做一笔很划算的出售交易却放弃了”的机会成本，这一点我并不知道，也是一件我永远不会去计算的事。Charlie？
原则的第11条，在紧密的合作关系中让对方紧张也会让自己紧张，好的想法不可能出自一个充满紧张的环境中。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do tend to calculate it, at least roughly. And so far, I think that the loyalty effect is a plus in our life.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我倒是倾向于去算一算，至少是大致算一算。到目前为止，我认为这种“忠诚效应”对我们的人生总体来说是正面的加分项。
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you regard that as true though in both public — I mean, both marketable securities and owned businesses?
WARREN BUFFETT：不过你会不会认为，这一点在两种情形都成立——我是说，既包括上市流通证券，也包括我们全资拥有的企业？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, no. I don’t think the loyalty effect in lots of public companies is nearly as important as it is with the private companies.
CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，不。我并不认为，在很多上市公司那一类持股上，这种“忠诚效应”有像在私人控股企业上那么重要。
WARREN BUFFETT: You can say it’s a mistake for us to be directors of companies, because we give up huge amount of flexibility in investment because we are directors. I — and there’s no question that we do. It’s — if you’re thinking solely of making money, you do not want to be a director of any company. So there’s just no question about that.
WARREN BUFFETT：你甚至可以说，我们去当一些公司的董事，从“纯投资”的角度看，是一个错误。因为一旦我们成为董事，就会放弃掉在投资上非常大的一部分灵活性。而我——我认为这一点是毫无疑问的。如果你的唯一目标就是“赚钱”，那你根本就不应该去当任何一家公司的董事，这一点是毫无疑问的。
22. Life advice: take care of your most important asset
人生忠告：照顾好你最重要的资产
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
WARREN BUFFETT：10 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Lowell Chrisman (PH), from Phoenix, Arizona. I am retired and teaching in — seniors in high school. I wish they could be here to hear you today. I’m teaching these people an investment course part-time. And the first class I went to, they asked me to teach them how to prepare for retirement. I would like to know what the two or three things are that you would suggest that I include in this course.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Lowell Chrisman（音），来自亚利桑那州的 Phoenix。我已经退休了，现在在教——高中毕业班的学生。我真希望他们今天也能在这里听你讲话。我在给这些学生兼职上投资课，第一堂课他们就问我，要教他们怎么为退休做准备。我想请教你：你认为在这门课里，最应该包含的两三点是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯——
CHARLIE MUNGER: What the hell does Warren know about retirement? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：Warren 懂个啥退休啊？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We haven’t even thought about it. Now, let me give you one suggestion for that group. I use this sometimes when I talk to high school — a bunch of high school seniors down in Nebraska Wesleyan, a few weeks ago. Tell the youngsters in the class, they’re probably around 16 or 17, and if they’re like I was when I was 16, you know, I was only thinking of two things. And Martin’s Aunt Barbara wasn’t going out with me, so I was down to cars. (Laughter) I tried hearses, but that didn’t work. The — And let’s assume, and I use this with — let’s assume a genie appeared to you when you turned 16, and the genie said, “You get any car you want tomorrow morning, tied up in a big pink ribbon, anything you name. And it can be a Rolls Royce, it can be a Jaguar, it can be a Lexus, you name it, and that car will be there and you don’t owe me a penny.”
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊，我们压根儿都没想过退休这事儿。现在，我给你们那帮学生提一个建议。我有时候给高中生讲话会用这个例子——几周前我还在 Nebraska Wesleyan 给一群高三学生讲过。你可以跟班里的那些年轻人说，他们大概 16、17 岁，如果他们像我 16 岁时那样，你知道的，我脑子里只想着两件事。而 Martin 的 Aunt Barbara 又不肯跟我约会，所以我就只剩下“车”这一个念头了。（笑声）我还试过殡仪车，但那没用。（笑声）然后我们假设——我就用这个设想——假设你 16 岁生日那天，有个 genie（精灵）出现，对你说：“明天早上你可以得到任何一辆你想要的车，上面系着一个粉红色的大蝴蝶结，随你点。可以是 Rolls Royce，可以是 Jaguar，可以是 Lexus，只要你叫得出名，明天那辆车就会停在那里，而且你一分钱都不用付。”
And having heard the genie stories before, you say to the genie, “What’s the catch?” And of course, the genie says, “Well, there’s just one. That car, which you’re going to get tomorrow morning, the car of your dreams, is the only car you’re ever going to get. So you can pick one, but that’s it.” And you still name whatever the car of your dreams is, and the next morning you receive that car. Now, what do you do, knowing that’s the only car you’re going to have for the rest of your life? Well, you read the owner’s manual about 10 times before you put the key in the ignition, and you keep it garaged. You know, you change the oil twice as often as they tell you to do. You keep the tires inflated properly. If you get a little nick, you fix it that day so it doesn’t rust on you.
你以前听过这种精灵的故事，所以你会问精灵：“这里面有什么猫腻？”当然，精灵会说：“就一条。你明天早上拿到的那辆车——你梦寐以求的那辆——将会是你一生中唯一的一辆车。你可以任意选一辆，但就这一辆。”你还是会说出你梦寐以求的那辆车的名字，第二天早上那辆车就真的到了你手里。那接下来，你会怎么做？在明知道这是你余生唯一的一辆车的前提下。你会在第一次点火之前，把用户手册读上十遍；你会把车老老实实停在车库里；机油会比说明书要求的更频繁地更换；轮胎永远保持在合适的气压；车身上哪怕有一点小划痕，你也会当天就去修掉，以免生锈。
In other words, you make sure that this car of your dreams at age 16 is going to still be the car of your dreams at age 50 or 60, because you treat it as the only one you’ll ever get in your lifetime. And then I would suggest to your students in Phoenix that they are going to get exactly one mind and one body, and that’s the mind and body they’re going to have at age 40 and 50 and 60. And it isn’t so much a question of preparing for retirement, precisely, at those ages, it’s a question of preparing for life at those ages. And that they should treat the importance of taking care and maximizing that mind, and taking care of that body in a way, that when they get to be 50 or 60 or 70, they’ve got a real asset instead of something that’s rusted and been ignored over the years. And it will be too late to think about that when they’re 60 or 70. You can’t repair the car back into the shape it was. You can maintain it. And in the case of a mind, you can enhance it in a very big way over time.
换句话说，你会尽一切努力，确保这辆你 16 岁时梦寐以求的车，在你 50 岁、60 岁时仍然配得上“梦寐以求”四个字，因为你把它当成你这一辈子唯一的一辆车。然后，我会建议你在 Phoenix 的学生这样想：他们这辈子也只会得到“唯一一套”心智和“唯一一副”身体，而这就是他们在 40 岁、50 岁、60 岁时所拥有的那套心智和那副身体。到了那些年龄，最重要的问题与其说是“为退休做准备”，不如说是“为那个年龄的人生做准备”。他们应该意识到：把这副头脑照顾好并尽量发挥到极致、把这副身体照顾好，其重要性在于——等他们到了 50、60、70 岁的时候，手上拥有的是一项真正的资产，而不是一件多年来被忽视、已经生锈报废的东西。要到 60、70 岁才开始想这件事就太晚了。你没办法把那辆车修回到当初的状态，你能做的只是好好维护。而对于大脑来说，你不仅能维护它，随着时间推移你甚至还能在很大程度上增强它。
But the most important asset your students have is themselves. You know, I will take a person graduating from college, and assuming they’re in normal shape and everything, I will be glad to pay them, you know, probably $50,000 for 10 percent of all their earnings for the rest of their lives. Well, I’m willing to pay them 10 percent for — $50,000 for 10 percent — that means they’re worth $500,000 if they haven’t got a dime in their pocket, as long as they’ve got a good mind and a good body. Now that asset is far, far more important than any other asset they’ve got, unless they’ve been very lucky in terms of inheritance or something, but overwhelmingly their main asset is themselves. And they ought to treat their main asset as they would any other asset that was divorced from themselves. And if they do that, and they start thinking about it now, and they develop the habits that maintain and enhance the asset, you know, they will have a very good car, mind, and body when they get to be 60. And if they don’t, they’ll have a wreck. Charlie?
但是，你那些学生所拥有的最重要的资产，是他们自己。你看，一个刚刚大学毕业的人，只要他在各方面都算正常，我是愿意出价的——我很乐意付，比如说 50,000 美元，来买他此后终身收入的 10%。如果我愿意出 50,000 美元买他 10% 的终身收入权，那就意味着，即便他现在身无分文，只要有一副正常的大脑和身体，他就值 500,000 美元。相较之下，这项资产远远比他们目前拥有的任何其他资产都重要——除非有人极其走运，继承了一大笔财产之类，但对绝大多数人来说，他们的主要资产就是他们自己。而他们应该像对待一项“和自己切割开来的资产”那样，来对待这项主资产。如果他们现在就开始这样思考，慢慢养成维护和提升这项资产的习惯，那么等他们到了 60 岁，就会拥有一辆非常好的“车”——一副良好的头脑和身体；如果他们不这么做，最后得到的就会是一副“报废车”。Charlie？
人性假设的新版本，汽车保养的说法是为了调整注意力的视角，把自己的大脑和身体看成”和自己切割开来的资产“，语言有很大的力量，语言的背后是看问题的角度。
(Applause)
（掌声）
13、《2005-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
8. What Buffett looks for in managers
巴菲特在经理人身上看重什么
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to microphone number 1, please.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们先请 1 号麦克风提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Simon Denison-Smith from London. You talk a lot about the importance of selecting terrific managers. I’d just like to understand what your three most important criteria are for selecting them, and how quickly you can assess that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 London 的 Simon Denison-Smith。您经常谈到挑选出色经理人的重要性。我想知道，您在挑选他们时，最重要的三条标准分别是什么？以及，您通常多快能判断出来？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll give you two different answers. The most important factor, subject to this one caveat I’m going to give in a second, is a passion for their business. We are frequently buying businesses from people who we wish to have continue manage than them and where we are, in effect, monetizing a lifetime of work for them. I mean, they’ve built this business over the years. They’re already rich but they may not be rich in the liquid sense. They may have all their money, or a good bit of it, tied up in the business, so they’re monetizing it. They may be doing it for estate reasons or tax reasons or family reasons, whatever. But we really want to buy from somebody who doesn’t want to sell. And they certainly don’t want to leave the business. So we are looking for people that have a passion that extends beyond their paycheck every week or every month for their business. Because if we hand somebody a hundred million or a billion dollars for their business, they have no financial need to work. They have to want to work. And we can’t stand there with a whip.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，这个问题我会给出两种回答。最重要的因素——先说明一点，我马上会说一个例外——是他们对自己业务的热情。我们经常是从那些我们希望“他们继续经营公司”的人手中买下公司，而我们在实际操作中，是在帮助他们把一生的心血“货币化”。我的意思是，他们在很多年里一点点把业务做起来。他们已经很富有了，但可能在“流动性”的意义上还不算富有——他们的全部财富，或者很大一部分财富，都还绑在这家公司上，所以这笔交易是在把它们变现。他们可能是出于遗产安排、税务考虑或者家庭因素等等来做这件事。但我们真正希望买的是那种“其实并不想卖”的人的公司，而且他们肯定也不想离开这家企业。所以我们寻找的是这样一群人：他们对业务的热情远远超过每周、每个月那张工资单本身。因为一旦我们把 1 亿、甚至 10 亿美元交到他们手里买下公司，他们在经济上就再也没有“必须工作的需要”了；接下来，他们得是“想工作”才会继续干，而我们又不可能拿着皮鞭站在旁边盯着他们。
We don’t have any contracts at Berkshire. They don’t work, as far as I’m concerned. So we hope that they love their business and then we do everything possible to avoid extinguishing, or in any way dampening, that love. I tell students that what we’re looking for when we hire somebody, beyond this passion, we’re looking for intelligence. We’re looking for energy. And we’re looking for integrity. And we tell them, if they don’t have the last, the first two will kill you. Because if you hire somebody without integrity, you really want them to be dumb and lazy, don’t you? I mean, the last thing in the world you want is that they are smart energetic. So we look for those qualities. But, we have generally — when we buy businesses, it’s clear to us that those businesses are coming with managers with those qualities in them. Then we need to look into their eyes and say, do they love the money or do they love the business? And if they love — there’s nothing wrong with liking the money.
我们在 Berkshire 是没有任何“合同”来绑住经理人的。在我看来，那些东西根本不起作用。所以我们希望他们真心热爱自己的公司，然后我们会尽一切可能避免熄灭、或以任何方式削弱这种热爱。我跟学生说，当我们聘用某个人时，除了这种“热情”之外，我们还在寻找三样东西：intelligence（聪明）、energy（干劲）和 integrity（正直）。我们会告诉学生：如果一个人缺少最后一项（integrity），前两项会“要你的命”。因为如果你雇了一个不正直的人，那你真是巴不得他又笨又懒，不是吗？你最不想要的，就是那种既聪明又特别有干劲、但却不正直的人。所以我们会去寻找这些特质。不过，一般来说，当我们收购企业时，我们已经很清楚，这些企业本身就自带拥有这些品质的经理人。然后，我们需要做的是看着他们的眼睛，问自己：他们是真的热爱这家企业，还是只是热爱那笔钱？当然，喜欢钱本身没有任何问题。
能牢牢绑住注意力的业务不多，被绑住的人也不多，大部分机会可能是家族企业，如果是职业经理人管理的企业，几乎没有这样的可能性。
But if — what it’s really all about is that they built this business so they can sell out and cash their chips and go someplace else, we have a problem, because right now we only have 16 people at headquarters and we don’t have anybody to go out and run those businesses. So we — it’s necessary that they have this passion and then it’s necessary that we do nothing to, in effect, dampen that passion. Charlie?
但如果事实是：他们之所以辛苦把生意做大，只是为了有一天“套现离场”、把筹码换成现金，然后去做别的事情，那我们就会遇到麻烦。因为现在我们的总部只有 16 个人，我们根本没有人可以派出去接手这些公司。所以，我们必须要他们真的对业务有激情，同时我们也必须做到“不去做任何会削弱这种激情的事”。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The interesting thing is how well it’s worked over a great many decades and how few people copy it. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。有趣的是，这套做法在很多很多年里效果都非常好，但真正学着去模仿的人却少之又少。（笑声与掌声）
Picking the right person(s) will not be an easy task. It’s not hard, of course, to find smart people, among them individuals who have impressive investment records. But there is far more to successful long-term investing than brains and performance that has recently been good.
挑对人并不容易。当然，找聪明人不难，其中也不乏近期业绩亮眼、投资记录出色的人。但长期投资的成功，远不止智力与短期漂亮的成绩单。
Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.
随着时间推移，市场会做出非同寻常、甚至怪诞的事情。一次重大的错误，就可能抹掉一长串成功。我们因此需要一种“基因层面就被编程为能识别并躲开严重风险”的人——包括那些以前从未遇到过的风险。投资策略里潜伏的一些危险，用今天金融机构常用的模型是看不出来的。
Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.
性格气质也同样重要。独立思考、情绪稳定，以及对人性与制度行为的敏锐理解，对长期投资成功至关重要。我见过不少非常聪明的人，却缺少这些品质。
制度性的愚蠢。
*****
In my will I’ve stipulated that the proceeds from all Berkshire shares I still own at death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within ten years after my estate is closed. Because my affairs are not complicated, it should take three years at most for this closing to occur. Adding this 13-year period to my expected lifespan of about 12 years (though, naturally, I’m aiming for more) means that proceeds from all of my Berkshire shares will likely be distributed for societal purposes over the next 25 years or so.
我在遗嘱中规定：我去世时仍持有的全部伯克希尔股票，其变现所得必须在遗产结算完成后的十年内全部用于慈善。因为我的事务并不复杂，遗产结算最多三年就能完成。把这13年（结算最多三年+十年内花完）加上我预计大约12年的寿命（当然，我希望更久一些），意味着：我全部伯克希尔股票的收益，很可能会在未来大约25年内陆续被用于社会公益。
I’ve set this schedule because I want the money to be spent relatively promptly by people I know to be capable, vigorous and motivated. These managerial attributes sometimes wane as institutions — particularly those that are exempt from market forces — age. Today, there are terrific people in charge at the five foundations. So at my death, why should they not move with dispatch to judiciously spend the money that remains?
我之所以设定这样的时间表，是因为我希望这笔钱能被我所认识、并确信其有能力、有活力且有动力的人相对迅速地花出去。随着机构——尤其是那些不受市场力量约束的机构——逐渐老化，这些管理特质有时会衰退。今天，这五家基金会的负责人都非常出色。那么等我去世时，他们为什么不应该迅速行动，把剩余资金审慎而有效地花掉呢？
远离现实的人=忙着作死的人。
Those people favoring perpetual foundations argue that in the future there will most certainly be large and important societal problems that philanthropy will need to address. I agree. But there will then also be many super-rich individuals and families whose wealth will exceed that of today’s Americans and to whom philanthropic organizations can make their case for funding. These funders can then judge firsthand which operations have both the vitality and the focus to best address the major societal problems that then exist. In this way, a market test of ideas and effectiveness can be applied. Some organizations will deserve major support while others will have outlived their usefulness. Even if the people above ground make their decisions imperfectly, they should be able to allocate funds more rationally than a decedent six feet under will have ordained decades earlier. Wills, of course, can always be rewritten, but it’s very unlikely that my thinking will change in a material way.
支持“永久基金会”的人会说：未来必然会出现规模巨大、极其重要的社会问题，需要慈善去应对。我同意。但到那时，也会出现许多超级富有的个人与家族，他们的财富会超过当今美国人的水平；慈善机构可以向他们争取资金。这些出资人可以亲自判断：哪些机构既有活力又有聚焦，最能解决当时存在的重大社会问题。这样一来，理念与效果就能接受一种“市场测试”。一些组织值得获得大量支持，而另一些组织可能已经过了其有效期。即使仍在世的人做决定时并不完美，他们把资金分配得也应当比一个早在地下六英尺处、几十年前就拍板的人更理性。遗嘱当然随时可以重写，但我也很难想象自己的想法会在实质上发生重大改变。
Beware when someone says “it’s so easy”
当有人说“这很简单”时要小心。
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7, please.
WARREN BUFFETT：第七位，请。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thanks for hosting this wonderful meeting. My name is Chander Chavla (PH), and I’m visiting from Seattle, Washington. And I think Berkshire Hathaway can contribute to the reduction of global warming if, for next year shareholder’s meeting, Mr. Gates and I fly on the same plane. (Laughter) My question is, I have made a few mistakes in business by trusting the wrong people. So in — and I don’t know where to learn how to trust the right people. They don’t teach you that in business school, and the people who are supposed to teach you in the corporate world sometimes betray you. So how can I learn who to trust and who not to trust?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Mr. Buffett 和 Mr. Munger，感谢你们举办这样一场精彩的大会。我叫 Chander Chavla（PH），从 Seattle, Washington 过来参加。我觉得如果明年股东大会时，Mr. Gates 和我坐同一架飞机来的话，那 Berkshire Hathaway 在减少全球变暖方面就能做出一点贡献了。（笑声）我的问题是：我在商业上犯过几次错误，原因是信错了人。而我不知道应该到哪里去学习如何信对人。商学院里不教你这些，职场上那些“本来应该教你的人”，有时候也会背叛你。那么，我该如何学会判断谁值得信任、谁不值得信任呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Boy, that’s a great question. But you probably have about as good a chance of getting a good answer from me on that as you have on getting on Bill Gates’ plane next year. (Laughter) I get letters all the time, and I hear from people who have been taken advantage of in financial transactions. And, you know, it really is — it’s sad. And a lot of it isn’t even — it’s not fraud or anything. For one thing, I mean, just the charges involved, the frictional costs and the baloney that is presented is tough. Charlie and I have had very good luck in terms of buying businesses and putting our trust in people. It’s been just overwhelmingly good. But we filter out a lot of people. And then you say, “Well, how do you filter them out?” I would say — I think Charlie will agree with this — people give themselves away fairly often. And maybe it does help to have been around as long as we have in seeing the various ways they give themselves away.
WARREN BUFFETT：哇，这是个很好的问题。不过，你从我这里拿到一个好答案的概率，大概跟你明年能不能坐上 Bill Gates 的那架飞机差不多。（笑声）我经常收到来信，也常听说有人在金融交易中被占了便宜。你知道，这真的——让人难过。而且很多情况甚至都算不上欺诈什么的。光是各种费用、各种摩擦成本，还有那些被包装出来的鬼话，就已经很难对付了。就我们自己买企业、把信任交给别人的经历而言，我和 Charlie 一直都算非常幸运，整体结果非常好。但前提是，我们过滤掉了很多人。接下来你会问：“那你们是怎么把这些人筛掉的？”我会说——我想 Charlie 会同意——人们其实很经常会“暴露自己”。而我们活了这么久，看过那么多种类的“自我暴露”方式，这一点也许确实帮了我们不少。
They — when somebody comes to me with a business — and I probably shouldn’t tell this publicly because they’ll probably tailor their approach subsequently — but when they come, just the very things they talk about, what they regard as important and not important, there are a lot of clues that come as to subsequent behavior. And, like I say, we’ve really had a batting average I wouldn’t have thought we would have had in the people that we’ve joined with. But it hasn’t been a hundred percent. It’s been well above 90. And I get asked that, you know, I mean, “How do you make those judgments?” And I don’t know. Charlie, can you articulate the way we do it?
他们——当有人带着一门生意来找我时——其实我大概不应该在公开场合把这件事说得太明白，因为他们以后可能会针对性地“改剧本”——但事实是，当他们来找我们的时候，他们聊的那些点、他们认为哪些是重要的、哪些是不重要的，这些东西本身就包含了很多关于他们将来会怎么做事的线索。正如我刚才说的，在我们选择的合伙人身上，我们的“击球率”确实好得超出我当初的预期。但也不是 100%，只是在 90% 以上。我也经常被问到同样的问题：“你们是怎么做出这些判断的？”而我也说不上一个清清楚楚的公式。Charlie，你能不能把我们的做法说得更清楚一些？
有一个弥补经验不足的方法：文字记录，用逐行逐句的方式找出对方脑回路的重点，文字记录的好处是可以反复调整注意力的方向，这个过程有助于排除自身情绪上的干扰。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, partly we’re deeply suspicious when the proposition is too good to be true. Warren once introduced me to a gentleman promoter who wanted to inveigle us into an insurance program. And he said, “We only write fire insurance on concrete bridges that are covered by water.” He says, “It’s like taking candy from babies.” We are able to filter out propositions like that.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，部分原因是，当一个机会“好得不像真的”时，我们天生就会高度怀疑。Warren 曾经介绍我认识一位“绅士型推销员”，他想把我们哄进一个保险项目里。他说：“我们只承保那种被水覆盖着的混凝土桥的火灾险。”他还说：“这简直就像从婴儿手里拿糖一样容易。”像这样的项目，我们是能第一时间筛掉的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Anybody that, implicit in their comments or what they kind of laugh about or — all kinds of things in terms of the fact — you know, it’s so easy and — it ain’t that easy, you know, and we get suspicious very quickly. And the truth is, we rule out 90 percent of the times. And we may be wrong about a fair number that we’re ruling out. The important thing is whether the ones we’re ruling in we’re right about. And so we don’t mind — we’re looking for the obvious cases of people you can trust. I mean, go back to 1969 again. When I was thinking about who to turn my partners over to, all kinds of people with great records. That was a hedge fund — that was the first hay-day of hedge funds. And there were books written about it, “New Breed on Wall Street” and some of those. You can look them up. And dozens and dozens and dozens of people with good records.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。凡是那种在话里话外、在他们自己笑点里，透出一种“你看，这事儿太容易了”的人——而我们知道，这世界没那么容易——我们都会很快起疑。事实是，我们会把 90% 的机会直接排除在外。在这些被排除的机会中，我们也许错过了不少好东西。但关键不在于我们错判了多少被筛掉的，关键在于：被我们留下来的那一小部分，我们是否判断正确。所以我们一点也不在乎“错杀”的问题——我们在找的是那些“显而易见可以信任的人”。举个例子，再回到 1969 年。当时我在思考，我要把我的合伙人们交给谁来管理——有一大堆战绩漂亮的人，那正是第一波 hedge fund 热潮的时代，还出了很多书，比如《New Breed on Wall Street》之类，你都可以去找来看看。当时有成打成打的“业绩很好的人”。
显而易见的很少，现实条件中有时候只能挑相对好的，这个需要经验。
And when I sat down and thought about, I’m going to write my partners and tell them who to turn over all their money to — because most of them had a hundred percent or close to it with me — you know, Charlie, Sandy, Bill Ruane. I couldn’t have told you which of the three was going to do the best. And, you know, I couldn’t even tell you those three would done better than five others that somebody else might pick. But the one thing I was sure of is that they were going to be sensational stewards of money. They were going to care more about those people — the people that were turned over to them — in getting the best result possible than they were going to care about, you know, whether they made X or 2X this year in terms of commissions or fees or any of that sort of thing. Anytime I find somebody with a — what I regard as an unfair fee structure, and saying, “Well, I can get it,” well, you know, I rule them out. And I may rule out some of the wrong people. But the ones that are left in, I feel very good about.
而当我静下心来思考：我要给我的合伙人写信，告诉他们“以后把所有的钱交给谁打理”——要知道，他们当中大部分人，是把 100% 或接近 100% 的钱都交给了我——这时候，我想到的名字是：Charlie、Sandy、Bill Ruane。你要我说，这三个人里谁将来表现会最好，我说不出来。甚至，你要我说，这三个人一定会比别的人随便挑出来的另外五个人做得更好吗？我也说不出绝对的话。但我有一件事是百分之百确定的：他们会是“极其负责的管家”。他们会比起“自己今年拿多少 X、2X 的佣金或费用”，更在乎那些把钱交给他们的人，能不能拿到尽可能好的长期结果。任何时候，只要我看到有人使用在我看来“不公平的收费结构”，然后还一副“我能拿到这些钱理所当然”的样子，那这个人对我来说就出局了。没错，这样我可能也会把某些好人排除在外。但留在名单里的那批人，我会非常放心。
And I wish I could give you better advice than that, but that’s all I can do.
我当然也希望能给你一个比这更“系统化”的建议，但我能做的，也就只有这些了。
50. Buffett’s advice for young people
巴菲特给年轻人的建议
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
WARREN BUFFETT：第8位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m (inaudible) from Apopka, Florida. I would like to thank you for this wonderful opportunity to learn so much more about finances and, at the same time, have a wonderful time. It’s been fun.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：下午好。我是来自 Florida 的 Apopka 的（听不清）。感谢你们提供这次绝佳的机会，让我在学到更多金融知识的同时也度过一段美好的时光。非常有趣。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s great.
WARREN BUFFETT：太好了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I teach at Valencia Community College in Orlando, Florida. I teach office administration and business. I applaud my students for investing in themselves by enrolling in college. I also want to stress financial independence and financial freedom. I do this by telling them that slow and steady wins the race; also, good, sound financial management; and then the law of reciprocity. I have them track every expense over a period of time. Also they buy, theoretically, one stock and track that, too, over a period of time. We keep track of the current financial news, current news, and also they have research papers. (Applause.)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我在 Florida 的 Orlando 的 Valencia Community College 任教，教授办公室管理和商业。我为我的学生通过上大学来投资自己而喝彩。我也强调金融独立与财务自由。我通过告诉他们“慢而稳者赢得比赛”、以及良好且稳健的财务管理、还有“互惠法则（law of reciprocity）”来做到这一点。我让他们在一段时间内记录每一笔开支；同时，他们会“理论上”买入一只股票，并在一段时间内对其进行跟踪。我们关注当前的金融新闻、时事新闻，并且他们还要写研究论文。（掌声。）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. (Laughter) They research FICO scores, the credit reports, Clark Howard, Suze Orman, the top ten billionaires, not because — (Applause)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。（笑声）他们研究 FICO 分数、信用报告、Clark Howard、Suze Orman、全球十大富豪，并不是因为——（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think — Could you move onto your question, then, please? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我想——请你进入提问可以吗？（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的。
WARREN BUFFETT: But thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT：不过谢谢你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. What else should I be doing to lead them — (laughter) — to make sound financial decisions and to have happy, sound financial life?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的。我还应该做些什么来引导他们——（笑声）——做出稳妥的财务决策，并拥有幸福而稳健的财务生活？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m ready to hire your entire class right now. (Laughter) Well, I think you’re telling — you’re giving them some very good advice. I think that the most important investment you can make is in yourself. I mean, very, very, very few people get anything like their potential horsepower translated into the actual horsepower of their output in life. And potential exceeds realization to just an enormous factor with so many people. And I — one illustration you might try with your class — I tell them this when I talk to high school groups — just imagine that you’re 16 and I was going to give you a car of your choice today, any car you wanted to pick, and — but there was one catch attached to it — it was the only car you were going to get in the rest of your life, so you had to make it last there. You can pick out the fanciest you want, a Maserati, whatever it might be. How would you treat it? Well, of course you would read the owner’s manual about five times before you turn the key in the ignition. You’d keep it garaged.
WARREN BUFFETT：我现在就准备把你们全班都雇下来。（笑声）我认为你正在——你确实在给他们非常好的建议。我认为你能做的最重要的投资就是投资自己。我的意思是，能把自己“潜在马力”转化为人生“实际产出马力”的人，真的、真的、真的凤毛麟角。对许多人来说，潜力与实现之间的差距大得惊人。而且——有一个例子你可以在课堂上试试——我在和高中生交流时也会这么说：想象你现在16岁，而我今天要送你一辆你自己任选的车，任何一辆都行——但有一个前提——这将是你此生唯一的一辆车，所以你必须让它撑到最后。你可以挑最华丽的，Maserati，或者别的都行。你会怎么对待它？当然，你会在点火前把用户手册读上五遍。你会把它停在车库里。
人性假设的再一次修改，加入一生只能有一辆车的比喻。
Any little rust, you would get taken care of immediately. You’d change the oil twice as often as you were supposed to, because you know it has to last a lifetime. And then I tell the students, you get one body and one mind, and it’s going to have to last you a lifetime, and you better treat it the same way, and you better start treating it right now, because it doesn’t do you any good to start worrying about that when you’re 50 or 60 and the rust — that little speck of rust — has turned into something big. So anything your students do to invest in their mind and body — particularly your mind — we didn’t work too hard on the bodies around here, but — (laughter) — you know, it pays off. It pays off in an extraordinary way. Your best asset is your own self. And you can become, to an enormous degree, the person you want to be. When I get classes in universities, I just ask them to imagine they were going to buy one of their classmates to own 10 percent of for the rest of their life. Which one would they pick?
任何一点点锈斑，你都会立刻处理。你会把换机油的频率提高到规定的两倍，因为你知道它要撑一辈子。然后我告诉学生们：你只有一个身体和一个大脑，它们也要陪你一辈子，你最好用同样的方式对待它们，而且最好从现在就开始，因为等你50或60岁时再开始担心，等那一点点锈——那小小的锈点——已经变成了大问题，就一点用也没有了。所以，只要是对自己的身心进行投资的事——尤其是你的头脑——都值得去做。我们这里对身体不算太“下功夫”，不过——（笑声）——你知道的，这些投入会有回报，会带来非同寻常的回报。你最好的资产就是你自己。你可以在很大程度上成为你想成为的那种人。我去大学和学生交流时，会让他们想象：如果你可以“买下”某位同学未来一生10%的收益份额，你会选谁？
用汽车的损坏比喻“基本不信任”对人性的腐蚀，有些车很早就坏的不能再开了。
They wouldn’t pick the one with the highest IQ, or necessarily the one with the highest grades. They’d pick the person that’s going to be effective. And the reason people are effective is because other people want to work with them. They want to be around them. And other people they don’t want to be around. And those are qualities than an individual picks up — being generous, being humorous, being on time, not claiming credit for more than you do but rather less than you do, helping out other people — all kinds of human qualities that turn other people on, and then there’s things that turn other people off. And those are habits, and they’re the habits that you pick up when they’re the age of your students. The habits they have today will follow them throughout life, so why not have good ones? So that’s the only message I would give your students. (Applause)
他们不会选择IQ最高的那个，或者不一定选择成绩最好的那个。他们会选那个“有效”的人。而人之所以“有效”，是因为别人愿意和他一起工作，愿意待在他身边；相反，也有人会让别人不愿意靠近。这些来自个人所养成的品质——慷慨、幽默、守时、不把功劳往自己身上多揽、反而少揽、乐于助人——各种各样能让别人喜欢的品格；当然也有一些会让人反感的东西。而这些都是“习惯”，而且正是在你学生们这个年龄段养成的习惯。他们今天的习惯会伴随一生，那为什么不让这些习惯变得更好呢？所以这就是我会给你学生们的全部信息。（掌声）
反向校正的思路一直没有变化。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve got a specific suggestion that answers your specific question. I would add to that extensive repertoire of yours by teaching them to avoid being manipulated to their disadvantage by vendors and by lenders using the standard tricks of the vendor and lender trade. And you couldn’t start with a better book than Cialdini’s “Influence,” and I think Bob Cialdini, who is a shareholder, is here somewhere in this audience. And so I have a new textbook to — I suggest you add to your class — which is Cialdini’s “Influence.” And he’s just got a new book that’s coming out and for sale in Omaha today, I think, for the first time, and that’s called “Yes.” So here’s two books that I suggest you add to your class.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我有一个具体建议，正好回答你的具体问题。我建议在你已经很丰富的教学内容上再加一点：教他们如何避免被商家和放贷人利用行业里那些“标准招数”操纵而吃亏。没有比 Cialdini 的《Influence》更好的入门书了。我想 Bob Cialdini（他是股东）就坐在现场的某个地方。所以我有一本新的“教材”建议你加入到课程中——就是 Cialdini 的《Influence》。此外，他还有一本新书，我想今天在 Omaha 首次开售，书名叫《Yes》。所以，我建议你把这两本书都加进课堂。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause.)
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。（掌声）
17、《2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
17. Creating a good corporate culture is easier than changing a bad one
创造良好的企业文化比改变不良的企业文化要容易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, thanks for having us here. I recently joined a new organization and for me to succeed there, the culture of the organization needs to change. So I’m interested in hearing your thoughts about how do you change culture of an organization? And if you’re building a new organization, then how do you make sure you have a strong and unique culture?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Mr. Munger 和 Mr. Buffett，感谢你们在这里接待我们。我最近加入了一家新的组织，而如果我要在那儿取得成功，这个组织的文化需要发生改变。所以我想听听你们的看法：应该如何改变一个组织的文化？如果你是在从零开始打造一个新组织，又如何确保能够形成一种强大而且独特的文化？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s a lot easier to build a new organization around a culture than it is to change the culture of an existing organization. It is really tough. And I like that fact, in the sense of Berkshire. I mean, it would be very tough to change the culture of Berkshire. It’s so ingrained in all our managers, our owners. Everything about the place is designed, in effect, to reinforce a culture. And for anybody to come in and try and change it very much, I think the culture would basically reject it. And the problem you describe, if you want to walk into, you know, whatever kind of organization you want to name — I’ve got to be a little careful here — it is tough to change cultures. Charlie and I have bucked up against that a few times. And I would say if you have any choice in the matter, I would much rather start from scratch and build it around it. But that was the — I’ve had the luxury of time with Berkshire.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为，围绕一套文化去打造一个新组织，要比改变一个现有组织的文化容易得多。改变现有文化真的非常难。而就 Berkshire 而言，我反而喜欢这一点。我的意思是，现在要去改变 Berkshire 的文化会非常非常困难，因为它已经深深扎根在我们所有管理者、所有股东心中。关于这家公司的方方面面，从设计上看，实际上都是在不断强化这种文化。如果有谁想进来把它大幅度改一改，我觉得这套文化本身大概率会把他“排斥”出去。你刚才提到的问题——不管你说的是哪一类组织，我在这里得稍微注意一下说话方式——要改变它的文化都很难。Charlie 和我也曾经在这方面碰过几次硬仗。如果这个问题上你有选择权的话，我会更愿意从零开始，从一开始就围绕一套文化来建设组织。当然，这也是因为——在 Berkshire 这件事上，我有“时间优势”。
通过Compression反向校正Value Functions机率很小。
（1）出厂设置是最关键的变量。
对个人来说，是 Basic trust / mistrust；对组织来说，是创始人和早期一代人种下的文化。这些一开始写进去的东西，就像左撇子用右手写字：可以训练，但永远带着偏向，一旦不刻意思考，动作就会滑回默认的那一套。
左撇子可以通过训练让右手写得很漂亮，但疲劳时、压力大时往往会露出原始偏好；Basic mistrust 的人，通过长期稳定的安全关系、治疗、反复正反馈，也可以更接近 trust，但在高压情境下，老的防御模式容易瞬间弹出来。
（2）现实世界里，正反馈既不够大，也不够密集，达不到“改写 Value Functions”的临界值。
要反向校正老的 Value Functions，不仅要有更好的 Compression（看懂问题本身），还要在新的行为标准下，连续拿到规模够大、时点够密的正反馈，让系统真切感到“按新标准行动明显更好”。
而在现实世界，讲真话、为长期牺牲短期、不薅客户羊毛，在短期不一定有任何奖励，甚至立刻吃亏。于是，新标准没积累到足够“厚”的正反馈，无法对冲掉旧习惯那种“别扭感”，系统自然就会退回原来的局部最优。
（3）习惯是最顽固的自我强化机制，时间越久越难改。
I mean, it goes back to 1965, and there really wasn’t much of anything there, you know, except some textile miles, so I didn’t have to fight anything. And as we added companies, they became complementary and they bought into something that they felt good about, but it took decades. And, you know, at Salomon, I attempted to change the culture, in terms of some respects, and I would not grade myself A+ in terms of the result. Charlie?
我的意思是，这一切要追溯到 1965 年，那时候那里实际上没什么东西，除了几家纺织厂，所以我并不需要去和既有文化“对着干”。随着我们不断收购新公司，它们彼此之间逐渐形成互补，也逐渐认同并融入了一种让大家感觉良好的文化，但这个过程花了几十年。再比如，在 Salomon，我曾在某些方面尝试去改变那里的文化，而如果要给这件事的结果打分，我绝不会给自己打 A+。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m quite flattered that a man would say that he’s in a new place where he can’t succeed unless he changes the culture and he wants us to tell him how to change the culture. In your position, my failure rate has been 100 percent. (Laughter) And —
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我还挺受宠若惊的——有人说自己到了一个新地方，如果不去改变那里的文化就没法成功，然后希望由我们来告诉他该怎么改文化。站在你这个位置上，我自己过去在这方面的失败率是 100%。（笑声）然后——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie started a law firm. Go back to, what, 1962, Charlie, what was it?
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊，Charlie 当年创办过一家律师事务所。要追溯到哪一年来着，1962 年，对吗，Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I can move out but I couldn’t change the culture. (Laughs)
CHARLIE MUNGER：对。我可以“搬出去”，但我没办法改变那里的文化。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: We can tell some interesting stories from the old law firm, but we’ll go on to Carol now.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们其实可以从那家老律师事务所里挑出不少有意思的故事来讲，不过现在还是交给 Carol 吧。
31. Expand you circle of competence if you can, but don’t force it
如果可以就扩张你的能力圈，但不要硬来
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，8号麦克风。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is Jacob (PH). I’m a shareholder from China and also a proud graduate of Columbia Business School. Thanks for having us here. (Cheers) My question is, our world is changing at a faster pace today versus 40 years ago and even more so going forward. And in this context, for each of us individually, should we expand our circle of competence continuously over time? Or should we stick with the existing circle but risk having a shrinking investment universe? Thank you.
观众：你好，Warren。你好，Charlie。我叫 Jacob，是来自中国的股东，也是 Columbia Business School 的骄傲毕业生。谢谢你们邀请我们来这里。（欢呼）我的问题是：现在这个世界变化的速度，比 40 年前快得多，而且未来只会更快。在这样的背景下，对我们每个人来说，是不是应该不断扩张自己的能力圈？还是应该坚守现有的能力圈，但承担可投资范围逐渐缩小的风险？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, obviously you should, under any conditions, you should expand your circle of competence —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，很明显，在任何情况下，你都应该扩张你的能力圈——
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you can.
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果你做得到的话。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you can. Yeah. (Laughter) And I’ve expanded mine a little bit over time. But —
WARREN BUFFETT：如果你做得到，是的。（笑声）我自己的能力圈，确实也在这些年里稍微扩大了一点。但是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you can’t — I’d be pretty cautious.
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果你做不到——那我就会非常谨慎。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can’t force it. You know. If you told me that I had to, you know, become an expert on physics or, you know —
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。你不能硬来。你知道的。如果你现在要求我去成为物理学的专家，或者说——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Dance maybe the lead in a ballet, Warren. That would be a sight. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：也许是去跳芭蕾当男主角，Warren。那画面可就有意思了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. That’s one I hadn’t really —
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊，这个嘛。这个选项我倒真是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible) now.
CHARLIE MUNGER：（听不清）现在可以考虑一下。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s one you may be thinking about, but I— (laughter) — it hadn’t even occurred to me. (Laughter) But, you know, it’s ridiculous. That doesn’t mean you can’t expand it at all. I mean, I did learn about some things as I’ve gone along in a few businesses. In some cases, I’ve learned that I’m incompetent, which is actually a plus, then you’ve discarded that one. But it doesn’t really — the world is going to change. And it’s going to keep changing. It’s changing every day. And that makes it interesting. You know. And as it changes, certainly within what you think is your present existing circle, you have to — you should be the master of figuring that one out or it really isn’t your circle of competence.
WARREN BUFFETT：这个是你在琢磨的，但对我来说——（笑声）——连想都没想过。（笑声）不过你知道，这显然是不现实的。但这并不意味着你完全不能扩张能力圈。我的意思是，在过去的一些生意里，我确实慢慢学会了一些新的东西；有时我也学到“自己在这个领域完全不行”，这其实反而是好事，因为你可以把它从列表里删掉。但这不改变一个事实——世界一定会改变，而且会持续改变，而且是每天都在变，这本身就很有趣。随着世界变化，在你自认为现有的能力圈之内，你必须——也应该——做到真正的精通，如果连那一块你都搞不明白，那它其实根本不属于你的能力圈。
总得有一个点是懂的，起点必须是确信无疑的懂，即便是送外卖。
And if you get a chance to expand it somewhat as you go along — I’ve learned some about the energy business from Walter (Scott) and Greg (Abel) as we’ve worked together, but I’m not close to their level of competence on it. But I do know more than I used to know. And so, you get a chance to expand it a bit. Usually, I would think normally your core competence is probably something that sort of fits the way the mind has worked. Some people have what I call a “money mind.” And they will work well in certain types of money situations. It isn’t so much a question of IQ. The mind is a very strange thing. And people have specialties, whether in chess or bridge. I see it in different people that can do impossible — what seem to me — impossible things. And they’re really kind of, as Charlie would say, stupid in other areas — (laughs) — you know. So just keep working on it. But don’t think you have to increase it and therefore start bending the rules. Anything further, Charlie?
而如果你在这个过程中有机会稍微把能力圈扩张一下——比如，我和 Walter（Scott）以及 Greg（Abel）一起工作时，确实也学到了一些能源生意的东西，但我的水平离他们还差得远。不过，相比过去，我确实懂得更多了一点。也就是说，你可以有机会把能力圈往外推一点点。通常，我认为所谓的核心能力，大概率是跟你大脑一贯的运转方式“对得上”的东西。有些人天生就有“经济头脑”，在某些跟钱打交道的场景里，他们就能如鱼得水。这跟 IQ 高不高没那么大关系。人的大脑是很奇怪的东西，人们各自有自己的“专长”，不管是国际象棋还是桥牌。我见过一些人能做到在我看来“根本不可能”的事情，但同时，他们在别的领域——用 Charlie 的话说——其实挺愚笨的（笑）。所以，你就是不断在自己这块上多下功夫就行了，但不要因为觉得“必须扩张能力圈”，就开始扭曲自己的规则。还有什么要补充的吗，Charlie？
能力是天生的，Compression所擅长的领域很大程度上是天生的，Value Functions有出厂的默认设置（发生在1岁以前），财务上的成功跟Value Functions的关系更大。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有了。
19、《2021-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
43. Top “risk factor” for any business is getting the wrong management
任何企业的首要“风险因素”是管理层不当。
WARREN BUFFETT: The biggest danger — they have that section in the prospectus called, what do they call that? About — certain —
沃伦·巴菲特：最大的危险——他们在招股说明书中有一个部分，叫什么来着？关于——某些——
GREG ABEL: Risk factors.
格雷格·阿贝尔：风险因素。
AJIT JAIN: Risk factors.
阿吉特·贾因：风险因素。
WARREN BUFFETT: Risk factors, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：风险因素，是的。
The number one risk factor — you never see it — the number one risk factor is that this business gets the wrong management. And you get a guy or a woman in charge of it that are — they’re personable, the directors like them. They don’t know what they’re doing, but they know how to put on an appearance. That’s the biggest single danger that a business — and that that person stays and runs it for 10 or 15 years, and either stays in the textile business or department store business and expands. (Laughs) And, you know, I’ve looked at a lot of businesses. And that’s what’s caused the number one problem. And it isn’t the kind of thing where they list them all because the lawyers tell them to list them.
首要风险因素——你永远看不到——首要风险因素是这个企业得到了错误的管理。你可能会让一个人或一个女人负责这个企业，他们很有亲和力，董事们喜欢他们。他们不知道自己在做什么，但他们知道如何营造一种表象。这对一个企业来说是最大的单一危险——那个人在那里待了 10 或 15 年，要么继续留在纺织行业或百货商店行业并扩展。 （笑）而且，你知道，我看过很多企业。这就是造成头号问题的原因。这并不是他们因为律师告诉他们要列出所有问题而列出的问题。
人的风险最大，巴菲特认为对人的判断的准确性在90%以上，首先不是天赋，“吃自己的饭”，注意力不受干扰的情况下能看得更清楚。
20、《2023-03-02 武志红.如何构建强大的自我》
武志红:
你刚才讲了一个很生动的例子，也很具体的例子，关于乐高的这个故事。就是当孩子玩乐高的时候，他全然的投入其中，他在一个高度专注状态。那这时候如果谁能够看见那个看不见的东西的时候，就知道孩子的专注，这是一个极其宝贵的东西。不过这时候家长就不仅说，哎，你别玩了，你要去学习，有个网课要怎么怎么样，这是一种破坏。但还有些家长是这样，也有些家长看起来对孩子也挺关爱的。孩子累了吗？来喝点水，吃点水果。你这个乐高搭得真不错，你跟爸妈分享一下你搭乐高的感觉是怎样。
专注跟Value Functions应该是两回事，有些人读书成绩非常好但Value Functions照样非常糟糕。
结果你看这都是对孩子的一个感觉的破坏。其实我们就明白孩子能够持续的在他的这个专注之中，如果能持续 45 分钟，那就是非常了不得的事情。我想专注是一部分，还有一部分，你看我们在讲这么一个故事，当孩子在专注的做搭乐高的时候，他在一种享受之中。甚至假如他能够持续 45 分钟的专注，其实他会体验到一定的心流。那么这个时候，孩子就处在一种愉悦，处在一种享受之中，那这是非常宝贵的。当孩子一旦能够在一件事情之中，他体验到，当他能够全然投入其中，有一定的心流的体验产生，他就获得了一个极其宝贵的事情，就是做事情是享受的。
所以我想这是真正的力量和虚假的力量一个极其巨大的区别。当我们体验不到做事情是享受的，最后就变成什么呢？学习是苦的，工作是苦的，都是为了生存，不得已，都是那个人第一名，自己第二名，感觉不爽，不行，要超过他，或者说自己如果发展不好以后怎么活呀？都是基于这么一个部分，会认为为了活着，为了证明自己比别人强，不得不去努力地学习和工作。当有了这种感觉之后真的很不幸你就沦落成普通人了。
当我们有另外一种感觉做事情是享受的，是愉悦的，那么这个时候就形成了所谓的内趋力。内趋力不是说有个家长在内在拿着鞭子抽打着他，你不努力你就怎么样，内趋力是和愉悦连在一起。他深刻地体验到当他去做事的时候，无论是学习工作还是娱乐，他总是专注在一件事情的时候，这是一个非常愉悦的事情。而且这个立在的愉悦就是它带来的享受要超过物质，甚至超过各种各样的这种这个世界上用物质带来的这些东西。那么这样一来，孩子就获得一个极其宝贵的这么一种体验，就是高度专注，带来这个愉悦，而且带来这个世界上极其宝贵的愉悦，
Compression+Value Functions在“基本信任”的方向上循环递进的足够好才能跑成“惯性轨道”的系统。
而且在愉悦的过程中实际体验了一种合一，你发现你和这个事情好像有一种合而为一的感觉。但是对幼小的孩子来讲，我已经体验到这种合一，或者知道合一有什么，这是非常不容易的。但是他有这么一点感觉，这是极其宝贵的部分。那么未来这种专注、愉悦、合一、心流，这也成了一个世界上最好的东西。那么这样一来，对他来讲，学习也好，工作也好，都是愉悦的。那么有愉悦去做事，这感觉是很不一样。比方我们想，如果我们学习的时候是苦的，你在学习的时候是在损耗自己。
那么工作的时候你觉得是苦的，你也是在损耗自己，所以因此大家觉得很累，要躺平。但是假如你在学习的时候一直享受的，你工作的时候是享受的，这个时候你就完全不一样了。那么讲到这可能很多朋友就会说，工作是享受的吗？我给大家来举一个我自己的例子，就是你看我现在都写了六七百万字了吧，我具体也不知道我到底写了多少字，但总之六七百万肯定是有的，至少写了十几本书，在德道上那个课程一年写了一百万字。
但是每次我去做按摩的时候，按摩师都觉得很奇怪，因为很多按摩师知道我，说，哎，武老师，你怎么没有写作病呢？我的颈椎，我的肩膀都挺 OK 的。那为什么没有颈椎病呢？因为我享受，我在写作的时候，我乐在其中，非常的愉悦。所以这种愉悦，它不仅是一种感受上的开心，它作为一种能量，作为一种活力，它会滋养自己的身体。结果自己的身体也因此得到一种滋药。如果现在有人说，武老师，我给你……其实很多人不相信这个说法，但是对我来讲，这很真实的。
说我给你几十个亿，你这辈子别写作了，你别讲课了，你别思考问题了，那这事我是拒绝的。因为对我来讲，这带来的愉悦是非常不同的。所以你看，对我来讲，专注写作，我并没有什么写作病，甚至我都没有说做了太久了，有这个作者带来的疾病，也没有。这是因为写作带来一种高度的享受和愉悦。但是我们做自媒体，我们这些小孩就是到我们这儿来工作，他们开始码字。真的是一两年就开始有写作病了。这个颈椎变粗大了，然后肩膀变得开始僵硬了，然后不断地要去按摩，动不动就疼。那这个就不一样是吧？
当你必须作为一个成年人，你经常在工作之中，但是你是愉悦的。而另外一个人，他在工作中，他是痛苦的。你看，这样一下来，生命差别有多大呀？时时刻刻都在做的一件事，这边觉得是愉悦的，这边觉得是痛苦的，这是一个非常巨大的不同。所以我想我们做父母的或者做教育的，包括我们自己的时候得看见。当然这一点我们得明白，我们成年人重新学习愉悦的去做事不容易，但是我们看孩子，孩子当他天然地做事的时候，他都是愉悦的呀。所以做父母的很多时候，后来我就说，中国家长想躺平挺容易的，
你别干涉孩子，让孩子爱干嘛干嘛，就保证他的吃喝拉撒睡玩就行了，你给他提供好物质基础，结果你的孩子你发现你没这么使劲，你居然已经胜过了绝大多数父母，因为大多数父母都在使劲地破坏自己的孩子，所以你没使劲你就成了。所以我想这是一个极其重要的这么一个部分，就是专注和愉悦，和另外一个不专注， 就是痛苦，这些人生就是何等不同呢？
这是非常有道理的，但要克服不干预就要克服自己的紧张，非常难。
Becky Quick: This question comes from Scott Williams in Portland, Oregon. He said, “Do you think the net benefit of DOGE will be positive or negative for the long-term health of the United States?”
Becky Quick：这个问题来自俄勒冈州波特兰的 Scott Williams。他说：“你认为 DOGE 的净效应对美国的长期健康是正面还是负面？”
Warren Buffett: I think that bureaucracy is something that is amazingly prevalent and contagious even in our capital system, and big corporations overwhelmingly most of them look like they could be run better. I’m sure Berkshire does in many respects. And government is the ultimate. It really doesn’t have any checks on it.
Warren Buffett：我认为官僚主义在我们的资本体系中也惊人地普遍且具有传染性，绝大多数大型公司看起来都有提升经营的空间。我确信在很多方面 Berkshire 也是如此。至于政府，那更是终极形态——它实际上缺乏有效的制衡。
That’s why it scares you to some extent about what the future of the currency will be, because they can print currency. If you have people that get elected by promising people things – that doesn’t mean that they aren’t sincere about all kinds of items, but there’s no politician that says to anybody that has money, “I really think you have bad breath and if you don’t mind, would you step away from me.” It just doesn’t happen.
这也是为什么我们在一定程度上会对货币的未来感到担忧，因为他们可以印钞。若有人靠向民众许诺而当选——这并不意味着他们对各项主张不真诚，但没有政治人物会对有钱人说：“我觉得你口气很糟，麻烦离我远一点。”这种事不会发生。
I think the problem of how you control revenue and expenses in government is the one that is never fully solved and has really hurt dramatically many civilizations. I don’t think we’re immune from it, and we’ve come close to it.
我认为政府如何控制收支这个问题从未得到彻底解决，并且严重伤害过许多文明。我不认为我们能免疫，而且我们已多次接近危险边缘。
We’re operating at a fiscal deficit now that is unsustainable over a very long period of time. We don’t know whether that means two years or 20 years because there’s never been a country like the United States. But as Herbert Stein, the famous economist, said, “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.” We are doing something that is unsustainable, and it has the aspect to it that it gets uncontrollable to a certain point.
我们当前的财政赤字在很长时期内是不可持续的。究竟是两年还是二十年，我们并不知道，因为从未有过像美国这样的国家。但正如经济学家 Herbert Stein 所言：“不能永远持续的事，终将终止。”我们正在做一件不可持续的事，而且其中有一部分会在某个点变得不可控。
Paul Volcker kept that from happening in the United States, but we came close. We’ve come close multiple times. We’ve still had very substantial inflation in the United States, but it’s never been runaway yet. That’s not something you want to try and experiment with because it feeds on itself.
Paul Volcker 曾阻止这种情况在美国发生，但我们离临界点很近；而且不止一次。美国也经历过相当高的通胀，但尚未失控。你绝不想拿它做试验，因为一旦启动就会自我增强。
I wouldn’t want the job of trying to correct what’s going on in revenue and expenditures of the United States with roughly a 7% gap when probably a 3% gap is sustainable. The further away you get from that, the more you get to where the uncontrollable begins. It’s a job I don’t want, but it’s a job I think should be done. And Congress does not seem good at doing it.
我不愿意接手修正美国收支问题的工作——现在缺口大约是7%，而大概3%才是可持续水平。偏离越远，就越接近不可控。我不想做这件事，但我认为它必须有人去做。而国会看起来并不擅长此事。
We’ve got a lot of problems always as a country, but this is one we bring on ourselves. We have a revenue stream, a capital-producing stream, a brains-producing machine like the world has never seen. And if you picked a way to screw it up, it would involve the currency. That’s happened a lot of places.
作为一个国家，我们总会有很多问题，但这一项是我们自找的。我们拥有前所未见的收入创造力、资本生成力与人才生产机制。如果你非要挑一种方式把这一切搞砸，那就是货币问题。许多地方都发生过。
In theory, you would make it so there was substantial downside for anybody that screwed things up, but there isn’t downside. There’s upside. It’s the problem of the most successful company in the history of the country, in the history of the world.
理论上，你应当为任何把事情搞砸的人设置巨大的负面后果，但现实中并没有，反而有上行激励。这是这个国家、乃至世界历史上最成功体系所面临的问题。
Warren Buffett: We’re spending close – it’s hard to get the precise figure, but close to 20% of GDP on health. And if you go back to 1960, there were a number of countries that were each spending around 5%. And then the lines began to diverge dramatically. But the mathematical fact that there are only 100 percentage points in the equation didn’t change.
Warren Buffett：我们在医疗上的开支接近——确切数字很难给出，但接近——GDP 的 20%。如果回到 1960 年，当时有不少国家各自大约只花 5%。此后曲线开始显著分化。但“总量只有 100 个百分点”这一数学事实并没有改变。
So we tried that experiment with JP Morgan and Amazon and we had three people that didn’t think they knew the answer, but thought that in my case I use the term that it was a tapeworm in the economy. We also found out that the tapeworm was alive in every part of the country. I mean the hospitals liked it. The hospitals had prominent people working with people. People generally like their doctor, didn’t like the system. I mean all kinds of things, but in the end, JP Morgan and Amazon and Berkshire were not going to have any effect on changing that 20%.
所以我们与 JP Morgan 和 Amazon 一起做了那个尝试。我们三个人并不自认为知道答案，但我用过一个说法：这是经济体内的一条“tapeworm（绦虫）”。我们也发现，这条“绦虫”寄生在全国每个角落。比如医院也“喜欢”它，医院里有显赫人物在与各方打交道。人们普遍喜欢他们的医生，但不喜欢这个体系。情况五花八门，但最终，JP Morgan、Amazon 和 Berkshire 不可能把那 20% 改变掉。
Now that 20% – there are only 100 percentage points available and other countries spend six or 7% and perhaps use our system to their advantage which is also very true. That is an enormous percentage of an economy and we simply – it was too entrenched to really do much in the way of change.
而那 20%——总共也就 100 个百分点，别的国家花 6% 或 7%，还可能利用我们的体系为己所用，这也确实存在。医疗占经济的比重过于庞大，而这个体系根深蒂固，我们确实很难推动实质性改变。
And we spent some money on it and we did some work and we learned a good bit about our own systems and we saw the degree to which the present system was ingrained in so many people’s lives, whether the health care providers or whether everybody. And these aren’t evil people. I mean, they’re just going about something and trying to save lives.
我们花了些钱，也做了不少工作，从中学到了很多关于我们自身体系的东西，也看到了当下体系是如何深深嵌入无数人的生活——无论是医疗服务提供者，还是普通大众。这些人并不“邪恶”，他们只是各司其职、试图挽救生命。
But we found that whether it was in Canada or France or Britain or wherever it might be, that if you looked at our costs that they were just far higher and to some extent we were subsidizing the rest of the world. And people would come to the United States to do the really unusual or challenging aspects of health in terms of operations and that sort of thing.
但我们发现，无论在 Canada、France、Britain 或其他地方，相比之下我们的成本要高得多，而且在某种程度上我们是在补贴世界其他国家。很多人在涉及高难度手术等复杂医疗时会来到美国。
But we made no progress and there comes a point where the government – and I mean it’s so involved in the situation and health is so important to most to everybody, and we couldn’t – as I said to Jamie and Jeff, I said well the tapeworm won.
但我们没有取得进展，而到了某个节点，政府——我指的是政府在其中的深度参与——再加上医疗对几乎所有人都至关重要，我们也无能为力。正如我对 Jamie 和 Jeff 说的：“绦虫赢了。”
There are problems of society when you get 20% of your GDP going into a given industry, the degree of enthusiasm for changing that industry, the political power that the industry will have, and that doesn’t mean they’re evil. It’s just everybody – they just end up there.
当一个行业吃掉 GDP 的 20% 时，社会就会出现问题：你要改变该行业的热情会被削弱，该行业的政治力量会壮大。这不意味着他们“邪恶”，只是所有人最终都会被卷入到那样的格局里。
自我强化、自我实现。
So I don’t know – we came to the conclusion we didn’t know the answer, the three of us, and we had the money to do it and we didn’t know how to change how 330 million people felt about their doctor, felt about our healthcare, what they felt entitled to.
所以我也不确定——我们三人得出的结论是：我们没有答案。我们有资金，但我们不知道如何改变 3.3 亿人对医生的感受、对医疗的看法以及他们认为自己“理应拥有”的权利。
It won’t change by itself and government is the only one that can change it and the only people in government that can change it are getting majority of 435 people and 100 people. And my dad lost one election in his life in 1948 and he was a very strong Republican and in 1950 he went back and beat the guy that beat him in 1948 and he got the doctors behind him. And they believe 100% in what they’re doing. They’re helping people every day.
这件事不会自发改变，只有政府才能改变；而政府中能改变它的人，必须在 435 人与 100 人中取得多数。我父亲一生只在 1948 年输过一次选举，他是铁杆共和党，1950 年他又回去击败了 1948 年击败他的对手，因为他争取到了医生群体的支持。他们 100% 相信自己所做的事——他们每天都在帮助他人。
And during the pandemic, the sacrifices made by people to save other people – just incredible. Can you imagine working in something where they’re bringing in people that are going to die by the dozens and dozens and dozens and you try to somehow keep your own morale up and keep working with them. So, you can’t argue about the importance of it.
在疫情期间，人们为拯救他人所作的牺牲——令人难以置信。想象一下，你在一个场景下工作，身边不断送来一批又一批濒危的人，而你要设法保持士气并继续投入。对医疗的重要性，这是无可争辩的。
But our costs are so different than any country in the world that it’s a huge element and we’re a very rich country. So we can do things other countries can’t do. And through our elected representatives and a whole variety of things over time, we’ve developed a system that is enormously resistant to any kind of major change and it’s important in every community that it’s in.
但我们的成本与世界任何国家相比都过于悬殊，而我们又是一个非常富裕的国家，因此我们能做其他国家做不到的事。长期以来，通过民选代表和各种过程，我们形成了一个对任何重大变革都极其“抗性”的体系，而且这套体系在每个社区都举足轻重。
巴菲特是精英主义，我自己的看法更乐观一些，Compression+Value Functions包含简洁优雅的隐性偏好，掌握这种力量的前提条件是对世界是”基本信任“的，坏人（基本不信任）都只是支离破碎的小聪明。
So, I wish we had an answer for you, but I was somewhat pessimistic going in and I was a little more pessimistic when we came out. But I’m glad we did what we did and we learned something about our own failings in the process. So, Berkshire in effect got its money’s worth, but we didn’t kill the tapeworm.
所以，我也希望能给你一个答案，但进入时我就偏悲观，出来时更悲观一些。不过我仍庆幸我们做了那次尝试，也在过程中看见了自身的不足。换言之，Berkshire 的投入没有白花，但我们没能“杀死绦虫”。
Trying to change things in government is an interesting proposition in the country because you get self-selection in terms of the people that go into government and continue in it. And to some extent they keep having to make decisions that they don’t like as they go along and they learn to accept them or rationalize them or whatever it may be.
在这个国家，试图通过政府去改变，是一个“有趣”的命题，因为走进并留在政府的人群本身就具有自我筛选的特征。在某种程度上，他们一路上会做出自己并不喜欢的决定，并逐渐学会接受、或为之寻找理由，诸如此类。
But it’s still – this country’s worked out better than any country in the world. So you can’t argue it was a failure, but you can’t argue that there are certain problems that are terribly tough to figure out ways to solve. And of course, one of them gets back to the fiscal problem I mentioned before because it’s easy to spend money and it’s hard to cut people’s receipts.
但即便如此——这个国家的运转仍优于世界上任何国家。所以你不能称之为失败；但你也不能否认，有些问题极难找到解决路径。当然，其中之一又回到我之前提到的财政问题：花钱容易、削减他人收入很难。
And if you get elected, you’re going to say to yourself, well, I can do more good if I stay, and then if I really vote my conscience on this sort of thing. So, you give away a little bit here and a little bit there and a little bit there and finally you don’t recognize yourself in the mirror anymore. And that’s – I grew up in a political family, but I watched how people behaved and they behave like human beings which is what you have to expect and I behave like human beings.
而当你当选，你会告诉自己：如果我留在这里，我就能做更多好事；然后在这种事情上你若按良知投票……于是这里让一点，那里让一点，久而久之镜子里已认不出自己。我出身政治家庭，见过人们的行为模式，他们的表现与“人性”一致，这是你必须预期到的——而我也同样具有人的弱点。
We still manage to keep moving forward in dramatic way. It’s so much better to live here than it was 100 years ago or 200 years ago. It’s dramatic. So you can’t say the system’s a failure, but you can say that it is very difficult to make major changes in it.
我们仍然能以令人瞩目的方式向前推进。生活在今天远胜 100 年、200 年前，变化是剧烈的。因此不能说这套体系失败了，但可以说在其中推动重大变革极其困难。
Ilya Sutskever 01:25:13
Here is what I think is going to happen. Number one, let’s look at how things have gone so far with the AIs of the past. One company produced an advance and the other company scrambled and produced some similar things after some amount of time and they started to compete in the market and push the prices down. So I think from the market perspective, something similar will happen there as well.
我觉得会发生的事情大致是这样的。第一，我们先看看过去这几轮 AI 的演化是怎么走的：通常是某家公司率先做出一个重大突破，随后其他公司迅速跟进，在一段时间后搞出类似的东西，然后大家一起在市场上竞争，把价格往下打。我认为，从市场机制的角度看，这一轮也会出现类似的过程。
We are talking about the good world, by the way. What’s the good world? It’s where we have these powerful human-like learners that are also… By the way, maybe there’s another thing we haven’t discussed on the spec of the superintelligent AI that I think is worth considering. It’s that you make it narrow, it can be useful and narrow at the same time. You can have lots of narrow superintelligent AIs.
顺带一提，我们现在讨论的是“比较好的那条世界线”。什么叫“比较好的世界”？就是我们拥有这种强大的、类人学习者的 AI，同时还……再顺着说一个我们没怎么展开、但在设计 superintelligent AI 规格时很值得考虑的点：**你可以把它做窄一点，让它既超级智能，又在职能上保持窄域实用**。你完全可以有一堆“窄领域的超级智能 AI”。
But suppose you have many of them and you have some company that’s producing a lot of profits from it. Then you have another company that comes in and starts to compete. The way the competition is going to work is through specialization. Competition loves specialization. You see it in the market, you see it in evolution as well. You’re going to have lots of different niches and you’re going to have lots of different companies who are occupying different niches. In this world we might say one AI company is really quite a bit better at some area of really complicated economic activity and a different company is better at another area. And the third company is really good at litigation.
在这种设定下，假设有很多这样的系统，其中一家公司靠此赚取了巨额利润，然后另一家公司也杀进来开始竞争。竞争会怎么展开？答案是：**通过专业化来展开**。竞争最“偏爱”的就是分工与专业化——你在市场里能看到这一点，在进化里也能看到。最终你会出现大量细分“生态位”，对应一批占据不同生态位的公司。在那样的世界里，你可能会看到这样的格局：某一家 AI 公司在某种非常复杂的经济活动领域上明显更强；另一家公司则在另一个领域更胜一筹；还有第三家公司，也许在诉讼与法律业务上特别厉害。
Dwarkesh Patel 01:27:18
Isn’t this contradicted by what human-like learning implies? It’s that it can learn…
这难道不是和“类人学习能力”的含义相矛盾吗？因为它可以去学习……
Ilya Sutskever 01:27:21
It can, but you have accumulated learning. You have a big investment. You spent a lot of compute to become really, really good, really phenomenal at this thing. Someone else spent a huge amount of compute and a huge amount of experience to get really good at some other thing. You apply a lot of human learning to get there, but now you are at this high point where someone else would say, “Look, I don’t want to start learning what you’ve learned.”
它当然可以学，但这里还有“沉淀的学习成果”这件事。你已经在某个方向上投入了巨大的资源，你花了非常多的算力，才在这件事情上变得极其擅长、好到惊人。与此同时，另一个人（或系统）则在另一个方向上投入了同样巨量的算力和经验，在那件事上变得非常强。你们都用上了大量“类人学习”的能力才爬到各自的高点，而当你已经站在这个高度时，其他人就会说：“算了，我可不想从头开始学你已经学完的这些东西。”
自我强化带来两样东西，一是吸附力，被擅长的事牢牢吸住，越来越紧；二是越来越好的泛化能力，这是跨领域都适用的能力，最终的结果会是什么？
（1）算力资源有限
每家公司的“人脑 + GPU”都是稀缺的，最理性的做法是把自我强化的飞轮优先丢在“最能赚钱、回本最快”的那几块业务上。结果就是 Ilya 说的那种格局：一家公司在人类极复杂的某一块经济活动上远超同行，另一家在另外一块远超同行，第三家可能专门做诉讼这样的利基市场。竞争偏爱专业化，自我强化让专业化变成“惯性轨道”。
（2）算力资源无限
理论上，一家公司可以在每一个足够赚钱的岗位上都开一个独立的“类人学习体实例”，把整个经济里所有“正 NPV 的任务”全覆盖。这个世界里，约束从算力转向数据质量、监管约束和组织的管理复杂度——技术上可以全覆盖，现实里不见得有人能管理好这么庞杂的系统。
Dwarkesh Patel 01:27:48
I guess that would require many different companies to begin at the human-like continual learning agent at the same time so that they can start their different tree search in different branches. But if one company gets that agent first, or gets that learner first, it does then seem like… Well, if you just think about every single job in the economy, having an instance learning each one seems tractable for a company.
那这大概就要求很多不同的公司在差不多同一时间，都拿到这种“类人持续学习的智能体”，这样它们才能各自在不同分支上展开自己的那棵“搜索树”。但如果只有一家公司最先拿到了这种智能体，或者说最先拿到了这种学习者，那看起来就会变成这样……毕竟如果你只考虑经济体系里的每一种工作，让模型的不同实例分别去学习每一种工作，对一家公司来说似乎是可行的。
Ilya Sutskever 01:28:19
That’s a valid argument. My strong intuition is that it’s not how it’s going to go. The argument says it will go this way, but my strong intuition is that it will not go this way. In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is. I think that’s going to be one of those.
这是一个有道理的论点。不过我的强烈直觉是：事情最后不会那样发展。你的推理指向那条路径，但我的直觉非常强烈地觉得，现实不会按那条路径走。从理论上讲，理论与实践之间没有差别；但在实践中，差别是存在的。我觉得这会是“理论和实践不一样”的又一个例子。
*****
You kind of ask yourself, is something fundamental or not fundamental? How things should be.
你会不断地问自己：什么东西是“基本的”、是“底层”的，什么不是？事物“应该是怎样的”？
I think that’s been guiding me a fair bit, thinking from multiple angles and looking for almost beauty, beauty and simplicity. Ugliness, there’s no room for ugliness. It’s beauty, simplicity, elegance, correct inspiration from the brain. All of those things need to be present at the same time. The more they are present, the more confident you can be in a top-down belief.
我觉得这些一直在很大程度上指导着我：从多个角度思考，同时去寻找某种“接近美感的东西”——美感、简洁性。丑陋的东西，是不该留下空间的。你要追求的是：美、简洁、优雅，以及来自大脑的“正确灵感”。这些要素需要同时出现，而且出现得越充分，你就越能在“自上而下的信念”（top-down belief）上有信心。
The top-down belief is the thing that sustains you when the experiments contradict you. Because if you trust the data all the time, well sometimes you can be doing the correct thing but there’s a bug. But you don’t know that there is a bug. How can you tell that there is a bug? How do you know if you should keep debugging or you conclude it’s the wrong direction? It’s the top-down. You can say things have to be this way. Something like this has to work, therefore we’ve got to keep going. That’s the top-down, and it’s based on this multifaceted beauty and inspiration by the brain.
这种“自上而下的信念”，就是当实验结果暂时和你唱反调时，支撑你继续往前走的东西。因为如果你永远只信任数据，那有时会出现这样一种情况：你做的是对的，但实验里有 bug，而你不知道那里有 bug。那你要如何判断，到底还要不要继续调试？是该说“这方向错了”，还是该说“系统里还有没找到的问题”？靠的就是这种 top-down 信念。你会对自己说：“事物必须是这样的，这种结构总得有一种方式是能工作的，所以我们得继续干下去。”这种 top-down 信念，正是建立在多维度的“美感”和“来自大脑的正确灵感”之上的。
头脑清晰是在大脑发展的早期就已经有一些简洁优雅的知识结构，在后面的人生中泛化到其他领域，必须是非常早的时期，两个方向（有安全感或者受恐惧困扰）都是自我强化的，简洁优雅如果是胜出的一方只可能出现在非常早的时期，可能是1岁以前，甚至是娘胎里都有可能。
Example.01.Charlie Munger
Warren Buffett: I’m Warren Buffett and that’s me with Charlie in an unscripted and spontaneous photo taken in Savannah, Georgia early in 1982. Our wives could tell us apart, as long as we wore name tags. When Charlie and I first met in 1959, if was as if twins who had been separated at birth had been reunited. But there were a few important differences between Charlie and me that people missed. Let me elaborate.
沃伦·巴菲特：我是沃伦·巴菲特，这张照片是我和查理在 1982 年初在乔治亚州萨凡纳拍的，完全没有剧本和准备。我们的妻子只要我们佩戴名牌，就能分辨出我们。当查理和我在 1959 年第一次见面时，就像是失散多年的双胞胎重聚。但查理和我之间有一些人们忽视的重要区别。让我详细说明。
For one thing, I was only interested in whether things worked. Charlie wanted to know how things worked. I would turn on a switch and if the tv or light bulb went on, I could not care less about what had caused that miracle. Charlie, however, would want to understand every aspect of how a generator worked, how electricity traveled to his home, the merits of AC vs DC, whatever. You could say that Charlie understood electricity better than Thomas Edison ever did.
有一点，我只对事物是否有效感兴趣。查理想知道事物是如何运作的。我只需打开一个开关，如果电视或灯泡亮了，我根本不在乎是什么导致了这个奇迹。然而，查理会想要理解发电机的每一个方面，电是如何传输到他家里的，交流电与直流电的优缺点等等。你可以说查理对电的理解比托马斯·爱迪生更深刻。
泛化能力不好的原因只有两个，一是Value Functions的方向不对；二是训练的数据量不够。
（1）两个都不对的不用提了；
（2）Value Functions是错的，用Compression反向校正会比较辛苦；
（3）Value Functions是对的，Compression的能力一般，没有大成就也有小成就。
芒格的是后两种情况，第（2）情况的可能性比较大，但是正像巴菲特说的，第（1）种情况立即避开；第（3）种情况的加强版是最应该追求的，比如乔布斯和巴菲特；第（2）、（3）情况是大多数，无感。
Like his hero, Ben Franklin, Charlie wanted to understand everything, and he pretty well succeeded. Additionally, Charlie liked to design things. When we met in 1959, he was designing the building, the house in which he lived throughout his life. He once wanted to design a home for me in Santa Barbara, on a piece of property Berkshire had inherited - fat chance! In 1958, I bought the house I now live in, but I would have been happy with any of 100 or more houses as long it was in the general neighborhood of where I had been renting. Of course I wanted my wife to like it and wanted to have room for 4 or 5 kids, but what it looked like inside, outside was irrelevant.
像他的英雄本·富兰克林一样，查理想要理解一切，并且他做得相当成功。此外，查理喜欢设计东西。当我们在 1959 年见面时，他正在设计他一生中居住的那栋房子。他曾经想为我在圣巴巴拉设计一所房子，那是一块伯克希尔继承的土地——希望渺茫！在 1958 年，我买下了我现在居住的房子，但只要在我租房的附近，我会对 100 多栋房子中的任何一栋都感到满意。当然，我希望我的妻子喜欢它，并希望有 4 或 5 个孩子的空间，但房子的内部和外观对我来说并不重要。
The difference, of course, was of supreme relevance to Berkshire. Charlie’s architectural thoughts led to the Berkshire Hathaway of today. Some of you may be surprised that Charlie first became a director of Berkshire in 1978. Through a small partnership, I bought control of Berkshire early in 1965. Charlie then didn’t have a penny invested in Berkshire. But he immediately told me purchase was just plain dumb. Which it was.
当然，这个差异对伯克希尔来说至关重要。查理的建筑思想导致了今天的伯克希尔哈撒韦。你们中的一些人可能会惊讶，查理在 1978 年首次成为伯克希尔的董事。通过一个小型合伙企业，我在 1965 年初买下了伯克希尔的控制权。那时查理在伯克希尔没有投资一分钱。但他立刻告诉我，这笔购买简直是愚蠢的。确实如此。
Charlie then did for me what needed to be done to correct my error. And over time, we worked together to achieve his vision. Charlie, in effect, then became the architect of today’s Berkshire. The architect is the person who dreams of, then designs, and finally supervises the construction of great structures. The carpenters and the (inaudible), that’s me, are needed, but the architect is the genius who provides the blueprint.
查理为我做了纠正错误所必需的事情。随着时间的推移，我们共同努力实现他的愿景。查理实际上成为了今日伯克希尔的建筑师。建筑师是梦想、设计并最终监督伟大建筑建造的人。木匠和（听不清的），也就是我，是必需的，但建筑师是提供蓝图的天才。
Berkshire has become a great company with a unique group of owners. The directors of Berkshire are the trustees of the structure Charlie designed that lives beyond his lifetime and will live far beyond mine. I’m now going to introduce these directors and give you a short first quarter report and the outlook for the company. After that, we will take your questions. Please turn up the lights, and I hope you’ll join me in applauding Charlie Munger, the architect of Berkshire.
伯克希尔已经成为一家伟大的公司，拥有独特的股东群体。伯克希尔的董事们是查理设计的结构的受托人，这一结构将超越他的生命，并将远远超越我的生命。现在我将介绍这些董事，并给您一个简短的第一季度报告以及公司的前景。之后，我们将回答您的问题。请调亮灯光，我希望您能和我一起为伯克希尔的建筑师查理·芒格鼓掌。
Example.02.Greg Abel
Warren Buffett: It’s working way better with Greg than with me because I just didn’t want to work as hard as he worked and I could get away with it because we’ve got a basically good business, very good business and I wasn’t in danger of you firing me by virtue of both ownership and the fact that we would do pretty well.
Warren Buffett：在 Greg 手里运转得比在我手里好得多，因为我并不想像他那样努力工作，而我之所以还能蒙混过关，是因为我们本来就是一家好公司，非常好的公司；再加上我既是股东又能交出不错的成绩，所以你们也不可能把我开掉。
But the fact that you can do pretty well doesn’t mean you couldn’t do better. And Greg can do better at many things. Many people want to be managed, need help in being managed. Some don’t. Some you just leave alone.
但“做得还不错”并不意味着“不能做得更好”。而在许多方面，Greg 能做得更好。很多人希望被管理、也需要在管理中得到帮助；也有一些人不需要，对他们你只要放手不管就好。
We’ve had managers it would have been crazy to start giving instructions to because they just quit. And I wouldn’t blame them because I’d be the same type myself. But a lot of people really do welcome direction and help, particularly when they’re getting it from somebody like Greg that really lives the life himself and doesn’t just come down from on high and say “here’s what you do” while I do something else. A manager that behaves differently than what he’s asking the people beneath them to behave – it just doesn’t work over time.
我们也有一些经理人，你一旦开始指手画脚那就太疯狂了——他们会直接辞职。我不会责怪他们，因为我自己也属于那一类人。但也有很多人确实欢迎方向与帮助，尤其当这帮助来自像 Greg 这样“身体力行”的人——不是高高在上地说“你就这么干”，而自己却去做别的事。一个管理者如果要求下属那样做、自己却那样做，长久看是行不通的。
And people want a manager that they admire and they’re not going to admire them if those people profess to behave in one manner and behave in another manner. It’s easier – this is a sad thing, but it’s easier for an organization to see its quality move downward than it is upward.
人们希望有一个值得敬佩的管理者；如果一个人言行不一，就不会赢得敬佩。有件令人遗憾的事是：一个组织的素质往下滑比往上升要容易得多。
I mean, if the boss behaves badly, it causes everybody to behave badly. That is really catching. It’s not as catching on the way up in upper management. But if the manager is doing a lot of little things to grease his own situation, pretty soon, let’s say you’re running a retail establishment, pretty soon all the employees or a lot of the employees are telling their friends that they get a discount with the retail operation and if they want something they’ll put it on their account and then get the discount.
我的意思是，如果老板行为不端，大家都会学坏——这传染性极强。向上感染没那么快，但如果管理者为了自己方便在很多小事上“抹油走账”，很快——比如你经营一家零售店——员工们就会告诉朋友可以拿员工折扣，想买什么先挂自己账户然后再打折。
Once you start deviating downward, it is really contagious and it is hard to rebuild. So, you really need someone that behaves well on top and is not playing games for their own benefit. And we get a lot of managers that bend over backwards not to do that sort of thing. And then we get a few that bend over forwards. And if you get enough companies, you’re going to get a lot of different forms of behavior, and Greg does something about it and I’ve generally been lax in doing something about it, but he’s done a way better job at that than I have.
一旦开始向下偏离，就会迅速蔓延，而且很难重建。所以你必须在顶层放一个行为端正、不玩小算盘的人。我们有很多经理人为此竭尽全力，也有少数人“向前弯腰”。当公司多了，各种行为都会出现；Greg 会着手处理，而我通常不够严格——在这方面他做得比我好得多。
不能再要求BRK出现巴菲特这样的人才，Greg不是巴菲特，做不了巴菲特能做的事，但是BRK已经在商业模式上取得的优势可以弥补管理团队能力上的不足。
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