I.C.S.00.004.我们的工作方法
我们的工作不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息，需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力，参考：《1976-11 Warren Buffett’s Forward to The Intelligent Investor》。
To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a strato-spheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What’s needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework. This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline.
一生中成功的投资并不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息。你需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力。本书精准清晰地阐述了正确的框架。你必须具备情绪自律的能力。
1、Think Independently, Think Correctly
合适的性格（Think Independently）+合适的智力框架（Think Correctly），加在一起是真正意义上的理性，参考：《1993-10-18 Warren Buffett's Idea Of Heaven: "I Don't Have To Work With People I Don't Like"》。
He credits Graham with giving him “an intellectual framework for investing and a temperamental model, the ability to stand back and not be influenced by a crowd, not be fearful if stocks go down.” He sums up Graham’s teaching: “When proper temperament joins with proper intellectual framework, then you get rational behavior.”
他把本·格雷厄姆的贡献归结为“为投资提供了一个智力框架和一种性格模型——能够超然旁观、不受大众影响，股价下跌也不恐惧。”他用一句话概括格雷厄姆的教诲：“当合适的性格与合适的智力框架结合时，你就会表现得理性。”
（1）合适的性格
如果商业模式中存在结构性的优势，那么同样的情况也存在于人的性格特征中，有些人有一种长期稳定的注意力结构，能将大量信息压缩成简单的知识结构，这些人的第一反应是寻找“更好的结构”，与此形成结构化差异的另一类人，第一反应是防御。两者的重大差异源自于一个更早期的结构性差异：世界是基本可信任的，还是基本不可信任的，参考：《2025-09-27 段永平.你需要先确认你确实有脑袋》。
MarDiscover：段师兄好，想请教您一个问题，互联网上经常充斥着各种各样的信息，鱼目混珠，特别是在判断力方面有欠缺的。请问我们应该怎样思考和判断真伪，以免被别人牵着脑袋走@大道无形我有型
大道无形我有型：你需要先确认你确实有脑袋。
另一个跟注意力结构相关联但又相对独立的因素是情绪，注意力的稳定有助于情绪稳定，但并不能完全替代情绪本身，比如，相比男性，女性整体上的情绪更温和，再仔细想一想，在人类的生存竞争中，女性一直处于优势，男性因为情绪上的劣势成为某种程度上的“耗材”。
理性行为并不只是注意力的结果，更是情绪稳定之后的产物，情绪比注意力更根本地决定了理性行为。
（2）合适的智力框架
注意力结构和情绪的最终目的不是解释性格，而是解释现实；而解释现实最简单、最根本的问题是如何判断一个想法是对还是错。几乎所有人都会回避这个问题，巴菲特在很年轻的时候就对此做了精准的定义，参考：《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确，你就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
未来无论如何都有不确定，但不等于不能做出决策，理性行为不是单纯的智力结果，而是一套结构性能力：能否提出假设，能否接受事实，能否检查推理，能否在不确定中判断关键变量已经达到“对决策有用的准确度”，参考：《1994-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful.
尽管这种风险无法用工程学那样的精度去计算，但在某些情况下，它能以对决策有用的准确度被判断出来。
*****
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, “I know it when I see it,” so also can investors—in an inexact but useful way—”see” the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.
这些因素在许多分析师看来，恐怕会“模糊得让人受不了”，因为它们无法从任何数据库中提取出来。但无法精确量化，并不意味着这些问题不重要；也不意味着困难不可克服。就像 Justice Stewart 认为他无法为“淫秽”制定一个可操作的测试标准，却仍然断言：“我一看就知道（I know it when I see it）。”同样，投资者也可以在不精确但有用的意义上，在不依赖复杂方程或价格历史的前提下，“看见”某些投资中内含的风险。
巴菲特将企业估值分为两部分：下行保护+可能的上行收益，”下行保护“指的是90%以上的信心能获得7-8%的投资回报；“可能的上行收益”是至少50%的信心实现每年7%的增长。在某些情况下，关键变量能“以对决策有用的准确度被判断出来”，这时候的“下行保护”有足够好的支撑，结合“可能的上行收益”，这样的决策就是对的，比如，Apple的投资就是例子，前面还尝试过IBM和HP，都没有成功，巴菲特在买入Apple时也不知道最终能获得巨大的成功。
以前有人把字节称作“APP工厂”，因为内核的推荐引擎可以重复使用，围绕同一个推荐引擎的尝试的成本就很低，最终采用的策略跟巴菲特的就非常像：不是每个决策都聪明，而是决策的数量够多、速度很快、失败的代价很低。
2、Right Business, Right People
具体到投资工作，巴菲特有一个几十年没有变过、并且广为熟知的框架，参考：《1978-03-14 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
(1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.
(1) 我们能够理解的生意， (2) 具有良好的长期前景， (3) 由才德兼具的人士所经营， (4) 非常吸引人的价格。
“我们能够理解的生意”指的就是合适性格、合适的智能框架，当这些概念进一步向现实延伸的时候，映入眼帘的是Right Business、Right People。
（1）商业模式
用一句话描述Right Business，即“对一家企业长期经济特征能够被评估的确定性”，更具体的讨论参考：《I.H.03.Right Business》。
（2）企业文化
巴菲特在描述Right People时用了两个句子：（1）对管理层能够被评估的确定性——既包括其实现企业全部潜力的能力，也包括其明智运用现金流的能力；（2）对管理层是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性。巴菲特的两句话包含3个判断，3个判断之间是有一些联系的。
- 实现企业全部潜力的能力（intelligence）？
- 明智运用现金流的能力（energy）？
- 是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性（integrity）？
再对照巴菲特1998年的演讲：《1998-10-15 Talk to MBA Students at Florida University》。
I would like to talk for just one minute to the students about your future when you leave here. Because you will learn a tremendous amount about investments, you all have the ability to do well; you all have the IQ to do well. You all have the energy and initiative to do well or you wouldn't be here. Most of you will succeed in meeting your aspirations. But in determining whether you succeed there is more to it than intellect and energy. I would like to talk just a second about that. In fact, there was a guy, Pete Kiewit in Omaha, who used to say, he looked for three things in hiring people: integrity, intelligence and energy. And he said if the person did not have the first two, the later two would kill him, because if they don't have integrity, you want them dumb and lazy.
我想花一分钟时间，和在座的学生谈谈你们离开这里之后的未来。你们将会学到大量关于投资的知识，你们每个人都有能力取得好成绩；你们都有足够的聪明去成功，你们也都有足够的活力和主动性，否则你们不会坐在这里。你们中的大多数人将能够实现自己的抱负。但决定你是否成功，不只是聪明和活力那么简单。我想简单谈一下这一点。事实上，在奥马哈有个人叫皮特·基威特（Pete Kiewit），他常说，在招聘时他看重三件事：诚实、聪明和活力。他说，如果一个人没有前两者，后两者反而会害了他，因为如果一个人没有诚实，那你宁愿他又蠢又懒。
- 第1个判断：实现企业全部潜力的能力（intelligence）？
是不是足够的聪明？喜欢复杂问题简单化，能将大量信息压缩成简单的知识结构，找出关键变量，而不是简单问题复杂化。
- 第2个判断：明智运用现金流的能力（energy）？
是不是具备足够的活力和主动性？会不会不顾成本、不顾一切的往前冲？“忘记目标后加倍努力”？
- 第3个判断：是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性（integrity）？
跟第1、2个判断是有联系但不是必然的联系，比如，有些人只是性格上的惯性，单纯的“忘记目标后加倍努力”；但如果第1条有问题，能力不足的管理团队将企业回报导向自身的可能性是比较大的。
更具体的讨论参考：《I.H.04.Right People》。
3、Correct Facts
价值投资者的日常工作是收集事实+思考事实（想法），一个有效的事实要满足两个条件：（1）重要的（Important）；（2）可知的（Knowable）；一个有价值的想法也要满足两个条件：（1）90%以上的信心获得7-8%的保底回报；（2）至少50%的信心实现7%的年复合增速。
（1）区分观点和事实
要能够区分叙事和事实，叙事和观点可能夹杂了大量的偏见，或者就是幻觉，参考：《1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
WARREN BUFFETT: A fat pitch coming up. (Laughter) But I don’t mind it at all, because the truth is that we get — I don’t even know what we pay for Value Line. Charlie and I both get it in our respective offices, but we get incredible value out of it because it give us the quickest way to see a huge number of the key factors that tell us whether we’re basically interested in the company. And it also gives us a great way — good way — of sort of periodically keeping up-to-date. Value Line has 1,700 or so stocks they cover, and they do it every 13 weeks. So it’s a good way to make sure that you haven’t overlooked something if you just quickly review that. But the snapshot it presents is an enormously efficient way for us to garner information about various businesses. We don’t care about the ratings. I mean that doesn’t make any difference to us. We’re not looking for opinions. We’re looking for facts.
沃伦·巴菲特：一个大好球正飞过来。（笑声）不过我一点也不介意这个问题，因为事实是，我们会收到——我甚至都不知道我们为 Value Line 付了多少钱。Charlie 和我在各自办公室里都会收到它，但我们从中获得了极大的价值，因为它给了我们最快的方法，让我们看到大量关键因素，从而判断我们是否对这家公司在根本上感兴趣。它还给了我们一个很好的方法——不错的方法——让我们能够定期保持最新了解。Value Line 覆盖大约 1,700 只股票，而且每 13 周轮一遍。所以，如果你快速过一遍它，这就是一个很好的办法，确保你没有遗漏什么。但它呈现出来的那个快照，是我们收集各种企业信息时效率高得惊人的方式。我们不在乎它的评级。我是说，那对我们毫无意义。我们不是在寻找观点，我们寻找的是事实。
But I have yet to see a better way, including fooling around on the internet or anything, that gives me the information as quickly. I can absorb the information on — about a company — most of the key information you can get — and probably doesn’t take more than 30 seconds in glancing through Value Line, and I don’t have any other system that’s as good. Charlie?
但到目前为止，我还没见过更好的办法，包括在互联网上东翻西找之类的任何方式，都不能像它那样如此迅速地给我信息。我浏览 Value Line 上关于一家公司的信息——大部分关键数据——并吸收下来，大概看一眼 30 秒都用不了，而我没有任何别的系统能做到同样好。Charlie？
（2）重要并且可知的事实
能区分叙事（幻觉）和事实的就有机会更进一步，弄清楚什么是重要的什么不重要，什么是重要并且可知的，什么是重要不可知的，“模糊的正确好过精确的错误”是巴菲特的核心思想，巴菲特对此有一个非常精确的定义：《1994-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:
在我们看来，投资者必须评估的真正风险，是：在他预期持有期内，一项投资为他带来的税后总回款（包括出售时收到的款项）是否至少能给他带来——（1）不低于起初那笔投入的购买力；并且（2）在这笔初始投入之上再加上一点温和的利息回报。尽管这种风险无法用工程学那样的精度去计算，但在某些情况下，它能以对决策有用的准确度被判断出来。影响这一判断的主要因素包括：
更具体的讨论参考：《I.H.RP.103.Approximately Right》。
3、Sound Reasoning
在这个行业里，你永远不会得到一个最终答案，你只是到达一个需要采取行动的时点。我们只是尽量选择那些我们认为成功概率最高的事情去做，并按照同样的方式继续参与这个游戏，但最终的结果往往会和你原先想象的不同，参考：《2025-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
You never reach an answer in this business. You reach a point of action that you take but we try to get into as high probability things as we think we can do, and play the game in the same way, but it will be different than you think.
在这个行业里，你永远不会得到一个最终答案，你只是到达一个需要采取行动的时点。我们只是尽量选择那些我们认为成功概率最高的事情去做，并按照同样的方式继续参与这个游戏，但最终的结果往往会和你原先想象的不同。
巴菲特的团队在实际挑选股票时有一个简单的计算方法，参考：《2022-10-28 Todd Combs.32nd Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast》。
Combs goes to Buffett’s house on many Saturdays to talk, and here’s a litmus test they frequently use. Warren asks “How many names in the S&P are going to be 15x earnings in the next 12 months? How many are going to earn more in five years (using a 90% confidence interval), and how many will compound at 7% (using a 50% confidence interval)?” In this exercise, you are solving for cyclicality, compounding, and initial price. Combs said that this rubric was used to find Apple, since at the time the same 3-5 names kept coming up.
Combs经常在周六去Buffett家里交流，他们常用一个“试金石”。Warren会问：“在未来12个月里，S&P中有多少家公司会是15倍市盈率？有多少家公司在五年后能赚得更多（以90%的置信区间衡量）？有多少家公司会以7%的复合增长率增长（以50%的置信区间衡量）？” 在这个练习中，你要解答的是周期性、复利和初始价格问题。Combs说，他们正是用这个标准找到了Apple，因为当时反复出现的就是那三到五个名字。
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
当Charlie和我买股票时——我们把它们看作企业的一小部分——我们的分析与收购整家公司时非常相似。我们首先要决定能否对五年甚至更久之后的盈利区间作出合理估计。若答案为是，只要价格相对于我们估计区间的下沿合理，我们就会买入该股票（或企业）。反之，若我们缺乏估计未来盈利的能力——这通常是事实——我们就干脆转向别的机会。在我们合作的54年里，从未因为宏观或政治环境，或他人的观点而放弃有吸引力的买入。事实上，这些话题在我们决策时根本不会出现。
这个方法实际上是一个非常朴素的策略：下行保护+上行收益，计算由两个部分组成：
- 下行保护（确信的部分），90%的概率获得7%（对应15倍的PE）的收益率；
- 上行收益（不太确信的部分），50%以上的概率额外增添超过7-8%的收益率。
这种算账的方式不仅仅是股票，“优先股+认股权”的做法更加直接，参考：《1990-03-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。
The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.
债券出售所得连同年初的多余现金以及随后通过盈利产生的现金，用于购买三只可转换优先股。首笔交易在7月完成：我们购入 The Gillette Co. 优先股6亿美元，股息8 3/4%，10年强制赎回，并可按每股50美元转换为普通股。随后我们购入 USAir Group, Inc. 优先股3.58亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股60美元转换为普通股。最后在年末我们购入 Champion International Corp. 优先股3亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股38美元转换为普通股。
And what about the other recent deals? Aren’t they just an indirect way of buying the stocks of Salomon Brothers, Champion, USAir and Gillette? Yes and no. “I wouldn’t have bought any of them on an equity basis,” Buffett tells FORBES. “This \[buying convertible preferred issues] is lending money, plus an equity kicker.” But you can look at what he is doing the other way around. Buffett was buying Gillette stock with a yield kicker. What, then, does he mean by saying he wouldn’t buy Gillette stock on an equity basis? Merely that the straight common stock is too risky. The convertible is much safer than the stock because it carries the option to put it back to the company as a fixed-income investment. It can be a stock or a bond—at Buffett’s option. If Gillette’s earnings fall apart, Buffett doesn’t convert the preferred into stock, and it retains value as a fixed-income investment.
那么最近的其他交易呢？它们难道不只是变相买入所罗门兄弟、Champion、USAir 和吉列股票的方式吗？答案是也对也不对。巴菲特告诉《福布斯》：“若单纯当股权投资，我一个都不会买。这（购买可转换优先股）本质上是放贷，再加上一点股权增值的甜头。”反过来看，巴菲特其实是在用收益附加条款买吉列股票。那他说不会买吉列普通股又是什么意思？仅仅因为单买普通股风险太大。可转优先股更安全，因为可选择将其作为固定收益投资回售给公司。它既可以是股票，也可以是债券——取决于巴菲特的选择。如果吉列盈利崩塌，巴菲特不会把优先股转为普通股，而它依然作为固定收益投资保持价值。
（1）PE（FWD）是不是低于15倍？
巴菲特的目标收益率是15%，r=c/DCF+g，PE即DCF/c，15倍约等于7%，其余的8%需要由增长（g）来实现，PE值过高=完全寄希望于增长（g），未来很难预测，更危险的是“脚不着地”的思维方式，最终的影响是无孔不入，侵蚀和影响脑子里的每一个想法，参考：《1974-11-01 Warren Buffett.THE MONEY MEN》。
"A water company is pretty simple," he says, adding that Blue Chip Stamps has a 5% interest in the San Jose Water Works. "So is a newspaper. Or a major retailer." He'll even buy a Street favorite if he isn't paying a big premium for things that haven't happened yet. He mentions Polaroid. "At some price, you don't pay anything for the future, and you even discount the present. Then, if Dr. Land has some surprises up his sleeve, you get them for nothing."
“自来水公司相当简单，”他说，并补充 Blue Chip Stamps 持有圣何塞水务公司 5% 的股份。“报纸也是。大型零售商也是。”如果他不用为尚未发生的事支付高额溢价，他甚至会买华尔街热门股。他提到宝丽来：“在某个价格上，你不会为未来支付任何费用，甚至会对现状打折。那么，如果兰德博士还有什么惊喜，你就能免费得到。”
（2）未来五年有90%的信心成为更赚钱的公司（EPS是增长的）？
用于巩固上一步的成果，不要买入一家既没有增长空间又没有增长能力、处于衰退中的企业，参考：《2022-10-28 Todd Combs.32nd Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast》。
Combs recalled the first question Charlie Munger ever asked him was what percentage of S&P 500 businesses would be a “better business” in five years. Combs believed that it was less than 5% of S&P businesses, whereas Munger stated that it was less than 2%. You can have a great business, but it doesn’t mean it will be better in five years. The rate of change in the world is significant, which makes this exercise difficult, but this is something that Charlie, Warren and Todd think about. When Combs started at Berkshire, they had a 7/10 confidence on the businesses outlook for the next five years. The nature of the world is that things are constantly changing, and Todd says they are right on maybe 1/10 predictions.
Combs回忆道，Charlie Munger问他的第一个问题是：在五年内，S&P 500中有多少比例的企业会成为“更好的企业”。Combs认为少于5%，而Munger则表示少于2%。你可以拥有一家很好的企业，但这并不意味着它在五年后会变得更好。世界变化的速度非常快，使得这一判断非常困难，但这是Charlie、Warren和Todd一直在思考的问题。当Combs刚加入Berkshire时，他们对未来五年企业前景的信心大约是7/10。但世界的本质在于不断变化，Todd表示他们可能只有1/10的预测是正确的。
（3）至少50%信心实现每年7%的增长？
可以期盼但不能强求的结果，5个选择中有4个成绩平平（比如能跟S&P500持平），其中1个“一飞冲天”，中间有运气的成分但也跟严谨细致的工作有很大的关系，参考：《1994-06-16 Steve Jobs.The Rolling Stone Interview》。
I don’t think of the world that way. I’m a tool builder. That’s how I think of myself. I want to build really good tools that I know in my gut and my heart will be valuable. And then whatever happens is… you can’t really predict exactly what will happen, but you can feel the direction that we’re going. And that’s about as close as you can get. Then you just stand back and get out of the way, and these things take on a life of their own.
我并不以那种方式看待世界。我是一个工具制造者。这就是我对自己的看法。我想制造出真正好的工具，我在内心深处知道它们会有价值。然后，无论发生什么……你无法准确预测会发生什么，但你可以感受到我们前进的方向。这就是你能接近的程度。然后你只需退后，放手让这些事情自行发展。
就像小时候打水漂，飞出去的碎瓦片能在水面上跳多少次是无法预测的，乔布斯在斯坦福的演讲中也讲了这个道理，参考：《2005-06-12 Steve Jobs.Stanford University Commencement Speech》。
Again, you can’t connect the dots looking forward; you can only connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will somehow connect in your future. You have to trust in something - your gut, destiny, life, karma, whatever. Because believing in the dots will connect down the road will give you the confidence to follow your heart even when they leave you off the well-worn path. And it has made all the difference.
同样的，你们也无法预知未来，只有回头看时才会发现它们的关系，所以你必须相信你现在获得的点滴会在未来连结起来。你必须相信一些东西：直觉、命运、人生、因果，什么都没关系，因为如果你相信这些点滴会连接起你未来的道路，你就会拥有跟随自己内心的自信，即使你的选择不被主流认同，这将使一切都变得不一样。
*****
I used to tell the stock exchange people that before a person bought 100 shares of General Motors they should have to write out on a [piece of paper:] “I’m buying 100 shares of General Motors at X” and multiply that by the number of shares “and therefore General Motors is worth more than $32 billion” or whatever it multiplies out to, “because ... [fill in the reasons]” And if they couldn’t answer that question, their order wouldn’t be accepted.
我过去常对交易所的人说，在某人买入100股通用汽车之前，他应该在一张纸上写下：“我以X价格买入100股通用汽车”，再乘以股数，“因此通用汽车的价值超过320亿美元”，或者算出多少就是多少，“因为……【写明理由】”。如果他回答不了，就不该接受订单。
That test should be applied. I should never buy anything unless I can fill out that piece of paper. I may be wrong, but I would know the answer to that. “I’m buying Coca Cola right now, 660 million shares of stock, a little under $50. The whole company costs me about $32 billion dollars.” Before you buy 100 shares of stock at $48 you ought to be able to answer “I’m paying $32 billion today for the Coca Cola Company because...” [Banging the podium for emphasis.] If you can’t answer that question, you shouldn’t buy it. If you can answer that question, and you do it a few times, you’ll make a lot of money.
必须采用这种测试。除非我能填好那张纸，否则绝不买。我可能会出错，但我会知道答案。“我现在买可口可乐，6.6亿股，每股不到50美元，整家公司成本约320亿美元。”在你以48美元买入100股之前，你应能回答：“我今天花320亿美元买下可口可乐，因为……”【敲讲台强调】若答不上，就不该买。若能回答并重复几次，你会赚大钱。
[From the audience: “Well, you bought it, how did you answer it?”]
【观众问：“那您买了，您怎么回答？”】
Well, it was only $14 billion. I would say this: “If you added a penny to price of every Coca Cola sold in the world this year, that would add $2 billion to pretax earnings.” Now you tell me whether you think there’s a penny, worldwide, of price flexibility per serving of Coke. Well, the answer is “you know there is.”
当时才140亿美元。我会这么答：“如果今年全球每杯可乐涨价一分钱，就能增加20亿美元税前利润。”那么，你觉得每杯可乐在全球范围里有没有涨价一分钱的灵活空间？答案显然是“有”。
*****
Appendix
Appendix.1.《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致，你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致，你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时，正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的假设正确、事实正确、逻辑正确，你就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
是不是相信自己是对的？这是情绪结构是不是正常的关键特征。相信是对的和结果是对的是两回事，未来有不确定但不等于不能做出判断，也不等于做出的决策无法确定对错，未来无论如何都有不确定，把当下能做到的确定性做到位了，这样的决策就是对的。
Appendix.2.《1976 An Hour with Mr. Graham / A Conversation with Benjamin Graham》
There are two requirements for success in Wall Street. One, you have to think correctly; and secondly, you have to think independently.
在华尔街取得成功有两个条件：第一，你必须正确思考；第二，你必须独立思考。
Appendix.3.《1976-11 Warren Buffett’s Forward to The Intelligent Investor》
To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a strato-spheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What’s needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework. This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline.
一生中成功的投资并不需要超凡的智商、非凡的商业洞察力或内幕信息。你需要的是一个健全的决策思维框架，以及防止情绪侵蚀该框架的能力。本书精准清晰地阐述了正确的框架。你必须具备情绪自律的能力。
市场大幅度下跌的情况下做多、坚持自己的看法≈跟全世界持不同的看法，这种心理上的素质跟平庸隔着十万八千里的距离，能做到的早有迹象。
*****
But over forty years after publication of the book that brought structure and logic to a disorderly and confused activity, it is difficult to think of possible candidates for even the runner-up position in the field of security analysis.
然而，在他为混乱无序的学术活动注入结构和逻辑的著作出版四十多年后，我们却很难想象在证券分析领域，哪怕是屈居亚军的候选人也寥寥无几。
Appendix.4.《1991 Warren Buffett.Three Lectures to Notre Dame Faculty》
... Incidentally, I would say that almost everybody I know in Wall Street has had as many good ideas as I have, they just had a lot of \[bad] ideas too. And I’m serious about that. I mean when I bought Western Insurance Security selling at \$16 and earning \$20 per share, I put half my net worth into it. I checked it out first – I went down to the insurance commission and got out the convention statements, I read Best’s, and I did a lot of things first. But, I mean, my dad wasn’t in it, I’d only had one insurance class at Columbia – but it was not beyond my capabilities to do that, and it isn’t beyond your capabilities.
……顺便说一句，我想说的是，在华尔街我认识的几乎所有人都有和我一样多的好主意，他们只不过也有很多[糟糕的]主意。我是认真的。比如当我以每股16美元买入、而每股赚20美元的Western Insurance Security时，我把自己一半的净资产都投了进去。我事先做过调查——我去了保险监管机构，调出了年会报告，我查阅了《贝斯特年鉴》，还做了很多其他功课。但我的父亲并没有参与，我在哥伦比亚大学也只上过一门保险课——然而做这件事并未超出我的能力范围，也不会超出你们的能力范围。
可靠性不足，运气是不确定的，没有自己的脑子是确定的，不确定的运气+确定性的没有脑子。
Now if I had some rare insight about software, or something like that – I would say that, maybe, other people couldn’t do that – or biotechnology, or something. And I’m not saying that every insight that I have is an insight that somebody else could have, but there were all kinds of people that could have understood American Express Company as well as I understood it in ‘62. They may have been...they may have had a different temperament than I did, so that they were paralyzed by fear, or that they wanted the crowd to be with them, or something like that, but I didn’t know anything about credit cards that they didn’t know, or about travelers checks. Those are not hard products to understand. But what I did have was an intense interest and I was willing, when I saw something I wanted to do, to do it. And if I couldn’t see something to do, to not do anything. By far, the most important quality is not how much IQ you’ve got. IQ is not the scarce factor. You need a reasonable amount of intelligence, but the temperament is 90% of it.
如果我对软件之类的领域有某种罕见的洞见——那我会说，也许别人就做不到——比如生物技术。但我并不是说我拥有的每一个洞见别人都可以拥有，不过在1962年，有很多人本可以像我一样理解美国运通公司。他们也许……他们也许与我有着不同的性情，以至于被恐惧麻痹，或者想要随大流，诸如此类；但关于信用卡或旅行支票，我并不比他们了解更多。这些产品并不难理解。但我拥有的是强烈的兴趣，并且当我发现想做的事情时，我愿意去做；而当我找不到可做之事时，就什么也不做。最重要的品质绝不是你的智商有多高。智商并不是稀缺因素。你需要适量的智力，但性格（气质）占了90%。
That’s why Graham is so important. Graham’s book \[The Intelligent Investor] talks about the qualities of temperament you have to bring to the game, and that is the game.
这就是格雷厄姆如此重要的原因。格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》讨论了你在投资游戏中必须具备的性格特质，而那正是游戏本身。
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.” We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”
我们的股票投资策略与十五年前几乎无异。正如我们在1977年的年报中所说：“我们选择可交易普通股的方式，基本就像评估一整家公司是否值得整体收购。我们希望该企业：(a) 我们能够理解；(b) 具备良好的长期前景；(c) 由诚实且能干的人经营；(d) 可在一个非常有吸引力的价格买到。”只有一处我们认为需要调整：鉴于市场环境与我们的体量，我们如今将“非常有吸引力的价格”改为“有吸引力的价格”。
Appendix.6.《1994 Warren Buffett.UNC Business School》
WB: If you understand an idea, you can express it so that other people understand it. It’s interesting, I find that every year when I write the [annual] report, I hit these blocks. And the block isn’t because I had run out of words in the dictionary, the block is because I haven’t got it straight in my own mind yet. There’s nothing like writing to force you to think and get your thoughts straight.
WB：如果你理解一个想法，你就能把它表达清楚，让别人也能理解。有趣的是，我发现每年写年报时，我都会遇到一些障碍。而这些障碍不是因为字典里的词用完了，而是因为我自己心里还没理清楚。没有什么比写作更能迫使你思考、让你的思想变得清晰。
If you want to communicate something to other investors or co-owners or whatever it may be, it’s quite possible to do it. And, based on what Chairman Levitt said, I think you’re going to probably see a lot of improvement in that area.
如果你想把一些东西传达给其他投资者或合伙人，这是完全可能做到的。而根据 Levitt 主席所说，我认为你们很可能会看到这个领域有很多改进。
The same thing goes for accounting footnotes. I get accounting footnotes that I have trouble understanding. The reason I have trouble understanding is [because] the person who wrote it didn’t want me to understand it. It’s not impossible to write a footnote explaining deferred acquisition costs in life insurance or whatever you want to do — you can write it so people can understand it.
会计附注也是一样。我收到过一些会计附注，读起来让我很费解。之所以难以理解，是因为写那东西的人根本不想让我理解。解释人寿保险递延取得成本或别的什么内容，并不是写不明白——你完全可以写得让人明白。
If it’s written so you can’t understand it, I am very suspicious. I probably won’t invest — well, I won’t invest in a company where I can’t understand a footnote because I know they don’t want me to understand it.
如果它写得让你看不懂，我会非常怀疑。我大概不会投资——确切地说，我不会投资一家让我连附注都看不懂的公司，因为我知道他们是不想让我懂。
Appendix.7.《1994-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:
在我们看来，投资者必须评估的真正风险，是：在他预期持有期内，一项投资为他带来的税后总回款（包括出售时收到的款项）是否至少能给他带来——（1）不低于起初那笔投入的购买力；并且（2）在这笔初始投入之上再加上一点温和的利息回报。尽管这种风险无法用工程学那样的精度去计算，但在某些情况下，它能以对决策有用的准确度被判断出来。影响这一判断的主要因素包括：
1.The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
对一家企业长期经济特征能够被评估的确定性；
2.The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
对管理层能够被评估的确定性——既包括其实现企业全部潜力的能力，也包括其明智运用现金流的能力；
3.The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;
对管理层是否可以被指望把企业回报导向股东、而非导向自身的确定性；
4.The purchase price of the business;
企业的买入价格；
5.The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor’s purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.
未来将经历的税收与通胀水平——它们将决定投资者的“购买力回报”相对于名义回报会被削减到何种程度。
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, “I know it when I see it,” so also can investors—in an inexact but useful way—”see” the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.
这些因素在许多分析师看来，恐怕会“模糊得让人受不了”，因为它们无法从任何数据库中提取出来。但无法精确量化，并不意味着这些问题不重要；也不意味着困难不可克服。就像 Justice Stewart 认为他无法为“淫秽”制定一个可操作的测试标准，却仍然断言：“我一看就知道（I know it when I see it）。”同样，投资者也可以在不精确但有用的意义上，在不依赖复杂方程或价格历史的前提下，“看见”某些投资中内含的风险。
Appendix.8.《1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
44. “You need a large margin of safety”
“你需要一个很大的安全边际”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is (inaudible). I’m from New Mexico. And I’m a shareholder. I have two questions.
听众： 是的，我叫（听不清），来自新墨西哥州。我是伯克希尔的股东。我有两个问题。
First, in your ’91 letter, you wrote about investors eventually repeat their mistakes. So what do you do to keep you from making the same mistake twice?
第一个问题，在您1991年的信中，您写到投资者最终会重复他们的错误。那么，您如何避免自己两次犯同样的错误？
And the second question is, in your ’92 letter, you wrote that you tend to deal with a problem of future earning in two ways. The first way is the business you understand. And the second is the margin of safety. And you say they are equally important. But if you — (loud noise) — but if you cannot find the happy combination of faster growth at a low key, which one do you think is more important, faster growth or low key? That’s my two questions.
第二个问题，在您1992年的信中，您提到您倾向于通过两种方式处理未来收益问题。第一是理解的业务，第二是安全边际。您说它们同样重要。但是如果——（噪音）——如果您找不到高增长和低风险的完美结合，您认为更重要的是高增长还是低风险？这是我的两个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we were told by — (loud noise) — we were told by some higher authority which one was more important there for a second. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想我们刚刚听到了——（噪音）——某个更高的权威在告诉我们哪个更重要。（笑声）
Well, they’re bound together. Obviously, if you understood a business perfectly — the future of a business — you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety.
实际上，它们是紧密相连的。显然，如果你完全理解一家企业及其未来，你需要的安全边际就会很少。
So the more volatile the business is — or possibility is — but assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger the margin of safety.
因此，业务或前景越不确定——假设你仍然想投资——你需要的安全边际就越大。
I think in that first edition of [Benjamin] Graham — I doubt if I’m right — was it (inaudible) and said, you know, maybe it was worth somewhere between 30 or 110, or some number. He said, “Well, that sounds — how much good does that do you to know that it’s worth between 30 and 110?” Well, it does you some good if it’s selling below 30 or above 110.”
我记得在本杰明·格雷厄姆的第一版著作中——我不确定是否记得准确——他说，也许某个东西的价值在30到110之间。他说，“好吧，知道它的价值在30到110之间有什么用？”嗯，如果它的价格低于30或高于110，这就对你有帮助。
That’s — you need a large margin of safety.
这就是——你需要一个大的安全边际。
Well, if you’re driving a truck across a bridge that holds — it says it holds 10,000 pounds — and you’ve got a 9,800 pound vehicle, you know, if the bridge is about six inches above the crevice that it covers, you may feel OK.
比如，如果你开着一辆9800磅重的卡车通过一座标称承重为10,000磅的桥梁，如果桥下只有6英寸深的裂缝，你可能会觉得没问题。
But if it’s, you know, over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety, in terms of only driving a 4,000 pound truck, or something, across. So it depends on the nature of the underlying risk.
但如果它横跨大峡谷，你可能会希望有更大的安全边际，比如只开一辆4000磅的卡车过去。因此，这取决于潜在风险的性质。
We don’t get the margin of safety now that we got in a 1973-4 period, for example.
比如说，我们现在的安全边际不像1973-74年那样高了。
The biggest thing to do is understand the business. If you understand the business, and get into the kind of the businesses where surprises — by their nature — surprises are few. And we think we’re largely in that type of business.
最重要的是理解企业。如果你理解企业，并选择进入那些本质上意外较少的企业，我们认为我们基本上就在这种类型的业务中。
And they asked me what — sometimes they asked me what I’d do if I was running a business school, teaching investments.
他们问我，如果我在经营一所商学院，教授投资，我会怎么做。
And I’d tell them I’d only have two courses. One would be how to value a business, and the second would be how to think about markets.
我会告诉他们我只会有两门课程。一门是如何评估一个企业，第二门是如何思考市场。
Appendix.10.《2011-04-01 Warren Buffett.Meeting with Business students》
Q4：请您从定性层面谈谈您是如何计算估值？你如何得出估值的数字的，是用 excel 表做定量的估值计算吗？
巴菲特：我从来不用 excel 表进行计算，但不代表我脑袋里面没有类似 excel 计算的框架。比如说我不动笔做笔记，不代表我头脑中不记忆，这些是读书的时候就形成的学习习惯。我从来就没有开始用过 excel，而且我过去的 60 年也没有学什么新的工具，除非我开始学，否则我不会用 excel 来计算，但我也能算出你通过 excel 进行的计算结果。我不喜欢任何可能传达虚假假设的计算。通过在 excel 表中列出详细的数据表格，人们会获得一种虚假的安全感，让人们认为未来会更加的有规律，但是事实并不是这样。
我曾经在所罗门投行待过一段时间，根据一个客户的股票研究要求，研究部门的人花了几周时间，打出来了一个很长的报告，预测了一个制造业公司未来 20 年的利润情况，另一方面，当我问所罗门公司未来一周能够产生多少利润的时候，他们说这怎么可能算的出来。真正的原因是做 20 年后的预测，这些人都不一定在这里了，而要做出下一周的预测，我们下一周马上知道预测是对的还是错的，所以我从来不看这些预测。在路博润公司 Lubrizol（注：2011 年 3 月 14 日伯克希尔完成的收购）交易中，公司 CEO 要给我看他们对于生意未来业绩的预测，我说我不用看了，每一个公司都会预测说明年要赚的更多，如果我对于未来的生意没有形成自己的判断，我也不想别人告诉我。如果我不知道该怎么做，别人没有放自己钱的人，又怎会告诉你该如何做呢。我不关注他们做的预测，但是我头脑中自有对于公司的经济前景有预测，然后基于这个预测进行估值。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在寻找新的独立业务时，我们寻求的关键品质是：持久的竞争优势；能干且高标准的管理层；运营所需净有形资产能带来良好回报；具有吸引人回报的内生性增长机会；以及最后，一个合理的收购价格。
Appendix.12.《2026-05-02 Sam Altman's Vision For the Future!》
Sam Altman:
All the time. Ilya Sutskever once said a very simple sentence that as many simple sentences said really stuck in my mind, which is prediction is very close to intelligence. And the idea is that if you can Compress all of the information about the world, the state of things, whatever, into its smallest representation. And then as part of that, predict the thing that's going to happen next. You understand it in a sort of deep way. And this idea At the time, a lot of people in the AI field were quite excited about generative models for a reason they couldn't quite articulate.
一直在想。Ilya Sutskever 曾经说过一句非常简单的话，和许多简单的话一样，它深深留在了我的脑子里，那就是：预测非常接近智能。这个想法是说，如果你能把关于世界的所有信息、事物的状态等等，压缩成最小的表征，然后作为其中的一部分，预测接下来会发生什么。那就意味着你在某种深层意义上理解了它。而这个想法在当时，AI 领域很多人都对生成模型感到非常兴奋，尽管他们还说不太清楚原因。
这跟巴菲特的思维框架几乎是一样的。
But I think the reason was something to do about this that prediction is very close to. Intelligence and if we're trying to build systems that really understand all of the data they're trained on, if we can get them to start predicting what comes next, that seems like a great step. And certainly when you watch children begin to understand the world, I think you can observe a similar phenomenon.
但我认为原因与这一点有关：预测非常接近智能。如果我们试图构建真正理解其训练数据的系统，如果我们能让它们开始预测接下来会发生什么，那看起来就是非常重要的一步。当然，当你观察儿童开始理解世界时，我认为你也能看到类似的现象。
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