I.H.104.Warren Buffett.Property & Casualty Insurance
保险的商业模式非常特别。
The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower rate.
保险生意的数学关系（表格已经把它浓缩了）并不复杂。当行业年度收入（保费）增幅只是在4%或5%附近“慢慢爬行”时，承保亏损必然会扩大。这不是因为车祸、火灾、风暴等发生得更频繁，也并非近来一般通胀的锅。今天，真正的元凶是“社会通胀”和“司法通胀”：走进法庭的成本已经膨胀到惊人程度。成本上升，一部分来自判决金额飙升，另一部分来自法官与陪审团倾向于把保单保障范围解释得比保险公司在出单时所设想的更宽。我们看不到这两股趋势有任何缓和，因此仍然认为：行业保费收入必须以大约每年10%的速度增长，才能在盈利能力上“勉强站稳”，即便一般通胀率可能显著更低。
保险离发生通胀的源头很近，包括医疗保险，但医保没有浮存金。
The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and, indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the quarters rolled by: Best’s estimates that year-over-year volume increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% “equilibrium” figure. Clearly, the party is over.
1985-87年的强劲保费增长几乎保证了行业在1987年取得出色的承保表现——事实也确实如此，那是一个“丰收年”。但随着季度推进，消息逐渐变味：Best’s 估算的同比保费增幅分别是12.9%、11.1%、5.7%、5.6%。到了1988年，保费增幅肯定会远低于我们所说的10%“均衡”水平。很明显，派对结束了。
However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a small climb for the industry’s combined ratio in 1988, followed by several years of larger increases.
不过，盈利不会立刻下沉。这个行业存在滞后效应：大多数保单期限是一年，因此保险价格的上调或下调，要过许多个月才会对盈利产生完全影响。借用我们的比喻：派对结束、酒吧打烊后，你仍被允许把杯中的酒喝完。如果没有重大自然灾害冲击业绩，我们预测行业综合成本率在1988年会小幅上升，随后几年会出现更大幅度的上升。
The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels.
保险行业被一组糟糕的经济特性“诅咒”，因此长期前景不佳：竞争者成百上千、进入门槛低、产品在任何有意义的维度上都难以差异化。在这种近似大宗商品的生意里，只有极低成本的经营者，或在受保护（且通常很小）的细分利基中经营的人，才能维持高水平的盈利。
When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage conditions—even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the typical manager simply can’t wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming again Disraeli’s observation: “What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history.”
然而，一旦出现“供给短缺”，即便是大宗商品式的行业也会繁荣。保险业曾享受过一段这样的气候，但现在它已消失。资本主义的一大讽刺在于：大宗商品行业的大多数管理者厌恶短缺环境——尽管恰恰只有在短缺时，他们才可能获得好回报。每当短缺出现，典型经理人就迫不及待扩张产能，去堵住那个“金钱正从中倾泻而下”的洞。1985-87年保险业的管理者正是这么干的，再一次印证了 Disraeli 的那句观察：“我们从历史中学到的，是我们不会从历史中学习。”
At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry’s commodity economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness. It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer’s ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind—and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)
在 Berkshire，我们通过两种方式努力逃离行业这种“商品化”的经济学。第一，我们用财务实力来差异化我们的产品，而我们的财务实力超过业内任何其他公司。不过，这种优势的用途也有限：在个人保险领域它毫无意义——买车险或房主险的人，即便保险公司倒闭（这种事发生过很多），也照样会拿到赔款。在商业保险领域，它也常常毫无意义：当环境好时，许多大型企业买家及其经纪人很少关注保险公司在更不利条件下的履约能力——比如五年后，一桩复杂索赔终于要结案时。（眼不见心不烦——然后可能就要自己掏腰包。）
Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin’s observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust. Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.
然而，买方也会周期性地想起 Ben Franklin 的那句观察：空麻袋很难站直——于是他们意识到，自己只能向那些拥有持久财务实力的保险公司购买“承诺”。正是在这种时候，我们就拥有了重大的竞争优势。当买方真正聚焦于：五年或十年后，一笔1,000万美元的索赔，保险公司是否能轻松支付；并且把这样一种可能性也纳入考虑——糟糕的承保环境也许会与低迷的金融市场、以及再保险人违约同时出现——他就会发现：他能信任的公司只有少数几家。而在这些公司里，Berkshire 会领跑。
Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we write in 1988—or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course, that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with equal restraint.
我们差异化自己的第二种方式，是我们对业务规模（volume）保持彻底的无所谓。1989年，我们完全愿意把业务量做成1988年的五倍——也同样愿意只做1988年的五分之一。当然，我们希望条件允许我们做大规模；但我们无法控制市场价格。如果价格不令人满意，我们就干脆几乎不做业务。没有任何一家主要保险公司能像我们这样克制。
Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of insurance, including most of those in which we operate, distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year. Third, idle capacity—which in this industry largely means people—does not result in intolerable costs. In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term prosperity.
保险业里存在三条条件——多数行业并不具备——使我们可以拥有这种灵活性。第一，市场份额并不是盈利能力的重要决定因素：在这个行业里，与报纸或杂货行业不同，经济规律不是“胖者生存”。第二，在保险的许多领域（包括我们经营的大多数领域），分销渠道并非专属，进入也很容易：今年量小，并不妨碍明年量巨大。第三，闲置产能——在这个行业里主要意味着“人”——不会带来难以忍受的成本。与印刷或钢铁等行业不同，我们可以在很长时间里以四分之一速度运转，却仍能享有长期繁荣。
We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we’re happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means that we are always available, given prices that we believe are adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of property-casualty insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out approach. When they are “out”—because of mounting losses, capital inadequacy, or whatever—we are available. Of course, when others are panting to do business we are also available—but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large reservoir of standby capacity.
我们奉行“按风险暴露定价、而不是按竞争对手定价”的政策，因为这对股东有利。但我们也很高兴地报告：这同样具有“亲社会”的效果。这个政策意味着：只要价格达到我们认为足够的水平，我们随时可以承接几乎任何类型的财产与意外险的大规模业务。许多其他保险公司采取“进进出出”的做法：当他们“退出”——因为亏损攀升、资本不足或其他原因——我们依然在场可用。当然，当别人气喘吁吁想抢生意时，我们也在场——只不过那种时候我们往往发现自己报的价格高于市场。实际上，我们为保险买方与经纪人提供了一个巨大的“备用承保能力水库”。
One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office. Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in 1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.
1987年年中发生的一件事，能说明我们的定价政策会带来哪些后果：美国最大的家族控股保险经纪公司之一，由一位长期持有 Berkshire 股票的人领导。他经手许多大型风险，这些都是我们纽约办公室可能承接的业务。很自然，他会尽最大努力为客户争取最优条件；也同样自然地，当1987年保险市场显著软化时，他在其他保险公司那里看到了比我们愿意给出的更低价格。他的反应是：第一，把所有业务都放到别家；第二，买入更多 Berkshire 股票。他说，如果我们真的那么有竞争力，我们会拿到他的保险业务，但他就不会买我们的股票了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Bermuda is simply a, you know, a new competitor. They’re not so new, I mean, there’ve been companies in Bermuda before. But in the last 15 months, 18 months, maybe there’s been 4 billion-plus raised. And because, for tax reasons — maybe other reasons as well, but certainly for tax reasons — that capacity has been concentrated in Bermuda-based, Bermuda-domiciled reinsurers. But essentially there’s no great difference between that type of competition and other reinsurers competition, except for the fact that that capacity is new and the money’s just been raised, and so there may be some greater pressure on the managers of those businesses to go out and write business promptly than on somebody that’s been around for 50 years. But it’s no plus for us any time new capacity enters any business that we’re in, and that certainly goes for the reinsurance business. Reinsurance business, by its nature, will be a business in which some very stupid things are done en masse periodically.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，Bermuda 其实就是，你知道的，一个新的竞争者。当然也不算太新——Bermuda 之前就有公司存在。但过去 15 到 18 个月，可能募集了 40 多亿美元。由于税收原因——也可能还有别的原因，但税收肯定是关键——这些“承保能力”集中到了设在 Bermuda、注册在 Bermuda 的再保险公司。总体上，这类竞争与其他再保险竞争并无本质不同，唯一不同是这批承保能力是“新钱”，刚募集到手，所以这些公司的管理层可能比“经营了 50 年”的老公司承受更大压力，要尽快出去“写保单”。对我们来说，只要有新承保能力进入我们所在的任何行业，都不是好事，再保当然也不例外。再保险行业的本性决定了：它会周期性地“集体干出非常愚蠢的事”。
I mean, you can be doing dumb things and not know it in reinsurance, and then all of a sudden wake up and find out, you know, the money is gone. And it’s what people have found out — and I used that line in the report a year ago — it’s what people have found out that were speculating on bonds with (inaudible) margins recently, that, you know, you don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the tide goes out. And — (laughter) — essentially that’s what happens in reinsurance. You don’t, you really don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the wind blows at them.
我的意思是，在再保险里你可能一直在做蠢事却不自知，等到某一刻突然醒悟，发现钱已经没了。正如——我在去年的报告里用过那句话——那些最近用（听不清）保证金去投机债券的人所体会到的那样：你不会知道谁在裸泳，直到潮水退去。（笑）而这基本就是再保险里会发生的事。你不会，真的不会知道谁在裸泳，直到“风吹到他们身上”为止。
*****
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about our primary insurance figures, you’ll find it way in the back someplace. But they’re a little distorted because we bought Central States Indemnity, what would it be, late in the year ’92. So there’s a lot more premium volume in there for Central States in ’93 than there was in ’92. Our basic — National Indemnity’s basic insurance, which is commercial, auto, and general liability, premium volume was fairly flat, the Homestate operation fairly flat, Cypress up somewhat. But those numbers were not anything like the changes — So our business last year, pro forma for including Central States Indemnity for all of ’92, would not have shown a dramatic change. There really hasn’t been much happening in our primary business, except that it’s been run, it’s done very well, but it is not growing or exploding. And that’s true this year as well as last year. It’s a good business.
WARREN BUFFETT：首先关于我们的“primary insurance”数据，你可以在年报靠后的位置找到。数据有些失真，因为我们在1992年末收购了 Central States Indemnity，所以1993年计入 Central States 的保费量远高于1992年。我们的基础业务——National Indemnity 的基础险（商业险、车险与一般责任险）保费规模基本持平；Homestate 业务也基本持平；Cypress 略有增长。但这些数字远没有你看到的那种变化——如果把 Central States Indemnity 按“全年并表”的方式回溯到1992年，我们去年的业务并不会显示出剧烈变化。总体看，我们的 primary 业务并没有发生太多事：运营良好、表现出色，但不是在高速增长或爆发。今年与去年一样。它是一门不错的生意。
And it could grow in certain kinds of markets very substantially, but it is not growing in this market, and it did not grow last year, although its underwriting was very good. In the reinsurance business, I think, essentially, the difference in our reinsurance business from many others, you know — it doesn’t include them all in a place like Bermuda — is essentially the difference that may exist in our operations and securities versus other people. We will offer reinsurance at any time in very large quantities at prices we think make sense. But we won’t do business if we don’t think it makes sense, just like we will buy securities, to the extent of the cash we have available, if they make sense. But we have no interest in being in the stock market per say just to be in it. We want to own securities that make sense to us.
它在某些市场环境下可能实现相当可观的增长，但在当前市场没有增长，去年也没有增长——尽管承保结果很好。至于再保险业务，我认为我们与许多同行（并不专指在 Bermuda 的所有公司）的本质区别，类似于我们在证券投资上的作风与他人的不同：只要价格合理，我们随时愿意、并能在很大规模上提供再保险；但如果价格不合理，我们就不会做，正如我们只有在价格合理且有现金可用时才会买入证券一样。我们对“仅仅为了在股市里而待在股市里（per say）”毫无兴趣；我们只愿意持有对我们而言“讲得通”的证券。
I think for most managements, if the only thing they’re in is the reinsurance business, they may like it better when prices make sense, but they will, I think they will be prone to do quite a bit of business when prices don’t make sense as well, because there’s no alternative, except to give the money back to the owners. And that is not something that most managements, you know, do somersaults over. (Laughter) So, I think we are in a favored position, essentially being — having the flexibility of capital allocation that lets us take the lack of business with a certain equanimity that most managements probably can’t, because of their sole focus on the business. Rates will get silly, in all likelihood, after a period when nothing much happens, when you’ve had a couple of years of good experience. We price to what we think is exposure. We don’t price to experience.
我想对大多数管理层而言，如果他们唯一的业务就是再保险，他们当然喜欢“价格合理”的时期；但在“价格不合理”的时期，他们也倾向于做不少生意，因为别无选择——除非把钱还给股东。而这并不是多数管理层会“翻跟头去做”的事（笑）。因此，我们处在一个更有利的位置：本质上，我们拥有资本配置的灵活性，可以对“没有业务可做”保持一种多数只做单一业务的管理层很难做到的“坦然”。在经历一段“风平浪静、承保结果不错”的时期后，定价多半会变得“愚蠢”。我们的定价依据是“风险暴露（exposure）”，而不是“历史经验（experience）”。
拿工资养活自己的基本上必须做点什么。
I mean, the fact that there was no big hurricane last year — I forget the name of the one that was coming in at North Carolina and then veered out essentially — but to us, it has nothing to do with the rates next year whether that hurricane actually came in in a big way or veered out into the Atlantic again. I mean, we are pricing to exposure. And everyone says that, but the market tends to price and respond to experience, and generally to recent experience. That’s why all the retrocessional operations in London, you know, in the spiral, went busted, because they priced, in our view, they priced to experience rather than to exposure. It’s very hard not to do that, to be there year after year with business coming by and investors expecting this of you and not do that. But we will never knowingly do that. We may get influenced subconsciously in some way to do that, but we will not do that any more than we will accept stock market norms as being the proper way for us to invest money and equities. Basically, when you lay out money or accept insurance risks, you really have to think for yourself. You cannot let the market think for you. Charlie?
举例说，去年并没有大的飓风——我忘了那次在 North Carolina 登陆前又转向外海的名字了——但无论它是否登陆、还是再次偏出 Atlantic，都与我们“下一年的费率”无关。我们是按“暴露”定价。人人都这么说，但市场往往按“经验”定价，且通常是按“最近经验”定价。这就是为什么伦敦市场那些再转分保业务在“螺旋（spiral）”里集体爆雷：在我们看来，他们按“经验”而不是按“暴露”来定价。要不这么干其实很难——年复一年，案子源源不断、投资者有所期待——但我们绝不会“明知故犯”。即便潜意识里可能受到些影响，我们也不会那样做，就像我们不会把“股市常规”当作我们投资股票资金的正确方式一样。归根到底，不管是出资还是承担保险风险，你都必须独立思考，而不能让市场替你思考。Charlie？
8. The two reasons for buying insurance
购买保险的两个理由
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name’s Dave Lancasam (PH) with Business Insurance Magazine. The sum of property-casualty risk management experts are advising commercial insurance buyers to forge five- and 10-year policies with their property-casualty insurers to promote stronger partnerships with their insurers, as well as to maintain the smooth PC market of the past seven, eight years. Do you believe this idea will take hold for most policyholders? And if so, what would be the implications for policyholders’ costs and insurers’ underwriting results?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我叫 Dave Lancasam（PH），来自 Business Insurance Magazine。许多财产意外险风险管理专家建议商业保险购买方与其财产意外险公司签订 5 年或 10 年期的保单，以促进与保险公司的更强伙伴关系，同时维持过去七八年那样平稳的财险市场。你认为这个想法会在多数投保人中落地吗？如果会，对投保人的成本和保险公司的承保结果会有什么影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about partnerships between, probably, commercial policyholders and their insurers. And there are a lot of ways of doing that by various retrospective plans or adjustable rates of various sorts, and self-insured retentions, and that sort of thing. As a general matter, there are only two reasons for buying insurance. One is to protect yourself against a loss that you are unable or unwilling to bear yourself. And that is partly a — an objective decision. It’s partly subjective. For example, a manager that’s terribly worried that his board of directors may second-guess him if he has an uninsured loss, is going to buy a lot more protection, probably, than the company really needs. But he knows he’s never going to have to go in front of his board of directors and say, “We just had a million-dollar fire loss.” And then the next question the director asks is, “Was it insured?” And then he doesn’t want to answer no. So, he may do something that is very unintelligent from the company’s standpoint merely to protect his own position.
WARREN BUFFETT：这个问题是关于商业投保人与保险公司之间的“伙伴关系”。实现方式很多，比如各种追溯性计划、各种可调整费率、自留额等。总体而言，购买保险只有两个理由。第一，是为了防范你自己无力或不愿自行承担的损失。这一部分既有客观成分，也有主观成分。比如，一个经理人非常担心如果出现了未投保的损失，董事会会事后质疑他，那么他可能会购买远超公司实际需要的保障。因为他知道自己永远不用在董事会面前说：“我们刚发生了一起 100 万美元的火灾损失。”接着董事会会问的下一个问题是：“有投保吗？”他不想回答“没有”。于是，他可能仅仅为了保护自己的位置而做出对公司并不明智的选择。
But the reason for buying insurance is, whether — and this is true of life insurance, it’s true of property-casualty, it’s true of personal insurance, it’s true of commercial insurance — is to protect against losses that you’re unwilling or unable to bear yourself. Or the second reason, which occasionally comes up, is if you think the insurance company is actually selling you a policy that’s too cheap, so that you really expect, over a period of time, to have a mathematical advantage by buying insurance. Well, we try to avoid selling the second kind and to concentrate on selling the first kind. And we think any company we can sell insurance to — and of course, we — much of the insurance we sell is to other insurance companies. I mean, we are a reinsurer, in very large part. We are selling them insurance against a loss that they are either unable or unwilling to sustain. And a typical case, you know, might be a company that had a lot of homeowners policies in California.
但购买保险的理由——无论是寿险、财险、个人险还是商业险——都是为了防范你不愿意或无法自行承担的损失。第二个理由（偶尔会出现）是：如果你认为保险公司在卖给你的保单“太便宜”，以至于你预期在一段时间里通过投保获得数学意义上的优势。我们努力避免销售第二种情况的保险，专注于销售第一种。我们认为，凡是我们愿意承保的公司——当然，我们卖出的相当一部分保险是卖给其他保险公司；也就是说，我们在很大程度上是再保险人——我们卖给他们的是针对他们不愿意或无法承担的损失的保障。一个典型案例就是，在 California 拥有大量房主保单的公司。
And if those include earthquake coverage, they may not be able to sustain the kind of loss that is possible, even though they want to keep a distribution system in place that merchandises en masse to homeowners in California. So, we will write a policy. They may take the first 5 million of loss, they may take the first 50 million of loss — depends on their own capabilities — but then they come to us. And we are really uniquely situated to take care of problems that no else — that the companies can’t bear themselves and that they can’t find anybody else to insure. But we really don’t want to insure someone for a loss that they can afford themselves, because if we’re doing that it may because they’re dumb. But it may be because they also have a loss expectancy that’s higher than the premium we’re charging, which is not what we’re trying to do in business. I think that — I think probably, as compared to 30 years ago, that risk managers at corporations are probably more intelligent about the way they buy their insurance than many years ago.
如果这些保单包含地震险，即使他们希望继续维持覆盖加州房主的大规模销售网络，也可能无力承受潜在的巨额损失。因此，我们会为其提供再保险。他们可能自留首笔 500 万的损失，也可能自留首笔 5,000 万——取决于他们自身能力——随后再把超出部分转给我们。而我们在处理这类问题上具有独特优势：这些是公司自身负担不起、也找不到别人承保的风险。但我们确实不想为那些公司“自理得起”的损失承保，因为如果我们这么做，要么是他们不聪明，要么就是他们对损失的期望值高于我们收取的保费——这并不是我们做生意所追求的。我认为，与 30 年前相比，如今企业的风险经理人在购买保险的方式上更聪明、更专业了。
I think it’s become a — I think they’re more sophisticated and they’ve thought it through better. But there’s a lot of insurance — there’s some — there’s a fair amount of insurance bought that doesn’t make sense. And there’s a fair amount of insurance that isn’t bought that should be bought. There are certain companies that are exposing themselves in this country to losses which would wipe them out. And they prefer not to buy reinsurance because it’s, quote, “expensive.” But what they’re really doing is betting on something that won’t happen very often, happening not at all. And if you take a huge hurricane on Long Island or you take a major quake in California, there are a number of companies that are not — that have not positioned themselves to withstand those losses. And if you’re a 63-year-old CEO and you figure, “I’m going to retire in a couple of years,” you know, the odds are pretty good that it won’t happen on your watch. But the — it will happen on somebody’s watch.
我认为他们更成熟、更周全地思考了。但仍有不少——可以说相当一部分——被购买的保险并不合理；同时，也有相当一部分应该购买的保险却没有买。在这个国家，有些公司在暴露于足以摧毁它们的损失之下；他们不愿意购买再保险，因为所谓“很贵”。但他们实际在做的，是押注罕见事件“永远不发生”。如果 Long Island 发生超强飓风，或者 California 发生大地震，会有不少公司并没有做好承受这类损失的准备。对于一个 63 岁的 CEO 来说，他可能想，“我再过几年就退休了”，发生在他任内的概率似乎不大。可是——总会发生在某个人任内。
And we try to sell reinsurance to those people. And usually, we do. But sometimes we don’t. Charlie?
我们会努力向这些公司销售再保险。多数时候我们能做成，但有时也做不成。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。（笑声）
General Re
On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.
12 月 21 日，我们完成了对 General Re Corp. 的 220 亿美元收购。除了 100% 持有 General Reinsurance Corporation（美国最大的财产与意外险再保险公司）之外，该公司还持有（包括它已达成协议将买入的股票在内）全球历史最悠久的再保险公司 Cologne Re 的 82% 股权。这两家公司合在一起，覆盖所有险种的再保险业务，并在 124 个国家运营。
再保险（Reinsurance）是BRK保险集团的核心，这个业务特征可以充分利用BRK的竞争优势，并且政策上的干扰较少，一开始是让Ajit Jain一步步把super-cat reinsurance，再后来是收购了General Re，想着进一步扩充这个板块，17年后的2016年，巴菲特在股东信中最后一次披露了分部门的浮存金规模，B-H Reinsurance（450.81亿）+General Re（176.99亿）=627.80亿美元，同时期的GEICO只有171.48亿美元，这个地方可以说明几个问题。
1、再保险（Reinsurance）是BRK的战略核心，是众多保险业务中最适合BRK的领域，大部分直接针对消费者的业务都有政策上的干扰，医疗保险最明显，汽车保险稍好一些；
2、可能不放心只有一个团队负责这块业务，这个业务本质上不需要太大的团队但还是另外收购了General Re，即使后来证明自己培养的团队比外面收购来的General Re更好。
For many decades, General Re’s name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance — and under Ron Ferguson’s leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re’s and Cologne Re’s managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.
几十年来，General Re 这个名字在再保险行业一直代表着质量、诚信与专业；在 Ron Ferguson 的领导下，这份声誉被进一步擦亮。Berkshire 对 General Re 与 Cologne Re 的管理团队的能力“完全加不了任何东西”。相反，他们能教我们的很多。
Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire’s ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re’s management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.
尽管如此，我们相信 Berkshire 的所有权会在关键方面让 General Re 受益，并且我们预计：十年之后，它的盈利将显著高于在没有这次合并的情况下所能达到的水平。我们之所以乐观，是因为我们能够给予 General Re 的管理层一种经营自由：让他们以最能发挥公司优势的方式来运作。
Let’s look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.
我们先简单看一下再保险业务，以理解为什么 General Re 单靠自己做不到在 Berkshire 旗下能做到的事。再保险的大部分需求来自原保险公司：它们希望摆脱由于重大且异常损失而导致的盈利大幅波动。实质上，再保险公司拿到的保费，就是为了承担客户保险公司想甩掉的波动性。
Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called “retrocessions”) or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.
但讽刺的是，上市的再保险公司，无论在股东眼里还是在信用评估者眼里，都会被拿“自身业绩的平滑程度”来打分。盈利的大起大落会伤害信用评级与市盈率（p/e ratios），即便造成这种波动的业务从长期看仍然有望带来令人满意的利润。正是这种市场现实，有时会迫使再保险公司做出代价高昂的动作：其中包括把相当一部分已承保业务再转分出去（这类交易被称为“retrocessions”，即再转分保），或者仅仅因为担心带来过多波动而拒绝那些本来很好的业务。
Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can’t impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing — and retaining — reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we’ve used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.
与之相反，Berkshire 乐于接受波动——只要这种波动伴随着“长期利润增加”的预期。此外，我们的资本实力堪比 Fort Knox（金库堡垒），这意味着盈利波动不可能损害我们顶级的信用评级。因此，我们拥有一种近乎完美的结构：几乎可以在任何规模上承保——并留存——再保险业务。事实上，过去十年我们就一直在运用这种优势，打造出一项强大的“超级巨灾”（super-cat）业务。
What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re’s outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.
不过，General Re 带给我们的，是渠道力量、技术能力和管理团队——它们能让我们把这种“结构性优势”运用到行业的每一个角落。尤其是，General Re 与 Cologne Re 现在可以加速进军国际市场；而行业增长的大头几乎肯定会发生在那里。正如合并委托书（proxy statement）里所阐述的，Berkshire 也会给 General Re 带来税务与投资方面的好处。但这次合并最有说服力的原因，其实很简单：General Re 那支卓越的管理团队，现在可以不再受那些限制其增长的约束，专注做他们最擅长的事。
Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re’s investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re’s. We will not, however, be involved in General Re’s underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage — making these moves in recognition of Berkshire’s financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we’ve long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.
Berkshire 将接管 General Re 的投资组合管理，但不接管 Cologne Re 的投资组合。不过，我们不会参与 General Re 的承保工作。我们只会要求公司延续过去的纪律，同时提高业务留存比例、扩展产品线、扩大地域覆盖——并且这些动作要充分考虑到 Berkshire 的财务实力以及我们对盈利大幅波动的容忍度。正如我们长期以来所说：我们宁要“起伏的 15% 回报”，也不要“平滑的 12% 回报”。
Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re’s new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.
随着时间推移，Ron 和他的团队会把 General Re 的新潜力发挥到极致。我和 Ron 相识多年，我们两家公司都曾开展过大量业务，并彼此进行过再保险安排。事实上，General Re 在 1976 年把 GEICO 从濒死状态救回来这件事上，扮演了关键角色。
Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.
Ron 和 Rich Santulli 都计划出席年度股东大会，我希望你有机会跟他们打个招呼。
When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float, very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly — unlike the situation prevailing in many other industries — neither size nor brand name determines an insurer’s profitability. Indeed, many of the biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results. What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:
当你用 float 成本来衡量财产/意外险公司时，真正称得上“令人满意的生意”的并不多。有意思的是——这点与许多其他行业不同——保险公司的盈利能力既不由规模决定，也不由品牌名气决定。事实上，许多规模最大、名气最响的公司，长期交出的成绩都相当平庸。在这个行业里，真正决定成败的是承保纪律（underwriting discipline）。赢家一定会毫不动摇地遵循三条关键原则：
1.They accept only those risks that they are able to properly evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy conditions.
他们只承保那些自己能够正确评估的风险（守在自己的能力圈内），并且在评估了所有相关因素（包括极端的、遥远的损失情景）之后，仍然具备盈利期望（expectancy of profit）的风险。这类保险公司不在乎市场份额，看到竞争对手用愚蠢的价格或条款抢走生意也能泰然处之。
2.They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten their solvency. They ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly-unrelated risks.
他们会限制承保规模，以确保不会因为单一事件或相关事件而出现损失“聚集”（aggregation），从而威胁自身偿付能力（solvency）。他们会不知疲倦地寻找表面上互不相关风险之间的潜在相关性（correlation）。
保险和投资的最大区别，保险是个下沉式的业务，而投资是只看头部的业务。
3.They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn’t work. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive, sometimes extraordinarily so.
他们会回避涉及道德风险（moral risk）的业务：无论费率多高，想和坏人签出“好合同”都行不通。虽然绝大多数投保人和客户都正直守信，但和少数例外做生意通常代价高昂，有时甚至高得离谱。
*****
“Loss Development” and Insurance Accounting
“损失发展（Loss Development）”与保险会计
Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or investment professionals use terms such as “EBITDA” and “pro forma,” they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I have firm plans to “restructure” my putting stroke and therefore only count the swings I take before reaching the green.)
糟糕的术语是良好思考的敌人。当公司或投资专业人士使用诸如 “EBITDA” 和 “pro forma” 之类的词时，他们往往希望你不加思索地接受一些危险且有缺陷的概念。（在高尔夫里，我的成绩经常在 “pro forma” 口径下低于标准杆：因为我有明确计划要“重组”我的推杆动作，所以我只计算球到达果岭之前的挥杆次数。）
In insurance reporting, “loss development” is a widely used term — and one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid. When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has occurred.
在保险披露里，“loss development（损失发展）”是一个被广泛使用的词——而且严重误导。先给个定义：保险公司的损失准备金（loss reserves）不是“留着以备不时之需”的一笔钱，而是一个负债科目（liability account）。如果计算得当，这项负债代表保险公司必须为截至报告日之前已经发生、但尚未支付的所有损失（包括相关费用）最终要付出的金额。在计算准备金时，保险公司已经接到通知的损失有很多，但还有一些损失尚未向它报案。这些损失被称为 IBNR，即 incurred but not reported（已发生但未报案）。事实上，在某些情况下（例如产品责任或监守自盗），连被保险人自己都可能尚未意识到损失已经发生。
It’s clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer’s managers won’t know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early 1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and more policies at ever-larger losses.
显然，要为这些已报案与未报案事件的最终成本给出一个数字，对保险公司来说非常困难。但能以合理精度做到这一点至关重要。否则，保险公司的管理层就无法知道真实的损失成本是多少，也无法把这些成本与所收取的保费进行对比。GEICO 在 1970 年代初陷入巨大麻烦，正是因为它连续几年严重少计准备金（underreserved），从而误以为其产品（保险保障）的成本远低于真实水平。结果，公司就“开开心心”地一路航行：不断以过低价格销售保险，保单越卖越多，亏损也越来越大。
When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak of “loss development.” In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize reported earnings because the “catch-up” costs from prior years must be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded, were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that. Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was necessary.
当事实表明，过去报告日的准备金低估了当时真实存在的负债时，公司就会说发生了“loss development（损失发展）”。在被发现的那一年，这些缺口会惩罚当期的已披露利润，因为在计算当期结果时，必须把前些年遗漏的“补提”成本计入当年成本。这就是 General Re 在 2001 年发生的情况：高达 8 亿美元的损失成本其实发生在更早的年份，但当时没有记录；去年才迟迟确认，并计入当期收益中。我可以向你保证，这个错误是无意的、诚实的。尽管如此，多年来的少计准备金让我们误以为成本远低于真实水平，这一错误又导致我们在定价上严重不足。除此之外，被夸大的利润数字还使我们支付了本不该支付的大额激励薪酬，并且比必要时间更早地缴纳了所得税。
We recommend scrapping the term “loss development” and its equally ugly twin, “reserve strengthening.” (Can you imagine an insurer, upon finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as “reserve weakening”?) “Loss development” suggests to investors that some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and “reserve strengthening” implies that adequate amounts have been further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings previously reported. The losses didn’t “develop” — they were there all along. What developed was management’s understanding of the losses (or, in the instances of chicanery, management’s willingness to finally fess up).
我们建议把 “loss development（损失发展）” 这个术语扔掉，同时也把它同样丑陋的孪生词 “reserve strengthening（加强准备金）” 扔掉。（你能想象一家保险公司发现准备金计提过多时，会把随后的减少描述为 “reserve weakening（削弱准备金）” 吗？）“loss development” 会让投资者误以为当年发生了某种自然的、不可控的事件；而 “reserve strengthening” 又暗示原本就足够的准备金被进一步加固。但真相是：管理层在估计上犯了错，继而导致此前披露的利润也错了。损失并没有“发展出来”——它一直都在那里。真正“发展”的，是管理层对损失的理解（或者在耍花招的情况下，是管理层终于愿意认账）。
A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be “loss costs we failed to recognize when they occurred” (or maybe just “oops”). Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common — and serious — problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in 1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been conservative.
对这种现象，更坦率的标签应该叫“发生时我们未能确认的损失成本”（或者干脆叫“哎呀”）。需要指出的是，少计准备金（underreserving）在财产/意外险行业里非常常见，而且问题严重。Berkshire 在 1984 年和 1986 年就曾向你们坦承过我们自身低估的问题。不过总体而言，我们的准备金计提一直偏保守。
“loss development（损失发展）” =“哎呀”，这个总结非常形象。
Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn’t get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties — of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business — seldom proves to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution papers?
在那些为生存而挣扎的公司里，严重少计准备金非常常见。某种意义上，保险会计就像一份“自己给自己打分”的考试：保险公司把一些数字提供给审计机构，通常也不会遭到太多争论。（不过审计师会拿到一封管理层签字的说明信，目的在于：如果这些数字以后看起来很荒唐，让审计师事务所能免责。）一家遇到财务困境的公司——这种困境如果真正直面，可能会让它倒闭——很少会做个“严厉的评分者”。毕竟，谁愿意自己准备自己的行刑文件呢？
Even when companies have the best of intentions, it’s not easy to reserve properly. I’ve told the story in the past about the fellow traveling abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning, the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10 pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called his sister for an explanation. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried dad in a rented suit.”
即便企业动机再好，要把准备金计提正确也不容易。我以前讲过一个故事：有个人在国外旅行，他妹妹来电话说父亲去世了。哥哥说自己不可能赶回去参加葬礼，但愿意承担葬礼费用。回国后，哥哥收到殡仪馆账单 4,500 美元，立刻付清。一个月后、又一个月后，他又分别按附加账单付了 10 美元。当第三张 10 美元账单来了，他打电话问妹妹怎么回事。妹妹说：“哦，我忘了告诉你：我们给爸下葬时，用的是一套租来的西装。”
There are a lot of “rented suits” buried in the past operations of insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it’s management’s responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO’s office and says “Guess what just happened,” his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to hear it’s good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from symmetrical in their effect on earnings.
保险公司的历史运营里，埋着很多“租来的西装”。它们所代表的问题有时会潜伏几十年才发作——就像石棉责任（asbestos liability）那样——一旦爆发便来势凶猛。尽管这份工作再难，管理层也必须对所有可能性作出充分的会计反映。保守性至关重要。当理赔经理走进 CEO 办公室说“你猜刚发生了什么”，如果 CEO 是老手，他并不期待听到的是好消息。保险世界里的“意外”，对利润的影响从来不是对称的。
Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them. Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely established. They can’t, however, because a myriad of forces — judicial broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two chronic problems — are constantly working to make reserves inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies that are inclined to fudge.
正因为这种单边经验（坏消息多、好消息少），有人主张把所有财产/意外险准备金都做折现（discount），理由是这些赔付发生在未来，所以其现值小于账面负债——这种建议是愚蠢的。若准备金能被精确测算，折现或许还能接受。但事实是做不到：无数力量——比如司法对保单条款的扩大解释、医疗通胀（medical inflation）等长期顽疾——不断推动准备金走向不足。折现只会让本已严重的问题雪上加霜；而且还会给那些爱“动手脚”的公司提供一件新工具。
I’d say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex life. Neither party needs that kind of push.
如果你告诉一位利润压力很大的保险公司 CEO：通过折现把准备金降下来——其后果，大概就像一个父亲对 16 岁儿子说“去过正常的性生活”一样。双方都不需要这种“鼓励”。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
财产/意外险（Property/Casualty，P/C）保险的经济学
Our core business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
我们的核心业务——尽管我们还有其他同样非常重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解 Berkshire，你就必须懂得如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：（1）这门生意产生多少 float；（2）float 的成本；以及（3）最关键的——这两项因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover, the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.
首先，float 是我们“持有但并不拥有”的钱。在保险业务中，float 的产生源于这样一个事实：保费先收进来，而赔付在后面才发生；两者之间的间隔有时会长达多年。在这段时间里，保险公司可以把这笔钱拿去投资。这件事听上去很愉快，但通常也伴随着一个“阴暗面”：保险公司收进来的保费，往往不足以覆盖最终必须支付的赔款和费用。于是它就会出现“承保亏损（underwriting loss）”，而这正是 float 的成本。若一家保险业务在长期里所付出的 float 成本，低于公司通过其他方式获得资金所需付出的成本，那么这门保险业务就有价值；但如果它的 float 成本高于市场资金利率，那么这门生意就是一颗“柠檬”（lemon，指烂生意）。而且，近些年利率持续下行，使得过去尚可忍受的承保亏损，变成了沉重负担，把许多保险业务深深推入“柠檬类别”。
Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse. There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.
从历史上看，Berkshire 获得 float 的成本一直非常低。事实上，在很多年份里，我们的成本甚至低于零——也就是说，我们持有别人的钱，反而还拿到了报酬。但在 2001 年，我们的 float 成本糟糕透顶，达到 12.8%；其中大约一半源自 World Trade Center 的损失。早在 1983-84 年，我们曾经历过更糟的年份。低成本 float 从来都不是“自动发生”的。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下面这张表（按时间间隔展示）列出了自我们 36 年前通过收购 National Indemnity Company（其传统业务线被归入 “Other Primary” 分部）进入保险业以来，Berkshire 各个保险业务板块所产生的 float。表中我们对 float 的计算方法是：把净赔付准备金（net loss reserves）、赔付调整准备金（loss adjustment reserves）、分入再保险项下持有资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）以及未赚保费准备金（unearned premium reserves）相加，然后再减去与保险相关的应收款（insurance-related receivables）、预付获取成本（prepaid acquisition costs）、预付税款（prepaid taxes）以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。（都明白了吗？）
Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no megacatastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.
去年我们的 float 成本是 1%。正如我先前提到的，你应当对这个有利结果保持克制，因为 2002 年没有发生“超级巨灾（megacatastrophe）”。这类灾难我们肯定会周期性地遇到；一旦发生，我们的 float 成本就会飙升。
Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses that should have been recorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a “desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (see the next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion, or about 4.6% of float. Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, even after the charges noted, to approach a no-cost result.
我们 2002 年的结果受到两项因素的伤害：1）General Re 计提了一笔令人痛苦的费用，原因是一些本该在更早年份作为成本确认的损失；2）我们每年都会为追溯性保险（retroactive insurance）计提一笔“可以接受/甚至算是好事的”费用（关于这些项目，下一节会更详细说明）。这两项成本合计 17.5 亿美元，约相当于 float 的 4.6%。幸运的是，我们 2002 年承保的整体经验非常出色，这使得即便扣除上述费用，我们仍然接近“零成本”的水平。
Absent a megacatastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be very low — perhaps even less than zero. In the rundown of our insurance operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, over time, our underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and deliver us investable funds at minimal cost.
如果没有超级巨灾，我预计 2003 年我们的 float 成本仍会非常低——甚至可能低于零。在接下来对我们保险业务的梳理中，你会看到为什么我乐观地认为：长期来看，我们的承保结果既会超过行业水平，也会以极低成本为我们提供可投资资金。
Insurance Operations
保险业务运营
If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively; and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly “impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.
如果我们的保险业务要在长期里持续产生低成本 float，它们必须做到：（a）承保纪律始终如一、毫不动摇；（b）准备金计提保守；（c）避免风险暴露的“聚集”，以免某个按理说“不可能”的事件会威胁到偿付能力。除一个例外之外，我们所有主要保险业务都经常满足这些测试。
The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross, enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.
这个例外就是 General Re。去年这家公司需要做很多工作才能把它拉回到合格水平。我很高兴地报告：在 Joe Brandon 的领导下，并在 Tad Montross 的“老黄牛式”支持之下，上述每一个方面都取得了巨大的进展。
When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.
当我在 1998 年同意让 Berkshire 与 Gen Re 合并时，我以为 Gen Re 遵守我列出的三条规则。我研究这家公司已经几十年，看到它的承保纪律一贯稳定、准备金也一直保守。合并时，我没有发现 Gen Re 的标准有任何松动。
I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially changed and unbeknownst to management — and to me — the company was grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say, terrorists detonated several large-scale nuclear bombs in an attack on the U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-solid if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened the company’s existence.
我错得离谱。Gen Re 的文化和做法已经发生了重大变化；而管理层——以及我——都没有意识到，公司正在严重低价承保当期业务。此外，Gen Re 还积累了一堆“聚集性风险”：如果恐怖分子在袭击美国时引爆数枚大当量核弹，这些风险的叠加足以致命。当然，这种规模的灾难极不可能发生，但保险公司的职责就是把风险限制在这样一种程度：哪怕“不可能”真的发生，财务也依然坚如磐石。事实上，如果 Gen Re 当时仍然独立，仅 World Trade Center 那次袭击就足以威胁公司的生存。
When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s operations that I should have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do — and they did it.
当 World Trade Center（WTC）灾难发生时，它暴露了 Gen Re 运营中的一些弱点——这些问题本该更早被我发现。但我算是走运：Joe 和 Tad 当时就在现场，刚刚获得更多授权，并且急切地想迅速纠正过去的错误。他们知道该做什么——也确实把事情做成了。
It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind us.
不过，保险保单的“自然到期/跑完（run off）”需要时间；直到 2002 年已经过去很久，我们才设法把核、生、化风险（NCB：nuclear, chemical and biological）的聚集暴露降到可接受水平。这个问题现在已经解决了。
On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply doesn’t count.
在另一个方面，Gen Re 的承保态度发生了戏剧性的改变：整个组织现在都明白，我们只想承保“定价正确”的业务——不管这会对业务规模造成什么影响。Joe 和 Tad 只用 Gen Re 的承保盈利能力来衡量自己。规模根本不算数。
Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what its costs are is heading for big trouble.
最后，我们正竭尽全力把准备金计提做对。要是这件事失败了，我们就无法知道自己的真实成本。而任何一家根本不知道自己成本是多少的保险公司，都在朝着大麻烦狂奔。
很容易失控的地方。
At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid — but we failed badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”
在 2001 年年末，General Re 试图为此前已经发生但尚未支付的所有损失进行充分计提——但我们做得非常失败。因此，公司的 2002 年承保结果被额外惩罚：我们为纠正以往年度估计错误，又补记了 13.1 亿美元。当我回顾 General Re 被揭示出来的那些准备金错误时，一句乡村歌曲的歌词特别贴切：“真希望我现在不知道，当时我不知道的那些事。”
I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a particular mindset — which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise — if they are to overcome this devastating bias. Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General Re as well.
我可以向你保证：我们未来的首要任务就是避免准备金不足。但我不能保证一定能成功。大多数意外险管理者的“天然倾向”就是少计准备金；如果他们要克服这种毁灭性的偏差，就必须具备一种特定的心态——可能会让你惊讶——这种心态与精算专业能力毫无关系。此外，再保险公司在正确计提准备金方面的难度，要远高于原保险公司。尽管如此，在 Berkshire，我们总体上一直能把准备金计提做得不错；而我们也决心在 General Re 也做到这一点。
敢于面对现实、对于没有根据的自我解释保持警惕。
In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial strength.
总之，我相信 General Re 现在已处在一个很好的位置：它能够为 Berkshire 提供巨量的“零成本 float”，而且那种“足以把船压沉”的灾难性风险已经被消除。公司仍然保有我过去所阐述的那些重要竞争优势。并且，去年它又获得了另一项极其关键的优势：其全球最大的三家竞争对手——此前都被评为 AAA——分别至少被一家评级机构下调了评级。于是，在这些巨头中，General Re 以“全线 AAA”的评级，在财务实力方面已经形成了独一档的地位。
No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s largest reinsurers — a company regularly recommended to primary insurers by leading brokers — has all but ceased paying claims, including those both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap” reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s dangerous — and possibly life-threatening — for the insurer to deal with any but the strongest reinsurer around.
没有任何属性比财务实力更重要。最近，作为对比，全球最大的再保险公司之一——一家长期被顶级经纪人推荐给原保险公司的企业——几乎已经停止赔付理赔款项，包括那些既有效又到期应付的索赔。这家公司欠了数百家原保险公司数十亿美元，而这些公司现在面临巨额核销。“便宜”的再保险，是傻瓜交易：当一家保险公司今天掏钱，换取再保险公司在十年或二十年后才兑现的支付承诺时，如果它选择的不是最强的再保险公司之一，那对这家保险公司而言就是危险的——甚至可能是致命的。
既然愿意买再保险为什么不选择最好的？最有保障的？如果真想省成本可以选择不买。
Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I would wish for anyone — and it is paying off.
Berkshire 的股东应该向 Joe 和 Tad 为 2002 年取得的成果致以深深的感谢。他们这一年付出的努力之大，连我都不希望任何人承受——而这些努力正在见到回报。
Insurers have generally earned poor returns for a simple reason: They sell a commodity-like product. Policy forms are standard, and the product is available from many suppliers, some of whom are mutual companies (“owned” by policyholders rather than stockholders) with profit goals that are limited. Moreover, most insureds don’t care from whom they buy. Customers by the millions say “I need some Gillette blades” or “I’ll have a Coke” but we wait in vain for “I’d like a National Indemnity policy, please.” Consequently, price competition in insurance is usually fierce. Think airline seats.
保险公司通常回报很差，原因很简单：它们卖的是一种近似大宗商品的产品（commodity-like）。保单条款（policy forms）相当标准化，市场上供应者众多，其中一些还是互助保险公司（mutual companies，“由保单持有人而非股东‘拥有’”），其盈利目标天然受限。更重要的是，大多数被保险人并不在乎从谁那里买保险。成千上万的消费者会说“我需要一些 Gillette 刀片”或“我要一杯 Coke”，但我们却很难听到有人说“请给我一份 National Indemnity 的保单。”因此，保险行业的价格竞争通常异常激烈。想想航空公司机票座位就知道了。
So, you may ask, how do Berkshire’s insurance operations overcome the dismal economics of the industry and achieve some measure of enduring competitive advantage? We’ve attacked that problem in several ways. Let’s look first at NICO’s strategy.
那么你可能会问：Berkshire 的保险业务是如何克服行业糟糕的经济性，并获得某种可持续的竞争优势的？我们从几个方向去解决这个问题。先从 NICO 的策略讲起。
When we purchased the company — a specialist in commercial auto and general liability insurance — it did not appear to have any attributes that would overcome the industry’s chronic troubles. It was not well-known, had no informational advantage (the company has never had an actuary), was not a low-cost operator, and sold through general agents, a method many people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of the past 38 years, NICO has been a star performer. Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be lucky to be worth half of what it is today.
当我们收购这家公司时——它专注于商业车险（commercial auto）和一般责任险（general liability insurance）——它看起来并不具备任何足以克服行业长期困境的优势。它不出名，没有信息优势（公司从来没有雇过精算师），也不是低成本运营者，而且通过一般代理人（general agents）渠道销售——许多人认为这种方式已经过时。尽管如此，在过去 38 年中的几乎所有年份里，NICO 都是明星级的表现者。事实上，如果当年我们没有完成这笔收购，Berkshire 今天的价值能有现在的一半就算走运了。
What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers — but they left us.
我们真正的优势，是一种大多数保险公司根本无法复制的管理者心态（managerial mindset）。看看对页的数据：你能想象有任何一家上市公司，会主动拥抱一种商业模式——它会导致我们在 1986 到 1999 年间经历的那种营收下滑吗？必须强调的是，这种断崖式下滑并不是因为拿不到业务。只要我们愿意降价，市场上有“数十亿美元”的保费规模可以轻易被 NICO 拿到。但我们始终坚持：定价的目标是赚取利润，而不是去匹配我们最乐观的竞争对手的价格。我们从未离开客户——是客户离开了我们。
Most American businesses harbor an “institutional imperative” that rejects extended decreases in volume. What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did business contract last year but that it will continue to drop? In insurance, the urge to keep writing business is also intensified because the consequences of foolishly-priced policies may not become apparent for some time. If an insurer is optimistic in its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated, and years may pass before true loss costs are revealed (a form of self-deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s).
大多数美国企业都有一种“制度性冲动”（institutional imperative），它会本能地排斥长期的业务量下降。哪个 CEO 愿意向股东报告：不仅去年业务收缩了，而且未来还会继续下滑？而在保险业，这种“继续承保、继续做大规模”的冲动会更强，因为愚蠢定价的保单所带来的后果，往往要过一段时间才会显现。如果一家保险公司在准备金计提（reserving）上过于乐观，那么其报表利润就会被高估，而且可能要过很多年，真实的损失成本才会暴露出来。（这是一种自我欺骗，其形式几乎在 1970 年代初毁掉了 GEICO。）
*****
Another way to prosper in a commodity-type business is to be the low-cost operator. Among auto insurers operating on a broad scale, GEICO holds that cherished title. For NICO, as we have seen, an ebb-and-flow business model makes sense. But a company holding a low-cost advantage must pursue an unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy. And that’s just what we do at GEICO.
在类似大宗商品（commodity-type）的行业里，另一个致胜之道是成为低成本运营者（low-cost operator）。在全国性规模经营的车险公司中，GEICO 拥有这个令人向往的头衔。对 NICO 来说，正如我们所见，“涨落有致”（ebb-and-flow）的经营模式是合理的。但一家拥有低成本优势的公司，必须采取“油门踩到底、永不松脚”的策略（unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy）。这正是我们在 GEICO 所做的。
NICO、GEICO，两种应对商品化产品的策略。
A century ago, when autos first appeared, the property-casualty industry operated as a cartel. The major companies, most of which were based in the Northeast, established “bureau” rates and that was it. No one cut prices to attract business. Instead, insurers competed for strong, well-regarded agents, a focus that produced high commissions for agents and high prices for consumers.
大约一个世纪前，当汽车刚出现时，财产-意外险行业以一种“卡特尔”（cartel）的方式运作。几家大公司——多数位于美国东北部——制定所谓的“bureau”统一费率，就这么定了。没有人会通过降价来吸引业务。相反，保险公司竞争的是那些强势、声望高的代理人；这种竞争导致代理人佣金很高、消费者价格也很高。
In 1922, State Farm was formed by George Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, who aimed to take advantage of the pricing umbrella maintained by the high-cost giants of the industry. State Farm employed a “captive” agency force, a system keeping its acquisition costs lower than those incurred by the bureau insurers (whose “independent” agents successfully played off one company against another). With its low-cost structure, State Farm eventually captured about 25% of the personal lines (auto and homeowners) business, far outdistancing its once-mighty competitors. Allstate, formed in 1931, put a similar distribution system into place and soon became the runner-up in personal lines to State Farm. Capitalism had worked its magic, and these low-cost operations looked unstoppable.
1922 年，来自伊利诺伊州 Merna 的农民 George Mecherle 创立了 State Farm，目的是利用行业高成本巨头维持的“价格保护伞”（pricing umbrella）。State Farm 采用“专属”（captive）代理人体系，使其获客成本低于那些“bureau 保险公司”（它们依赖“独立”（independent）代理人，而独立代理人会在多家公司之间周旋比价，从而抬高保险公司的获客成本）。凭借低成本结构，State Farm 最终拿下了约 25% 的个人险（personal lines：车险与房屋险）市场份额，远远甩开昔日强大的竞争对手。成立于 1931 年的 Allstate 也建立了类似的渠道体系，很快成为个人险领域仅次于 State Farm 的第二名。资本主义施展了它的魔法：这些低成本运营看起来势不可挡。
But a man named Leo Goodwin had an idea for an even more efficient auto insurer and, with a skimpy $200,000, started GEICO in 1936. Goodwin’s plan was to eliminate the agent entirely and to deal instead directly with the auto owner. Why, he asked himself, should there be any unnecessary and expensive links in the distribution mechanism when the product, auto insurance, was both mandatory and costly. Purchasers of business insurance, he reasoned, might well require professional advice, but most consumers knew what they needed in an auto policy. That was a powerful insight.
但有个叫 Leo Goodwin 的人，想出了一个更高效率的车险公司模式，并用区区 20 万美元在 1936 年创办了 GEICO。Goodwin 的计划是把代理人这一环彻底拿掉，直接与车主交易。他问自己：既然车险既是强制性的（mandatory）又昂贵，那么在销售分销机制里，为什么要保留那些不必要且昂贵的链条（links）？他认为，购买商业保险的客户可能确实需要专业建议，但大多数消费者其实清楚一份车险保单需要什么。这是一个非常强的洞见。
Originally, GEICO mailed its low-cost message to a limited audience of government employees. Later, it widened its horizons and shifted its marketing emphasis to the phone, working inquiries that came from broadcast and print advertising. And today the Internet is coming on strong.
最初，GEICO 把“低成本”理念通过邮寄（mailed）的方式传递给一个小众群体：政府雇员。后来，公司拓宽视野，把营销重点转向电话（phone），通过广播与印刷广告带来的咨询电话来促成投保。而今天，互联网正在强势崛起。
*****
Reinsurance — insurance sold to other insurers who wish to lay off part of the risks they have assumed — should not be a commodity product. At bottom, any insurance policy is simply a promise, and as everyone knows, promises vary enormously in their quality.
再保险（Reinsurance）——也就是卖给其他保险公司的保险；这些公司希望把自己已经承担的一部分风险转移出去（lay off）——按理说不应该是一种大宗商品式的产品（commodity product）。归根结底，任何保险保单不过是一种承诺（promise），而众所周知，承诺的质量差异极大。
NICO和Ajit的再保险是真正的重点，而不是Geico。
At the primary insurance level, nevertheless, just who makes the promise is often of minor importance. In personal-lines insurance, for example, states levy assessments on solvent companies to pay the policyholders of companies that go broke. In the business-insurance field, the same arrangement applies to workers’ compensation policies. “Protected” policies of these types account for about 60% of the property-casualty industry’s volume. Prudently-run insurers are irritated by the need to subsidize poor or reckless management elsewhere, but that’s the way it is.
然而在原保险（primary insurance）的层面，“承诺是谁做出的”往往并没那么重要。比如在个人险（personal-lines）中，州政府会向仍具偿付能力的公司征收评估费（assessments），用来赔付那些破产公司的保单持有人。在商业险领域，工伤赔偿险（workers’ compensation）也有同样安排。这类被“保护”的保单大约占财产-意外险行业保费规模的 60%。经营谨慎的保险公司当然会对“被迫补贴别处糟糕或鲁莽的管理”感到恼火，但现实就是如此。
Other forms of business insurance at the primary level involve promises that carry greater risks for the insured. When Reliance Insurance and Home Insurance were run into the ground, for example, their promises proved to be worthless. Consequently, many holders of their business policies (other than those covering workers’ compensation) suffered painful losses.
而原保险层面的其他商业险，则意味着被保险人要承担更高的“承诺风险”。例如，当 Reliance Insurance 和 Home Insurance 被经营到破产时，它们的承诺就被证明一文不值。结果，许多持有它们商业险保单的人（工伤赔偿险除外）遭受了痛苦的损失。
The solvency risk in primary policies, however, pales in comparison to that lurking in reinsurance policies. When a reinsurer goes broke, staggering losses almost always strike the primary companies it has dealt with. This risk is far from minor: GEICO has suffered tens of millions in losses from its careless selection of reinsurers in the early 1980s.
但即便如此，原保险保单的偿付能力风险（solvency risk），与再保险保单中潜伏的风险相比，也显得小巫见大巫。一旦再保险公司破产，与其交易过的原保险公司几乎总会遭受惊人的损失。这种风险绝非细枝末节：GEICO 就曾因为在 1980 年代初不谨慎地选择再保险人（reinsurers），而遭受过数千万美元的损失。
8、《2005-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
WARREN BUFFETT: But, of course, insurance is a way to reduce volatility, and a perfectly proper way. I mean, if you pay $1,000 a year on your auto premiums for the next 30 years, it isn’t —
沃伦·巴菲特：但是，当然，保险是一种减少波动性的方法，而且是一种完全合适的方法。我的意思是，如果你在接下来的 30 年里每年支付 1000 美元的汽车保险费，这并不是——
You are going to have a more regular income stream than if you wait and have one $25,000 accident one year and don’t pay the premiums in the other years.
如果你等待并在一年内发生一次 $25,000 的事故，而在其他年份不支付保费，那么你的收入流将比这更稳定。
So, I mean, people have bought insurance to reduce the volatility in their own personal results and their own business results. So, reducing volatility, per se, is not bad at all. It’s the reason —
所以，我的意思是，人们购买保险是为了减少个人和企业业绩的波动性。因此，减少波动性本身并没有什么不好。这就是原因——
极其愚蠢的账，是比赌场更好的生意。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
WARREN BUFFETT: — there are $400 billion worth of insurance premiums paid in this country every year. But that doesn’t — you know, you can also get into abuses of that. And that’s what they’re — the people are looking to find and see what the real situation is.
沃伦·巴菲特：——每年在这个国家支付的保险费总额为 4000 亿美元。但是，这并不意味着——你知道的，这其中也可能存在滥用的情况。这就是人们正在寻找并想要了解真实情况的原因。
9、《2006-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
53. Key distinction between insurance and gambling
保险与赌博的关键区别
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. It’s Peter Webb here from London, UK.
观众成员：你好。我是来自英国伦敦的彼得·韦布。
Your views on gambling are well-known, and I think most people would agree that gambling is for the fiscally challenged.
你对赌博的看法是众所周知的，我认为大多数人会同意赌博是给经济状况不佳的人准备的。
But when I look at the insurance industry, what I see is an industry — I can’t even say it — I see an industry that’s based upon probabilities, and people not knowing those true probabilities, and money being made for the house in the same way as you see in a gambling market.
但当我看到保险行业时，我看到的是一个——我甚至不想说——我看到的是一个基于概率的行业，而人们并不知道那些真实的概率，并且像在赌博市场上一样，资金是为赌场所赚取的。
So the question I have for you is, how do you reconcile your views with gambling versus the insurance industry, and is the insurance industry for the fiscally challenged?
所以我想问的是，您如何调和您对赌博和保险行业的看法？保险行业是否也是针对经济状况不佳的人？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, gambling, I think — I think the distinction that usually is made is that gambling involves creating risks that don’t need to be created.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，赌博，我认为——我认为通常的区别在于，赌博涉及创造不必要的风险。
I mean, if the — you want to go out and gamble on where a little ball is going to fall on a wheel that’s revolving, that is not something that — that is a created risk.
我的意思是，如果你拥有一处位于沿海地区的房屋或商业地产，这个风险是客观存在的。
Whereas, if you’ve got a home or a business, you know, on a coastal area, the risk is there.
然而，如果你在沿海地区有一个家或一家公司，你知道，风险是存在的。
It wasn’t created intentionally — I mean, you say you built in that place, but — and then the question is who bears it. So there’s a transfer of — in the case of cat coverage — large existing risks as opposed to the creation of a risk that is not required.
它不是有意创造的——我的意思是，你说你在那个地方建造了，但——问题是谁承担它。因此，在灾难险的情况下，有一个大型现有风险的转移，而不是创造一个不必要的风险。
I mean, you can watch a football game without betting on it. But you can’t live in a house, you know, on a Florida coast without having a risk that your entire investment disappears.
我的意思是，你可以在不下注的情况下观看一场足球比赛。但是你不能住在佛罗里达海岸的一所房子里，而不冒着整个投资消失的风险。
So that’s the distinction, basically. I hope you’re right that the house wins in both cases. (Laughter)
所以这就是区别，基本上。我希望你是对的，无论哪种情况，赌场都能赢。（笑声）
Posted on July 9, 2012 by fundooprofessor
There is a company which has the world’s strangest bond outstanding. Strange, because this bond has no maturity date. Stranger, because the bond issuer pays no interest on it. Strangest, because year after year, the issuer gets paid to have this bond on its balance sheet.
有一家公司拥有世界上最奇怪的未偿还债券。奇怪，是因为这种债券没有到期日。更奇怪，因为债券发行人不支付利息。最奇怪的是，年复一年，债券发行人都能拿到钱，让这笔债券出现在资产负债表上。
What better source of financing is there than one in which neither do you have to return the borrowed money, nor are you charged any interest to use it? In fact, you are paid to use it!
还有什么比既不用归还借来的钱，又不收取任何利息的融资渠道更好的呢？事实上，使用这些资金是有偿的！
This is not a small bond issue in some obscure little country. As of end December 2011, this bond had a book value of about $71 billion and the issuer is an American company having a current market cap of $205 billion.
这可不是在某个不起眼的小国家发行的小债券。截至 2011 年 12 月底，这笔债券的账面价值约为 710 亿美元，发行人是一家美国公司，目前市值为 2 050 亿美元。
I am, of course, referring to the “float” enjoyed by the insurance businesses of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. “Float” in the insurance business, says Buffett, “arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.”
当然，我指的是沃伦-巴菲特（Warren Buffett）的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）的保险业务所享有的 "浮动"。巴菲特说，保险业务中的 "浮动"，"产生的原因是大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，保险公司通常需要时间来听取和解决损失索赔"。
This float, which has grown from $17 million in 1967 to an astounding $71 billion by the end of 2011, is a key reason behind Warren Buffett’s fame and fortune.
这笔资金从 1967 年的 1,700 万美元增长到 2011 年底的 710 亿美元，这也是巴菲特名利双收的重要原因。
OPM: As Addictive As Opium（像鸦片一样令人上瘾）
Float, as he explains is “money we hold but don’t own,” which, by the way, is how one would describe “other people’s money” or “OPM”, of which debt is the most common form.
他解释说，"浮动 "是 "我们持有但并不拥有的钱"，顺便说一下，这就是人们对 "别人的钱 "或 "OPM "的描述，其中债务是最常见的形式。
The problem with plain-vanilla debt, however, is that its quite onerous for borrowers. When you borrow money conventionally you have to: (1) pay back the loan by some definite date; (2) pay the lender interest on the money borrowed over the course of the loan period; and (3) put up adequate collateral until full repayment of loan has been made. How very onerous!
然而，普通债务的问题在于，它对借款人的要求相当苛刻。按照传统借贷方式，你必须(1) 在某个确定的日期之前偿还贷款；(2) 在贷款期间向贷款人支付借款利息；(3) 在全额偿还贷款之前提供足够的抵押品。多么繁琐啊！
Over the last 45 years, Berkshire’s insurance float enabled the company to effectively borrow huge amounts of cash, with no set repayment date, and with no tangible collateral put up. Even more astonishing is the fact that this money cost Berkshire less than nothing.
在过去的 45 年里，伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金使得该公司能够有效地借入巨额现金，没有固定的还款日期，也没有有形的抵押品。更令人吃惊的是，这笔钱让伯克希尔公司几乎不花一分钱。
How did this happen? 怎么会这样？
For a typical insurer, the premiums it takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss” – the cost of float – which is the functional equivalent of interest on conventional debt. An insurance business is profitable over time if the cost of its float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to borrow funds. The business will have a negative value if the cost of its float turns out to be higher than market rates for money.
对于一家典型的保险公司来说，它所收取的保费不足以弥补它必须支付的损失和费用。这就造成了 "承保亏损"，即浮动成本，在功能上相当于传统债务的利息。如果浮动成本低于公司借贷资金所需的成本，那么保险业务就会长期盈利。如果浮动成本高于市场货币利率，则保险业务的价值为负。
For Berkshire, the cost of its float, over the long term, has been less than zero. The net result of all this is that Berkshire has not only been able to borrow funds at a cost which is less than that of the U.S Treasury, it has been been paid to borrow that money.
对伯克希尔公司而言，其长期浮动成本一直低于零。所有这一切的最终结果是，伯克希尔不仅能够以低于美国财政部的成本借入资金，而且还获得了借入资金的报酬。
It’s already well-known that the value of this large float with a negative cost has been huge for Berkshire’s owners. After all, access to tens of billions of dollars of less-than-free capital in the hands of one of the world’s greatest allocators-of-capital, has to be winning combination, isn’t it?
众所周知，对于伯克希尔的所有者来说，这种负成本的巨额浮动收益价值巨大。毕竟，世界上最伟大的资本配置者之一掌握着数百亿美元的不那么自由的资本，这一定是一个成功的组合，不是吗？
However, no matter how good an allocator-of-capital Warren Buffett is, that has little to do with the value of Berkshire’s insurance float to its owners. That’s because of a principle of finance (MM on Capital Structure) according to which the value of a firm’s assets have little to do with how they are financed. So, we mustn’t let Buffett’s brilliant track record in capital allocation influence us on how we should think about Berkshire’s insurance float. But we do need to understand just how does that float create value for Berkshire’s owners. That’s because, once we have understood how to evaluate Berkshire’s float, we will use that knowledge to understand other types of floats in a variety of business models.
然而，无论沃伦-巴菲特是多么优秀的资本分配者，这与伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金对其所有者的价值关系不大。这是因为根据金融学原理（《资本结构》），公司资产的价值与融资方式关系不大。因此，我们不能因为巴菲特在资本配置方面的辉煌业绩而影响我们对伯克希尔保险浮动收益的看法。但我们确实需要了解，浮动资金是如何为伯克希尔的所有者创造价值的。这是因为，一旦我们了解了如何评估伯克希尔的浮存金，我们就会利用这些知识来了解各种商业模式中的其他类型浮存金。
Berkshire’s cost-less float can be best understood by comparing it with other forms of financing. When compared with plain-vanilla debt, it is obvious that borrowed funds which cost money, require posting of collateral, and which have to be repaid by a definite date are vastly inferior to Berkshire’s float which suffer from none of these disadvantages.
将伯克希尔公司的无成本浮动利率与其他融资形式进行比较，可以最好地理解它。与普通债务相比，借贷资金显然要花费资金、需要抵押、必须在确定的日期前偿还，而伯克希尔的浮动资金则没有这些缺点，因此要逊色得多。
Warren Buffett on Insurance Floats 沃伦-巴菲特谈保险浮动
It’s when we compare Berkshire’s insurance float with equity, things gets really interesting. Buffett explained this point in his 1995 letter:
当我们将伯克希尔公司的保险浮存金与股票进行比较时，事情就变得非常有趣了。巴菲特在 1995 年的信中解释了这一点：
“Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years, it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true equity in that it doesn’t belong to us. Nevertheless, let’s assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result – more shares, equal assets and lower earnings – would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business – if it is obtained at a low cost.”
"由于多年来这些保险浮存金几乎没有成本，所以它们实际上等同于股本，当然不同于真正的股本，这些资金并不真正属于我们。尽管如此，假设在1994年我们持有的不是34亿美元的浮存金，而是34亿美元的股本的话，在这种情况下，我们拥有的总资产并不会增加，但我们的收益却可能下滑很多，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的，也就是说浮存金产生了额外的贡献。当然，资本的增加代表着伯克希尔必须额外再发行许多新股，所以，更多的股份代表着更低的资本收益率，等于大大降低了我们股票的价值，所以大家应该理解，为什么浮存金对于保险公司如此的重要，尤其是当它们取得的成本极低之时。"。
He explained it again in his 1997 letter:
他在 1997 年的信中再次解释了这一点：
“Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.”
"自 1967 年进入保险业以来，我们的浮存金年均复合增长率达到 21.7%。更妙的是，它不仅没有给我们带来任何损失，实际上还为我们赚了钱。这就是会计上的一个讽刺：虽然我们的浮存金在资产负债表上显示为负债，但它对伯克希尔公司的价值却超过了同等数额的净资产"。
And again in his 2007 letter:
在 2007 年的信中也是如此：
“Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average break-even results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
"保险浮存金--我们在保险业务中暂时持有的不属于我们的资金--为我们 590 亿美元的投资提供资金。只要保险承保实现收支平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们的损失和支出，这笔浮存金就是 "免费 "的。当然，保险承保是不稳定的，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。不过，在我们的整个历史中，我们一直是盈利的，而且我预计我们未来的平均业绩将达到或超过收支平衡。如果我们做到了这一点，我们的投资就可以被看作是伯克希尔股东的一个无担保的价值来源。
And finally in his 2011 letter:
最后，在他 2011 年的信中
“So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.”
"那么，这种诱人的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算呢？在计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的浮存金被作为负债全额扣除，就好像我们明天就必须支付浮存金，而且无法补充一样。但这是看待浮存金的错误方式，浮存金应该被视为一种循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又长期存在，那么这项负债的真实价值就会远远低于会计负债"。
General Principles 一般原则
The lessons in these four excerpts from Buffett’s letters are just about all we need to know to evaluate not just quality of Berkshire’s float, but that of just about any other float. Here, then, are a few general principles:
从巴菲特的这四封书信摘录中，我们不仅可以了解到伯克希尔浮存金的质量，还可以了解到其他任何浮存金的质量。下面是一些一般原则：
1.Floats are wonderful if they cost less than nothing. They are also wonderful if they are free;
1.如果浮存金的费用低于零，那就太好了。如果是免费的，那也很好；
2.Perpetual floats are better than non-perpetual ones;
2.永久浮存金比非永久浮存金好；
3.Funds provided by free, or less-than-free floats, are more attractive than those raised through conventional debt or even equity; and
与通过传统债务甚至股票筹集的资金相比，通过免费或低于免费的浮存金提供的资金更具吸引力；以及
4.The true value of a liability represented by an attractive float is far lower than its accounting value.
4.有吸引力的浮动负债所代表的负债真实价值远远低于其会计价值。
Invert, Always Invert 反转，始终反转
One way to see how the true value of an attractive float is far lower than its accounting value is to use the “inversion” trick often used by Charlie Munger by looking at the problem from the float provider’s viewpoint.
要想知道有吸引力的浮存金的真实价值如何远远低于其会计价值，一种方法是使用查理-芒格（Charlie Munger）经常使用的 "反转 "技巧，从浮存金提供者的角度看问题。
Imagine that you subscribe to a bond issued by a company at Rs 100. Imagine further that this bond carries no interest, and has no definite repayment date. For the moment, suspend your disbelief and ignore the question “Why the hell would I ever buy subscribe to such bond?” Just assume that you did.
假设你以 100 卢比认购了一家公司发行的债券。再想象一下，这种债券没有利息，也没有明确的偿还日期。请暂时放下你的怀疑，忽略 "我为什么要购买认购这种债券？就假设你买了。
How would you value this “perpetual, zero coupon bond?” What price would any rational person pay you for your bond? Almost nothing, isn’t it?
你会如何估价这张 "永久零息债券"？任何理性的人会为你的债券付多少钱？几乎没有，不是吗？
Now let’s invert the situation again and at look at this example from the viewpoint of the bond’s issuer. The bond appears as a liability on the issuer’s balance sheet at Rs 100. Now, if the corresponding asset on your balance sheet is almost worthless, should not the true value of this liability also be almost worthless from the issuer’s viewpoint? Of course it should!
现在让我们再次反过来，从债券发行人的角度来看这个例子。在发行人的资产负债表中，债券作为负债出现，价值为 100 卢比。现在，如果你的资产负债表上相应的资产几乎一文不值，那么从发行者的角度来看，这笔负债的真实价值是不是也应该几乎一文不值呢？当然应该！
Now let’s add a twist. Imagine that for some reason the company must pay back Rs 100 it owes you, but that it can find someone else to give money to it on identical terms so that even if you get paid, the company’s overall liability on account of the float remains unchanged. In effect, the company gets to use OPM to retire a liability represented by OPM. Even if some of the older providers of OPM have to be made whole, they are paid through refinancing on identical terms by newer providers of OPM. If this sounds like a ponzi scheme (without its derogatory connotation), then you’re right on spot!
现在让我们来增加一个转折点。想象一下，出于某种原因，公司必须偿还欠你的 100 卢比，但它可以找到其他人以相同的条件给它钱，这样，即使你得到了钱，公司在浮存金方面的总体负债也不会改变。实际上，公司可以利用 OPM 来清偿 OPM 所代表的债务。即使一些较老的 OPM 提供者必须得到补偿，他们也可以通过较新的 OPM 提供者以相同条件进行再融资而得到补偿。如果这听起来像庞氏骗局（没有贬义），那你就说对了！
A Revolving Fund 循环基金
That’s precisely what Buffett meant when he wrote the above-mentioned extract in his 2011 letter, which I am reproducing here with emphasis on key words:
这正是巴菲特在 2011 年的信中写下上述摘录的意思，我在此转载时强调了关键词：
“Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.”
"在计算伯克希尔公司的账面价值时，我们的浮存金作为负债被全额扣除，就好像我们明天必须支付浮存金而又无法补充一样。但这是一种错误的观点，浮存金应该被视为一种循环基金。如果浮存金既无成本又长期存在，那么这项负债的真实价值就会远远低于会计负债"。
Unencumbered Source of Value 未支配价值来源
So long as one is certain that the size of a free float will not diminish over time because it resembles a “revolving fund,” one should value such a book liability at virtually nothing. And when that happens, then assets financed by such a float become “unencumbered.” This is what Buffett meant in his above-mentioned 2007 quote which I reproduce again with emphasis on key words:
只要我们确信浮存金的规模不会因其类似于 "循环基金 "而随着时间的推移而减少，我们就应该对这种账面负债进行估值，使其几乎不值一提。当这种情况发生时，由这种浮动负债融资的资产就变成了 "无担保 "资产。这就是巴菲特在 2007 年引用的那段话中的意思，我再次引用这段话，并强调其中的关键词：
“Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average break-even results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
"保险浮存金--我们在保险业务中暂时持有的不属于我们的资金--为我们 590 亿美元的投资提供资金。只要保险承保实现收支平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们的损失和支出，这笔浮存金就是 "免费 "的。当然，保险承保是不稳定的，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。不过，在我们的整个历史中，我们一直是盈利的，而且我预计我们未来的平均业绩将达到或超过收支平衡。如果我们做到了这一点，我们的投资就可以被看作是伯克希尔股东的一个无担保的价值来源。
This insight – as to how do assets, when financed with cost-less floats become unencumbered, will be instrumental in our understanding the role of floats in evaluating the economics of businesses outside of the insurance industry.
这种洞察力--即资产在使用无成本浮存金融资时如何成为无担保资产--将有助于我们理解浮存金在评估保险业以外企业的经济性方面所起的作用。
While cheaper-than-free float provided by astute insurance underwriting is the kind of float Buffett loves the most, there are other floats he has “flirted” with during the course of his long career.
虽然巴菲特最喜欢的是精明的保险承保所提供的比免费还便宜的浮存金，但在他漫长的职业生涯中，他还 "调戏 "过其他浮动收益。
Perhaps it started with American Express.
也许这要从美国运通说起。
The American Express “Don’t Leave Home Without Them” Float Story 美国运通 "不带它们就别出门 "浮存金故事
Between 1964 and 1966, Warren Buffett bet 40% of his partnership’s capital on American Express’ (Amex) stock, which had been battered down by the company’s involvement in the then infamous Salad Oil Scandal. Buffett’s investment of $13 million gave his partnership a 5% stake in the company, implying a total market cap of about $260 million at that time.
1964 年至 1966 年间，沃伦-巴菲特将其合伙公司 40% 的资金押在了美国运通（Amex）的股票上，该公司因卷入当时臭名昭著的色拉油丑闻而股价暴跌。巴菲特投资的 1300 万美元使他的合伙企业持有该公司 5%的股份，这意味着当时该公司的总市值约为 2.6 亿美元。
I searched for and found out Amex’s annual report for 1964. I urge you to read it. Apart from the fact that both its main businesses (travelers’ checks and credit cards) were doing extremely well, you will notice three additional points by studying its balance sheet on page 27: (1) The presence of $263 million of cash; (2) absence of interest-bearing debt; and (3) Travelers’ checks outstanding totaling to $525 million (a liability).
我搜索并找到了运通 1964 年的年度报告。我建议您读一读。除了它的两项主营业务（旅行支票和信用卡）都做得非常好之外，通过研究第 27 页的资产负债表，你还会注意到另外三点：（1）有 2.63 亿美元的现金；（2）没有有息债务；（3）未兑现的旅行支票总额达 5.25 亿美元（负债）。
Those $525 million travelers’ checks represent float. People pay for travelers’ checks upfront and cash them later. The lag between purchase and their subsequent cashing may last a few days or even a few years (and sometimes they never get cashed). In the meantime, Amex gets to use the float for its business – free funds which otherwise it would have had to pay for.
这 5.25 亿美元的旅行支票是浮存金。人们先付款购买旅行支票，然后再兑现。从购买到兑现之间的时间差可能会持续几天甚至几年（有时甚至从未兑现）。在此期间，美国运通可以利用这些浮存金开展业务--如果没有这些浮动资金，美国运通就必须支付成本。
Even though the Salad Oil Scandal had decimated the company’s stock price, as it did not have any interest-bearing debt, and had substantial cash to pay for the losses arising out of the scandal, all that Buffett needed to examine was the probability of it’s float disappearing. That, of course, would have happened only if the millions of holders of Amex’s travelers’ checks lost the trust behind the “American Express” brand.
尽管 "色拉油丑闻 "使该公司的股价一落千丈，但由于该公司没有任何有息债务，而且拥有大量现金来支付丑闻造成的损失，巴菲特需要研究的只是该公司的浮存金消失的可能性。当然，这只有在数百万运通旅行支票持有者失去对 "美国运通 "品牌的信任时才会发生。
In Buffett’s biography, “Snowball,” the author, Alice Schroeder, writes:
在巴菲特的传记《雪球》中，作者爱丽丝-施罗德写道：
“The company’s value was its brand name. American Express sold trust. Had the taint to its reputation so leaked into customers’ consciousness that they no longer trusted the name? Buffett started dropping in on Omaha restaurants and visiting places that took American Express cards and Travelers Cheques. He put Henry Brandt on the case. Brandt scouted Travelers Cheque users, bank tellers, bank officers, restaurants, hotels, and credit-card holders to gauge how American Express was doing versus its competitors, and whether use of American Express Travelers Cheques and cards had dropped off. Back came the usual foot-high stack of material. Buffett’s verdict after sorting through it was that customers were still happy to be associated with the name American Express. The tarnish on Wall Street had not spread to Main Street.”
"公司的价值在于它的品牌。美国运通卖的是信任。美国运通的声誉是否已经受到损害，以至于客户不再信任这个名字？巴菲特开始走访奥马哈的餐馆，参观那些使用美国运通卡和旅行支票的地方。他让亨利-勃兰特负责这个案子。勃兰特对旅行支票用户、银行出纳员、银行职员、餐馆、酒店和信用卡持有者进行了调查，以了解美国运通与其竞争对手的对比情况，以及美国运通旅行支票和旅行卡的使用量是否有所下降。巴菲特照例带回了一英尺高的一叠材料。巴菲特整理后得出的结论是，客户仍然乐于与美国运通这个名字联系在一起。华尔街的污点并没有蔓延到大街小巷"。
Despite the scandal, Buffett had figured out that Amex’s float was not going away. Without mentioning the investment, he hinted to his partners what he had done, by writing:
尽管丑闻缠身，但巴菲特已经意识到运通的浮存金不会消失。他没有提及这笔投资，而是在信中向他的合伙人暗示了他所做的一切：
“We might invest up to forty percent of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and our reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment.”
"在我们的事实和推理正确的可能性极高，而任何事情都可能极大地改变投资的基本价值的可能性极低的条件下，我们可能将我们净资产的百分之四十投资于单一证券"。
I would speculate that if, instead of $525 million of cost-less float given to Amex by millions of its customers, American Express had $525 million of bank debt, Buffett would have stayed away from the stock. Bankers, he would have reasoned, could have easily recalled their loans from the scandal-ridden company resulting in a death spiral. But all of the customers holding travelers’ checks wouldn’t line up outside the company’s offices to cash them all. For them, the scandal was a non-event.
我推测，如果美国运通拥有的不是数百万客户给予运通的 5.25 亿美元无成本浮存金，而是 5.25 亿美元的银行债务，巴菲特就会远离这只股票。他的理由是，银行家们可以轻而易举地从这家丑闻缠身的公司收回贷款，从而导致公司陷入死亡漩涡。但是，所有持有旅行支票的客户都不会在公司办公室外排队，将支票全部兑现。对他们来说，丑闻根本不算什么。
Buffett was right. Amex’s stock price trebled within the next two years as Wall Street slowly figured out what Buffett already had.
巴菲特是对的。随着华尔街慢慢发现巴菲特已经拥有的东西，运通的股价在接下来的两年里翻了三倍。
There is an important lesson about floats from the examples of Blue Chip Stamps and Amex: Float provided by millions of small customers can be quite enduring.
从蓝筹印花公司和运通银行的例子中，我们可以学到关于浮存金的重要一课：由数以百万计的小客户提供的浮存金是相当持久的。
Amex’s float is similar to that enjoyed by banks on funds of customers they get to keep for free. Bankers are known to fight each other over floats represented by “non interest bearing current accounts” of large corporate customers. Free money, even for just a few days is worth fighting for, isn’t it? And then, of course, there is the case of very large sums of unclaimed deposits lying with India’s public sector banks. That’s float too.
美国运通的浮存金与银行免费保留客户资金的收益类似。众所周知，银行家们为了争夺大公司客户的 "无息活期账户 "所代表的浮存金而互相争斗。免费的钱，哪怕只有几天，也值得争夺，不是吗？当然，还有印度公共部门银行的巨额存款无人认领的情况。这也是浮存金。
What’s fascinating is how Amex’s float on travelers’s checks – something that attracted Buffett to the stock- became almost inconsequential over time, even though its dollar amount soared. As of the end of 1964, Amex had a total of about $525 million worth of Travelers’ checks outstanding, or 445% of its $118 million revenue for that year. That’s a big number. By the end of 2011, the company’s revenues had soared to $25 billion, while total travelers’ checks outstanding as of that year’s close were $5 billion, or just 20% of revenues. Paradoxically, the company’s credit and charge card businesses overtook the traveler’s checks business, which is now in terminal decline. Even so, Amex marched on and its the tag line for its travelers’ checks commercials (“Don’t leave home without them”) was altered to suit the commercials for its charge card. The new tag line became: “Don’t leave home without it.”
吸引巴菲特的是，随着时间的推移，运通在旅行支票上的浮存金几乎变得无足轻重，尽管其金额在不断飙升。截至 1964 年底，运通公司的未兑现旅行支票总价值约为 5.25 亿美元，占其当年 1.18 亿美元收入的 445%。这是一个不小的数字。到 2011 年底，该公司的收入已飙升至 250 亿美元，而截至当年年底，旅行支票未兑现总额为 50 亿美元，仅占收入的 20%。矛盾的是，公司的信用卡和扣账卡业务超过了旅行支票业务，而后者目前正处于极度衰退之中。即便如此，运通仍在继续前进，其旅行支票广告的标语（"没有旅行支票就别出门"）也被改成了适合其扣账卡广告的标语，新的广告语变成了："没有它，别离开家"。
By 1968, Buffett sold out his 5% stake, which cost him $13 million for about $33 million. Many years later, he got back in the stock. By the end of 2004, Berkshire had bought a 10% stake costing it $1.4 billion. (That’s a good example of opportunity cost!).
到 1968 年，巴菲特以大约 3300 万美元的价格卖掉了他所持有的 5%的股份，花费了 1300 万美元。许多年后，他又买回了这只股票。到 2004 年底，伯克希尔买入了 10%的股份，花费 14 亿美元。(这就是机会成本的一个很好的例子！）。
The big problem for Buffett with Amex’s float was that he could only get a passive stake in it by buying his 5% stake. He could never control it.
对于巴菲特来说，运通银行的最大问题在于，他只能通过购买 5%的股份来被动地持有运通银行的股份，他永远无法控制美国运通。
All of that that changed when he, along with his friends bought Blue Chip Stamps.
当他和朋友们一起购买了蓝筹印花后，这一切都改变了。
The Blue Chip Stamps’ Float Story 蓝筹印花的浮存金故事
In her excellent book, “Damn Right!: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger,” the author, Janet Lowe, relates the 1967 story:
作者珍妮特-洛维在其出色的著作《Damn Right!: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger》。
“An early precursor to frequent flyer miles in the 1950s and 1960s, trading stamps, such as Green Stamps, Blue and Gold, and Blue Chip, were handed out as a customer incentive by merchants. Retailers deposited money at Blue Chip in return for their stamps, then the money was used to operate the stamp company and to purchase the merchandise handed out when stamps were redeemed. Shoppers were given a certain number of stamps for each dollar spent in a store, which they pasted into books, then redeemed for prizes such as toddler toys, toasters, mixing howls, watches, and other items. Because it took time to accumulate enough stamps to redeem merchandise-and because some customers tossed the stamps in the back of a drawer, forgot them, and never did redeem them-the float built up.”
"20世纪50年代和60年代，作为飞行里程的早期前身，交易印花，有绿色、蓝色和金色印花，以及蓝筹印花，这些都是商家给予顾客的激励，零售商在蓝筹印花存入资金换取印花，公司会运作这笔资金，用于购买人们集齐印花后来兑换的商品。消费者在店内每消费一美元都会得到相应数量的印花，他们把印花贴在本子里，集齐后去换些奖品，比如说玩具、烤面包机、搅拌碗、手表以及其他各色物品。顾客通常要花较长的时间，才能够集齐足够数量的印花来换取商品，而有些人就把印花随手丢在抽屉里遗忘，从来不去兑换，于是就会产生浮存金。"。
Lowe explains how Buffett ended up buying into Blue Chip:
Lowe 解释了巴菲特最终是如何买入蓝筹股的：
“Charlie and I talked a lot about investment ideas,” said Rick Guerin. “I’d react about Blue Chip Stamps in the newspaper, and I had an idea,” Charlie said, ‘I’ll take you to my friend who knows more about float than anyone.’” When Guerin was introduced to Warren Buffett, Rick realized, as he had when he first met Munger, that he was talking to someone exceptional. Rick was pleased when Buffett immediately saw the same potential value of Blue Chip’s float that he had seen. Just by investing the float alone, the company could amount to something. Buffett, Munger, and Guerin slowly began accumulating shares, with Buffett buying the stock both for his personal account and for the Buffett Partnership.”
"查理和我谈了很多关于投资的想法，"里克-杰林说。"查理说：'我带你去见我的朋友，他比任何人都了解浮存金。当 Guerin 被介绍给沃伦-巴菲特（Warren Buffett）时，里克意识到，就像他第一次见到芒格时一样，他正在与一位杰出人士交谈。令里克感到高兴的是，巴菲特立即看到了蓝筹印花浮存金的潜在价值，而他也看到了这一点。光是投资浮存金，这家公司就大有作为。巴菲特、芒格和格林慢慢开始积累股票，巴菲特为自己的个人账户和巴菲特合伙公司购买股票。
I couldn’t help but notice one of the comments in this video:
我不禁注意到这段视频中的一条评论：
“Thank you so much for posting this. My mother died about a year ago and in one of her cookie jars I found a stash of S&H green stamps. She never redeemed enough for so much as a plastic pitcher, but it was always fun saving them up. Ah, memories.”
"非常感谢你发布这个消息。我母亲大约一年前去世了，我在她的一个饼干罐里发现了一批 S&H 绿色邮票。她从来没有兑换过足够的邮票来买一个塑料水壶，但攒起来总是很有趣。啊，回忆"。
The green stamp capitalist would respond with nostalgia: “Ah, Float.”
绿色印花资本家会怀旧地回应："啊，浮存金"。
There’s a fascinating aspect to the Blue Chip story. The company, which was later merged into Berkshire, acquired See’s Candy for $25 million in 1972 at a time when See’s total capital employed was $8 million. Revenues for that year were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $ 5million. By 2007, as Buffett proudly noted in his letter for that year’s performance, See’s revenues had grown to $383 million, and pre-tax earnings were $82 million and yet the capital employed to run that business was just $40 million.
蓝筹印花公司的故事有一个引人入胜的方面。该公司后来并入伯克希尔公司，1972 年以 2,500 万美元的价格收购了 See's 糖果公司，当时 See's 公司的总资本为 800 万美元。当年的收入为 3,000 万美元，税前利润不到 500 万美元。到 2007 年，正如巴菲特在为当年业绩所写的信中自豪地指出的那样，See's 的收入已增长到 3.83 亿美元，税前利润为 8,200 万美元，而经营该业务所动用的资本仅为 4,000 万美元。
This means, wrote Buffett, “we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us.”
这意味着，巴菲特写道，"这意味着从1972年以来，我们只需再投资区区3200万美元，以适应业务的适度实际增长，和稍许过度的财务增长。同时税前收益总计是13.5亿美元，扣除3200万美元后，所有这些收益都流到伯克希尔(或早些年的蓝筹印花公司)。利润在缴纳公司税后，我们用余下的钱购买了其他有吸引力的公司。就像从亚当和夏娃最初喜好的活动，带来了60亿人一样，喜诗糖果开启了我们后来的许多滚滚而来的新财源。"。
Buffett used Blue’s Chip’s float to acquire See’s and See’s float (as I shall explain later) to buy more businesses. He discovered that an enduring but free float, is a financial fountain that keeps pouring out cash.
巴菲特利用蓝筹印花的浮存金收购了 See's，又利用 See's 的浮盈（我稍后会解释）收购了更多企业。他发现，一个持久但自由的浮存金，是一个不断涌出现金的金融喷泉。
But the really big (after insurance) attractive float that Buffett found, was given to him by the U.S. Treasury.
但是，巴菲特发现的真正大的（除保险之外的）有吸引力的浮存金，是美国财政部给他的。
The Deferred Taxes Float Story 递延税款浮动的故事
Berkshire owns marketable securities having market values far in excess of their acquisition prices. Taxes on gains realized on sale are payable only after the sale is made. If Buffett was to sell these securities, Berkshire would have to pay a very large tax bill. However, if he refuses to sell, and their market values continues to rise over time, then taxes not-due-but-which-would-have-been-due-if-he-had-sold-today would still need to be estimated and recorded as “deferred taxes” on Berkshire’s balance sheet. As of end 2011, these liability totaled to a staggering $ 38 billion.
伯克希尔公司拥有的有价证券的市场价值远远超过其收购价格。只有在出售后才需要缴纳出售利得税。如果巴菲特出售这些证券，伯克希尔公司将不得不支付一大笔税款。但是，如果他拒绝出售，而这些证券的市值随着时间的推移继续上升，那么仍需要估算未缴纳但如果他今天出售会缴纳的税款，并将其作为 "递延税款 "记入伯克希尔公司的资产负债表。截至 2011 年底，这些负债总额达到了惊人的 380 亿美元。
For Berkshire, this $38 billion is also a form of float – functional equivalent to an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury. Buffett explained this power of delayed taxes by giving a wonderful example in his 1989 letter:
对于伯克希尔公司来说，这 380 亿美元也是一种浮存金，其功能相当于从美国财政部获得的无息贷款。巴菲特在 1989 年的信中举了一个绝妙的例子来解释这种延迟纳税的力量：
“Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000. The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments.”
"设想伯克希尔公司只有 1 美元，我们把这 1 美元投入一种证券，这种证券到年底翻了一番，然后卖出。再设想一下，我们用税后收益在接下来的 19 年里每年重复这个过程，每次都能翻一番。在这 20 年结束时，我们将为每次出售的利润支付 34% 的资本利得税，政府将获得约 13,000 美元，我们将剩下约 25,250 美元。还不错。但是，如果我们进行了一次梦幻般的投资，而这项投资本身在 20 年中翻了 20 倍，那么我们的美元就会增长到 1,048,576 美元。如果我们将其套现，我们将支付大约 356,500 美元的 34% 税款，剩下大约 692,000 美元。造成这种惊人结果差异的唯一原因就是纳税的时间"。
Is this “float” which appears as a liability on Berkshire’s balance sheet really worth its value as calculated by accountants? No, it isn’t. Just as was the case with insurance float, where fair value of the liability was much lower than its book value, Buffett explained:
在伯克希尔公司的资产负债表上作为负债出现的 "浮存金"，其价值真的如会计师计算的那样吗？事实并非如此。巴菲特解释说，就像保险浮存金的情况一样，负债的公允价值远远低于其账面价值：
“We would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not – despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
"如果我们按年终市值出售所有证券，我们将欠税 11 亿多美元。这 11 亿美元的负债与年末 15 天后应付给贸易债权人的 11 亿美元负债是否相等，甚至相似？显然不是--尽管这两个项目对经审计净资产的影响完全相同，都是减少 11 亿美元。
On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
另一方面，这种递延税款负债是否是一种毫无意义的会计虚构，因为只有在出售股票时才会触发其支付，而在很大程度上，我们并不打算出售这些股票？答案还是否定的。
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election…”
从经济学角度看，这笔债务类似于美国财政部的一笔无息贷款，只有在我们选择时才会到期......"
To summarize, neither the insurance float, nor the float represented by deferred taxes on the liability side of Berkshire’s balance sheet are worth their book values. In his “Owner’s Manual” Buffett explains this again:
总而言之，无论是伯克希尔资产负债表负债端的保险浮存金，还是递延税款所代表的浮存金，都不值它们的账面价值。巴菲特在其《所有者手册》中再次解释了这一点：
“Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $100 billion.
"伯克希尔有两个低成本、无风险的杠杆来源，使我们能够安全地拥有远远超过仅靠股权资本所能拥有的资产：递延税款和 "浮存金"，即我们的保险业务在需要赔付损失之前收到保费而持有的他人资金。这两种资金来源都增长迅速，目前总额约为 1,000 亿美元。
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.”
更妙的是，这笔资金迄今为止往往是无成本的。递延税款负债不产生利息。而且，只要我们的保险承保业务能够实现收支平衡，那么该业务所产生的浮存金成本就是零。当然，这两项都不是股本；这些都是实实在在的负债。但这些负债没有附带契约或到期日。实际上，它们给我们带来了债务的好处--能够有更多的资产为我们工作，但却没有任何债务的弊端"。
As of the end of 2011, Berkshire’s balance sheet carries assets having an aggregate book value of $392 billion. About $100 billion of these assets have been financed by the best form of OPM which either costs Berkshire nothing (deferred taxes), or it pays Berkshire for having it (insurance float)!
截至 2011 年底，伯克希尔资产负债表上的资产账面价值总计 3920 亿美元。这些资产中约有 1000 亿美元是通过最佳形式的 OPM 融资的，OPM 要么不会给伯克希尔带来任何损失（递延税款），要么会为拥有 OPM 向伯克希尔支付费用（保险浮存金）！
For me, it’s very instructive to observe how Buffett has flirted with various kinds of floats throughout his career. The seductive appeal of free (or less-than-free) money is all too alluring. He explained the logic in his 1995 letter:
对我来说，观察巴菲特在其职业生涯中如何与各种浮存金调情是非常有启发性的。免费（或不太免费）资金的诱惑力太诱人了。他在 1995 年的信中解释了其中的逻辑：
“Any company’s level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of “leverage” – that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity. Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly – to a degree that is not generally well-understood – because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms.“
"任何公司的盈利水平都取决于三个方面：(1) 资产收益；(2) 负债成本；(3) "杠杆 "的使用，即资产由负债而非股本提供资金的程度。多年来，我们在第 1 点上做得很好，资产回报率很高。但我们也从中受益匪浅，因为我们的负债成本很低，这一点一般人还不太了解。成本低的一个重要原因是，我们以非常有利的条件获得了浮存金"。
Buffett hasn’t stopped looking for attractive floats. He once denounced derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction” but when he became aware that some of the esoteric derivative contracts could be a source of attractive float, he embraced them.
巴菲特一直在寻找有吸引力的浮存金。他曾一度斥责衍生品是 "大规模杀伤性金融武器"，但当他意识到一些深奥的衍生品合约可以成为有吸引力的浮存金来源时，他接受了它们。
The Derivatives Float Story 衍生产品浮存金的故事
In his 2008 letter, Buffett disclosed that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivative contracts consisting of equity puts, credit default swaps, and others. Describing these contracts, Buffett noted:
巴菲特在 2008 年的信中披露，伯克希尔是 251 份衍生品合约的一方，这些合约包括股票看跌期权、信用违约掉期等。巴菲特在描述这些合约时指出
“As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid – our derivatives “float,” so to speak – totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.”
"截至年底，向我们支付的款项减去我们已经支付的损失--可以说是我们的衍生品 "浮存金"--共计 81 亿美元。这种浮存金类似于保险浮存金：如果我们在相关交易中实现了收支平衡，我们将长期享受免费资金的使用。我们的预期是，我们的业绩将好于收支平衡，而我们从这些资金中获得的可观投资收益将是锦上添花，"。
Aha! We get to see the same combination we saw in Berkshire’s insurance float – an underwriting profit (implying less-than-free float), and freedom to invest that float in buying undervalued assets.
啊哈！我们看到了与伯克希尔保险浮存金相同的组合--承保利润（意味着浮存金不那么自由），以及将浮存金投资于购买低估资产的自由。
In his 2010 letter, Buffett again emphasized these points:
在 2010 年的信中，巴菲特再次强调了这些观点：
“The thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk.”
"我们在这些衍生品交易中使用的思维过程与我们在保险业务中使用的思维过程完全相同。您还应该明白，我们在签订合同时会预收款项，因此不存在交易对手风险"。
“In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float…”
"我们为这些合同总共收取了 34 亿美元的保费。我最初在 2007 年年度报告中向大家介绍这些合同时说，我预计这些合同将为我们带来 "承保利润"，这意味着我们的损失将低于我们收到的保费。此外，我还说我们将从浮存保费的使用中获益......"
“It appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago…”
"现在看来，我们几乎可以肯定，我们将按照最初的预期获得承保利润。此外，在合同有效期内，我们还使用了平均约 20 亿美元的无息浮动资金。总之，我们收取了适当的保费，这在三年前经营状况变得糟糕时保护了我们......"
“What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.”
"可以肯定的是，我们将在平均约 10 年的时间里使用 42 亿美元的剩余 "浮存资金"（这笔浮存资金和高收益合同产生的浮存资金均未计入 660 亿美元的保险浮存资金）。(这部分浮存金和高收益合同产生的浮存金都不包括在 660 亿美元的保险浮存金中）。由于资金是可替代的，因此可以将这些资金的一部分用于收购 BNSF"。
Money is fungible, says Buffett. As I described in Part I, if Buffett can figure out a way to borrow money for free or even less than that, and if he can get to keep that money for a long long time without putting up collateral, then the fair value of those liabilities on Berkshire’s balance sheet are far below their book values. Under those conditions, as Buffett himself put it in his 2007 letter, “our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.”
巴菲特说，钱是可替代的。正如我在第一部分中所描述的，如果巴菲特能想出办法免费借到钱，甚至以更低的价格借到钱，如果他能在不提供抵押的情况下长期持有这些钱，那么伯克希尔资产负债表上这些负债的公允价值就会远远低于其账面价值。在这种情况下，正如巴菲特本人在 2007 年的信中所说，"我们的投资可以被视为伯克希尔股东的一个无担保价值来源"。
Attractive floats, then, are “unencumbered sources of value” for shareholders of companies which get to enjoy them.
因此，对公司股东来说，有吸引力的流通股是 "无担保的价值来源"，他们可以享受这些价值。
Are there other business models which have access to cheap floats? Yes indeed, there are, and they go by the name of “moats.”
还有其他商业模式可以获得廉价的浮存金吗？是的，确实有，它们的名字叫 "护城河"。
‹ A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.
‹ 一百多年前，汽车发明问世，并催生了为汽车及其驾驶员提供保障的保险行业。最初，这一业务通过传统保险代理机构承保——与办理火险业务的机构相同。这种以代理为核心的模式手续费和其他承保费用高昂，大约占到保费收入的 40 美分。当地实力雄厚的代理掌握主导权，因为它们代表多家保险公司，可以在佣金谈判时让保险公司相互竞争。当时呈现类似卡特尔的定价局面，相关各方都过得不错——除了消费者。
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
随后，美国人的创造力开始发挥作用：伊利诺伊州 Merna 的农民 G. J. Mecherle 想出了建立专属销售队伍的主意，只销售同一家公司的保险产品。他的“孩子”被命名为 State Farm Mutual。该公司削减佣金和费用——从而得以降低价格——很快便成为行业巨头。数十年来，State Farm 一直稳坐汽车险和住宅险的销量冠军宝座。同样采用直接销售模式的 Allstate 长期位居第二。State Farm 和 Allstate 的承保费用率均约为 25%。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
20 世纪 30 年代初，另一个竞争者——类似互助公司的美国军人汽车协会（USAA）——开始直接面向客户为军官承保汽车保险。这一营销创新源于军人群体的需求，他们需要一种保险，无论调往何处都能随行生效。而这类业务对当地保险代理机构兴趣不大，因为他们更青睐长期定居者带来的稳定续保。
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with \$100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
事实证明，USAA 的直接销售模式成本低于 State Farm 和 Allstate，由此为客户提供了更大的价格优惠。这促使 USAA 员工 Leo 与 Lillian Goodwin 萌生念头，想把这种直销模式的目标市场扩展至军官之外。1936 年，他们以 10 万美元资本创立了 Government Employees Insurance Co.（后来简化为 GEICO）。
Their fledgling did \$238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did \$22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
这家新公司在 1937 年第一个完整经营年度实现了 23.8 万美元的汽车保险业务。去年，GEICO 的业务量达到 226 亿美元，超过 USAA 的两倍。（早起的鸟儿有虫吃，第二只老鼠却能吃到奶酪。）2015 年，GEICO 的承保费用率为保费的 14.7%，仅有 USAA 的比例更低。（GEICO 的运营效率与 USAA 不相上下，但为了促进增长在广告上花费更多。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
凭借低成本带来的价格优势，GEICO 几年前从 Allstate 手中夺得了汽车保险业的第二名也就不足为奇了。GEICO 也正在缩小与 State Farm 的差距，尽管后者的业务规模仍遥遥领先。我计划在 2030 年 8 月 30 日——我 100 岁生日那天——宣布 GEICO 登顶第一。请把这一天记在日历上。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO 现有约 34,000 名员工，为 1,400 万名保单持有人提供服务。我只能猜想，若采用代理系统，要服务相同数量的保单持有人需多少人手。我认为至少需要 60,000 名员工，既包括保险公司直接雇用的人员，也包括代理机构的人手。
10. FDIC: “A very, very, very good thing”
FDIC：“非常非常非常好的事情”
WARREN BUFFETT: One of the things, as I look back on that period is — and I don’t think economists, generally, like to give it that much of a point of importance, but — but if we’d had the FDIC 10 years earlier, we’d — the FDIC started on January 1st, 1934 — it was part of the sweeping legislation that took place when (President Franklin) Roosevelt came in — but if we’d had the FDIC, we would have had a much, much different experience, I believe, in the — in the Great Depression.
沃伦·巴菲特：回顾那段时期，我认为经济学家通常不太愿意强调这一点，但如果我们在十年前就有联邦存款保险公司（FDIC），我们——FDIC 于 1934 年 1 月 1 日成立——这是罗斯福总统上任时进行的一系列广泛立法的一部分——但如果我们有 FDIC，我相信我们在大萧条期间的经历会截然不同。
People blame it on smooth — Smoot-Hawley. I mean, they — there’s all kinds of things — and the margin requirements in ’29 — and all of those things entered into creating a recession.
人们把它归咎于斯穆特-霍利。我是说，他们——有各种各样的因素——还有 1929 年的保证金要求——所有这些因素都导致了经济衰退。
But if you have over 4000 banks fail, that’s 4000 local experiences where people save and save and save, put their money away and then someday, they reach for it and it’s gone.
但是如果有超过 4000 家银行倒闭，那就是 4000 个地方的经历，人们不断存钱，把钱存起来，然后有一天，他们想取钱，却发现钱不见了。
And that happens, you know, in all 48 states. And it happens to your neighbors and it happens to your relatives. It — it has to have an effect on the psyche that’s incredible.
这在所有 48 个州都发生。它发生在你的邻居身上，也发生在你的亲戚身上。这——这必然对心理产生难以置信的影响。
So, one very, very, very good thing that came out of the depression, in my view, is the FDIC. And it would have been a somewhat different world, I’m sure, if the bank failures hadn’t just rolled across this country and — and with people that thought that they were savers find out that they had nothing when they went there and there was a sign that said “Closed.”
所以，在我看来，经济大萧条带来的一个非常非常好的结果就是联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）。我相信，如果银行倒闭没有在这个国家蔓延，世界会有所不同——那些认为自己是储户的人发现，当他们去银行时，看到的却是“关闭”的标志，结果一无所有。
Incidentally, the FDIC — I think very few people know this — but — or at least they don’t appreciate it — but the FDIC does not cost the American taxpayer a dime. I mean, its expenses have been paid, its losses have been paid, all through assessments on banks. It’s been a mutual insurance company of the banks, backed by the federal government, and associated with the federal government.
顺便提一下，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）——我想很少有人知道这一点，或者至少他们没有意识到这一点——但FDIC没有花费美国纳税人一分钱。它的开支和损失都是通过对银行的评估支付的。这实际上是一个由银行组成的互助保险公司，由联邦政府支持并与其相关联。
跟最早的火灾保险一样。
But now it holds a hundred billion dollars and that consists of premiums that were paid in, and investment income on the premiums, less the expenses and paying of all the losses. And think of the incredible amount of peace of mind that’s given to people that were not similarly situated in — when the Great Depression hit.
但现在它拥有一千亿美元，这包括已支付的保费和保费的投资收入，减去费用和所有损失的支付。想想在大萧条时期，那些处境不佳的人们所获得的巨大安心感。
Reading recommendations to better understand the insurance industry
更好理解保险业的阅读推荐
\[00:23:29] Mark Hughes: Good morning, Tom. Thank you for putting this on. Thank you to all the Markel associates here. Thank you, Susan Gayner, for being Tom’s margin of safety. So that doesn’t go off the rails. My question is, you know, I’ve been a shareholder for 29 years. I’ve been reading Markel’s financials for 30 years, your competitors, et cetera. Still, I find myself with gaps in my knowledge of the insurance industry. Like a lot of people here, I’m a generalist, not an insurance industry specialist. Are there things that you could recommend reading? Is there an intelligent investor in the insurance industry? A podcast? YouTube video? Something that might let us generalist, you know, enhance our knowledge of the broader insurance industry. Anything you could mention to us. Is there anybody we should follow would be appreciated. Thank you.
\[00:23:29] Mark Hughes：早上好，Tom。感谢你举办活动，也感谢所有马可尔同事。还要感谢 Susan Gayner，成为 Tom 的安全边际，让一切有序进行。我做股东 29 年，阅读马可尔财报 30 年，也看竞争对手的资料，但仍觉得对保险业了解不足。我是通才而非保险专家。你能推荐哪些读物吗？保险领域有没有类似《聪明的投资者》的书？或者播客、YouTube 视频，能让我们这些通才加深对保险业的理解？任何建议、值得关注的人或资源，都将感激不尽。谢谢。
\[00:24:22] Tom Gayner: Well, great. Thank you. The challenge in answering that question is that you presume that we know. And there is an irreducible amount of black box and uncertainty and not knowing that you’re just never going to get beyond. And I don’t mean to single you out for that, I can promise you that is the case for us too. So when somebody says, you know, their combined ratio was 94.3 or 97.2. or 91.1. I said that those are not combined ratios. Those are FM radio stations and their estimates. So I think at a very fundamental level, one of the things to try to just conceptualise the mechanism of insurance is that I call insurance a bucket of money. It’s a bucket of money. And when you make a premium payment as somebody buying an insurance policy. You throw money into the bucket and that bucket accumulates money in it. And then if something untoward happens or something that causes a claim, you put your fist back in that bucket of money and you pull out the money that has been pulled from all the others doing so.
\[00:24:22] Tom Gayner：好的，谢谢。回答这个问题难在你假设我们知道答案，但其中有无法消除的“黑盒”和不确定性——我们也同样面对。有人说他们的综合赔付率是 94.3、97.2 或 91.1，我就说，那听起来像 FM 电台频率，只是估算值。从根本上讲，理解保险机制的方式之一是把保险视为“一桶钱”。投保人支付保费时，把钱丢进这桶里，桶里资金累积；当发生索赔事件时，你把手伸进桶里，从大家投进去的共有资金中取钱。
Now here’s my segue in turn from first to second base. I’m talking about the insurance cycle and pricing. When that bucket of money that represents the insurance industry writ large starts overflowing with money and it just starts spilling over the edges, tends to be that insurance prices and rates go down because there’s enough money in the bucket. And when that bucket is getting a little bit thin and we’re scraping the bottle of the barrel and wondering where the money is, that’s when insurance rates are going up. And that has been the case in the last two or three years. We’ve heard about the wildfires in California, the Hurricanes in Florida, Hawaii, places like that, climate change, inflation and all those kinds of things that have been taking money out of the bucket and that’s why, you know, insurance rates writ large are going up rather than and down and has been the case for a while. Point number one.
接下来从一垒跑向二垒，谈谈保险周期与定价。当代表整个保险业的那桶钱装得满满当当、甚至溢出来时，保险价格通常会下跌，因为桶里钱够多；而当桶里快见底、大家刮着桶底找钱时，保险费率就会上涨。过去两三年情况正是如此。加州山火、佛罗里达和夏威夷的飓风、气候变化、通胀等因素不断从这桶钱里掏走资金，因此整体保险费率持续上升而非下降，并已延续一段时间。这是第一点。
Point number two. You and I share the fact that we are both ex-accountants, CPAs by training, but both of us got out. When somebody was trying and this is before the days of Markel Ventures, which does indeed create a different set of dynamics within our financial statements and somebody was asking me the kind of question you’re asking whether just trying to understand the insurance business, I would invite them to open the balance sheet. The fact the number one and most important financial statement of any kind of financial company, banker and church, is the balance sheet. And I would say here’s a test, point just with your figure point, you need to do no math at all other than the ability to count. Point to me where the biggest number on the balance sheet is. And if you look at the balance sheet, you’ll see that the biggest number typically is the loss reserves number. That is the number we expect to pay out in claims in the future. That’s the biggest number.
第二点。你我都有注册会计师背景，但后来都离开了会计岗位。在 Markel Ventures 之前，有人问我与你类似的问题：如何理解保险业？我会建议他们打开资产负债表。对任何金融机构——银行也好、保险公司也好——最重要的财务报表是资产负债表。我会给他们做个小测试：用手指点出表中最大的数字，不需要做任何运算，只要会数数就行。通常最大的数字是损失准备金，也就是我们预计未来要支付的理赔金额。
And then I would say I promise you one thing is the CPA, and by the way, the CPA society would find me if I just said that without the asterisk, I am a non-practising CPA. I’m not taking the CPA CPE courses and stuff. And you know when Jeremy was doing accounting and was the Chief Financial Officer, you know, we used to talk about accounting with certainly different points of view sometimes at about 30 seconds after he got his new job and left. I heard him start to say, you know, I used to be an accountant, which is what I say. But someone who used to be an accountant, I will tell you that number, that loss reserve number is wrong. It’s wrong. Now the interesting question is it wrong the right way or wrong the wrong way? And wrong the right way means that it’s more than what the claims will end up being. Wrong in the wrong way is that it’s not enough. We have explicitly committed to a standard that we hold ourselves to where we want that number to be more likely to be redundant than deficient.
接着我会说，作为曾经的注册会计师（顺便说明一下，我现在是不执业 CPA，没有继续教育学分），我敢保证那个损失准备金数字一定是错的。问题在于，是“向好”的错，还是“向坏”的错？“向好”的错意味着准备金多于最终理赔；“向坏”的错则是准备金不足。我们明确承诺并长期坚持一个标准：宁可多提也不能少提。
You can look at 36 or 37 years of our reporting financial results as a public company and I know some quarters we might have missed it, but have we ever missed it on an annual basis? 2004 which I can’t remember what the circumstances were that caused that to be the case. Oh, asbestos. Yeah. Recognising the big asbestos loss. But let’s say for the vast majority of the time we’ve actually met that standard. And I think what that shows and really that is the test of both sorts of actuarial and financial technical competence that we sort of know enough of what the number is and add a margin of safety and get there and more importantly than that it is a measure of integrity where we are operating in such a way that we are not going to try to deceive you about what our ultimate loss causes and more importantly, we’re not going to try to deceive ourselves.
回顾我们上市 36、37 年的财报，也许有些季度差强人意，但全年层面有没有失手？2004 年例外——那年我们确认了大额石棉损失。但绝大多数时间我们符合“多提”标准。这既是对精算和财务技术能力的考验：我们大致知道数字，应加安全边际并做到位；更是诚信的体现——既不欺骗投资者，也不自欺。
So we hold ourselves to a pretty tough standard and we’ve got decades of actually meeting or exceeding that standard. So I understand the complexity and the ambiguity of trying to understand insurance but I would encourage you to back out the lens a little bit and do wide open and just look at that kind of sensation of is the number of the combined ratio of less than 100 which means that it’s profitable and in year after year after year after year that number subsequently proved to be enough or not enough. Thanks for the question. Zone two.
因此，我们自设了颇为严苛的标准，并几十年如一日地满足或超越它。我理解学习保险业的复杂与模糊，但建议你把镜头拉远些：先看综合赔付率是否长期低于 100、是否持续盈利，再看多年之后准备金是否充足。谢谢你的提问。下一位。
Inflation and new technology
\[00:41:03] Mariya Messerli: Good morning. I’m Mariya Messerli. I’m a private investor coming from Switzerland. Special thanks for putting my picture on the website of this registration of the brunch. I got slightly more famous among my fellow value investors, so I guess it’s win-win lived life. So today I have a question for you and here it is. Yesterday, we heard Ajit Jain saying, “Climate change is much like inflation. If done right, it can be a friend of a risk bearer.” My question is, if and when will social inflation and economic inflation turn to be Markel’s friends, what is the role of new technology to get there? Any example of application cases would be highly appreciated. Thank you.
\[00:41:03] Mariya Messerli：早上好！我是 Mariya Messerli，一名来自瑞士的私人投资者。非常感谢你们把我的照片放在早午餐报名网页上，在价值投资圈里我因此小小出名了一把，可谓双赢人生。今天我有个问题想请教。昨天我们听到 Ajit Jain 说：“气候变化有点像通胀，如果处理得当，它可以成为风险承担者的朋友。”我的问题是：什么时候、以及在什么条件下，社会通胀和经济通胀会成为 Markel 的朋友？要做到这点，新技术将扮演怎样的角色？如果能举一些应用案例，将不胜感激。谢谢！
\[00:41:54] Tom Gayner: Sure. I’ll take the first stab at this and then ask Jeremy to speak to it as well. So what Ajit was speaking of in particular, I think were the mechanics of how insurance policies work. So every single day that goes by, roughly speaking 1/365th of all the risks we have get repriced because insurance policies are sold largely one year at a time. So you take on a certain amount of risk to the policy limit you’re exposed to that risk for a year and the effects of climate change that have happened so far have happened day by day, by day, by day, by day, such that day by day, by day, by day we also respond in tandem with the repricing of that risk. And then in the marketplace, people see the renewal prices for their insurance quotes that factor into their decision as do we still want to live here or not? Should I go somewhere else? Do I need to improve the fire safety within my structure compared to what it is right now?
\[00:41:54] Tom Gayner：好的，我先回答，然后请 Jeremy 补充。我认为 Ajit 谈的是保险保单的运作机制。每天都会有大约 1/365 的在保风险被重新定价，因为保险多数是一年期的：你承担某个保额范围内的一年风险。气候变化带来的影响也是日复一日累积的，同样我们也会同步、日复一日地重新定价这些风险。市场上，人们看到续保报价后，会思考诸如“我们还要住在这里吗？要搬去别处吗？是否该提升建筑的防火安全？”之类的问题。
There are measures and countermeasures that exist all the time and the insurance mechanism sends a signal to the marketplace that, hey, more bad things can happen than used to. And if that’s true, we need to charge more for it and we need to maintain profitability for the insurance company. So that if you have a claim, we are financially solvent to pay that claim and it helps inform your decisions of how much you can start to do things that would improve climate outcomes. So he was speaking to the technical matters and that would apply to inflation and social inflexion. Every single thing that goes into making up loss, we try to stay as quick on understanding that and use that as a feedback loop to change and alter our pricing day by day, by day, by day. And if we get it wrong, typically within the context of a year, our bell gets rung and we know that we got it wrong, such that when we reprice that policy next year, we have the opportunity to charge a different price for it. Jeremy, do you have anything to add?
风险与对策始终并存，保险机制会向市场发出信号：现在坏事发生的概率比过去高。如果真如此，我们就必须提高费率，并保持保险公司的盈利能力，这样当你出险时我们才能有充足资金赔付；同时也帮助你决定该采取多少措施来改善气候结果。他谈的是技术层面，这同样适用于经济和社会通胀。所有造成损失的因素，我们都尽可能快速理解，并把它当作反馈循环，天天调整定价。如果判断失误，通常一年内就会被“敲钟”提醒，到了下一次续保便有机会重新定价。Jeremy，你有什么补充吗？
非常好的理解保险的方式。
\[00:44:05] Jeremy Noble: Yeah. Good morning, everyone. Maybe a few things. So building off what Tom just said. So at the end of the day from a speciality insurance standpoint, you know our job is to absorb other’s volatility and uncertainty. So to a certain degree, I think that might have been what Ajit was commenting on as well. If there wasn’t a volatility, there was no uncertainty. You start to minimalize the value proposition. I think of insurance. So we have to do that thoughtfully and efficiently and well. And if we can do that and when we do that well, we earn appropriate returns on capital and that’s the name of the game. And that builds off some of what Tom was sharing, how do you go about managing that effectively? If we think about taking, for example, you know climate change as an aspect and when we think about a business that we would have within our insurance engine with Nephila, their value proposition longer term is the fact that they sit, I think, at the intersection of we’re in a world with elevating level of volatility and risk and uncertainty. There’s a value to associate with that risk, and there is an uncorrelated aspect of natural catastrophe risk relative to a lot of other things that move markets.
\[00:44:05] Jeremy Noble：大家早上好。我补充几点。首先，正如 Tom 所说，从专业保险角度看，我们的职责是吸收他人的波动和不确定性。某种程度上，我认为这也是 Ajit 的意思。如果没有波动，就没有不确定性，保险的价值主张也会被削弱。所以我们必须审慎、高效地做好这件事；做得好，资本回报就合适，这就是游戏规则。这与 Tom 分享的管理方法一脉相承。以气候变化为例，我们保险引擎中的 Nephila 业务长期价值在于：当世界波动、风险和不确定性上升时，他们处于“交汇点”，能够为这种风险定价；而自然灾害风险与许多驱动市场的其他因素不相关，这是宝贵的。
So if you think there is that uncorrelated aspect and you believe that the world is a bit sort of more risky and you are concerned about sort of, let’s say, climate risk, well then investing in an uncorrelated way at that intersection with somebody that’s driving our thought leadership around the science of risk. So back to the tools, technology, data insights that’s I think, an example of that. The same would be true for wider economic inflation or social inflation in those products. So Tom’s point. We can reprice the product each year, but it’s also our job to manage that thoughtfully over the long term and be leaders. So complement that with data insights and that’s certainly what we’re investing in with the insurance platform as well. Thank you.
因此，如果你看重这种非相关性，并认为全球风险上升、尤其关注气候风险，那么在这一交汇点进行非相关投资、与推动我们风险科学理念的团队合作就很有意义。回到工具、技术和数据洞察，这正是案例。同理，面对更广泛的经济或社会通胀，这些产品也是如此。正如 Tom 所言，我们可以每年重新定价产品，但同时也要在长期内审慎管理并发挥引领作用，再辅以数据洞察——这正是我们在保险平台持续投资的方向。谢谢。
14、《2025-01-21 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. (IBKR) Q4 2024 Earnings Call Transcript》
And finally, a special note on ForecastEx. We created this exchange which is regulated by the CFTC and allows trading on predictions that have measurable third-party verified outcomes. This is an entirely new asset class, one that provides a market driven way to quantify real-world expectations on measures like economic, political, and climate outcomes.
最后，关于ForecastEx的特别说明。我们创建了这个受CFTC监管的交易所，允许对具有可测量的第三方验证结果的预测进行交易。这是一种全新的资产类别，为经济、政治和气候等结果提供了一种由市场驱动的量化方式。
Another significant broker now offers access to our exchange. We were ready with election trading when it became permissible, we believe the greater ambition ForecastEx becoming the most accurate marketplace for predicting significant events will occur over time.
另一家重要经纪商现在也为其客户提供了访问我们的交易所的渠道。当选举交易被允许时，我们已经准备就绪。我们相信，ForecastEx成为预测重大事件的最准确市场的雄心将在未来逐步实现。
保险业务的发展方向？
Patrick Moley
So I had one on the just prediction markets and the ForecastEx platform. It seemed like the election brought a lot of people into the prediction market. So I just was hoping you could give us an update on kind of the traction that you're seeing there, your outlook for next year and whether there's any kind of milestones or things we should be looking out for on the product roadmap there?
帕特里克·莫利
我有一个关于预测市场和ForecastEx平台的问题。选举似乎吸引了很多人进入预测市场。所以我想听听您能否提供一些关于这一领域的进展更新、对明年的展望，以及产品路线图中我们应该关注的里程碑或其他重要事项？
Thomas Peterffy
Well, the prediction markets are going slowly. We are being very careful not to step on their own foot. And we believe that this is going to be a huge market, but we want to do it slowly and carefully and build out our personnel and our systems so that we can do it in a really, really big way. And that's what we are. That's what I'm devoting my time to.
托马斯·彼得菲
预测市场发展缓慢。我们非常小心，以免出现问题。我们相信这将是一个巨大的市场，但我们希望慢慢来，谨慎行事，同时扩展我们的团队和系统，以便我们能够以非常大的规模来开展工作。这正是我们正在做的事情，也是我目前投入时间的重点。
15、《2025-02-04 Robinhood Yanks Super Bowl Betting Contracts After Regulator’s Pushback》
CFTC asked the brokerage to stop offering customer access to contracts, warning they might be illegal blurring of financial markets and gamblingCFTC 要求该经纪公司停止向客户提供合约访问权限，并警告称这可能是金融市场与赌博之间的非法模糊行为。
Robinhood said Tuesday that it was withdrawing its plans to offer betting contracts on the Super Bowl, following pushback from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which raised concerns that the contracts might be illegal.
Robinhood周二表示，在商品期货交易委员会的反对下，该公司将撤回提供超级碗投注合约的计划，该委员会对这些合约的合法性表示担忧。
“We were in regular contact with the CFTC prior to launching this product, and we believe we are in full compliance with all applicable regulations,” said Robinhood General Counsel Lucas Moskowitz. Still, “we are heeding their directive to cease offering these contracts,” he added.
“在推出该产品之前，我们与 CFTC 保持定期联系，并且我们相信自己完全符合所有适用法规，”Robinhood 总法律顾问 Lucas Moskowitz 表示。不过，他补充道：“我们正在遵循他们的指示，停止提供这些合约。”
Robinhood said it had been asked by the CFTC to stop offering its customers access to the sports contracts on Monday afternoon, just hours after it unveiled its sports-betting plans, a move that blurred the lines between regulated financial markets and gambling.
Robinhood 表示，周一下午在其公布体育博彩计划仅数小时后，CFTC 要求其停止向客户提供体育合约的访问权限，此举模糊了受监管金融市场与赌博之间的界限。
Robinhood launched the contracts through a partnership with Kalshi, an online prediction market that listed a family of sports-betting contracts in January.
Robinhood 通过与 Kalshi 合作推出了这些合约，Kalshi 是一家在线预测市场，1 月份曾列出一系列体育博彩合约。
CFTC-regulated prediction markets such as Kalshi are barred under federal law from listing contracts that involve “gaming” and are against the public interest, but the definition of “gaming” isn’t spelled out in the law, which has led to disputes over what is permitted.
受 CFTC 监管的预测市场（如 Kalshi）在联邦法律下被禁止列出涉及“博彩”且违背公共利益的合约，但法律并未明确定义“博彩”，这导致了对允许内容的争议。
预测、保险、博彩的本质都是赌博，这个领域看着正在加速变化，参考：《I.H.15.Warren Buffett.Insurance and Gambling》。
Earlier Tuesday, a CFTC spokesman said the agency had “serious concerns” about brokers offering customers access to contracts that “may not be permissible under the law.” The agency “will exercise its oversight authority to the fullest extent as appropriate,” the spokesman added.
周二早些时候，CFTC 发言人表示，该机构对经纪商向客户提供“可能不符合法律规定”的合约存在“严重关切”。该发言人补充称，该机构“将酌情充分行使其监管权力”。
Robinhood has rolled out its sports bets to about 1% of customers, the company said. Those investors will have the choice between closing their positions or taking them to resolution.
Robinhood 已向约 1% 的客户推出了体育博彩，该公司表示。这些投资者可以选择平仓或持有至结算。
The Super Bowl bets were Robinhood’s second foray into the world of event contracts, a type of derivative contract that allows investors to bet on an outcome of a future event. Such events might range from elections to the weather to pop culture. Robinhood launched event contracts on the U.S. presidential election late last year that proved popular among customers.
超级碗投注是 Robinhood 第二次涉足事件合约领域，这是一种衍生合约，允许投资者对未来事件的结果进行押注。此类事件可能涵盖从选举到天气再到流行文化。Robinhood 去年年底推出了针对美国总统选举的事件合约，并在客户中颇受欢迎。
Robinhood said it was disappointed by the CFTC’s move and noted that the agency hadn’t formally deemed Kalshi’s contracts illegal. The brokerage is working with the CFTC to roll out a larger event-contracts platform later this year, Robinhood said.
Robinhood 表示对 CFTC 的举措感到失望，并指出该机构尚未正式认定 Kalshi 的合约非法。Robinhood 称，该券商正与 CFTC 合作，计划在今年晚些时候推出一个更大的事件合约平台。
Prediction markets have been testing the limits of what they are permitted to list following a court ruling last year that legalized election betting. The arrival of the Trump administration, which is expected to usher in an era of light-touch financial regulation, also emboldened the platforms to push the envelope.
预测市场一直在测试其被允许上市的边界，此前一项法院裁决在去年使选举投注合法化。特朗普政府的到来预计将带来宽松的金融监管，这也鼓励了这些平台不断突破界限。
In December, Crypto.com listed a Super Bowl contract on a prediction-market platform it owns, despite years of longstanding CFTC resistance to such contracts. During the last days of the Biden administration, the CFTC asked the digital-currency exchange to suspend trading of the contracts, but Crypto.com refused.
去年 12 月，Crypto.com 在其拥有的预测市场平台上列出了一份超级碗合约，尽管 CFTC 多年来一直反对此类合约。在拜登政府的最后几天，CFTC 要求这家数字货币交易所暂停合约交易，但 Crypto.com 拒绝了。
Kalshi followed suit with its own Super Bowl contracts shortly after Inauguration Day. The CFTC is currently reviewing Crypto.com’s contracts, and on Friday it sent letters to Crypto.com and Kalshi seeking information on why they consider their sports contracts legal.
在总统就职日后不久，Kalshi 也推出了自己的超级碗合约。CFTC 目前正在审查 Crypto.com 的合约，并于周五向 Crypto.com 和 Kalshi 发送了信函，要求提供其认为体育合约合法的理由。
“The CFTC made the right call in requesting Robinhood not to permit its customers to access sports-event contracts,” said Cantrell Dumas, director of derivatives policy at Better Markets, a nonprofit that advocates for tougher financial regulation. “These event contracts are wagers, not legitimate financial instruments.”
“CFTC 要求 Robinhood 不要允许其客户访问体育赛事合约的决定是正确的，”非营利组织 Better Markets（倡导更严格金融监管）的衍生品政策主管 Cantrell Dumas 表示。“这些赛事合约是赌注，而不是真正的金融工具。”
Betting contracts on the Super Bowl and coming basketball and hockey championships were still available for trading through Kalshi’s website on Tuesday afternoon, despite Robinhood’s decision to disable access to them on its own app.
尽管 Robinhood 决定在其应用程序上禁用这些合约，周二下午，Super Bowl 以及即将到来的篮球和冰球锦标赛的投注合约仍可通过 Kalshi 的网站进行交易。
With its abortive foray into Super Bowl contracts, Robinhood had sought to cash in on the growing bonanza of sports betting, just days before the most-watched championship in U.S. professional sports.
通过其对超级碗合约的尝试未果，Robinhood 试图在美国职业体育最受关注的冠军赛前几天，借助日益增长的体育博彩热潮获利。
Sports betting has exploded across the U.S. in recent years, driven by gambling companies such as DraftKings and FanDuel. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have legalized sports wagering. The American Gaming Association, the gambling industry trade group, said Tuesday that it expects Americans to legally wager $1.39 billion on this weekend’s Super Bowl alone.
近年来，体育博彩在美国迅速增长，由 DraftKings 和 FanDuel 等博彩公司推动。三十九个州和哥伦比亚特区已将体育博彩合法化。美国博彩协会，这一博彩行业贸易组织，周二表示，仅本周末的超级碗，美国人预计将合法投注 13.9 亿美元。
The trade group said Tuesday that it is “concerned with current efforts by certain trading platforms and digital exchanges to launch national sports-event contracts that appear to circumvent state regulatory frameworks” and called on the companies to stop offering sports-event contracts during the CFTC’s review period.
该贸易组织周二表示，“对某些交易平台和数字交易所当前推动推出全国性体育赛事合约的努力感到担忧，这些合约似乎规避了州监管框架”，并呼吁相关公司在 CFTC 审查期间停止提供体育赛事合约。
Gambling companies have been watching the rise of prediction-market offerings, weighing whether it represents a competitive threat or possibly opening the way to a new line of business. Kalshi has marketed its product in gambling terminology: “Bet on everything.”
博彩公司一直在关注预测市场产品的兴起，权衡其是否构成竞争威胁，或可能为新业务开辟道路。Kalshi 以博彩术语推广其产品：“押注一切。”
Some Robinhood users were thrilled to see the brokerage wade into the sports-betting world. Alexander Bittan, a 31-year-old investor based in New Jersey, asked Robinhood Chief Executive Vlad Tenev about making such a move during the company’s investor day in December.
一些 Robinhood 用户对这家经纪公司涉足体育博彩领域感到兴奋。居住在新泽西州的 31 岁投资者 Alexander Bittan 在公司 12 月的投资者日上询问 Robinhood 首席执行官 Vlad Tenev 是否会采取这样的举措。
“A lot of our customers…are interested in sports in general, so we’re keenly looking into that space,” Tenev responded.
“我们的许多客户……总体上对体育感兴趣，所以我们正在密切关注这一领域，”Tenev 回应道。
Bittan updated his app after the announcement this week to get access to the contracts as soon as they rolled out. He planned to put down about $5,000 on a Kansas City victory.
Bittan 在本周公告发布后更新了他的应用，以便在合约推出后尽快获取访问权限。他计划押注约 5,000 美元支持堪萨斯城获胜。
He was still waiting on access when the brokerage suspended trading of the contracts on Tuesday.
他仍在等待访问权限时，券商于周二暂停了这些合约的交易。
“It’s disappointing,” he said. “When you innovate fast, not everything is going to be allowed to be done and not everything will work.”
“这令人失望，”他说。“当你快速创新时，并非所有事情都被允许去做，也并非所有事情都会成功。”
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